Atul Singh: Welcome to FO° Exclusive — in fact, the fourth edition of 2025’s FO° Exclusive. Last month, in March, we covered the Risk of Recession in the US, Germany’s Radical New Economic Policy, and New Troubles in the Middle East. In April 2025, our top three issues are:
- Tariffs and the New Donald Trump Economic Revolution
- Pakistan’s Deadly Islamist Terror Attack, India’s New Water War
- Mark Carney Leads Liberals to a Fourth Consecutive Victory
So there we go. Let’s start with number one: “Tariffs and the New Donald Trump Economic Revolution.” US President Donald Trump has announced Liberation Day. So what is Liberation Day? Tariffs on trading partners. Why? Because these trading partners, in his eyes, have been cheating, whilst the US has opened up its markets. These partners have followed protectionist policies — they use tariff and non-tariff barriers — and once he brings tariffs, this will lead to an economic revolution which he is confident of winning. He has echoed Steve Bannon, who has said repeatedly that the rest of the world has not played fair with the US. So this is the politics of grievance, it is the politics of protectionism. And the essence of the argument is very simple, as I said, and there’s an element of truth to it: For decades, the US kept its market open, others did not. And as I said, the others used tariff and non-tariff barriers to keep American goods and, indeed, other foreign goods out of their markets. The argument of the Trump administration is that these countries depress their currencies to gain unfair trading advantages. As a result, honest working-class Americans lost their jobs. They suffered from an opioid epidemic. In fact, China and some other countries exported opioids to the Rust Belt — in the eyes of many in the Trump camp. And of course, China exports fentanyl, a synthetic opioid, and causes the deaths of the very workers whose jobs it has stolen. So we’ve heard this complaint from numerous young Republicans, many of whom work on Capitol Hill and the Trump administration. And they provide a compelling and legally defensible narrative for the new belligerent US trade policy.
The Japan argument recycled for China
Atul Singh: Now, Glenn, you’ve pointed out many a time that Donald Trump used to say the same things about Japan in the 1980s.
Glenn Carle: This is the thing: I’m going to struggle today because endlessly repeated stupid arguments just kill me. And they do others — which is possibly why we now have the government we have. But it’s true that Donald Trump has been very creative. He has changed one word in his vocabulary in the last 50 years: He has replaced “Japan” with the word, “China.” But otherwise, he truly has made the exact same argument verbatim for 46 years at least, which is that the world plays America for suckers. They’re cheating, blah blah blah. “They’re laughing at us,” is the expression.
Atul Singh: Hey, that’s consistency! Forty-five years of consistency! (Laughs)
Glenn Carle: That is correct, that’s right. Consistency is the hobgoblin of little minds, and we’re dealing with a very little mind. But yes, he is consistent. He does see the world as one of exploitation — everyone exploiting the United States, which is weak and a sucker. It’s, as you said, politics of grievance and resentment, of trying to justify why others have influence and you, in fact, never attended a course at either of the two institutions that you’ve bought your way into and aren’t accepted because you’re vulgar — and thus drives the nation. But carry on.
Mercantilism vs. free market thinking
Atul Singh: So, taking a step back, Donald Trump represents an economic philosophy that predates Adam Smith, and that is called mercantilism. In fact, there’s a video with music which a former student of mine sent, which explains the various facets of this philosophy. But we will not get into too much of it. Suffice to say that mercantilists believed that balance of payments — or, let’s say, a trade surplus — more importantly, trade surplus represents the health of an economy. And they believed that exports should exceed imports, and if that is the case, then the country is stronger. Remember, this was at a time when kings paid their soldiers with gold. And therefore, if exports exceeded imports, you got more gold. And if you could pay more gold to your soldiers, you had a bigger army. And of course, later, this was supplanted by Adam Smith’s philosophy, a Scotsman. Mercantilists were the Spaniards, the Portuguese and the French — all the economies that eventually got superseded. And there was another British economist, curiously, with the name David Ricardo. David, of course, is English, but Ricardo sounds suspiciously Italian. And he, again, extended this theory.
Glenn Carle: He was a smart man seeking the freedom of free markets and free discourse in liberal England, as opposed to mercantilist Europe.
Atul Singh: Exactly. There you go. Anglo-Saxon flame flickers strong in your heart. Winston Churchill would be proud of you.
Glenn Carle: Well, I am a quarter French, and my current masters — America’s leaders — would have done well to read a little bit about French history. You know, France was the leading nation in Europe — economically, culturally, politically, militarily — every way in the first half of the 17th century. That’s 400 years ago. And what happened was the king’s chief counselor — who was both foreign minister, intelligence chief and economics minister rolled into one — was Colbert. And he wanted to make France great again, and greater forever, and perennialize French leadership. So he did two things. He centralized the economy and nationalized many industries, essentially, by a ruthless industrial policy. And he centralized the state and brought all power into the hands of the chief executive — who was the king then. And what happened was that France became an also-ran over a period of a couple of generations. Not the leader; he destroyed the basis of French leadership, which was a dynamic, open, decentralizing economy which was industrializing. And he killed it. He killed the goose that lays the golden eggs, and we now have another poultry butcher doing the same thing.
Industrial strategy and trade deficits
Atul Singh: Well, speaking of industrial policy, core members of the Trump administration believe that the loss of the American industrial base is a national security issue, given China’s spectacular rise as the workshop of the world. Now, Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent and Chair of the Council of Economic Advisers Steven Miran both see deindustrialization as the biggest risk facing the US and want the country to reindustrialize. The two policy tools that they’re using are tariffs and a devalued dollar. So once you have tariffs, then you can basically have a hedge against the cost advantage. It makes all the foreign goods more expensive. And once you have a devalued dollar, then your goods get cheaper and you can export. Now, Miran wrote a 41-page paper. And that paper, in some ways, is a revolutionary paper. It’s a plan to reform the global trading and financial systems. We cover this in our FOI Geopolitical Risk Monitor. Those of you who want it, email us — we’ll send you a complimentary copy. But the important thing is: Miran believes — and there’s an element of truth, again, to Miran — that the current system fails because export-oriented economies such as China, Japan and South Korea impose not only tariff and non-tariff barriers to market access, but also engage in currency manipulation, subsidies for preferred industries, forced technology transfers and outright theft of intellectual property. Our sources in the Trump administration see tariffs as short-term pain for long-term gain. They believe that the US has the market size, the innovative technology and the talent pool to prevail over other economies. Now, the important thing here to note is: A lot of the people in the Trump administration think China is weak. They think President Xi Jinping overreached with his wolf warrior diplomacy, failed in his zero-Covid policy. They think that the collapse of their real estate sector, the huge amounts of bad debts on the books of Chinese banks and the squeeze on private businesses — coupled with high unemployment, coupled with an aging and declining population — make this an ideal time for the US to ratchet the pressure, turn on the screws and break China’s back. And they think: If not now, then when? If not us, then who? And they really do believe this. And therefore, hey ho, there we go — you have this new economic policy. And curiously, this has actually caused bond yields to go up. The dollar actually has gone down for the first time in forever. Because generally, when you bring in tariffs, the dollar recedes. But markets have been losing confidence in Donald Trump’s economic policies and protectionism. And, as he himself admitted, the bond markets have turned a bit yippy. Now, I’m going to share my screen with you and show some of the graphs that the managing partners—
Glenn Carle: So the reality, apparently, in the view of the world — and there’s a wisdom in crowds, as we all know — is that Donald Trump’s true name is Liz Truss. He wears a dress and he has no idea what he’s doing.
Atul Singh: Maybe so. But here you can see very clearly that the US has run a trade deficit for almost 50 years. This is something Sanjay Acharya, a managing partner at FOI, made. Of course, this is our Geopolitical Risk Monitor. It tells you how China has responded. And of course, China has rolled out tariff and non-tariff barriers. It has restrictions on seven medium and heavy rare earths, which are particularly useful for fighter jets, submarines, radar systems, drones. And they think they’ve actually cut down their deficit. Look at this: There’s been a $19 billion fall in the annual trade deficit. Of course, the deficit has increased when it comes to Mexico, EU, Vietnam, Taiwan, even India and, of course, South Korea. Some people would argue it’s just Chinese companies reexporting from Vietnam. And something to watch is consumer sentiment. It has plummeted. That’s alarming. Look at what the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta is still forecasting: falling GDP. And I think I’m not going to bore you more with graphs and figures, but the bottom line is that the tariffs have had an effect on markets, on bond markets, on consumer confidence, on the global economy. We can all expect a recession for the next 12 to 24 months. Over to you, Glenn.
Historic parallels and economic fallout
Glenn Carle: Yeah, what we’re experiencing is unique in American history in a number of ways. And Trump — I agree with the view of the intelligentsia, or the commentators in general — that the first 100 days of Trump’s administration have been as significant, as historic — I’ll use the word, “consequential,” which I know I use a lot — as any since Franklin Roosevelt in 1932. So that makes him one of the two or three or four most significant presidents in his first three months in history. One of the differences that’s critical is that Franklin Roosevelt was creating things, Donald Trump is destroying things. That’s not a political statement, like some of the others I made earlier today are — that’s a fact. It’s pretty easy to break stuff, it’s very hard to build things. The administration, however, is not new in much of what it’s attempting to do. When I was working during the Bush son administration — I worked under both, but I’m referring now to the president from 2001 to 2008 — my focus near the end of my career was on terrorism, transnational threats, and I would frequently brief the White House or the executive office and so on. And this is literally true, what I’m now going to say: Whatever the topic that I was briefing on or attending a meeting about, the first question asked when it came time for the Q&A period after the briefing would invariably be by the Office of the Vice President’s representative — Vice President Cheney’s representative. And the question would be: “But what about China?” You know, I might have been talking about the Houthis, or I might have been talking about the water table in Bolivia. Literally, the first question was: How does this affect how we can destroy China? That was not verbatim the wording, but that was the objective. And the belief was that the United States had a unique moment: the unipolar moment of strength when China was not yet strong, and we could, for time immemorial, destroy China as a threat and perennialize American supremacy. Other great nations have had similar thoughts in the past. And this never works against a state that has intrinsic characteristics that underpin its economic, political, international and military strength. You can defeat someone momentarily. If I’m in a boxing match with someone who’s two meters tall and outweighs me by 40 kilos, maybe I can hit him on the head and knock him out momentarily. But he will still remain two meters tall and 40 kilos heavier than I am. And when he wakes up, his capabilities will resurge and return. So this is nothing new. It is similarly — not just by historical example, but by an objective assessment of capabilities, potentials and objectives — an impossibility, short of self-destruction simultaneously. What are the consequences, though? As I said flippantly, but also accurately — referring to Louis XIV’s economics minister and what happened then — this is what’s happening now. Now, the argument is coherent, as Atul laid it out from the administration. It’s coherent, but it’s also delusional. And anyone who studies — this is literally true, and again, I’m not being facetious — basic economics will understand that tariffs increase costs and lower the availability over time of capital for investment. And if there’s less investment, you can have less research and development, you will have less growth, you will have lower GDP rates and so on. So what have been the consequences of the policies? They have destabilized the markets. That will lead to lower profits, therefore less investment, less R&D, less long-term growth. The businesses in the United States and internationally are anxious about Wall Street, but they’re also anxious on Main Street and about Main Street. Meaning: The businesses that will supposedly profit from this — they’re not just anxious, but are going to have less capital to use to conduct business, fewer workers because of the immigration policies and economic policy in this instance, higher costs, lower growth and less cutting-edge technology. America continues to progressively antagonize its allies. Allies are a leverage. They enhance one’s influence and power. They have emboldened our enemies and turned allies into adversaries. “They,” being the policies, are increasing inflation. They are weakening the dollar, which has been historically a unique advantage that the United States has had — because the dollar has been the basis of the global economy. And they will lower long-term GDP growth. I could continue on with the negative effects that are empirically already starting to be verifiable. So the policies are, frankly, delusional and are leading to the relative destruction of American supremacy.
Atul Singh: One quick note before we leave: Tariffs have had their uses. We can’t be completely negative about them. Generally, they lead to disaster over the long term, but sometimes for your core industries, it’s good to have a small garden and a high gate. And the first act after American independence was a protectionist act — it was tariffs. Because the Northeast of the US decided it would industrialize, and unlike Latin America, it would not just supply raw materials to industrial Europe, particularly England. So we don’t want to sound doctrinaire on anything — that’s something we have to be intellectually fair and admit. And then the other thing is, the Trump administration is inspired by Richard Nixon. On the 15th of August, if I remember correctly, 1971, basically, Nixon announced a 10% import tariff and the suspension of the dollar’s convertibility into gold. That killed the Bretton Woods fixed exchange rate system. The Nixon Shock ended the 1944 gold-backed dollar. And people thought the dollar would go down — and it did, to some degree, but it certainly did vis-à-vis gold. It also inaugurated a new era of trading floating currencies, rapid credit creation and unrestricted capital flows that have lasted until now. The dollar replaced gold as the repository of value. Now note that Nixon’s Treasury Secretary, John Connally, once said, “The dollar is our currency, but it’s your problem.” And the Trump administration takes the opposite view: The dollar is everyone’s currency, but an American problem. The US comprises only 25% of the global economy, but 57% of the world’s official currency reserves are in dollars. Foreigners hold an estimated $19 trillion of US equities, $7 trillion of US Treasuries, and $5 trillion of corporate debt.
Glenn Carle: The critical difference between what Nixon did and what Trump is doing was that, fundamentally, Nixon’s policies opened the international economic system and were based upon economic production and dynamism, rather than determining by fiat exchange rates and guarding economic sectors.
Atul Singh: He’s inspired also by the 1985 Plaza Accords, wherein the US forced its trading partners to appreciate their currencies and thereby devalue the dollar. So all of that is going on. But we will now move on to India and Pakistan.
[Lee Thompson-Kolar edited this piece.]
The views expressed in this article/video are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.
” post-content-short=” Atul Singh: Welcome to FO° Exclusive — in fact, the fourth edition of 2025’s FO° Exclusive. Last month, in March, we covered the Risk of Recession in the US, Germany’s Radical New Economic Policy, and New Troubles in the Middle East. In April 2025, our top three issues are: Tariffs and…” post_summery=”US President Donald Trump has launched a protectionist economic agenda dubbed “Liberation Day,” using tariffs and a weak dollar to reindustrialize the United States and confront China’s trade practices. While his administration views this as a necessary national security strategy, it is historically self-destructive. This agenda has brought rising bond yields, plummeting consumer sentiment and fears of recession.” post-date=”May 08, 2025″ post-title=”FO° Exclusive: Tariffs and the New Donald Trump Economic Revolution” slug-data=”fo-exclusive-tariffs-and-the-new-donald-trump-economic-revolution”>FO° Exclusive: Tariffs and the New Donald Trump Economic Revolution
Professor Luca Jourdan, a social and political anthropologist at the University of Bologna, discusses the ongoing war in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). The war, centered in the eastern region near Rwanda, has persisted for nearly 30 years. The fighting began after the 1994 Rwandan Genocide, when over a million Hutu refugees fled into the DRC. The refugees included members of the Interahamwe militia, who reorganized in camps and launched attacks against Rwanda. Rwanda and Uganda supported rebel movements in the DRC, setting off the First and Second Congo Wars.
The conflict has fragmented over time. Armed groups form and shift alliances. The March 23 Movement (M23), one of the most powerful rebel groups, emerged in 2012 and re-emerged in 2021. M23 fighters seized Goma, a key city in North Kivu, in early 2024. The fighters are primarily Tutsi, and Rwanda is widely suspected of supporting them. The Rwandan government denies involvement. The Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR), which descends from the Interahamwe, remains active and opposes the Rwandan government. Various Mai-Mai militias, self-defense groups with local ties, also participate in the fighting.
Economic and ethnic tensions
The Congolese army (FARDC) struggles with corruption, poor organization and divided loyalties. Many officers were former rebels integrated through peace agreements, which weakens military cohesion. The Rwandan government’s role in the conflict is a point of contention. Rwanda benefits economically from mineral exports, though the country itself has few mineral resources. Smugglers transport coltan, gold and diamonds from eastern DRC, fueling Rwanda’s economy. International trade agreements facilitate these operations. Uganda has also been accused of involvement, though its current role is unclear.
Eastern DRC holds vast mineral wealth. The region contains deposits of coltan, gold and diamonds. Rebel groups, military officers and foreign networks control and profit from mining operations. The European Union has trade agreements with Rwanda for mineral resources, raising questions about indirect economic support for illicit mining operations. Multinational corporations rely on minerals extracted from conflict zones, perpetuating demand.
Ethnic tensions drive violence. Groups identifying as indigenous Congolese clash with the Banyarwanda, people of Rwandan descent who have lived in the DRC for generations. Land disputes fuel conflict. Farmers compete for agricultural land, and miners fight over resource-rich territories. The arrival of Rwandan refugees in the 1990s intensified these existing struggles.
How will the conflict play out?
M23 fighters hold Goma. The Congolese government struggles to reclaim control. Reports of massacres circulate, but casualty numbers remain unclear. The United Nations’ MONUSCO peacekeeping mission, active since 1999, has failed to prevent further violence. Humanitarian organizations work in the region but face security challenges.
International reactions remain minimal. Rwanda has faced scrutiny, but no major sanctions have been imposed. European nations express concern but take little action. Governments focus on conflicts in Sudan, Ukraine and Gaza, leaving the DRC crisis in the background. Sanctions on Rwanda remain a possibility, but their effectiveness is uncertain.
The DRC has a history of resource-driven conflicts. Pre-colonial fighters clashed over ivory and slaves. Belgian rulers extracted rubber, leading to mass atrocities. Cold War leaders backed Mobutu Sese Seko to counter communist influence. Today’s war follows a familiar pattern. Local strongmen and external actors profit from instability.
The war in eastern DRC is unlikely to end soon. The Congolese government lacks the strength to counter rebel groups. Economic interests benefit from continued violence. The humanitarian crisis deepens. Millions live in displacement camps. Without major international pressure and structural reforms, the cycle of violence will persist.
The views expressed in this article/video are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.
” post-content-short=” Professor Luca Jourdan, a social and political anthropologist at the University of Bologna, discusses the ongoing war in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). The war, centered in the eastern region near Rwanda, has persisted for nearly 30 years. The fighting began after the 1994 Rwandan…” post_summery=”Rwanda has backed M23 rebels in eastern DRC, where armed groups and the Congolese army fight for control of mineral-rich land. M23 took Goma after overpowering government forces. The war will go on unless international pressure forces Rwanda to stop supporting rebels and the Congolese government builds a stronger military.” post-date=”Apr 29, 2025″ post-title=”FO° Talks: RDC, Rwanda and M23 Rebels” slug-data=”fo-talks-rdc-rwanda-and-m23-rebels”>
FO° Talks: RDC, Rwanda and M23 Rebels
Peter Isackson: Welcome to FO° Talks. I’m Peter Isackson, Fair Observer’s Chief Strategy Officer. It’s my great pleasure to welcome back the talented opera and theater director Emily Hehl for our second edition of a series of conversations we’re calling The Culture of Culture. Our focus is on music, theater and all forms of storytelling. A key aim of what we’re doing is to look more deeply into the role of the audience — not just the artist, but the audience. Now, in the previous chat, Emily, we talked about the history of the classical concert and the role of the audience in its construction and impact. Today, I think you suggested that we delve into the relationship between music and storytelling. Could you just say a few words about what you’re working on now in Vienna?
Emily Hehl: Yes, I’m currently working on two productions, one of them being a new production of Norma by Vincenzo Bellini, and the other production is something that will be coming later this year, which is a new opera about Lee Miller, the war photographer who took a picture of herself in Hitler’s bathtub. And this new opera is questioning how a person could possibly have the idea to take a picture of herself in Hitler’s bathtub, and therefore it becomes a very intense portrait of Lee Miller and things she lived through. And yeah, so that’s the things I’m currently working on. And then, yeah, I have the pleasure of having these serious conversations with you every few weeks, which is a big pleasure. Thanks for having me.
Peter Isackson: Oh, it’s a wonderful pleasure for me to have these conversations. I never know where they’re going to go.
Emily Hehl: Neither do I! (Laughs)
Historical context and rediscovery of La Montagna Noire
Peter Isackson: So it’s not like we’re talking about the events in the political world — and there are plenty of those today — but it’s great to get away from them. So let’s go look at La Montagne Noire, which I don’t think many people know. It had some impact at the time. I think it was noticed by the musical world in Paris, where it was produced. When was it? Just before the end of the 20th century?
Emily Hehl: Yes. So the world premiere was 1895, and it was written by Augusta Holmès — a woman. She was French-Irish, and it was only the second opera that was ever premiered by a female composer in the Palais Garnier, or the big opera house in Paris. And the one before had been Louise Bertin in the 1830s. So after 60 years of no female composers presenting their own works in Paris, this was only the second time in history. So for that reason, this was quite remarkable, but it was forgotten since then and never performed again since 1895. And so we re-premiered the work last year at the opera in Dortmund in Germany.
Peter Isackson: So, has it been forgotten or neglected because it was written by a woman? She was the composer and the lyricist at the same time?
Emily Hehl: Absolutely.
Peter Isackson: And I think the critics said that the music was really good and interesting, but the plot and the writing wasn’t up to the same standard. Was that your impression?
Emily Hehl: To me, it would be the other way around, because I think the libretto is remarkable. But you’re right — she wrote the libretto herself. She wrote poems, she was composing, she was singing as well. And at her time, she was one of the most famous women in France, and she was living a radical life. She had kids with a man she was not together — who was actually married with someone else. So she had really the most liberal life you could imagine at that time. And being a composer as a woman in France, who actually had an Irish nationality, was very, very difficult for several reasons. And why was this work forgotten? I think, yes, her being a woman might have been one of the reasons, because the critiques were worse than they might have been if it was a work by a man at that time. But also, I think we’re quite deep in the kind of content we want to talk about, which is, for example, the repertoire — and how do things become part of history, and how do things just disappear in history? And I think it’s the responsibility of the people who live after the composers to keep these pieces alive. Because, I mean, many composers like Bach and Mozart, they were not composing music for them to become eternal. Music was composed for one event, usually. The idea of repertoire is an invention. It was not usual. But there was this time where an audience and performers started going back into history. And then, of course, we started appreciating a certain quality of pieces and then seeing pieces which are not in this kind of canon or repertoire. Sometimes they might have less quality, but also they might remind us of the quality that the pieces have that we keep playing again and again. So I think there’s a whole question connected to why do we not play certain pieces.
Emily’s directorial approach
Peter Isackson: So was this your choice, La Montagne Noire? And how did you — or whoever made the decision to produce it — how did you come to know it, because it’s such an obscure part of the repertoire?
Emily Hehl: It is. No, the artistic director of Opera Dortmund asked me if I would like to do this piece. The piano reduction was available on the Internet, and it is a collaboration with the Bru Zane, which is an edition that takes care of rediscovering composers or preparing the material in order for these works to be played again. And so they invited me, and all I got was the score. There was no translation, there was no research on this piece very much. And that’s a very different approach to directing, because usually, if you direct, I don’t know, an opera by Puccini or Verdi, you have to, on the one hand, deal with the piece, but you mainly have to deal with the history of the performance, because what has been done? What have been the interpretations? How have people looked at the piece? Whereas in this case, it was really just about trying to get any information about where is the libretto coming from? Because she wrote it, but you felt that there were sources. What is all of this music? Who is Augusta Holmès? So it was really more of a scientific work for a long, long time. It took me almost three years to prepare it. And I translated the libretto myself, all these kinds of things. It was really research. But it was beautiful. I play the piano, so that was very helpful, because whenever you turn a page, I started playing, and it was like reading a very interesting novel, because you had no idea where it would go.
Themes and storytelling in La Montagna Noire
Emily Hehl: And so, yeah, I did a lot of research on the libretto. It’s set in La Montagne Noire — it’s an old French word for Montenegro. So it’s set in this Slavic country during the time of the Ottoman occupation. And you feel in the libretto that there’s a lot of very specific terms and words that I didn’t know, but it didn’t feel as if it was a pure fictional text. And so I started doing a lot of research, and I was diving into the folk songs of the Slavic time around the time where the story is set, because often diving into folk poetry and folk songs can give you a lot of ideas of where things might be coming from. And as I was reading these folk songs of the Slavic people of this time, I recognized a lot of parallels to this libretto. And it turned out that she must have known these folk songs, because around the time where she was writing, just a few years before, there was a French translation of the most famous Slavic folk songs published in France. And she most likely came across them, because her father had one of the biggest libraries of France at the time. And it turns out that she must have done some kind of a mosaic — taking characters from the Slavic folk songs, turning them into a different kind of story, but also uncovering the backside of all the heroes and myths, and basically showing how history and myths are being constructed. And that maybe the truth is not the most strong word for where these stories are coming from.
Peter Isackson: So that’s why you maintain that the libretto is more interesting than the music itself?
Emily Hehl: Absolutely. Also because she talks about constructing, the construction of history, not knowing that she would be the one being forgotten. I mean, she had no idea that this could happen. But looking at it from today, her caring so much about her heritage and talking about how people are being remembered and then being forgotten herself is quite a remarkable combination of things. So we made this whole reflection part of the production. So, yeah.
Peter Isackson: I take it that when you were asked to do this — I don’t know if you committed immediately — but you didn’t know what you were getting into?
Emily Hehl: I had no idea. I was young. I just took it. (Laughs) Honestly, it was the first — I’m quite young, and I’m very lucky that at an early age I had people who trusted me to direct these kinds of massive operas. The whole thing is over three and a half hours. There’s a massive chorus. There’s like a hundred people on stage. The orchestra is almost bigger than Wagner’s orchestras are. It was a massive undertaking. So when they offered it to me, of course I was very much afraid. But yeah, I had no idea what would come.
Peter Isackson: How do you work with the performers? Are you concentrating on the musical side or the textual side — the storytelling side — or both?
Emily Hehl: Both. For me, I always start from music, because I’m a musician at first, and that’s ultimately what singers are as well. You can never go against the music. You always have to deal with the fact that it’s singing people on a stage. And there was a time of directing where directors tried to hide that people were singing — they should act as if they were just in a movie. But it doesn’t work, because singing needs your whole body in order to do it. So that’s where I will always start from, is this whole physicality of singing. But then, of course, in a case like this, to really have everyone included in the whole development of the piece and where things are coming from is important. So what I did with this production was that the first day — which is with the whole cast sat on a table — I tried to tell them everything I had researched in the last two and a half years. And it’s important for people to know where characters are coming from, because especially in this case, most of the characters have an equivalence in the Slavic folk culture. And so we were preparing, kind of — they were reading into the songs and into the characters where their characters were based on — because it’s important for a singer, an artist, a performer, to know where their characters are coming from. But in this case, we also invited a Montenegrin-Serbian artist whose profession is to sing these folk songs. So there’s this very specific instrument called the gusle, which is a one-stringed instrument, and it’s played like this. And this is how the bards at that time were traveling through the countries singing these folk songs. And because this is where this story is originating from, we invited a female artist from Montenegro-Serbia — she’s half-half — and she was part of this production. And we basically looked at the piece of Holmès through her eyes — or actually through her blind eyes, because we had her as a blind character. And so the audience was diving into the imagination of this blind bard. And that’s how the opera came into existence for the audience.
Audience reaction and impact of political events
Emily Hehl: Because it’s also a difficult piece — 1895 — I mean, political correctness is not the term that is the right one for this piece. So there’s a lot of religious conflict. So you have to be quite clever and careful when putting something like this on the stage, to not reproduce any kind of conflicts or assumptions or these kinds of things. So that’s why we chose this blind, imaginational approach to look at the story.
Peter Isackson: So when you started working on it — you say it took three years.
Emily Hehl: It took three and a half years, yeah.
Peter Isackson: So that was before the political events that Eastern Europe has been living through. Now, did that have an effect on the audience and on the production itself? Because, I mean, this is about the Balkans. The Balkans is the frontier between Eastern and Western Europe. In some ways, it epitomizes what’s happened in Ukraine, right? I just throw that out. I don’t want to get involved in political discussion, but your experience as a director and part of a production that wasn’t designed initially to take into account the politics that was going on around you. Of course, you did it in Dortmund — you didn’t do it in Montenegro. But just tell me if that had any influence at all, negative, positive or interesting, let’s say.
Emily Hehl: I mean, of course, it always has an influence, because you read the news in the morning before you go to rehearsal. So you’re full of these conflicts and these themes. But then also, you have to take artistic, visual decisions two years in advance, so you never have an idea what will be happening when you actually are directing the opera. Which is one of the reasons why I try to very much avoid any kind of contemporary reflections on a stage visually. Because you will always be behind, you have no chance. And therefore I’m trying to, of course, create a universe on a stage that allows these kinds of reflections, but they are never explicit. But of course, you know that the audience will be loaded with this information, and they will look at certain conflicts in the opera differently than you would have probably imagined they would a year before. But I think, therefore, it’s a task of an artistic team and the director to keep this openness without being too explicit, and to avoid making something too small. Because you have to be very concrete when you do something on a stage, otherwise no one can act if you don’t have a very concrete situation. But you can also not make the situation too concrete and too small, in order to keep the openness and the reflection of the audience into this situation.
Peter Isackson: So in terms of your aesthetic choices, as you were saying earlier, some people try to contemporize — if we can say that — to bring up to date traditional operas where the plots took place in defined historical circumstances, and then bring them up to date by referring to either modern customs or modern events and modern costumes as well. I think you chose a more classical idea of using the costumes and the styles of the end of the 19th century. Is that right? Or was it set in an earlier time?
Emily Hehl: No. So what we did actually is — because it’s so difficult, especially with these kinds of politics and these kinds of conflicts — to actually reproduce something on the stage. And therefore the approach we chose was through this blind poet. And maybe I’ll just quickly dive into why we chose this: Because I told you that this libretto comes from these folk songs, and that’s the reason why I suggested this theme for our conversation today — because there’s so much more connected to it than just this opera. Because there were these bards traveling through the Slavic countries, and they were writing their songs, and they were listening to people — their stories, their opinions on historical events — and they turned this mixture of historical events and fiction into the songs. But the interesting thing is that many, many of these bards were blind. So they had no possibility to verify things with their eyes. But they were really just depending on what people would tell them. But then these songs were the kind of historiography of this country at that time, and the people were singing these songs as kind of marching into the vision which they had created in the songs — they wanted to be freed from the Ottoman Empire. And they wrote songs about this liberation. But so historical events were turned into songs, and these songs then were turned into historical events, because eventually they were freed from the Ottomans. And so this kind of circle — how stories and fiction influence historical events, and how historical events are always stories in the end, because it’s what we tell each other — that was very crucial for us. And this idea of blindness, in a very beautiful, poetic sense, was the starting point for our production. And therefore, what you see on the stage is neither historical nor purely fictional, but we actually took fragments from all kinds of times and we turned them into a fictional world. Because Augusta Holmès, she had never — at least it’s not recorded — been to Montenegro or Serbia. She had no idea what it looked like. So she described certain things, but it’s a very French look of the 19th century on these kinds of things. And so we didn’t try to make a documentary, but we were really trying to go into this individual imagination of a person imagining these stories and these conflicts.
Peter Isackson: Were you thinking of a parallel with Homer? Because isn’t that the story of how the first truly important literature of Europe is accounted for? Whether it’s true or not, whether Homer was actually a blind poet. I mean, I think historians believe that there were a whole series of poets who were Homer, but maybe all of them were blind or some of them were blind in the same way you say that that seemed to be part of a tradition in the Balkans.
Emily Hehl: Yes, absolutely. It’s very, very fascinating. And this idea of this blind historiography that we’re now talking about — Augusta Holmès — and that’s why I think the libretto is better than the music, up to a certain point, because we have these myths in the Slavic culture. One of them is about Marko Kraljević, who is now — and I was in Montenegro in summer to really see the kind of settings and to talk to people — the hero of the Serbians, I mean, what we call Serbia now, because he’s the most celebrated hero who freed the country from the Ottomans. But if you dive deeper into the research of the historical Marko Kraljević, he in the end actually switched sides to the Ottomans. He didn’t die in the battle, but he had a quite good life until the very end. And so the main character in the opera is not called Marko but Mirko, but his fiancée has the same name. So it’s very obvious that she refers to this very character. But what Augusta Holmès does in the opera is that she uncovers the point where he actually switches his sides. So in the beginning, we have the folk and the people who are telling these songs about the hero, but then the audience — and that’s the interesting point — witnesses the actual other side of the coin of this myth. But in the end, the people keep singing the same song as they did in the beginning, but the audience knows more than they did in the first act. And in the very end, it’s very much about who survives and who is dying — because the people who survive, they will be the ones telling the stories. And that’s where we are questioning: Why do we perform certain pieces and why do we forget others? It’s always our responsibility — the living — to transfer stories in written or oral ways and to keep performing pieces. Yeah, it’s our responsibility.
Peter Isackson: So you added — I mean, as a jazz musician, I would call that your act of improvisation. You added the blind poet. That’s quite a feat, because you’ve got an opera which is totally composed. Did the blind poet actually have a musical role in your production?
Emily Hehl: Yes, but it was not part of the score that she wrote — something we added. But it was, for me, very, very important to actually add it. Because if you look at music in the 19th century, you have a lot of this local color — it’s composers who tried to make music sound like something they imagined Egyptian music would sound like, or Serbian music would sound like. And in order to overcome this, and to just say, okay, you see, this is an actual heritage of this country, and this is what Holmès made of it — but this is not trying to be this. This is really — it’s the creation of poetry, it’s fiction. It’s not reality. And also, for me, talking about this whole culture, which is a very complex culture — when I was in Montenegro this summer talking about these stories — it’s so deeply rooted, these conflicts, until this very day. And so for me, it was very, very important to have someone from this culture with us in the production to verify things and to feel more comfortable with this theme and to tell this story — which is definitely not my story — but to actually have someone on the stage who cared about it very, very much, because her grandfather had already been one of these blind poets as well. It felt more acceptable for me to perform this piece or to direct this piece, because I felt there was some kind of justification for it on a stage. And yeah, people said that she really opened their eyes for a different form of singing also. Yeah.
Peter Isackson: I’m very interested — you’re in the audience reaction. I mean, how much feedback do you get from your audience, and how long did the production run?
Emily Hehl: We had, I think, six performances, but spread over several months. And so, I mean, you get as much feedback as you would like to take in, because everyone will put their opinion on you if you want or not, but it’s up to you to listen to it or to actively seek for it. But the interesting thing was that there were some people at the premiere, and they kept coming back for every single performance because they loved the music, they loved the piece, and they loved the production. So if a theater programs a piece like this, they know that it won’t be sold out, because it’s not Don Giovanni and it’s not Wagner. But of course, then therefore they do musical theater before to be able to finance this kind of responsibilities, experiments, whatever you want to call it, rediscoveries. But the people who were there — and I was in three out of the six performances, for other reasons I was in town — but so I witnessed three of the six performances, and the audience was cheering and really, really enjoying the performance, apparently. Of course, you always have people who don’t like anything, but in general, the reviews were good and the audience seemed to really enjoy it as well.
Comparison with other productions and personal reflections
Peter Isackson: Because the storytelling was such a big part of it for you, do you feel that the audience could appreciate that and had learned something, if you like, had challenged their understanding of the opera itself? I don’t think that’s really a question, because nobody knew the opera — it’s not like Don Giovanni or Norma. But do you feel that you got the point across, the original points you were trying to make about the history, about the story itself, the impact? Also, it’s a tragedy, right?
Emily Hehl: Yes, it is.
Peter Isackson: So it’s got that emotional dimension which fits into a historical context. So you could look at it like any Shakespearean tragedy and say it’s as much the emotion as the poetry and the music. But I’m curious: With only six performances, what kind of feedback do you get? I suppose there were critics about it.
Emily Hehl: Yes, and we also got nominated. There is the International Opera Awards, which is one of the biggest awards for opera. And our production got nominated for the Best Rediscovered Work. So it was really appreciated in the critics and the reviews. Also, what I was happy about most was that people were interested in Augusta Holmès and not only in this Slavic culture, because they were really intrigued by Bojana Peković. That was the artist that joined us. And she was also giving workshops around and concerts and stuff. So I really think that the people who saw it were really, really touched by her singing as well, because it’s a very different way of singing. It’s very direct. If you know this kind of wide voice that just goes right through your body — you immediately get goosebumps. It’s the opposite of operatic singing. Also to have this as a contrast, I think for audiences this was a great experience. But we had a lot of after-talks and these kinds of things. And people were just curious about Augusta Holmès. Because when you read a little bit about her, you wonder why you had never heard about her. Because she was so big at her time. Like, she was a friend of Wagner, and she had relations with Liszt and a lot of really important composers. She was very deeply in the scene of the poets in France at that time. Everybody knew her, but no one knows her today. And so I think that’s what people really started to wonder about — how is this possible? And I think this is where the reflection probably sets in even more than in just the story of the opera. Because her life’s story and the dilemma and drama of her life’s story corresponds so much with what she actually talks about in the opera, without knowing that this would become her story. The question that you are not responsible for what people will tell about you once you’re not on this planet anymore. So I think this was a coincidence of these two things that, yeah, I’m sure people realized it, and I hope that it inspired them to think further into it.
Peter Isackson: So how would you compare the kind of experience it was for you — in terms of the research you did on storytelling itself, and the relationship between music and narrative, and propaganda even, I think, is part of it because there’s this political dimension — how would you compare that with what you’re doing with Norma?
Emily Hehl: It’s a completely different world. It’s literally a different universe. And I must say, I prefer the universe of the rediscovered works, because you feel you’re actually contributing to something. And you’re giving these pieces a chance to be seen again, and also people to experience these things. I had a very interesting conversation with John Andrews not so long ago — who is a British conductor who is a master in performing rediscovered works or works that hadn’t been performed in a long time, or even just in the last 20 years. And as I said in the beginning, for me, it’s really the main difference that, in the case of Holmès, you take care of and really investigate the piece, just the piece and how it came into existence. Whereas in the other case of Norma, you’re mainly busy with what have other people done with the piece. And for me, that’s different.
Peter Isackson: With Norma, do you feel — I mean, not you personally — but is this the normal thing, to feel that you’re in competition with all the directors who have done this before you?
Emily Hehl: Absolutely. Because even now, it’s really culminating, because Vienna has two big opera houses: Staatsoper and Theater an der Wien. And within a few days of difference, they’re performing Norma in two different productions. So this is really the culmination of the problem I’m talking about. Because it’s not about Norma, it’s about the competition of these two productions. And that’s what I really, really admired about being able to direct La Montagne Noire, was to dive into this universe. And yeah, I mean, it’s a beautiful coincidence that this became this kind of meta-reflection on storytelling and historiography and all these kinds of things. And also this historiography that reflects on the repertoire we talk about. And I think that’s a whole other series of serious conversations, is the repertoire and who came up with the idea of having a repertoire, and how it didn’t exist for a very, very long time.
Peter Isackson: Yeah, so just to go back to the question of competition, you are now competing with another production?
Emily Hehl: Yes, Staatsoper is competing with another production! (Laughs)
Peter Isackson: Do you communicate? Do you know the people there?
Emily Hehl: Yes! Well, so the Norma, it’s not my personal direction. I’m part of the team, but it’s not my responsibility what the artistic output will be. There’s communication, there’s non-communication, I would say. Yeah.
Peter Isackson: I mean, when I say that, do you try to do things differently because you know the others are doing it in a certain way and you have to contrast? And is there a spirit of competition, or is it a kind of creative collaboration — “We can both turn Norma into something contemporary with impact on the audience?”
Emily Hehl: Ideally, it will be the second. And ideally, people who see the show in one place are so curious that they want to see the piece in the other one. And also it’s beautiful, because you’re confronted with the core conflict of performing arts, which is: You can never see a piece as it just hangs in a museum. Because you always need the people to do it. So I think this is really a beautiful problem we have, and something we’re presented with or we are confronted with now here in Vienna, on this example of Norma. But then also, something I said before is that you have to take the major decisions many years in advance. And with this size of house, even more than two or three years. And I’m not even sure if back then, things were clear that things would happen at the same time, so I’m quite sure that these productions came into existence without knowing of each other. And so, yeah. But I hope—
Peter Isackson: We’ll kind of wrap this up, because we’ve used the allotted time. But I’d like to come back, in perhaps a more general way, to the question of competition or collaboration in musical productions. I have my own ideas about it, but in a different context. We have the example given to us by Hollywood of Amadeus, where we are told, through that storytelling, that Mozart and Salieri were competing in ways that probably aren’t very true, but maybe they are as well. But that’s a topic — if you’re interested — I’d like to come back to that in one of our conversations.
Emily Hehl: Yes, I’d appreciate that.
Future plans and legacy of La Montagna Noire
Peter Isackson: Okay, great. Well, thank you again. And is there any place that people can profit from your production of La Montagne Noire? Has it been filmed?
Emily Hehl: It has been filmed. It hasn’t been published. But if anyone who is watching this is actually really curious, just reach out to us and I’m sure we can find a way of sharing this recording. But it’s not available in public. So we hope that someone will program this piece again. I mean, that’s why these kinds of awards — one might think about opera awards, whatever you like — but it’s good for these kinds of reasons, that things stay in the memory of people for a bit longer. And so maybe there will be an artistic director who will program it again. There are even conversations of actually bringing the piece to Montenegro, because Montenegro doesn’t really have an opera story. That was the reason why I was there in summer, because we’re trying to find a way to bring the piece there. But then also we would need to majorly rewrite it, because, of course, then there is already a political interest in performing art. And then that’s where it gets difficult for me as a director, because Augusta Holmès — she had never in mind to write it for this kind of event.
Peter Isackson: Yeah, if you were to do it again more than a year later than the initial production, would you have the same singers? Would they be available?
Emily Hehl: It really depends on when and how and what. But it’s also for singers to learn a piece that no one has ever performed before, and that will most likely not be performed again, and then you confront this really difficult music of like three and a half hours. It’s quite an investment of a singer to say, “Yes, I really want to do it.” And usually you don’t have an idea what the piece will be like when you sign the contract. So, yeah. It would be wonderful to keep—
Peter Isackson: At least they can see the film.
Emily Hehl: Exactly. (Laughs)
Peter Isackson: Okay. Well, thank you very much, Emily, and I’m looking forward to our next session. We’ll be announcing it very shortly.
Emily Hehl: Yes, wonderful. Thanks for this invitation to chat.
Peter Isackson: Bye.
[Lee Thompson-Kolar edited this piece.]
The views expressed in this article/video are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.
” post-content-short=” Peter Isackson: Welcome to FO° Talks. I’m Peter Isackson, Fair Observer’s Chief Strategy Officer. It’s my great pleasure to welcome back the talented opera and theater director Emily Hehl for our second edition of a series of conversations we’re calling The Culture of Culture. Our focus…” post_summery=”Fair Observer Chief Strategy Officer Peter Isackson and opera and theater director Emily Hehl explore Augusta Holmès’s forgotten opera, La Montagne Noire, and examine its themes of history, myth and audience perception. Hehl shares her journey of rediscovery, emphasizing the opera’s overlooked feminist legacy. They highlight the living power of storytelling in music.” post-date=”Apr 27, 2025″ post-title=”FO° Talks: The Culture of Culture, Part 2: Memory, Melody and a Forgotten Opera” slug-data=”fo-talks-the-culture-of-culture-part-2-memory-melody-and-a-forgotten-opera”>
FO° Talks: The Culture of Culture, Part 2: Memory, Melody and a Forgotten Opera
Atul Singh: Welcome to FO° Talks. With me is Ashank Desai, the founder and chairman of Mastek. Today, we are going to explore the fascinating story of NASSCOM. Ashank, of course, is one of the founders. He’s a legendary entrepreneur in the software space. He’s also a philanthropist who has done a lot to promote public policy in India. Today, our focus is how NASSCOM was born. India’s National Association of Software and Services Companies, NASSCOM, was born in 1988, a little more than 19 months before the Berlin Wall fell on November 9, 1989. Two years later, the Soviet Union would dissolve. In contrast to the Soviet bloc, NASSCOM went on a rocket ride. Over the years, it has gone from strength to strength. And who better than Ashank, one of the founders and past chairman of NASSCOM, to recount the story of this extraordinary Indian success. Welcome, Ashank.
Ashank Desai: Thanks, Atul. It is always great to interact with you, and I appreciate your contribution to this whole area of covering the public policy, covering the politics and economics globally.
Atul Singh: Thank you for your kind words. So let’s get started. What was going on in the IT industry before NASSCOM began?
Ashank Desai: Yes, so this is an interesting story of, as you said, almost now, from 1988 till 2025, which is close to 35–37 years. And I always say that I have lived a dream. So it’s a dream that we were going to live, which I was not aware when the dream started. But let me go back to, in fact, late ‘70s, early ‘80s. That’s the era when India was just getting into what I would call as software and IT-related things. For example, Mastek started in 1982. There were a few other companies who started before that. And what really was happening at that time was the whole software development as a separate business was not existing — not only in India. In fact, even in the US, it was a very small business because hardware companies used to give software. In fact, there is some — I don’t remember — IBM case was there when the court ordered them to give a separate code for software versus their hardware, and that’s the way they could create a competition. Others could do software. So that was the era when hardware was the main cost and software was very rich in cost. And because of that, what used to happen was hardware companies were the major players and software companies were very small minnows, if I may call that — ‘70s and ‘80s. On top of it, there was this idea that India has an advantage because of English language, large talent pool, cost of development and a very, very, very focus on improving and excelling in whatever they do. Now, that was a potential, although the image outside of India was not that great at that time, and everybody used to think that India has only elephants and snakes. So that was an era where a few of our entrepreneurs, started these companies for software development, and we were struggling to understand how we go about making this software business global. And we figured out that unless we come together in some form and push this as a group — and also pressurize government to offer us better policy — we will not be able to move it. Now, it was not possible to do it under the umbrella of hardware companies. They had their own association, MAIT, and obviously they were busy in the domestic market, and it was growing. And as I said, software was given almost very low cost by them. Now it is the other way — we can almost give hardware free along with software. So there was no motivation in that group called MAIT. Some of us had become members of that group to push software and software exports in particular.
The founding of NASSCOM
Ashank Desai: So then there was this discontent and an opportunity. And all of us, whether in Mumbai, whether in Bangalore, whether in Delhi, were discussing how we can come together. In fact, there is a story that even in the US, there were groups from India discussing this and so on. So this action at different places got into some kind of mass, if I may call it. And that mass ultimately converged in Delhi, sometime in ‘87, probably sometime around that, to say what we can do together. And that was an inflection point, really, where around 30–40 of us, I think, if I remember right, came together and we said, “We want to split away from this existing association and start our new association.” I still remember the chairman of the other association came and had a great plea for us, that you should remain together and how it is the power of staying together and all that. We heard that, but we felt that their dynamics and their opportunities are different, and we should form a separate association. And that was really a starting point, although, as I said, there were many, many groups in different places talking about what can be done for building the software industry. So that meeting — I still remember very vividly what we were doing and how we were thinking about doing it. After that, when this group formed, there was the idea that we should write a constitution and start naming the association and all that, which is what happened over the next few months. And actually, Mumbai was a center point there. And my friend, Harish Mehta, who was a part of a group called Hinditron at that time, was very dynamic to make this happen. And then we had others who came together, and we sat together and we wrote the constitution. We gave a name, and we thought about the name. We said, “What shall we name it?” So there is, in the software industry, what is called software, which is about building software products like Microsofts and Googles and so on and so forth. And then there is services, because you can’t do software unless you build custom-made software, unless you implement some of the software. So that is services. So we thought about that, and we said, “We should not say just software, but software and services.” So NASSCOM is the National Association of Software and Services Companies. That is NASSCOM.
NASSCOM’s pioneers
Atul Singh: So Harish Mehta played a critical role and it was one of the key drivers of NASSCOM. Who were the other players? Of course, one of them was you. Harish Mehta is another. Who were the others people?
Ashank Desai: Yeah. So we had also Mr. Nandan Nilekani and Mr. Narayans Murthy. Both of them got involved. We had Mr. KV Ramani, who was a CEO of Futuresoft, it was called — his company — and Mr. Saurabh Srivastava, who was working at that time in Tata Unisys, if I am right, the name of the company. So these were five, six people. We were very, very involved, and we worked really hard over the next few years to make it happen. And that is, again, a story by itself, which I can recount as we move ahead. But these were the five, six people, and then there were a few others also, all names may be difficult. But the core group around which we started working was this: Four of us — who were, of course, later felicitated by Prime Minister Modi for being founders — that is Harish Mehta, myself, Mr. KV Ramani and Saurabh Srivastava. But Infosys also had a major role to play, as I said, through Nandan Nilekani and Mr. Narayana Murthy. And I’ll talk about it later.
[Lee Thompson-Kolar edited this piece.]
The views expressed in this article/video are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.
” post-content-short=” Atul Singh: Welcome to FO° Talks. With me is Ashank Desai, the founder and chairman of Mastek. Today, we are going to explore the fascinating story of NASSCOM. Ashank, of course, is one of the founders. He’s a legendary entrepreneur in the software space. He’s also a philanthropist who has…” post_summery=”A founder of NASSCOM, India’s premier software and services industry association, recounts the company’s origin. Ashank Desai describes how early entrepreneurs, facing global challenges and domestic policy gaps, united to form an independent platform. Key figures like Harish Mehta and Narayana Murthy played instrumental roles in shaping India’s IT revolution.” post-date=”Apr 26, 2025″ post-title=”FO° Talks: How India’s NASSCOM Was Born” slug-data=”fo-talks-how-indias-nasscom-was-born”>
FO° Talks: How India’s NASSCOM Was Born
Peter Isackson: Welcome to FO° Talks. I’m Peter Isackson, Fair Observer’s Chief Strategy Officer. November 22, 1963 — I know where I was. In the meantime, the mainstream media, despite all its efforts, haven’t managed to silence the plethora of questions raised by that event. Today, we delve into the newest pieces of the puzzle with Jefferson Morley, journalist and author, who earlier this month gave his testimony before the House Oversight Committee’s new Task Force on the Declassification of Federal Secrets. Formerly a journalist at The Washington Post, Mr. Morley, editor of the blog JFK Facts — a great resource — is the author of several books on the CIA and the assassination, notably The Ghost: The Secret Life of CIA Spymaster James Jesus Angleton, who we’ll be hearing more about. So Jefferson, thanks for being here to bring us up to date as things continue to evolve.
Jefferson Morley: Thanks for having me, Peter. There’s a lot to talk about.
Peter Isackson: Yeah. So let’s get started with just a couple of things. You’ve had the documents for a month now. Where are you with the analysis of those documents, the ones that were released by the Trump administration on the 18th of March, I think? And second, I’d like to know more about what you know about how the task force itself is working and how things are likely to play out with them.
Jefferson Morley: Yeah. So, since March 18th, I’ve delved a little bit into these records. But to do the kind of reporting you do that needs to be done is very painstaking. So, thousands of records that once had redactions came into the public record. Once they’re in the public record, it’s impossible to tell what was redacted. So what we have to do is go back and look at the redacted versions — not just from 2022, but going back to 2017, really — because things were withheld for 30 years, 25 years, and only released five or seven years ago, and they haven’t really registered in the public mind because they haven’t been reported. So what we’re going to do is we go back, look at the documents that were redacted, understand the passages that were redacted, get the new versions and understand bit by bit what became public. And we don’t do that for one document. What people are doing now is they’re going in and they find an interesting document, they hold it up and they say, “Look, this proves my theory.” And they hang it on the clothesline of their theory. That’s not my approach. What I do is I go through and I look at every document on a given topic. And now we have the ability now that we’ve made these documents searchable, which just happened in the past week. We’ll go in and we’ll look at, “Okay, how many documents with the name Oswald were redacted as of December 2022?” Now, that’s when we know it: 103 documents that had Oswald in the metadata had redactions in the document. So we’re going to go through 103 documents — what was redacted, what was released and what does that tell us about Oswald? And then you do the same thing for each topic. So you do the same thing for the Fair Play for Cuba Committee, which Oswald belonged to. You do the same thing for the CIA. You do the same thing for leading personalities in the CIA: Richard Helms, Bill Harvey, David Phillips. These are men who knew about Oswald before the assassination, lied about it, so are the subject of interest. So that’s the process that we’re in right now. And, you know, we’re not very far along. It’s difficult to do, people don’t like to do it, they don’t know how to do it. I have to teach people how to do it. But the good thing is, there’s a ton of important and interesting material. This is the stuff that the CIA has been hanging on to for 50 or 60 years, right? And let’s be common sensical: The last thing that they release is, by definition, the thing that they are most reluctant to make public. So we’re just finding out now, not about the obvious stuff, but about what they were most reluctant to make public — and which, to be sure, they fully intended to keep private if Trump’s order hadn’t come along. So there’s a lot there, and we’re just beginning to unpack it.
The CIA, the archives and the law
Peter Isackson: Now, are these all CIA documents, or the FBI, or something else?
Jefferson Morley: A lot of different federal agencies: Army Communications Agency, a bunch of NSA records. CIA is most of them, I would say probably 75 to 80% of them. But there’s a significant portion of the FBI and other agencies.
Peter Isackson: And did they already exist in the National Archives but were hidden, or were they just released to the National Archives?
Jefferson Morley: These were documents that were made available to the National Archives via the JFK Records Act process. The JFK Records Act process was a process that was created by the 1992 JFK Records Act. That law passed in response to Oliver Stone’s movie, created an independent civilian review board with the power to declassify all assassination-related records in the government’s possession. What the law gave the agencies the right to do was withhold material for a certain period of time if they could justify it to the JFK Review Board. So starting in 1994, for the first time — 30+ years after the event — we actually began to get the historical record of the assassination. And a lot of that was released between ’94 and ’98. A lot of stuff was postponed from 1998 to 2017. In 2017, everything was supposed to be made public, according to the law — not according to the CIA. There was a provision which said the CIA could ask for continuation beyond the 25 years. What the law said was that after 25 years, all records should be made public, except in the rarest of cases. I talked to Judge John Tunheim, the head of that review board — he’s a federal judge in Minnesota — and he said, “At the end of 25 years, we expected there might be 100 records that would still remain secret. The CIA said, ‘No, there’s 16,000 records that we want to keep redactions in.’” And Trump caved and gave them that in 2017. And then when the question came to Biden in 2021 and 2022, he gave them continued secrecy while releasing some records.
Peter Isackson: I remember Biden, when he was supposed to release at the date that was planned for him to release, he said for security reasons it couldn’t happen, but that a year later it would take place. And then nothing happened a year later. Is that right?
Jefferson Morley: No. What he said in 2021 was, “Well, we had the pandemic.”
Peter Isackson: Oh, that’s right. Yeah.
Jefferson Morley: “And so you get another year.” Okay, so they’re 29 years past the deadline. And he said, “Well, yeah, you get another year because you really haven’t had enough time to comply with the law.” When The Washington Post called me up, I said, “This is the COVID dog-ate-my-homework excuse.” It was pathetic. And a year later, Biden did release some records — but basically gave the CIA everything they wanted and wrote an executive order in June 2023, washing his hands of the whole matter, effectively eviscerating the JFK Records Act and handing final disposition of the records back to the CIA and the NSA. Now, Trump came along, ran on releasing all the records — a popular issue — and he issued an order to do just that. So Biden’s order is defunct now, and the agencies are obliged to produce everything. So on March 18, we started to get those documents that had been sent to the National Archives and withheld under the JFK Records Act. There are still some redactions in these documents. But by and large, it seems that they have been fully declassified. So there’s a ton of material there — 77,000 pages of new material — and it’s definitely, a lot of it is significant. And we can talk about the significant things we’ve found so far, but there’s more to come, for sure.
The Warren Commission and the cover-up
Peter Isackson: So it’s significant. It’s not a smoking gun — everyone will say that, apparently — but it seems to me that the mountain of evidence that already existed proves a simple point, which I think is what you insist on, and that is that we have to forget about the Warren Commission and what it said, in a sense.
Jefferson Morley: Yeah. You know the official story. It’s not true. It’s not true that the President’s motorcade went by this building and a guy unknown to the US government fired three shots at it. That’s not what the medical evidence says, that’s not what the forensic evidence says, that’s not what the eyewitness evidence says. And so people continue to say, “Well, you don’t have a smoking gun.” I wasn’t looking for a smoking gun, okay?
Peter Isackson: I called your method the Sherlock Holmes method: Eliminate the impossible and whatever remains, however improbable, must be the truth. And I would say that the Warren Commission’s was: Eliminate the inconvenient, and whatever remains will be the actual story.
Jefferson Morley: Yeah. Don’t forget the Warren Commission story, as it’s been handed down to us, did not originate with the Warren Commission. It originated with Lyndon Johnson and J. Edgar Hoover, who decided the day Lee Harvey Oswald was killed that the entire crime would be blamed on him. And Hoover and Johnson were quite explicit about their intention to make sure that the public was convinced that this one guy did it and nobody else was involved. Okay? The assassination of the President hadn’t even begun. The President hadn’t been buried. And these guys had settled on the solution that the Warren Commission rubber-stamped, and some people who just don’t want to pay attention to the new evidence continue to repeat it.
Peter Isackson: I recently listened to that conversation, which was recorded between Johnson and Hoover. And the one thing that really surprised me — because I knew and I’ve always thought that the presence of Allen Dulles was the key to understanding why nothing that the Warren Commission could say would likely be true — but what really surprised me is that Johnson began the conversation and he says, “Well, we need to start thinking about who we’re going to nominate to this commission.” And I was thinking, “Allen Dulles” — the first name, the first name! It’s not as if it’s an afterthought — “Yeah, we need somebody who knows the CIA.” The first name he put on it. So Warren was the titular head, but if Johnson wanted to put Dulles on it, doesn’t that give the game away?
Jefferson Morley: Yeah, it does. It’s obvious. People didn’t comment on it at the time because people were so shocked. But yeah, a blatant conflict of interest. And then if you look at what Dulles did — he worked very, very hard to exclude any contradictory evidence. And there was plenty of it. He opened up the first session of the Warren Commission and said, “By the way, every political assassination in America has been committed by a lone nut.” And somebody raised their hand and said, “Excuse me, Mr. Dulles — what about Lincoln?” Right? A conspiracy to decapitate the Union — kill Lincoln and two cabinet officers — that was a lone nut? So Dulles had his mind made up from the start. And then when Richard Helms and John McCone—
Peter Isackson: And he had a motive.
Jefferson Morley: Yeah. And when he handles the questioning of John McCone, his successor, and Richard Helms, his great good friend — his leading questioning lets them say on the record a key part of the CIA’s cover-up, which was, “We just didn’t know anything about the guy.” And McCone says, “We had very little information in our files.” And Helms says, “It was probably minimal.” Okay, that was a maximal lie. James Angleton had a 194-page dossier on Lee Harvey Oswald the week Kennedy left for Texas. Okay? So Helms and Dulles were in on the cover-up from the get-go, and Helms lied under oath. One of the key things I pointed out in the new testimony was, we know that Helms had lied. We know that George Joannides, the chief of covert action in Miami, lied to JFK investigators. And then, when we got the documents on March 18, we got the testimony of Angleton to the House Select Committee on Assassinations, and one of the declassified passages showed that he lied about what he knew about Oswald before the assassination. So that’s a pattern of malfeasance. And this is what I said to the Luna Subcommittee: “You can interpret that however you want, but to me, that is not incompetence — that’s malfeasance. Three people lying in a homicide investigation — that’s a pattern of malfeasance. That’s incriminating. It’s not exculpatory.” So it adds to the state of the indictment of the CIA. And sure enough, you say this and the defenders of the Warren Commission reflexively defend the CIA and say, “Well, they were just lying because they were embarrassed.” Okay, is there any evidence of that? Is there any evidence? Did anybody ever say Dick Helms lied because he was embarrassed? That James Angleton lied because he was embarrassed? No, there’s zero evidence. It’s another one of those JFK theories for which there’s no factual support. I think that’s one of the important things we learned from this new—
Peter Isackson: Okay, so I have a question for you. You were a journalist. You’re no longer working as an establishment journalist, but you were at one time with The Washington Post, right?
Jefferson Morley: Yes.
Peter Isackson: So how do you explain that the editorial policies of major media can continue today to underreport the facts that you uncover and the facts that a lot of other people have uncovered, and continue to say, “Well, yeah, we don’t know, so we’ve got to trust the Warren Commission?” How do you explain that in terms of reasoning?
Jefferson Morley: I think there’s two things. One, people — institutions — are committed, right? The Washington Post attacked Oliver Stone before he even made his movie. They were attacking his idea, right? He hadn’t even put his idea on celluloid, and he was already savagely attacked by The Washington Post. And on March 18, the speed-reading editors of The Washington Post said, “77,000 pages of material came out, and none of it says anything to contradict the official story.” Huh? You read 77,000 pages in one day? That’s very impressive. But see, they don’t need to read it, because they know the truth — or they think they know the truth. Because one thing is the institutional thing. They can’t back off of it. If they start to show an open mind, then the whole institution looks bad. And same with The New York Times, same with CBS. So they’re locked into that. And then the second part of it is, it’s a scary story, right? The fact that the president was killed by his enemies and they got away with it? That’s a very profound story. And it’s not one that people want to look at. It’s very destabilizing to one’s worldview. And if you’re in a comfortable position in Washington and in Washington journalism, you don’t want to say something like that. You’re going to be branded a conspiracy theorist. What’s interesting now, though, is we had this hearing, and the Warren Commission people — they were very upset that they weren’t invited. But they have nothing new to add. That’s why Representative Luna didn’t add them. They have nothing to say. J. Edgar Hoover and LBJ got it right on November 24, 1963, and there’s really no need to revisit it. Well, okay, there’s nothing new in that proposition. Why would anybody be interested in it? Nobody is interested in it. People are interested in what was really going on.
Politics, press and patterns of malfeasance
Peter Isackson: So Representative Luna seemed pretty receptive to everything you and Oliver Stone presented. Do you see any serious follow-up? And is there?
Jefferson Morley: Yes. I’ve been very impressed with Representative Luna. We come from very different places politically, but on this issue, she’s very action-oriented. She has pressed the CIA repeatedly for documents and continues to do so, because they still have not disclosed fully. So I think she’s knowledgeable about the case, and she’s showing real leadership and acting strongly. We’re talking with her staff now, me and some friends, about a second JFK hearing and what that might entail. And so we’re hoping that happens soon. But we don’t have a date or exact format for that yet.
Peter Isackson: And is RFK Jr. at all involved in this?
Jefferson Morley: Not really. He put his voice behind it during the campaign and when he endorsed Trump the other day, when he was in a meeting, and I think Tulsi Gabbard was saying something about how she had assigned a lot of people at the ODNI to look into JFK, RFK and MLK. Trump pointed down the table and said, “What do you think, Bobby?” And he said, “Get it all out there,” or something. So he didn’t jump in — he just said, “Good idea.” I think he’s got other things to worry about.
Peter Isackson: So I thought we might be talking a lot about Angleton, whom you’re an expert in. I do have one question about Angleton, though, because I can refer people to all your other interviews where you’ve gone into great depth on this. We can talk about it, but the one question I wanted to ask you is: Oliver Stone came up with that anecdote about Angleton reckoning it was probably to help him. Were you aware of that?
Jefferson Morley: Yeah, yeah, Joe Trento. That was in a book that Trento published about the US intelligence community. And Trento spent a lot of time with Angleton. So I think that it’s a true quote. And yeah, it reflects the… you know, he said, “We were amoral people, we would do anything.” And he was sort of fessing up to that at the end of his life, kind of like, “Yeah, we were dirty tricksters, and we pulled off dirty tricks on the most massive scale you can possibly imagine.”
Peter Isackson: We got Mike Pompeo to say, “We lied, we cheated, we stole.”
Jefferson Morley: Yeah.
Peter Isackson: Yeah, that’s in character.
Jefferson Morley: And what you see in the defenders of the Warren Commission is a plea of innocence: “No, we’re not really like that. We’re well-meaning men who just made a few mistakes about this lunatic who up and shot the president. It’s no big deal that they were surveilling him. We’re really sorry, Mrs. Kennedy, that we didn’t understand the threat. But please excuse us.” It’s so lame, and it’s so anti-journalistic. There’s no effort to take on the new evidence. When you present new evidence, what they do is impugn the witness or the person who presents it. “Well, don’t believe Morley — he’s a conspiracy theorist.” The only problem with that is, I don’t have a conspiracy theory. So then they try to make one up and pin it on me, which I decline to do, because I don’t have a conspiracy theory. That’s not how I understand the case. And so they impugn the witness and they exclude the evidence. It’s signs of obvious bias. And so it’s just not credible anymore.
Suspects and leads
Peter Isackson: Yeah, okay. I’m going to push you towards a conspiracy theory, but staying with the facts.
Jefferson Morley: Okay.
Peter Isackson: You are very interested in William K. Harvey, right?
Jefferson Morley: Yeah.
Peter Isackson: You’ve spoken a lot about Harvey.
Jefferson Morley: Yeah.
Peter Isackson: And you think he’s a key player, right?
Jefferson Morley: Well, he was the agency’s leading specialist in assassination, and he hated the Kennedys, and he associated with Johnny Roselli and other mobsters who were killers. So he’s a plausible suspect. That’s what I would say — he’s a plausible suspect.
Peter Isackson: Well, yeah. If I was writing the story as a fiction writer, that would be a godsend to have his story. And I know you’ve officially requested the travel records of Harvey.
Jefferson Morley: Yeah. So that’s an example of records that the CIA has not turned over yet.
Peter Isackson: So you said he was in communication with Roselli?
Jefferson Morley: He wasn’t in communication with Roselli. He was best friends with Roselli. And that’s not something I said — that’s something his wife said. Clara Grace Harvey never gave an interview. The only interview she ever gave is on JFK Facts. And in there, she says, “Oh, I loved Johnny Roselli. He was a great guy. He was a patriot. My husband loved him.” So that’s who he was, yeah.
Peter Isackson: Yeah, so my question is: If it’s just open knowledge that a high official of the CIA, who even had responsibility for assassinations, which is quite a responsibility — if he was known to be working with or associating with the Mafia, doesn’t that tell us a lot about the whole set of relations that must have existed?
Jefferson Morley: Absolutely, absolutely. And those relations continued after RFK in 1962, when RFK first learned that the CIA was working with Roselli and Sam Giancana. He said, “Next time you work with those guys, just tell me, okay?” They didn’t do that. Harvey was meeting with Roselli in the summer of 1963 after he had been fired at the behest of the Kennedys.
Peter Isackson: Yeah, that’s something I found in the archives. When did he go to Rome? When was he sent to Rome?
Jefferson Morley: He was pulled off the Cuba Task Force after he cursed out Bobby Kennedy during the Cuban Missile Crisis. He didn’t actually go to Rome for many months.
Peter Isackson: Oh, right, okay. So you said — and I think in the archives it says — he had lunch with Roselli in June of ’63?
Jefferson Morley: Yeah. The FBI surveillance were watching Roselli at National Airport. And he gets out of a plane and he walks up to a car — and son of a bitch, Bill Harvey’s driving the car. And they all know Harvey because he was in the FBI. And they say, “Oh my God.” And now he’s a top CIA guy. And they call up their boss. They say, “Oh my God, why is Roselli talking with the top guy in the CIA?” And that guy calls Angleton at home and says, “What’s your guy doing with Roselli?” And Angleton calls the restaurant where Harvey and Roselli are, and he gets Harvey on the phone. He says, “What are you doing?” He says, “I’m having dinner with Roselli.” Angleton says, “That’s fine.” He hangs up. He calls back the FBI guy and says, “Leave him alone.” That was it, he totally blessed the thing. None of that is made up; we have the whole transcript. Hank said it himself. He was rather proud of the story, and he told it to Senate investigators in 1976.
Peter Isackson: So all this, the public doesn’t know about these things, even though they’re verified fact?
Jefferson Morley: They’re on the public record. And the public does know about them. It’s the elite media reporters who don’t really want to think about it. And so they say, “Well that’s not smoking gun proof of a conspiracy,” which is a way of saying: Don’t talk to me about the new evidence.
Peter Isackson: So if we take the case of Roselli. I’ll just ask you the question. James Files, who claims to have confessed to being the shooter on the Grassy Knoll, worked for Roselli. He was an accountant for Roselli, so he knew Roselli. Is his story at all credible?
Jefferson Morley: I haven’t looked at his story in a long time, and it’s probably worth revisiting. The first time I did it, I didn’t think it was credible. And I felt like sometimes he was talking like somebody who had read the JFK literature as opposed to having lived it. So there’s nothing to corroborate Files’s account.
Peter Isackson: No, I know. That’s what I appreciate about your methods, which is: Let’s stick to the facts. But it’s always interesting to notice that there are other accounts that somehow seem to correlate after you learn something else. And so your thing about patterns of facts — that is what we’re looking for, right?
Jefferson Morley: Yeah. So, I’ll tell you — here’s another story that just came out of them. Another person who has been plausibly described as a gunman in Dealey Plaza was a man named Herminio Diaz Garcia. And he was an assassin. He was a bodyguard for Batista. He was known to have committed an assassination in Colombia in 1948. A marksman, and passionately dedicated to killing Fidel Castro. And in fact, in 1966, on a raid into Cuba where he said he was going to go assassinate Castro, he was killed. And in the firefight that ensued, his leader of his commando group was blinded by a hand grenade and captured. He wasn’t killed. In the hospital, that man was questioned by Cuban intelligence, Tony Cuesta. And Cuesta said he believed that his dead friend, Herminio Diaz, had been in Dealey Plaza. And he said he didn’t have independent proof of that, but he had come to believe that, knowing Diaz. Well, another guy who was in the hospital at that time — not on any kind of political crime and not connected with anti-Castro activity, a guy who was in jail for embezzlement — had been childhood friends with Herminio Diaz. And he wound up taking care of Tony Cuesta in the hospital, this blinded man. And so they talked about it, and he talked about his friend. And this man, Martinez, came forward — he’s dead now — in 2011. And he went to British journalist Anthony Summers, and then to Bob Blakey, who headed the House Select Committee on Assassinations. And he told his story, and he said, “I too believe that Herminio Diaz was involved in the assassination.” He didn’t have independent proof. So there were two people who were not hostile to Diaz, who were friendly to Diaz, who felt this. Guess what pops up in the new JFK files? An informant talked to an FBI agent on November 26th and said, “I think Herminio Diaz was involved in the assassination.”
Peter Isackson: Wow.
Jefferson Morley: Who that informant was, that’s something we’re trying to figure out now. But when I saw that, that’s like, wow. We had no independent evidence connecting him to the event. And now we have somebody saying, four days after the assassination, “Oh, they thought he was involved.” So when people say, “Oh, there’s nothing there,” that’s a very interesting lead, which we are now pursuing.
Potential uses for AI in the case
Peter Isackson: Okay. I think we’ve consumed our allotted time, basically. But I have one more question to ask you, which is more about method than anything else. You talked about the difficulty of handling all these archives… actually, two questions. One: Shouldn’t the people at the National Archives have been organizing all this material?
Jefferson Morley: Well, Trump wanted a good news cycle. They did the thing very hurriedly. And one thing they didn’t do was they didn’t make the documents searchable by doing this thing called optical character recognition, OCR.
Peter Isackson: Yeah. It’s been around for 30 years, yeah.
Jefferson Morley: Yeah. So they didn’t OCR the documents. So the Mary Ferrell Foundation — which I’m associated with and which has the largest collection of online JFK documents — had to OCR the 77,000 pages themselves. Now they’re searchable. So the National Archives is not very up-to-date technologically, let’s put it that way.
Peter Isackson: And the other question is: Are you using AI to do any of this work?
Jefferson Morley: So, yeah, we’ve been exploring. We have an AI project with the computer science program at Duke. And we’ve had some smart young people doing that. People are sending me stuff — “Oh yeah, I talked to Grok. There’s a 71% chance that Angleton was part of a conspiracy.” That’s not a useful way of using AI.
Peter Isackson: I’m talking about using AI with the released documents.
Jefferson Morley: Yeah, yeah, no, so we are looking at how to get AI to interpret and organize documents quickly. So we’re not trying to use AI to solve the crime. That’s kind of a non-starter. But help us organize, sort and get new insights about the records — I think that’s definitely doable. And we’re just at the beginning of that process right now.
Peter Isackson: Okay. Well, thank you very much, Jeff.
Jefferson Morley: You’re very welcome.
Peter Isackson: I have about a hundred and more questions to ask — but I mean, that’s the whole problem with the JFK assassination. Of course, I was 17 years old when it happened, and obviously it affected my life. So I’m curious. Anything you can come up with, I’m interested in.
[Lee Thompson-Kolar edited this piece.]
The views expressed in this article/video are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.
” post-content-short=” Peter Isackson: Welcome to FO° Talks. I’m Peter Isackson, Fair Observer’s Chief Strategy Officer. November 22, 1963 — I know where I was. In the meantime, the mainstream media, despite all its efforts, haven’t managed to silence the plethora of questions raised by that event. Today, we…” post_summery=”In March, the Trump administration released declassified records of the infamous assassination of US President John F. Kennedy. In this interview, journalist and author Jefferson Morley outlines the longstanding institutional efforts to suppress key information about the event, as well as the painstaking analysis of redacted documents. He criticizes media and intelligence agency complicity in distorting the historical record and presents patterns of malfeasance within the CIA as central to the case’s unresolved truths.” post-date=”Apr 21, 2025″ post-title=”FO° Talks: Why the Media Buried the Truth, the JFK Files” slug-data=”fo-talks-why-the-media-buried-the-truth-the-jfk-files”>
FO° Talks: Why the Media Buried the Truth, the JFK Files
Peter Isackson: Welcome to FO° Talks. I’m Peter Isackson, Fair Observer’s Chief Strategy Officer. Today, I’m joined by the talented opera and theater director Emily Hehl. This will be the first in a series of discussions I’ve chosen to call The Culture of Culture. Emily has been hailed as an innovative stage director for both theater and opera. She’s now working on three projects concurrently — correct me if I’m wrong, Emily — in Vienna, as well as being involved in projects elsewhere in Europe and especially in Brussels. So for this first conversation, Emily suggested focusing on the evolution of the classical music concert, a journey through its history, function and audience. Why are we talking about classical music?
Emily Hehl: Well, there is a beautiful citation of Charles Rosen, who was a pianist and musicologist, and he said that “the death of classical music is perhaps its oldest continuing tradition.” I think that’s quite well on point because people keep talking about the crisis of classical music and the classical music events, and we’ve been talking about this for so long, and people have been talking about this a hundred years ago. And so I think it’s interesting to think about this crisis of the classical music, and to think if it’s really the crisis of the classical music itself or about the way how classical music is presented in the institutions or in the forms like the classical music concert.
Audience expectations
Peter Isackson: Okay, so a concert is a public event, independently of the music that’s going to be featured. So before we explore the history — which is what you suggested we talk about, the history of the institution and the role of the public, which I think is a really important thing to assess — I’d like to ask you a very personal question. As someone who doesn’t just organize concerts but designs and produces complex spectacles for the public, can you talk about how you perceive and think about the public’s expectations for a new production? Do you know how they’re going to react? Do you have to do things specifically that take into account a lot of different variables?
Emily Hehl: A new production of opera, for example, or theater?
Peter Isackson: Yeah, yeah.
Emily Hehl: I think it would be ignorant not to think about the people because when I direct, what I care about are the people on that stage and the people in the audience. And the most precious thing about both opera and concert is the fact that this is a live event and that people can react on to things, and that there’s a certain tension and a feedback. And so for me, it’s absolutely crucial to think of this situation of an audience and people on a stage as a starting point, but it is, I think, honestly impossible to predict how people will react because they will react all differently. And that’s the beautiful thing about art — that there is no right and no wrong, but just opinions of people, and there’s craft and all these kind of things. But to really predict how a certain person will react, it’s impossible because people are loaded when they enter a room. You never interact with a blank auditorium because everyone has their expectations, their experiences, their knowledge, their non-knowledge. So yeah, it really depends on who is in this audience. And I think that’s something that can be considered: Who do we expect to sit in that audience, and how can we therefore react to what we put on the stage?
The art of presence
Peter Isackson: Are there surprises? I mean, do you see audiences react in ways that you absolutely didn’t expect? And if there are, what kinds of strategies do you have for adapting? Because doing a complex spectacle is not the same thing as what someone like — I’m a performing jazz musician — it’s much easier for us to say, “Okay, let’s not play that tune, let’s play another tune.” So how does that work out? And what are the emotions that accompany that for someone like yourself, who’s in charge of, I would say, the audience’s reaction in a certain sense?
Emily Hehl: First of all, I would like people to like what they see and to experience something they actually like. There’s directors who say, “Oh, if I get a boo, that’s good, because then they were moved.” But I think that’s a very easy way to get out of the situation that people didn’t like what you were putting on a stage. And the difficult thing about these complex productions is that you can’t change too much the moment it’s on a stage because there is no time to correct. That’s a part of the system we work in. The moment you have a premiere, there is basically no time to really change it anymore. So what I try to do is to keep the people who are on the stage — the performers, the singers — to keep them present as human and not to cover them in a character, but to keep spaces in the production where they can actually interact with the audience or to react on things, and to just keep something that is actually very present and alive: Just a classical music concert, where people are performing music without pretending to be anyone else but themselves performing music. And I think this is why the concert, for me, is such a valuable event, because there is this direct connection between the audience and the performing people, and there is no pretentious character or something around. And so I think I’m trying to actually preserve something of what is happening in concert, sometimes in opera as well, because I think stage and opera and performing arts like this can learn a lot from the idea of a concert. So that’s also why I suggested this theme, is because for me, that’s actually a base to start thinking from when thinking about opera.
Peter Isackson: So are there real possibilities of doing strategic adjustment if you see that some of the effects you anticipated or planned psychologically to produce in the audience didn’t work out in the way you expected? How much leeway do you have to change the performance to meet the goals you’ve defined for yourself?
Emily Hehl: It’s a good question because it really depends on where you’re working. If it’s a very, very big house with a tight schedule — as, for example, here at Vienna State Opera, where I’m currently working — there is literally no time to correct anything afterwards if it regards anything technical. You can always go to the performers and ask them to go more into something or to go less into something else. But I think the most beautiful thing about seeing performances of your own work is that people will react in places you never would expect them to react, and that sometimes they will react differently every night. And also you can trust that the performers will understand how an audience will react, because that’s all they do, is being on a stage, reacting to the reactions of an audience. And I think a way of working in general is to keep a staging as open as possible so that the audience can actually dive into narrations they want to dive into. Whereas when you look at film, a camera tells you where to look at. But in theater — and that’s the reason why I’m a theater director and not a film director — is because I love creating broad pictures, broad images, broad narrations, where the audience, with the kind of load they come into, the expectation they come into, can start choosing their little threads through a story, through an evening. And therefore, yeah, expectations will never be met and will always be — yeah — overmet, if you could say so. Excuse my non-native English speaking sometimes.
Opera planning and production
Peter Isackson: That’s a perfectly legitimate neologism. Typically, how long do your productions run?
Emily Hehl: Usually, I would say it’s something between — like, if we talk about Germany and Austria — it’s something between six and ten performances. And they can be spread over just three or four weeks, but they can also be spread over several months. If it’s a not-so-popular piece or not a so well-known piece, then a theater will try to spread it a bit more so that the people can talk about it, there will be critiques and reviews. So yeah, it really depends on the piece and where you’re doing it.
Peter Isackson: So if you’re running for — or do you know? Do you always know how long it’s going to be? It is all pre-planned?
Emily Hehl: Yeah, it’s pre-planned. That’s one of the horrible — or not of the horrible things, but the difficult things about opera is that usually these things are planned several years in advance. Like, I know now what I’m going to be doing ‘27, ‘28 — that’s the kind of distances. And therefore, opera is also difficult because if you want to make art up to date, or at least in some kind of relation to what is happening in the world, you have to know three years in advance. So that’s one of the big, big challenges. If you want to decide on very exact stage designs or whatever, you don’t know what is happening three years later in the world. And I think there again, a big, big potential of the concert is that it is a lot shorter in preparation, shorter in time, short in rehearsal time. There’s a lot more space to try things, whereas the classical opera — just the institutions — they need this long, long time. And I think, again, there is something where the opera could learn from the concert if we want to be more relevant.
History of the concert tradition
Peter Isackson: This very question of personal curiosity: How much rehearsal is required for an opera?
Emily Hehl: Usually six weeks.
Peter Isackson: Six weeks. And is that a daily ritual?
Emily Hehl: Yeah, it’s a daily ritual. You rehearse usually six days a week, two times a day, one day off. So it’s always really a six-week — you feel like you’re in an intense workshop, kind of like holiday with your team or something. (Laughs) Really, a six-week, very intense kind of stretch. And then you have the opening night. But before you start rehearsing these six weeks, you will have already worked on the piece for several years normally, as a director, with your team together.
Peter Isackson: And are you there full time during the rehearsals?
Emily Hehl: Yeah, I mean, there will be rehearsals which the conductor is leading with just the orchestra, although I always try to even be there because for me, if you talk about opera — for me this is really a horizontal art form. It’s an art form of the collective: the orchestra, the chorus, the soloist. For me, a flute player is as important as a chorus singer or a soloist. And therefore, I think to take — yeah, to bring this up to the same kind of level of importance also in your work as a director — is one of the big potentials and challenges as well.
Peter Isackson: Okay, so now let’s go to the official theme we announced, which is the history. I don’t know if you’ve seen the documentary Howard Goodall did for the BBC — The Story of Music in six installments. I mention it because everyone in the West — you know, we’re talking to people from all over the world — so we’re nevertheless focusing on a Western tradition. And we all in the West, and probably a lot of people in the East, have their own idea of what a classical concert is. And I don’t have to make the case for the importance of classical music because we have so many fantastically talented musicians from the Far East who are playing European classical music and not Chinese or Japanese or Korean classical music. So we all have an idea, that’s why I insist on talking about the concert as an institution. Because it has its history, it has its shape, it has its sense of importance of culture and importance for people in social life, let’s say. So Goodall, when he began writing in the introduction to his series on The Story of Music, which is essentially the story of Western music, he said — something I don’t fully agree with, but it’s typically provocative from an entertainer — “Not that long ago, music was a rare and feeble whisper in a wilderness of silence.” Now, he’s contrasting that with today, where you can just press a button and listen — you know, Spotify — and listen to any bit of music you want, you’re interested in. But I would contest the idea that music was something that rarely existed in a wilderness of silence, which takes us back to the history of the concert. So I don’t know what knowledge you have historically about how music developed in the West, but we know that the concert became — in the 19th century, actually, I don’t think before that the idea of concert existed, but it’s part of that tradition. So just tell me anything we need to know about how the concert evolved and the role of the audience and the presence of music in a public event.
Emily Hehl: Yes, first of all, I won’t be able to, like, hold a lecture on that because I’m an artist and not like a scientist. So whenever I say any of these things, for me, that’s an artistic perspective or an artistic interest. But I think we can learn a lot when we look back where music comes from. And I think the most interesting thing for me when I started reading into that was that music always had a purpose. Like a purpose in the sense of — okay, music was played in church as part of liturgy; or on the court as a part of a status symbol; or as entertainment on fairs or as education in the house, domestic music kind of environment. The music always had a function and a purpose. And there was this time in the 18th century, I think, where for the first time something — it was called a music room — was invented. Which just meant that when people were sitting together in a salon, that the person who was playing the instrument was put on a little table so that the music got more attention. And this was basically the beginning of the idea of a concert, where the attention went more to the music than to the surrounding or the function that the music was fulfilling. And so this idea of the music room basically developed into the concert halls we know. That this music table was the ancient stage, basically, where people would look up to. So the idea that music would have its own place where it didn’t need to serve anything but itself, was the reason why the concert was invented — in order to give it more attention and more concentration. And first of all, I think that’s a beautiful idea and somehow a necessary idea that came in the 18th century also with the bourgeoisie and the middle class. It was self-understanding for these people to have this kind of concert and the concert hall. But then in the 18th century, people would go there, they would talk to each other, there was still, like, pieces of music would never be played completely, maybe just a fragment. Then there would be drinks or a dance or a tableau vivant, and then there would be another piece of music. But bit by bit, in the 19th century, there was a real kind of revolution or a reform of how a concert has to be. And this reform is what we do until this very day. And I think it’s interesting that the way we listen to classical music hasn’t changed in 150 years. It literally hasn’t really changed. The rules are the same, which are: silence; don’t be talking; don’t you dare applaud in between certain movements of one piece; rather 45 minutes, a little break, and another 45 minutes; you should dress up a little bit chic. So these kind of rituals that we have until this very day were invented 150 years ago. Yeah.
Resonance, ritual and physicality in performance
Peter Isackson: What I find curious is that that tradition, which I think we both agree seems artificial in many ways — there are a lot of artificial components to it about what you’re expected to do as an audience, the kind of attitude you’re supposed to have as you listen and the silence you mentioned — that I discovered, became part of the tradition of popular music. The popular music that I know, which is jazz. And that’s a surprising thing because if you know, and if you experience — as I had the opportunity to do — the way people listened to jazz 50 years ago, it was basically in clubs. And the way you reacted to the music was extremely varied. You could get up and move, you could — I mean, if you go back further to the ‘30s, let’s say — jazz actually functioned to allow people to dance. It was dance music. Then it became artistic music in the 1940s, really, with the Bebop Revolution, and the musicians thought of themselves and were very consciously aware of the classical tradition and the seriousness of music, even though at that time—
Emily Hehl: The holiness, one could even say.
Peter Isackson: Pardon, sorry?
Emily Hehl: Even the holiness. Like the seriousness, holiness. It’s the kind of spectrum we move into there.
Peter Isackson: Absolutely. I know that Sonny Rollins, the saxophonist, once was surprised that somebody criticized his music, and he said, “But it’s celestial.” And he expressed something that’s really very recognizable by any serious jazz musicians — but I would say any serious musician — and that is that you’re not just playing for an audience. You’re playing for a tradition, you’re playing for your relationship with the universe. Because music is basically resonance. I mean, you could go into quantum physics and seek parallels, but music is something — and I say that as someone who practices music. But you can be simply a listener, because you have no experience as a player or as a performer, but it’s something that you absolutely feel in a certain way. And you know that, in fact, music speaks for itself. The musician is just an instrument. I say that — classical pianists have said this as well as jazz pianists — they’re trying to express something that comes from somewhere else. No music is totally original. And they’re doing it in a way that they’re discovering as they do it. How they perform is something that they’re listening to and learning from. So that’s where — I don’t want to invent theories, although I’d be very happy to entertain theories about what resonance means in terms of relationship, and not just the frequency of the sounds we’re producing.
Emily Hehl: Absolutely. I think this kind of aspect of relationships that you mentioned is for me one of the most crucial points of — if we think about a future of the classical concert — is because that’s the most precious thing, is this relation between the people and the fact that it is a live event. And if you think about classical music itself, it’s the most current kind of art form you could think about. Because it’s — yes, okay, it’s notes written on paper — but the only way to actually listen to it, that’s the most simple notion, is by someone putting them into a live event, which is very much different from any kind of museum. And I think there’s a big potential and desire in today’s society to experience these kinds of things. But my point would be that the kind of institution of the concert as we have it now banishes any kind of social relation or physical experience. Because that was the idea of this kind of invention of the concert halls was to ban any kind of context, to ban any kind of physical, sensual experiencing. It was the attempt to make music an autonomous thing that would happen only here. Not with your heart, maybe, but it was not meant to be a physical, sensual experience. And in my eyes, that’s a big, big, big mistake. Because if you look at the kind of flourishing concert forms, that’s the exact opposite. If you look at pop concerts, it’s a very physical experience. And I think there is the potential for this experience also in classical music. And I think it’s very remarkable what you said about pianists who want to basically disappear behind their music. Because I was wondering about the organ for a while. Because the organ, I would say, was constructed in a way that you would not see who is playing the organ, but you could only hear the sound, as if it was magic. But for me, if I go into a concert, it’s the most emotional thing to look at the person who is actually playing the music. And therefore, I do have my problems in opera with the orchestra pit, because I want to see what these people are doing. And so I think there is a big kind of aesthetic change possible — not necessary, but possible — to think about the physicality of music and performing music.
Peter Isackson: Perhaps we could do the opposite of what I just mentioned: That in the world of jazz, which existed in a setting where people were doing other things, including dancing — not necessarily only dancing — but there was a sense of permanent interaction between the audience and the performers. And then I would say, really in the ‘70s or ‘80s, jazz moved to the concert hall, and it suddenly became a different kind of experience. And it actually had an influence on the evolution of the music because it put more accent on being a virtuoso and performing something that would wow people in terms of the technical performance, and less on the kind of cultural expression and that human quality that existed in, say, a nightclub. But this brings me back — I actually focused on Elizabethan and Jacobean literature in my university days at Oxford, and I learned at that time that, first of all, that was a very significant moment in the history of music, of European music, of English music, obviously — but significant in the sense that music appeared to be very widespread. People played instruments. There are periods of history when people didn’t play instruments, but that was a period of experimentation with instruments. There were some great composers in the Elizabethan period: William Byrd, Orlando Gibbons, people like that. But the interesting fact I picked up in my studies was that if you went into a barbershop — if there were barbershops — you went to a barber’s, and they actually had lutes sitting there so that someone who’s coming in and waiting to have their hair cut could pick up a lute and start playing. And I thought, “That’s a moment of culture that’s very specific, that’s really doing something to honor music, if you like, by bringing it into daily activities. And then we have periods where music moves away, what you were talking about, when the concert becomes an institution thanks to which you can isolate music from the environment. And then you have also the physical dimension of a theater with a stage, that proscenium arch that keeps the audience on the other side, if you like. So my question is: Can this change? Can we have the kind of phenomenon that we saw in jazz, which went in the other direction, going from an interactive music to a passive audience listening to active performing musicians? And in the classical world, can we come back from the formal concert, with all its rules and regulations, and find and create something more spontaneous? Is it possible?
Emily Hehl: I would say it absolutely is. I think one of the difficulties is that, indeed, as you say, these institutions have these kind of rituals in their architecture. The architecture itself demands a certain way or a certain distance or these kind of things. But I also think that there’s so many aspects of a concert that have this very precious quality, and if we would focus more on this performative aspect, on this human relational aspect instead of, for example, the interpretation of the musical piece itself. Because we have recordings, we have noise-canceling headphones — if it’s about the virtuosity and the perfection, then go and listen to something, because the concert will never be able to reach that kind of quality. Someone will be coughing all the time. You don’t have Dolby Surround. So I think we need to focus on a different aspect, which the qualities of a concert could be. And there is already, especially in contemporary compositions, a lot of things that I think provoke a new way of experiencing concerts. For example, there is a German composer called Georg Friedrich Haas, and he composed a piece of music which is meant to be played in complete darkness. No matter where you play it, it has to be completely dark. It’s an hour-long piece, and this very radically really brings you back to just your inner self because you can’t observe anything. But there was also, like in the ‘60s, ‘70s, ‘80s, Mauricio Kagel who brought theater into music. There’s many musical pieces which are on the edge of theater and music, where the musicians already perform something more than just music. So I think there’s a lot of pieces in the last 50 years, and also in the coming years, that will provoke a different way of experiencing classical music. And I think what we should dare to do is to also look at the repertoire which we love so much and think about ways how to perform this. And for me, one of them — it’s a simple thing — but I was in Zurich in the Tonhalle and there was one of the most wonderful orchestras of Europe playing, and they were playing fantastically. But they were looking as if they were bored, angry. It was just an orchestra of angry people. It was beautiful, but it was horrible to see it, because I felt so distant. So I think if one would even just make people aware of the kind of presence they have — or I think also, if you don’t play for a certain moment, there’s so much like listening to each other, there’s so much potential, although you’re maybe in that second not playing. You can learn a lot from the dramaturgy which we had back in the 17th, 18th century. There is new fields like museum studies. I think that’s a very interesting way as well to bring museum studies back into the concert. There is a new kind of department called concert design starting in the last ten–15 years. And I think there’s a lot of things happening. And yes, indeed, I think that there’s a big potential. And I personally try to start projects in that way — or projects with choruses — or when I get an offer for an opera, sometimes I try to bring it back more to a concert kind of base. So I think we just need to think from different fields onto the concert, because the concert has all of this in it. The concert has all the theatrical elements, all the visual elements, but they are rarely really thought about because we just keep doing it for 150 years.
Music education and commercial culture
Peter Isackson: Yeah, so I would suggest that we need to make a major effort at the level of education of music, I think it’s just been done in a very poor way. And it’s not clear what people in the educational field really want to achieve when they teach music. I think it’s either too technical or it’s too blandly historical. It’s not interactive enough, if you like. But I think there’s a lot of things that can be done. And given the kind of experiments you’re talking about, where we think of the way music is performed differently, education should be feeding into that and reflecting it at the same time. That I think is a major thing. I also think that we have a big challenge in front of us because music has become a commercial industry rather than a cultural reality, and the commercial side has really drowned out everything else to a large extent. I mean, I’m shocked when I see discussions in the media where they say they talk about music, and they’re only talking about popular songs. “We have great music.” “What great music?” “Oh, well, you know, Taylor Swift,” or whoever it is, “came out with a great song.” And we lose track of the reality that music is that lute in the barbershop, as well as the concert hall and Taylor Swift’s latest single. So I think we’ve covered a fair amount of ground there. There’s much more to say, but I don’t want to keep this on for too long. I do want to inform the audience that this is the first in a series. We have other topics planned such as silence in music — we talked a little bit about silence and the concert hall, but silence in music, which is a really fundamental thing as far as I’m concerned, which relates to what I was saying about resonance — culture and art of the future. So we’ve been talking a little bit about how things can evolve into the future, and this is really important because we mustn’t neglect the role that music plays unconsciously for people in their perception of who they are in the world, and even the political relations they have with other people. And then we’ll go on to blind historiography, the power of stories in history. I think you’ll be referring to one of your productions. And I’d like to go on and treat other topics like music, AI and the arts, and ask the question: Is art itself a simulation? I mean, we think it is, but simulation of what? And then another question I’d like to ask: Is anyone listening? And that applies to this podcast as well. (Laughs) So thank you very much. It was great spending this short time with you, but we’ll come back and do a whole series of conversations like this about where we are with the arts and music in particular, as well as opera and theater. So thank you very much, Emily Hehl.
Emily Hehl: Thank you. Was a big pleasure.
[Lee Thompson-Kolar edited this piece.]
The views expressed in this article/video are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.
” post-content-short=” Peter Isackson: Welcome to FO° Talks. I’m Peter Isackson, Fair Observer’s Chief Strategy Officer. Today, I’m joined by the talented opera and theater director Emily Hehl. This will be the first in a series of discussions I’ve chosen to call The Culture of Culture. Emily has been hailed as…” post_summery=”Peter Isackson and opera and theater director Emily Hehl discuss the evolving role of classical concerts, traces their origins and questions their current formats. Live performance, audience connection and the need for innovation are vital in staging and concert design. The conversation explores how tradition, architecture and education shape musical experience — and how change is possible.” post-date=”Apr 20, 2025″ post-title=”FO° Talks: The Culture of Culture, Part 1: The Classical Music Concert” slug-data=”fo-talks-the-culture-of-culture-part-1-the-classical-music-concert”>
FO° Talks: The Culture of Culture, Part 1: The Classical Music Concert
Atul Singh: Welcome to FO° Talks. With me is Jean-Daniel Ruch. He is one of Switzerland’s finest diplomats. He has a sharp mind, he’s a man who spends a lot of time mulling over the state of the world, a wise man, a great sage. And today we’ll talk about International Law in the New Donald Trump 2.0 World. Welcome, Jean-Daniel.
Jean-Daniel Ruch: Thank you very much for having me on the program again.
Atul Singh: Well, it’s always an honor. Jean-Daniel, international law has always been a tricky field. We’ve had Hobbesian conceptions of international law, universalist conceptions of international law, and we now live in a world where Viktor Orbán has just taken Hungary out of the International Criminal Court, the ICC. At the same time, Rodrigo Duterte has been arrested and will now face trial in the ICC. So what is going on these days? Paint us a picture.
Jean-Daniel Ruch: I think we’re at the confluence of various streams. And when various streams are joining, then there are turbulences. This is what happens with water and with rivers, and I think this is exactly where we are. On the one hand, I would say we have the continuation of the world we have dreamed of and mostly Europeans have tried to establish after the fall of the Berlin Wall, which is a world in their image — meaning a world based on a number of international treaties started, of course, with the United Nations Charter, with an executive power which would have been the Security Council, a legislative power which would have been the General Assembly, and the judicial institution. So typically, the three powers of democracies, according to the theory of democracy by Montesquieu from the Age of Enlightenment. Now, since this project was put in place — let’s say, in the ‘90s — and the negotiation of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, which is precisely the judicial arm of the system. Since the end of the ‘90s, a number of things have happened. And actually, what we see with Orbán, with Netanyahu traveling to Hungary, with Donald Trump ignoring totally or despising anything that might restrict the use of American economic, financial, political or military power… What we see is not surprising, because this is the natural result, I would say, of a slow sliding of international law into something that has become more the law of the force rather than the force of the law. In other words, the great powers have tended, on important issues, on key issues like the use of force, to ignore international law increasingly. I would say that there are three defining moments from where this process has been starting. Maybe the first one is the Kosovo wars or the bombings of Serbia by NATO in 1999. This decision to bomb by NATO was taken without the approval of the United Nations Security Council. And by international law, the use of force must be permitted by the Security Council unless you are in a situation of legitimate defense. And it was certainly not the case for NATO in Serbia in those days. The second key moment, which came as a kind of shock — I mean, a terrible shock — for the United States and the world, was the September 11 attacks against the Twin Towers in New York. And at that point, the Americans, of course, they were seeking revenge, they were seeking protection. They launched this War on Terror, which has very few rules, even though the first military operation in the context of the War on Terror was the invasion of Afghanistan. And the invasion of Afghanistan was indeed based on the resolution of the Security Council. So you can say this was a lawful war. But maybe the most important breaking point in the last 30 years has been the war on Iraq. Because the war on Iraq is as unjustifiable as the Russian aggression against Ukraine. There was no direct threat. It was not a case of legitimate defense. There were no weapons of mass destruction, as poor Colin Powell pretended in an ominous meeting of the Security Council. And there was no decision of the Security Council. So in terms of international law, UK said this is an act of aggression. And ever since—
Atul Singh: And we must remind our viewers and listeners that both Germany and France opposed this decision. Neither Jacques Chirac nor Gerhard Schröder went along with it, and Tony Blair’s support of George W. Bush really cost him, in many ways, his legacy.
Jean-Daniel Ruch: Yes, this is absolutely true, absolutely true. I think that this will stay as a dark spot in the legacy of Tony Blair. And quite the opposite, I believe that both Schröder and Chirac — but also Jacques de Villepin, who made this amazing statement in front of the Security Council when Colin Powell was falsely pretending that he had the evidence that Iraq was producing weapons of mass destruction — Villepin, who is back in the public stage in France right now, saved the honor, I would say, of the Western world back in those days.
Atul Singh: And he has support even among socialists because of that, and he may one day be president again. Who knows?
Jean-Daniel Ruch: Well, the line between left and right in France has been pretty blurred since Macron came to power, because Macron comes from the socialists. But then you can say is more of a centrist allied also with forces which you would define as rightist. So I think the political spectrum in France is not so clear-cut as it used to be in the times of Chirac. Whether Villepin has a chance to become the next president, we will see, I’m not sure. I don’t think he — he lacks the apparatus, the political party for that. But certainly his memory is very positive, mostly because of that famous speech in 2003 in front of the Security Council. And here’s a vision, which is a vision precisely based on international law. But the point is here that we have seen a slow sliding of respect for international law by great powers ever since 1999 or 2003. You can talk about the war in Georgia in 2008, you can talk about the war in Libya, you can talk about bombings of the Americans in various places in the world, even under Obama, which lacked, in my view, any sort of legal basis — all the way to the aggression of Russia against Ukraine. So this crumbling of the international law superstructure with international institutions, is not quite surprising because it’s a natural process now, which is, of course, encouraged by the behavior of Donald Trump, who seems to know absolutely no law, no faith, no religion.
Atul Singh: So basically, by your analogy — to take the water metaphor — like water dripping on a stone, it has worn away that bit of the stone, and we now are in a more Hobbesian world.
Jean-Daniel Ruch: Well, definitely in a more Hobbesian world, absolutely.
Resilience of legal institutions and the South Africa–Israel case
Jean-Daniel Ruch: But still, we should not also ignore the forest behind the tree. There are a range of international institutions based on treaties, based on international law, which are continuing to work. I mean, of course, what we see is Gaza, where there is absolutely difference, no respect whatsoever for international humanitarian law, the Geneva Conventions, which regulate the behavior of armies within a war. We see an ignorance of international law, the Charter of the United Nations, in the case of the Russian aggression against Ukraine, just like we’ve seen it when George Bush Jr. attacked Iraq. But still, be it in Geneva, be it in New York, be it in Brussels, don’t forget regional institutions. There are a number of international institutions based on the law which continue to work every day. And then, on the more sensitive issues like peace and war or war crimes, the ICJ and the ICC have proven in 2024 that they can operate, even in this highly politicized environment, and operate in a manner which is honestly very reasonable. Now, we will see. We all know that there are terrible pressures exerted on the members of the judiciary — the judiciaries, I should say, because we are talking about two separate courts in The Hague, both of them are in The Hague — to drop cases, especially the cases against the allies of America, meaning Israel. But so far, they seem to stand their ground — both the personal, but also those who support the courts, who are funding the courts, which are mostly the Europeans and other supporters, like many African countries, South Africa being the most vocal.
Atul Singh: So you mentioned the ICC — the International Criminal Court — and you mentioned the ICJ — the International Court of Justice. Most people don’t know the difference between the two, so please explain. What are these two institutions and how are they similar? How are they different? What is the jurisdiction and what is the status quo right now?
Jean-Daniel Ruch: I think it’s very important to keep in mind that the ICJ — the International Court of Justice — which was created by the United Nations Charter back in 1945, is dealing with states. Its main task is to resolve disputes between states. The International Criminal Court deals with individuals, not states. The International Criminal Court is a court of criminal law. So it is there to punish individuals — and I really have to stress individuals — for their behavior which might be a violation of the Rome Statute. The Rome Statute is sort of the basic law — or the criminal code, if you want — of the International Criminal Court. And the Rome Statute defines what is a war crime, what is a crime against humanity, what is a crime of genocide and what is a crime of aggression. And the International Criminal Court has jurisdiction over the territories and the nationalities and the persons of the nationality of the signatories and the member states of the International Criminal Court, which is by far not the whole world. But if an American or Russian — both have not ratified the ICC, are not members of the ICC — but if a Russian citizen or an American citizen commits a war crime on the territory of a state which is party to the court, then there is jurisdiction over that person. So this is for the ICC, whereas the ICJ reacts to complaints filed by individual states against other states. The most famous case over the recent years has been the case of South Africa against Israel. South Africa pretends that Israel is violating the Convention on Genocide, which was approved after the Second World War as a reaction precisely of the genocide committed against the Jews, the Holocaust. And the court has found that it had indeed jurisdiction to rule over this complaint filed by South Africa. And as a result, in January of 2024, the court issued a ruling which is saying that yes, there is a plausible risk of genocide, and we order Israel to take a number of measures to prevent that crime from happening. Now, there is some correspondence between the two. Because let’s say that the International Court of Justice, in the case of South Africa against Israel, finds that indeed genocide is taking place in Gaza. Then this would have an effect on the International Criminal Court, because it would be almost impossible for the International Criminal Court to ignore that count, that accusation, against the leaders of Israel. And probably they would then have to amend the indictment against the leaders of Israel, and probably they wouldn’t have to amend the indictment against Netanyahu to introduce the charge of genocide. So far, he is only — “only” between brackets — indicted for war crimes and possibly crimes against humanity. Is that clear enough?
Atul Singh: Yes, clear enough. Absolutely clear enough. But states—
Jean-Daniel Ruch: ICJ, states; ICC, individuals. Very important.
Limits of enforcement and the role of universal jurisdiction
Atul Singh: But what is the status quo? Have over the years these institutions suffered? For instance, we know that the ICC is powerful and it tried to bring Kenyan leaders to justice. That case fell apart. We know that the US is not a member of the ICC. We know that Hungary is withdrawing from the ICC. Similarly, we know that Israel and indeed many other countries have regularly ignored the ICJ. So how did they begin? When did they begin? And what is the status quo now?
Jean-Daniel Ruch: Well, I think what we need to say is that one of the weaknesses of the system. If you want, again, to try to think along the lines… we wanted to bring an international system which is a mirror of the domestic system, with the legislative, an executive — the Security Council — and judicial bodies. There is one missing link there, which is a police. You don’t have a United Nations police force. So therefore, these institutions have to rely on the willingness of the member states of the United Nations or of the International Criminal Court to bring those people indicted by the court to justice. In the case of Israel and Palestine, what happened is that in November, the judges of the International Criminal Court issued three arrest warrants based on the indictments: two against senior Israeli leaders, one of them being Prime Minister Netanyahu, the second one the former Defense Minister Yoav Gallant, and also one against the senior Hamas leader Mohammed Deif, the leader of the military branch in Gaza. There were two more indictments requested by the prosecutor against Hamas leaders, but in the meantime they have been killed by Israel — one of them in Gaza and the other one in Tahrir. So these arrest warrants create a legal obligation to all member states of the International Criminal Court, including Hungary. Which means that, in welcoming Netanyahu for a weekend in Budapest, Hungary has violated its obligations according to international law and to the International Criminal Court. But there is no enforcement mechanism, so nobody can really take sanctions. The International Criminal Court can only complain. It can say that Hungary has violated its obligations, but it will have no legal or practical consequences, I’m afraid.
Atul Singh: So that means, without a police force, in a way the court depends upon whoever brings a case to justice and the will of strong states to apprehend culprits or to impose some kind of order.
Jean-Daniel Ruch: Yes. You know, for instance, we had a similar dilemma when I worked for the Yugoslavia War Crimes Tribunal. This was actually the precursor, the pioneering work together with the tribunal on Rwanda, which then led to the creation of the International Criminal Court. The International Criminal Court has a universal jurisdiction, whereas the ICTY — the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, or the one for Rwanda — had a jurisdiction limited to the territories of Rwanda and of the former Yugoslavia, and also limited to the duration of the war. So we had the same problems. When I joined the Yugoslavia War Crimes Tribunal, we had about 20 or more indictees — people indicted for war crimes or crimes against humanity or genocide — who were at large, and we had no police force. So what we did, we put pressure on the states sheltering these war criminals through the European Union, mostly, and the USA. We were lucky, because all of these states aspired to join the European Union. So the European Union put in place what they call political conditionality, meaning, if you want to make progress toward the European Union, then you have to deliver the persons indicted for war crimes to the tribunal. And it worked. At the end of the day, all our indictees ended up behind bars and in front of the court, and most of them were sentenced heavily. Some of them were acquitted — which I wouldn’t consider unfortunate — but this is justice. I was part of the prosecution, so when you’re a prosecutor, of course, you want to see the people you have indicted being sentenced. But at the end of the day, 92 senior officials — political leaders, military leaders, militia leaders — were sentenced by the court, which is a pretty good result in terms of justice, maybe the best. And from all sides — this is also important to underline—
Atul Singh: After all, all prosecutors measure their success through convictions — and you did a bloody good job by that metric.
Jean-Daniel Ruch: Well, of course. Now, if you look at the number of crimes committed between ’91 and 2000 on the territory of the former Yugoslavia, there were many more hundreds of perpetrators we would have liked to bring behind bars. But this was not possible for that court, of course, it was too small. And there you have to rely on the domestic judiciary. But of course, we were lucky, because we had the most significant powers for that part of the world who were really supporting us — especially the European Union. I must say, after the September 11 attack, the Americans lost interest. They continued to pay lip service, but their real interest was in the Middle East. And they moved all their assets — you know, intelligence assets and things like that — to the Middle East, because they were preparing for what was to follow. But the difference here, if you consider the case of Israel–Palestine in front of the ICC, is that the main power in the world is actually protecting the Israelis. It doesn’t mean it has no impact at all. To give you a very precise, concrete example: It seems that the airplane of Mr. Netanyahu, when he left Budapest to go to America — because he went to Washington after Budapest — he made a detour because he was afraid to overfly some countries whom he believed might arrest him should there be an emergency landing. So he had a few hundred kilometers… he had to turn around, for instance, the Netherlands, of course, which is the host of both courts. Another thing is, so it means, basically, that Netanyahu or Gallant cannot travel anymore anywhere in the world. There is a risk. I can give you also a few other examples, because many countries in the world — and most of them member states of the International Criminal Court, including Switzerland — they have in their criminal legislation something called universal jurisdiction. It means that for international crimes — the crimes I have mentioned before: genocide, crimes against humanity, aggression and war crimes — there is jurisdiction even if the crimes were committed elsewhere in the world, and even if no Swiss citizen was involved. So I was confronted — I was ambassador in Israel — with two cases where senior Israeli figures either had to shorten their trip in Switzerland — that was the case of the former Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni — or eventually renounced their trip to Switzerland — that was former Prime Minister Ehud Olmert — because of the risk that they could be prosecuted in Switzerland, for crimes committed in the context of a totally different operation; nothing to do with Gaza today. It was another military operation in Gaza in 2008–09 dubbed the “Cast Lead,” which was also hundreds of civilian victims. And when Tzipi Livni was in Switzerland, an NGO filed a complaint against her, and there was a real risk that she could be brought in front of the federal prosecutor. And the same thing would have happened if Ehud Olmert, the Prime Minister then, would have come to Switzerland. So still, these instruments — international criminal law — it may have some deterrent effect on some of them. And it may pose a risk when they travel. Another example from last year is this Israeli soldier who was stupid enough to boast with videos of him in Gaza looting houses. An NGO found out that he was in Brazil. Brazil, who is a member of the court, who is also the system of universal jurisdiction. And they filed a complaint against him, and the Israeli embassy, I guess, managed to extract him before he was arrested. So basically, each and every Israeli soldier who has been involved in the war in Gaza runs the risk of being arrested depending where he’s traveling. But places like Brazil or Western European countries — maybe not Hungary now — are unsafe for them. And there are NGOs who are reviewing all these videos, all the materials you find on the Internet, to try to identify the names of the soldiers, put them on the list and make sure that they are being arrested, or that a complaint is raised against them should they travel in a country where there is universal jurisdiction.
Israel, antisemitism and the ICC’s global reach
Atul Singh: I see. So some would say that this universalism, in a way, is new imperial and even antisemitic. That’s what you hear a lot, especially in Israel.
Jean-Daniel Ruch: Well, I think this is wrong, because the ICC has been prosecuting people all over the world. I think that their prosecutions are based on the merits of the case. And then you have also a number of levels of checks and balances to make sure that the prosecutor cannot raise an indictment or issue an arrest warrant without any checks and balances. The indictments and the arrest warrants have to be reviewed by a chamber of three judges, and they are the ones, at the end of the day, who take the decision on the basis of the request from the prosecutor. So that’s one thing. The second thing is that, as we see, Israel is certainly by far not the only state which has been — and it’s not about states, it’s about individuals. So not only Israeli citizens have been targeted by the prosecutor for war crimes or crimes against humanity. I would say it is rather the opposite which is true: Israel has been enjoying for far too long total impunity. Because the crimes falling under the jurisdiction of the ICC are not new. In Article 8 of the Rome Statute, where they define all the war crimes, there is one of them which is exactly the settlement enterprise. So from that point of view, I think it’s pretty easy to argue that each and every illegal settlement — and they are all illegal — so each and every settlement in the occupied Palestinian territory is a war crime. And this has been going on since the ‘70s in total impunity. We now see also that crimes are not being punished inside the judiciary, even crimes which are very well documented by the Israeli system. And you have also NGOs in Israel — like Breaking the Silence, B’Tselem — who are extremely professional in documenting war crimes. But it almost never happens that there are proper investigations and prosecutions and convictions of persons involved in war crimes in those wars. Because one thing that has to be underlined that I have not underlined before is that the International Criminal Court functions according to the principle of subsidiarity. It means that the prosecutor has to prove before opening a prosecution that there was no proper prosecution in the domestic system. So if Israel would properly prosecute its soldiers or the persons having committed crimes, for instance, in Gaza, then there would be no need for the ICC to get involved. Now, I think you know this is a defense mechanism that has been built over the years, and I would say more forcefully over the past years, which is that every criticism of Israel becomes immediately antisemitism. Frankly, I think it is bad, because there is antisemitism. There are rising antisemitic acts and talks all over the world, including in Switzerland, including in European countries. And by enlarging that much the scope of the definition of antisemitism actively, you sort of reduce its legitimacy or its credibility, because everything becomes antisemitism. So I think really that this is not good. This way to define each and every criticism of Israel as antisemitism is diluting the power of the truth for the legitimate critique or the legitimate actions in prevention measures where truly antisemitic acts are taking place.
Duterte, Kenya and the ICC’s political dilemmas
Atul Singh: So let’s go back in the past and talk about Kenya, where the ICC initiated a prosecution and then it spectacularly fell apart. Do you think the allegation that arose in Kenya — that this was a new imperial institution which tried African leaders in Europe, which imposed universal standards of justice just as Europeans had once tried to enforce universal religion — has any merit?
Jean-Daniel Ruch: I don’t think so. Well, certainly the prosecution did a very bad job. And the justice, the ICC, did not do a good — actually, it’s a good job when you have people who are acquitted. Well, I mean, it means that justice works both ways also. I think when you have opponents to Putin who appear in front of Russian courts, it does not happen very often that they are being acquitted. So the fact that people are acquitted is also saying that this justice provided by the ICC is fair. Now, the criticism about neo-imperialism I think is really far-fetched because Kenya joined, as a sovereign state, the ICC, recognized the jurisdiction of the ICC. Plus, when the troubles happened — I think it was in 2008 — that you had this post-electoral violence in Kenya. Obviously, the Kenyan system, the Kenyan judiciary, was not in a position to do its work of justice for the crimes committed in the course of these riots and acts of violence. So I think there is another cause, maybe more important, in the criticism towards the ICC: that it was a court designed as a kind of neo-imperialist instrument against African countries. The argument is that in the, maybe, ten–15 first years of its existence, it dealt only with cases in Africa. And it didn’t deal with cases outside of Africa — for instance, the Iraq war. And I think that’s maybe one of the reasons why many in Africa have designated this court as an imperialist instrument. But I think now they cannot use this argument anymore, because you have the Philippines, Duterte, and you have Israel–Palestine.
Atul Singh: So let’s talk about the Philippines leader, Rodrigo Duterte. He had pulled out of the ICC, but now he’s been arrested by the ICC, and he will be tried. What’s happened there?
Jean-Daniel Ruch: Listen, I’m not familiar with all the legal details. But what any state can do — and this is based on the status of the ICC — is to request, even if you are not a member, to recognize the jurisdiction of the court for a specific duration of time. For instance, I know the case of Palestine a bit better. I know that in the case of Palestine, once Palestine obtained the status of an observer state at the United Nations, immediately they approached the ICC, and they asked the ICC to investigate — even retroactively — on crimes committed on the territory of Palestine, meaning the occupied Palestinian territory: Gaza, the West Bank and East Jerusalem, from 2014. And that gives the authority and the jurisdiction to the International Criminal Court to do this sort of investigation. So again, I’m not too familiar with the case in the Philippines, but I can imagine that something like that happened.
Atul Singh: Alright. So basically, some say that Marcos used the ICC to settle a domestic political score. Yes, of course, the state arrested Duterte on an ICC warrant, but many say it was convenient — it was fundamentally a political vendetta. What do you say to that?
Jean-Daniel Ruch: The eruption of politics into criminal law is an old story. There is nothing new to that. I’m pretty confident — because I know some of the judges and the judicial personnel in The Hague — that this is certainly not the political calculations they had in mind when they issued the indictment. It seems pretty clear to me that their base, their logic — and this is sometimes a challenge when you are in the prosecutor’s office in The Hague. You receive all sorts of pressure telling you, “You know, if you indict that one, that will create chaos in the country,” — so many states can try to interfere and push you in one direction or another. And I know that some of these personnel in the ICC have been trained in the Yugoslavia War Crimes Tribunal, where the line has always been: You do your work on the basis of the legal merits and never on the basis of political calculations. And I think that principle is what they have used. If you look at the situation the other way around: Imagine what would have been the reaction if the court had said, “Oh yes, this guy is a criminal. I mean, the indictment is very convincing. We have all elements to indict him and issue an arrest warrant. But because it’s a political calculation and it may be a political vendetta in the Philippines, we’re not going to do it.” I mean, they would not fulfill their mandate.
Atul Singh: So the challenge then is that you’re damned if you do and damned if you don’t. Now we are living in a new world. Donald Trump is now president again. The US is not a member of the ICC. As you said, it developed cold feet after 9/11. He does not seem to have much interest or respect for either the ICC or the ICJ. And of course, Viktor Orbán has withdrawn from the ICC. What exactly is going on? Do you see more pressures on both these institutions and on international law as the far right rises, even in Europe — and, of course, not to mention all the other things happening around the world: increased violence, extrajudicial violence as well — for instance, in Mexico, Brazil and elsewhere?
Jean-Daniel Ruch: Yes, I think you’re absolutely right. Times are getting tough. And when times are getting tough, you have to count on powerful supporters also to counterbalance the attacks you will be subjected to. And the only forces I can see who can counterbalance the wind which is coming from those, let’s say, rightist, nationalist, conservative movements who believe in the law of the force rather than in the force of the law, is to maintain a very strong Europe allied with Latin American, African and some Asian countries to uphold the importance of international law. In the case of the International Criminal Court, those states are mostly the European states, who are also defenders of the court. So we have to count on France, Germany, the UK, Spain, Italy and a few other states — the Nordic states, of course — to be principled and to continue to invest into that court. Which is — frankly, I think in a way, it’s a good thing that they are very much in the media today. Because it raises attention to them, and to the power they have, and to the deterrent. And maybe that can create a deterrent effect for future warlords or future leaders when they enter a war. Frankly, have you ever thought about the financial investment? Do you know what is the budget of the ICC and the military budget, for instance, of the United States? The budget of the ICC per year is exactly 4,400 times lower than the military budget of the United States. So with the military budget of the United States, you could create every year 4,400 tribunals. So you can say that having a court is a cheap investment and potentially, it may have a big impact. So I think it would be wrong for all peace-loving countries who believe in international law, even though we are now going through difficult moments, to give up. Quite the opposite: It is the time when we have to reassert the legitimacy of this court. Now, of course, we don’t know what will happen in Europe. We don’t know who is going to come to power over the next 20 years in the main European countries. But there is something I’m sure of: Deep inside, the drive, the greed, almost, for justice will not disappear. Because this is maybe the thing which is the most common in mankind: the sense of justice. And you see that — when you have kids, you have two children, you give a chocolate to one of them and not to the other one, of course the other one will feel a sense of injustice. It is as basic as that. And this drive for justice in whatever form will continue to animate the human soul and human feelings for as long as there is such a thing as mankind.
Atul Singh: So Jean-Daniel, point taken. But debates about what is justice go back thousands of years. Is it retributive? Is it normative? Is it restorative? What exactly is justice? Come on, Plato was discussing it. People in the East were discussing it. The Old Testament and the New Testament have different ideas of justice. And whilst you’re absolutely right that yes, there is a desire for justice that animates the soul, it’s more difficult to agree upon what exactly is just. And also, it is in human nature to bend and break those laws of justice and to be unjust, too, because human beings are complicated. So it’s a song and dance that seems to be going on at all times.
Jean-Daniel Ruch: Yes, and I understand the complexity of the matter. I think in the United Nations, they have thought a lot about that and they have elaborated a kind of concept of what they call transitional justice, which is based on four pillars. One of them is the punishment — so that’s what you would call retributive justice. Another one is the right to know — so the right to truth is also part of the justice process. And actually, if you look at the truth and reconciliation commissions that happened in various places in the world — thinking more about the successful ones. In my view, less South Africa, and more maybe Colombia or Guatemala. And then the third principle is the right to be sure that this will not happen again — so the non-recurrence or non-occurrence right.
Atul Singh: Preventive, deterrent.
Jean-Daniel Ruch: Yes. States have to take the measures.
Atul Singh: Yeah, you don’t really want to punish somebody who’s a pickpocket — you don’t want him to suffer, but you want to make an example out of him so that others don’t become pickpockets.
Jean-Daniel Ruch: Yes. And then we can go into details on all these four principles. The last one is the right to compensation for the loss and the sufferings you have. But you’re absolutely right: If you take the principle of the truth and reconciliation commission, the idea is to depart from retributive justice and to say, “Well, what is more important is truth and forgiveness. And to have truth and forgiveness, we can make an arrangement with you. We know you have committed awful crimes, but maybe know they were not the most serious.” So you come, you tell your story, you bring truth — which is also a way to bring relief to the victims or the families of the victims — and then either you’ll have a lighter sentence or you will have no sentence at all. That’s the way truth and reconciliation commissions have been working. So I think you have all these elements. There are also some traditional ways — especially in Africa, probably elsewhere also — to deal with justice. For instance, if somebody is caught committing an awful act — not talking about war crimes there — then the whole community is meeting on the main square of the village, or in some cases, it’s still under the tree, I hear. And then the guy is sort of confessing his sins and talking about that. And then the community will sort of forgive him and go back to a situation of harmony. Because these unlawful actions are destroying the harmony of the village, and what is more important for the village than punishment is to restore the harmony of the community. So there are all sorts of very interesting mechanisms, you are absolutely right. But when it comes to very serious crimes — the most serious crimes committed by very senior officials — I think it’s very difficult for any domestic judicial system to do a trial. You know, I think when you talk about Duterte — definitely, if he had been tried by the judiciary of the Philippines, first, there might have been all sorts of pressure, intimidation, blackmail, maybe worse, against the judiciary, so it’s difficult. But then it would have appeared as a political vendetta, and then it would have been much more difficult because of the political implications of such a trial in Manila. So that’s why also there, I think, for such cases, you need — as a kind of last recourse, not as a first-instance jurisdiction, necessarily — but as a last recourse when no other judicial or non-judicial means can be found, then I think the ICC remains a court which makes sense and which remains important. And I really hope that, despite all the tremendous pressure they are subject to, we, the Europeans; we, the Africans; we, the Asians; the Latin Americans — we will stay firm, and we’ll continue to work for a world. Because at the end of the day, what is it about? It is about a world which is ruled by dialogue, by the law — and not by the force. Because I’m very much afraid that these confrontations we see now — now it’s a trade war between China and the United States — but you never know how this can escalate one day. And mankind has much more, I would say, challenging issues than trade wars — I’m thinking, of course, about the climate and the consequences of climate changes, like migrations, like the preservation of resources also, including the soils. These are the key issues for the survival of mankind. And it’s just bad that we’re distracted by other things, like the ego of the most influential man in the world.
Atul Singh: Alright, so let’s talk about states that are not party to ICC. America is not a party to ICC. Russia is not a party to ICC. China is not a party to ICC. India is not a party to ICC. Pakistan is not a party to ICC. Saudi Arabia is not a party to ICC. Iran is not a party to ICC. I doubt Turkey is a party to ICC.
Jean-Daniel Ruch: It’s not.
Atul Singh: Yeah, so the leaders of the Muslim world — where there’s two powers, one where you have Mecca, and one which is a descendant of the Ottoman Sultanate — the former Shia empire, India, Pakistan, China, Russia, US… this is — geographically and population-wise — much of the world. So can the ICC exercise jurisdiction here? Is it even possible?
Jean-Daniel Ruch: Well, legally speaking, they can. Putin has been indicted by the ICC. So, in principle, Putin cannot travel to any of the member states of the ICC. I recognize absolutely that the absence of the most populous and probably soon-to-be the most important countries in the world, and the wealthiest countries in the world, is a serious weakness. But let’s not forget what I told you before: that each and every state which is a member of the ICC — or even not — any of these leaders who commits war crimes or crimes against humanity can be prosecuted by the countries under universal jurisdiction. So there is still, I think, a deterrent effect even against these big powers, just that they don’t really realize it. Because yes, they feel they can do whatever they want in all impunity. Look at the bombings in Yemen over the past weeks. Now first, you really wonder: What is the legal basis in domestic American law to start these bombings? Because I cannot say that the Houthis were representing a direct threat on the national security of America. And even so, I thought that there was something called the War Powers Act, which was obliging the Congress to be involved in the decision to go to war. So we know that there are civilian victims there — probably there are war crimes being committed there by the American bombing, indiscriminate bombing, is an indiscriminate attack against the civilian population. One cannot exclude that one day some court or NGOs will investigate these cases, will find out the names of the commanders who ordered those strikes, and may start judicial processes. This is theoretically and practically absolutely possible, because we have also seen that, for instance, against Olmert or Tzipi Livni. So yes, this deterrent effect is not being felt so much by the powerful people in the world today, but it’s not sure it will not happen in the future. You know, when the Yugoslavia War Crimes Tribunal indicted the then-President of Serbia, Slobodan Milošević, everybody was thinking, “This is ridiculous. This guy will never end up in front of the court. He’s so powerful, everybody is courting him, we need him to maintain stability in the Balkans. Without him, the war will restart.” And what, six years later, he was in The Hague? So you don’t know how the world will evolve. And maybe we one day will realize that it was a very wise investment — and a very cheap one — to continue to support the ICC.
Justice, state fragility and the role of the UN
Atul Singh: Alright, let’s talk about the ICJ. Because the ICJ looks at states. But we are seeing many of the states under pressure. Syria, as a state, is under pressure. We’ve had violence. Sudan split into Sudan and South Sudan. A lot of African states are under enormous pressure and may disintegrate. Myanmar is going through its own version of civil war. Afghanistan, you could argue, is a state of sorts. What happens in a world wherein states become failed states or split apart? I mean, that scenario exists for all large countries, too. After all, Russia, China, India and the US could all break into constituent parts.
Jean-Daniel Ruch: Yes, well, I don’t think you can ask any international institutions, and certainly not a judicial institution, to prevent a failed state from falling apart or falling into a—
Atul Singh: I’m not asking that. I mean, it’d be tricky to censure a state, right? If the state itself is like, “What is Syria?” You know? If you censure Syria, it’s like, “What is Syria right now?”
Jean-Daniel Ruch: I think Syria is not the worst case. I think one of the difficult ones would be Somalia. Would be Sudan—
Atul Singh: Yemen, even Yemen.
Jean-Daniel Ruch: Or Yemen, of course. Yemen also. So definitely there you wonder who is the real… because some of the big powers are supporting the official government, some others are supporting opposition or rebellious groups. This being said, in all these countries, you have sort of official representatives of these states. I mean, those sitting under the UN, for instance, the diplomats of Sudan or Yemen sitting at the UN have an official status and represent officially the states, even though sometimes their government does not control much of the state. And this is true also for a number of African countries.
Atul Singh: Even though sometimes they may not support the government — at least not in private! (Laughs)
Jean-Daniel Ruch: Well, you know, it’s a bit tricky to be the diplomat representing a country which is failed, which is split. Because what happens when there is a change of government? Look, I think you had the case with the Syrian ambassador in Russia this week, who was recalled to Damascus and sought and received political asylum in Moscow. So it is always dangerous as an individual to represent such regimes — especially in the case of Syria, when the regime of Bashar al-Assad was actually a criminal regime. But there, I would say forget the ICJ, the ICC. They were dealing with political issues and military issues and security issues. And in an ideal world — but we are far from living in an ideal world for the reasons mentioned before — but if the dream that those who won the Cold War in the early ‘90s had been implemented, then in all these cases we mentioned — Libya, Syria, Yemen — you would have had a consensus of the Security Council to dispatch military and political force in Yemen, in Sudan, in Libya, to restore order and put back on track a political process between the various parties. Now, since the permanent members of the Security Council have not been able to agree on anything meaningful regarding peace and war — probably since when? Since Libya, I think, over the past almost 15 years? You cannot really rely on the United Nations to play this role. Although, there are some interesting signs and we don’t know where it’s going to lead. But this new sort of temporary-or-not honeymoon between Russia and America can lead to surprising results. After many, many years where really there was no breakthrough in the UN Security Council on conflicts, this year, surprisingly, the United Nations Security Council approved a resolution calling for a ceasefire and for peace in Ukraine. Well, it’s the first time in almost 15 years that Russians and Americans could force a decision of the United Nations Security Council on a situation of conflict. So God knows, maybe those two, maybe with the support of China — we don’t really know where the world is going. As I told you, the water is bubbling in all directions, and we don’t know where it can lead. But sometimes you have a positive result, also surprisingly positive. Maybe the talks between Moscow and Washington will lead to more stability and more predictability in the world, God knows. But I think with China and India, it could be much more promising. But there are sometimes some interesting developments. Let’s dream a little bit: What would happen if the Russians, the Americans and the Chinese in the Security Council would agree on sending a peacekeeping force to Ukraine? A peacekeeping force with a military component, but also a political component, to supervise new elections in Ukraine? Well, I guess the French and the British would have to go along. And nowadays — it was unthinkable until 20 January, 2025, that something like that would happen. Nowadays, frankly, we can be surprised, and sometimes positively.
Atul Singh: On that positive note, Jean-Daniel, thank you for your time. We look forward to having you back.
Jean-Daniel Ruch: Thank you very much, Atul. And you know, I’m always trying to see the positive, and always trying to be optimistic, even in the dire circumstances we live through today.
Atul Singh: All for the best in the best of all possible worlds, in the spirit of Voltaire, Candide. (Laughs)
Jean-Daniel Ruch: Absolutely. I’m a bit like Candide.
Atul Singh: Thank you.
Jean-Daniel Ruch: Thank you very much, Atul.
[Lee Thompson-Kolar edited this piece.]
The views expressed in this article/video are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.
” post-content-short=” Atul Singh: Welcome to FO° Talks. With me is Jean-Daniel Ruch. He is one of Switzerland’s finest diplomats. He has a sharp mind, he’s a man who spends a lot of time mulling over the state of the world, a wise man, a great sage. And today we’ll talk about International Law in the New Donald…” post_summery=”This conversation with Swiss diplomat Jean-Daniel Ruch explores the erosion of international law amid rising geopolitical tensions, with particular focus on the ICC and ICJ under US President Donald Trump. Powerful states increasingly bypass legal norms while institutions like the ICC exert limited deterrence. Justice remains a vital global aspiration.” post-date=”Apr 19, 2025″ post-title=”FO° Talks: International Law in the New Donald Trump 2.0 World” slug-data=”fo-talks-international-law-in-the-new-donald-trump-2-0-world”>
FO° Talks: International Law in the New Donald Trump 2.0 World
[This is the final part of a nine-part series. To read more, see Parts 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8 here.]
Josef Olmert: Hello. This is going to be our ninth and last episode in the current series about Syria. And I need to start with a methodical comment, I should say, because people ask me, knowing that’s going to be the last episode in this series, as to, “Why didn’t you talk enough about that issue or about this issue?” And obviously, Syria is a complicated, diversified and very important country. There’s so much to talk about, so I promise that I will talk more about certain aspects of the Syria situation in another series or in a couple or three more video presentations later on, and I will announce it to my followers on Facebook, on YouTube and all that. So this will happen.
Western media and grounded reality
Now, about what has happened in Syria recently, I have to again and again emphasize the fact that the media in the West — I have to say it. It’s not a campaign I conducted against the media in the West, but I want my watchers, my listeners, my followers to know what really is going on in Syria. There are lots and lots and lots of troubles between Sunnis and Alawis. Mostly the Alawis are now the victims. And the videos that come out from Syria — and they are authentic, they are authentic — are very bad, are very disturbing and should arouse concerns about what really is happening. Also, there are videos that show clearly that despite the image that the leaders of the new regime, particularly Ahmed al-Sharaa or al-Julani, are trying to portray about moderation or a more realistic approach, there are signs of attempts to enforce religious behavior. You see more and more women with the hijab in a lot of the videos, as opposed to before. And there are stories about the enforcement to do so and so on. And of course, the problems between the Turks and the Kurds in the northeast of Syria continue to simmer. So there are lots of issues that put together form a picture of a very fluid, unstable situation in Syria that doesn’t necessarily come to the attention of the world media. And it should, because we need to know what’s going on. Otherwise we shall be again surprised, like we were surprised so many times before, or at least those who were surprised — not everybody was as surprised. So today, in our last episode of this series, I would like to make some very concrete comments about what’s happening and will happen in Syria in the foreseeable future.
Elections and representation
And let’s start with the question: What government is Syria? Is the current guys that are in Damascus — al-Julani or Ahmed al-Sharaa, the people around him — are going to be the government of Syria? Or there might be elections? I would say that we cannot see or foresee — and that’s maybe a prediction — a situation whereby Syria will be conducted by a group of people that were not elected for a period of time that will be more than, say, a few months or so. It’s not that Syria has a tradition of elections. They used to have elections in Syria. There were elections in 1949, 1954 that were relatively democratic. But they don’t have a tradition of elections. So if this group of people, if this coalition of Islamic or Islamist groups, will continue to rule Syria without elections, there will be troubles. There will be also troubles if there will be elections, and the results will be the usual in some Arab dictatorships — of the 99%. There’s not going to be 99% in the real elections in Syria. You know, it used to be under Hafez Assad, under Bashar Assad. And you know, Hafez Assad was elected president for seven years, the term was, and it was like 99.96%. And then seven years later, it was 99.97%. And people asked me at that time, “What’s going on?” I said, “Look, he’s become more popular — from 99.96 to 99.97.” But we know, of course, this was elections. So we’ll see what happens about that. My prediction is there won’t be real elections in Syria that will be democratic on the basis of one person, one vote. And if there will be elections, there will be sham elections. Real elections in Syria should reflect the cleavages of society according to religious, ethnic and other divisions. I’ll say, to some in surprise, “Look, in Iraq, there were relatively free elections after the fall of Saddam. Under the American supervision, but they were more democratic than any time in Iraq before and maybe in most Arab countries at any time.” And what they showed was the role of local forces, of ethnic groups, of religious divisions as part of the overall new political fabric. Civil wars in countries like Iraq or Lebanon or Syria brought about a real breakup of society according to bases of loyalty that were primordial, traditional. And at the time of conflict, people went back to the original basis of their social and therefore political loyalties. And that was reflected, at least in the case of Iraq, in the results of elections. So if there will be real elections in Syria, there should be representation for people representing different regions, even within the Sunni community. And there are differences between Hama, Homs, Aleppo and Damascus. There are many differences. Regionalism is very significant. There will have to be representation for the various communities: the Kurds; the Druze; the Alawis, of course, they should be represented; the Ismailis, which is a Shia sect; the various Christian groups. And there are quite a few: Armenians, Assyrians, alongside the Greek Orthodox and the Greek Catholics of Syria and others. The Turkmen — there are lots of Turkmen people in the north of Syria, more than what people know about, over a million. It’s a large group of people. And the Turks will take care and they will be represented. So that remains to be seen, and that will be a test. So to sum up this point, there are not going to be real democratic elections in the foreseeable future. And if there will be elections, and the results will be the usual 90-whatever, you know it was sham elections. Real elections will show all those divisions that I talked about. They will have to show them if they are really real.
Islamization and social tensions
Islamization will be significant, even if these people claim to be more moderate, which is very logical for them to say and do and very clever politically, because they need to show a nicer face in order to be able to then talk to other governments and ask for economic aid or any of those, or political aid, diplomatic aid, diplomatic support. There will be definitely an Islamization in society that again will create issues with the religious minorities. Arab Sunnis in Syria are 55 to 60%. That means 40 to 45%, definitely around 40, are not Sunni Arabs. And any Sunni Islamization process that will be enforced from above is bound, therefore, to cause troubles. Very obvious it’s going to happen.
Regional relations and internal divides
When we talk about foreign relations of Syria, obviously Iran is out of the game. The question is the level and the depth of Turkish support to the new regime and influence over it. And we talked a lot about the Turkish part of all this. Iraq, neighboring country, Sunni Arab minority. Will they be encouraged by the new regime in Damascus? Possibly. Not necessarily going to happen. My prediction: will not be a major factor. More important is the connection between the Kurds in Syria and Iraq. That could be a much bigger problem for both the Syrians and the Iraqis. The Druze in the south will not like to separate themselves in any formal way from the Syrian state. Never mind what some agitated Israelis have in mind about that. It’s not going to happen. But I can see, and I believe it will be, an informal Israeli zone of influence in parts of south Syria bordering with Jordan as well, inhabited by the Druze of the Jabal, of the mountain, that will make sure, from their perspective, because of their interest, that the border will not become a zone of hostilities between any government in Damascus and Israel. And that will be a difference from what it was when the Assad regime was so much dominated by Hezbollah, the Iranians, that tried to turn the Syrian side of the Golan Heights into a zone of conflict with Israel. And what Israelis are doing in Syria or have done in Syria to destroy any presence of hostile elements in those areas of Syria was intended to make it easier for the local forces that are there to keep stability along the border, which will be their interest. The real problem will be between the regime in Damascus and the Alawis. Killing Alawis in the streets now, of cities in Syria which are not Alawi-dominated, is terrible. It’s one thing, though. Trying to invade the mountains and really take over the entire mountainous region of the Alawis and then enforce a regime upon them would lead to a bloodbath, to a real major bloodshed. It hasn’t yet happened. Hopefully, it will not happen. But then the question is, what will be the representation of the Alawis in the new regime, in the new parliament that will be in any body of influence in the country? It will be very small. And you can’t ignore a certain percent of the population if you adapt to this. Also the 2% of the Ismailis — about 50% that are closer to Shia Islam than to Sunni Islam.
Sectarian dynamics, regional influence and outlook
And, of course, the question of the relation between Syria and Lebanon. In a famous speech in 1976, when Hafez Assad justified the Syrian invasion of Lebanon during the Lebanese civil war at that time, he said in simple words, Syria and Lebanon is one country, is one nation. That’s the typical Greater Syria approach that was adopted by the Ba’ath regime, even though originally, it is the approach of the Syrian Social Nationalist Party of Antoun Saadeh, the SSNP, that was mistakenly in French called the PPS. It’s not the right acronym in Arabic. The Syrian regime now will have to let the Lebanese conduct their affairs by themselves, and they will have to leave Lebanon for itself. Lebanon will have its own problems. We don’t talk about Lebanon now. They elected a new president, he talks a lot about changes, and all this remains to be seen. We always have to take with a grain of salt what Lebanese politicians say, particularly after they are elected. But that remains to be seen. So Syria and Lebanon will not be one country, one nation. And that also depends on the Iranians. If Iran is not allowed to move anymore from Iraq via Syria to Lebanon, the Iranian influence in Lebanon will have to be weakened, and will be weakened. And it will be not totally destroyed. There are Shias that are always supporters of Iran — many of them — but it will be decreased dramatically. And it also depends on Israel, how Israel would tolerate or not any attempts to recreate connection between Syria and Lebanon that would have also adverse repercussions on the border between Lebanon and Syria. Now we come to the last point about this — foreign affairs — and this is the role of the powers. Russia is out of the game. There are talks about, if vacuum created by the absence of Russia, China will move in. Remains to be seen, I doubt it. There’s an opening here for other countries. The question really is, who would fill the vacuum? Mostly, initially, it will be by Turkey. But the Turks cannot do in Syria what everybody said that they intend to do. They don’t have the funds, the financial resources, the economic resources rather, to reconstruct Syria. That will have to come from the Gulf countries, which as of now keep their hands off. They’re very careful and will remain careful for time to come. And, of course, the role played by the US. What will the Trump administration do? Surely, they have to make sure that the Kurds’ virtual autonomy in the northeast will be maintained, but to try and do it in a way that will prevent Turkish–Kurdish war. That remains to be seen. I doubt whether the Trump administration will invest too much money in Syria or at all. So we are going back to the EU. Somebody will have to put some money because Syria is a ruined, destroyed country after all those years of civil war. And if you don’t rehabilitate, reconstruct, rebuild Syria, there will not be stability there. Doesn’t matter who rules the country. As of now, we hear statements from the Europeans about the desire to accommodate themselves to the new regime. And al-Julani shows how moderate he is, and visits by the German and French foreign ministers and all this. But in the meantime, no money is coming, and money will be the key here. I will leave you with that, because we can go on and on like this. But the picture coming or emerging — isn’t that the main point? Syria is in a very bad situation. Rehabilitating, rebuilding a country after such an atrocious civil war is not a simple matter. And even if you can establish some political institutions that will be considered representative, to rebuild the relationship between the various communities is another story altogether. The same problem in Iraq. We have the same problem in Lebanon. We have the same problem in Libya. We shall have troubles in Syria. We shall have troubles by Syria. We shall have troubles connected with Syria. And therefore, there will be more talks from me, more presentations, but not immediately. I will let you know when we shall do more. So I will leave you with that. Sometimes people like an end to a story like this to be a happy end. The history of Syria over 100 years is not a happy history. I have no reason to believe that we are witnessing now a dramatic departure from traditional Syrian history, unfortunately. Thank you, my friends.
[Lee Thompson-Kolar edited this piece.]
The views expressed in this article/video are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.
” post-content-short=” Josef Olmert: Hello. This is going to be our ninth and last episode in the current series about Syria. And I need to start with a methodical comment, I should say, because people ask me,…” post_summery=”Professor Josef Olmert analyzes Syria’s unstable political future, emphasizing the unlikelihood of democratic elections and the deep societal divisions along ethnic and religious lines. He highlights foreign influence, especially from Turkey and Iran, and the region’s reconstruction challenges. Despite hopeful narratives, Syria’s complex history suggests ongoing turmoil and limited prospects for lasting peace.” post-date=”Apr 18, 2025″ post-title=”FO° Talks: Josef Olmert on Syria, Part 9: Predicting Syria’s Future” slug-data=”fo-talks-josef-olmert-on-syria-part-9-predicting-syrias-future”>
FO° Talks: Josef Olmert on Syria, Part 9: Predicting Syria’s Future
[This is the eighth part of a nine-part series. To read more, see Parts 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 here.]
Josef Olmert: Hello, I’m doing today the penultimate one, which will be a summation of the main points which I made until now. And then the next one will be like some, if you will, assessments/predictions about the foreseeable future of Syria as a result of all that we have discussed until now and the recent developments there. When we talk about recent developments, I would just mention that there still are clear signs that despite the impression created in the Western world, mainly because of the Western media — which, as usual, particularly, the American media — doesn’t really cover what really is happening on the ground. The impression is that Ahmed Sharaa, or Abu Muhammad al-Julani, the leader of the main group that took over now in Damascus, Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham, that he is in full control of Syria and is the new ruler. And it is not the case. I repeat, this is not the case. I’ll give you an example. His people sent a convoy, a kind of military-civilian convoy, to the Druze areas of South Lebanon in order to assert their authority there. And they were basically sent back after the Druze threatened to resist violently because, from the Druze perspective, any future of South Lebanon — something that we already discussed in this series, and I will come back to this later on today — has to be negotiated between them and the government in Damascus. Which is to indicate to you that the Druze will insist from now on — and I will explain more about that — some kind of autonomous self-rule regime in South Syria, more or less like the SDF or the Kurdish people are demanding and still experiencing and exercising in the northeast of Syria.
Historical context and persistent instability
So that’s just an indication of how fragile, still precarious, all these so-called central regime in Damascus. And another point about that is that when we look at the media in the West and the way they cover the situation in the Middle East, there’s always this tendency to apply impressions that we have about our own systems in the West to the other side of the world — in that case, the Middle East. And because we see al-Sharaa now in a suit and tie sitting in his nice chair in one of the buildings that they took over in Damascus — so there is a new government, there is a new regime and there is stability. No, there isn’t, and it doesn’t work like that. And it doesn’t work like that because of what we have seen in this series. So let’s sum up, therefore, the main points of what has really happened in Syria, which was leading to the current situation, to the downfall of the Assad regime. I will start with the most fundamental basic point, and this is that Syria, as of 1920, for over a century, has not been able — I will repeat, has not been able — to establish a legitimate, stable political entity which is supported by the vast majority of its people. Whether they like every aspect of government in Damascus or not, but because they share some common values — a fundamental kind of values basis for agreement between various groups, various ethnic groups, various religious groups. And because they share all these values, they accept whatever is the regime in Damascus as a legitimate and stable one. It has never happened in Syria. And the greatest failure, of course, of independent Syria since 1946 — until 1946, you could always argue it’s the fault of the mandatory system, the French. And yes, the French did apply divide and rule in Syria, promoting the Alawis, for example, to an extended role; the Christians, not really touching upon the Kurds in the northeast — all in order to weaken the Sunni Arab majority. And then they created Lebanon, separated from Syria, carving it up from Syria. Yes, but the French basically were playing up, not creating, divisions that existed before for centuries. This was the history of all this region. So the failure of the Syrian state at the end of 1946 was exactly that: the inability to overcome all these problems and to create a stable state. Syria is therefore the modern country of the failing Middle East state.
The Ba’ath regime’s contradictions
In the case of Syria, it was even more dramatic than in other cases, for example, because for three and a half years, between February of 1958 — as we mentioned — and September of 1961, they even agreed to cancel their own separate independence and to unite with Egypt, the much bigger and stronger Egypt of Nasser, into the United Arab Republic, as it was called, which was basically Egypt plus greater Egypt, because they did not find a way to maintain Syria as an independent state. So much so, the failure was so big. The Ba’ath regime gave you the aura, the soul, the sense of stability. Because you can argue they existed from 1963 until 2024 — that is to say, over 60 years. But even that was not the case for various reasons, because the ironic situation is — and this is something that has to be dealt with more extensively in a separate maybe series, but definitely not in this one, but I will mention it and just say something about it — the basic historic irony of the Ba’ath Party is that the party claiming to be the biggest, greatest, most comprehensive embodiment of Arab nationalism, of Pan-Arabism, became — and we talk about Ba’ath in Syria, not about the Ba’ath in Iraq — in the case of Syria, they became the party of the minorities, which through its so-called secular character of the party tried to create a political community which will surpass the ethnic and religious differences and give the minorities the sense of sharing in the running of the state, of equality. But this was resented by the Sunni majority from day one.
Assadism and the end of Syrian statehood
The Sunni opposition to the Ba’ath regime was already in place in 1964–65, and in the same places where it would be later on, on occasions — central Syria, Hama, Homs and other parts of Syria — with the Sunni alliances, so to speak. And the Ba’ath regime already in 1964–65 was bombarding mosques, attacking the Sunni population, even more so after the rise of the so-called Neo-Ba’aths in the coup d’état of the 23rd of February, 1966. And definitely after Assad came to power finally as the one and only dictator as of November of 1970, in what they called Harakat al-Tashih, the Movement of Corrections — that is to say, correcting the early Ba’ath regime. The Ba’ath regime of Assad was basically a three-pillar kind of regime. It was Ba’athism as the framework of political legitimacy. It was Alawism as the main force which really upheld the regime and kept it going. And it was Assadism, because of the personality cult of Hafez Assad and his family. And his family, by the way, is just one part of one of the four big confederate tribal connections of the Alawi community — which is, again, something that should be much more detailed and developed in a series like this. But we couldn’t do all this in this particular series. I still keep the option open for more on Syria in the foreseeable future, and there will be — in which I will dwell more specifically into any of the main communities in Syria, their history, their religion and so on and so forth. So the failure of the Ba’ath regime of Hafez Assad to create this real unity — other than using brutal force — and then of his son, Bashar, is the failure of the Syrian political entity as such. Syria failed to become a legitimate, united, stable political entity. It failed. And now with the rise of the Muslim, Islamist rulers — the Islamic, the Sunnis, whatever we would call them, Jihadists — pick out your name. This might be another attempt to create a community. Pan-Arabism failed, Ba’athism afterwards failed — by pan-Arabism, I mean the unity with Egypt and Ba’athism in Syria. And before, the various attempts at parliamentary democracy, with all the coup d’états and so on and so forth. So what we see really is not just the collapse of the regime. It is another dramatic indication of the collapse of the idea of statehood in a country like Syria. And the name of the new rulers, Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham — Bilad al-Sham is more than Syria and its current borders. It is another, not-so-implicit indication of the problematic of the Syrian existence. What? Where? How? What’s Syria? What borders? Is it Bilad al-Sham, which is Syria, Lebanon, Israel, Palestinian territories, Jordan? Wow. Is it only Syria? And the problem about identity throughout Syrian history has not been just one that was exemplified by the changes in the Ba’aths’ own ideology — from pan-Arabism, unity with Egypt, to particular Syrianism. Look also at the Syrian National Syrian Party of Antoun Saadeh, the famous SSNP, the party that talked about Greater Syria, the party that was supposed to be the enemy of Ba’aths ideologically, because they were pan-Syrians as opposed to pan-Arabists. And later on, they started to cooperate with each other. But they also — the Palestinians — talked about Syria beyond its borders today. That is to say, the problem of Syrian stability and legitimacy, as was exemplified by the downfall of another attempt at creating one state which seemed to be working because it lasted for so many years, the failure of all that is maybe indicating something much more fundamental: the artificiality of the entire political system that was created in the Middle East after the First World War. The creation of states that did not really reflect stable, long-standing historic geopolitical contexts, entities, legacies. Syria is the example of that, and that’s what happened in Syria. So before we talk about the chances of the new regime in Syria — the ability of the new regime to survive — all this has to be seen in historic perspective. And the perspective is that, until now, any attempt in creating stability in Syria failed. So it is too early, far too early, to already give praise to a new regime like, “This is the new Syria.” Maybe the new Syria in terms of who is sitting in the palaces of power in Damascus. But it will not be a new Syria in terms of the final creation of a stable, legitimate, everlasting political entity. So that remains to be seen. And this is basically the main something, the main item, the main topic that I wanted to emphasize in this series. Next time, we shall talk about some future predictions in terms of the specifics of Syria’s relations with other countries and also the domestic situation in Syria. That remains to be seen. Again, it will be a very careful attempt to make some predictions. It is still a fluid, not-so-stable situation. Thank you very much for your attention.
[Lee Thompson-Kolar edited this piece.]
The views expressed in this article/video are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.
” post-content-short=” Josef Olmert: Hello, I’m doing today the penultimate one, which will be a summation of the main points which I made until now. And then the next one will be like some, if you will,…” post_summery=”Syria has repeatedly failed to establish a stable, legitimate political entity since 1920. Despite Western media portrayals, current control by Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham is fragile and contested, notably by the Druze. This instability reflects deeper historical, ethnic and ideological fractures.” post-date=”Apr 13, 2025″ post-title=”FO° Talks: Josef Olmert on Syria, Part 8: Unstable Political Structures” slug-data=”fo-talks-josef-olmert-on-syria-part-8-unstable-political-structures”>
FO° Talks: Josef Olmert on Syria, Part 8: Unstable Political Structures
Peter Isackson: Welcome to FO° Talks. I’m Peter Isackson, Fair Observer’s Chief Strategy Officer. It’s my immense pleasure to welcome back the talented opera and theater director Emily Hehl. This is our third edition of a series of conversations we’re calling The Culture of Culture. Our focus in the series has been on music, theater and storytelling. Today, we’re going to explore what some might consider to be a total paradox: the role of silence in music. So Emily, let me start with the paradox itself. People think of music as an activity focused on the production of organized, well-executed sound, which, in their minds, is the antithesis of the ambient silence we are surrounded by, or what at least we used to be surrounded by, until modernity imposed on us a background of sound effects. But to ask the question: Is it wrong to assume, as some people do, that music and silence are opposites? So is silence the negation of music, and music the negation of silence? I think you’re going to say no, but let’s hear you.
Emily Hehl: (Laughs) Otherwise, this conversation would be over quite soon, I think, indeed. No, I think they are the condition of each other. And I think the kind of thing you describe, which is our, I would say, Western perception that silence is the absence of something is very much inscribed in our whole culture. I mean, if we look at the Christian creation story: “In the beginning was the Word,” and the Word was the beginning of everything. Whereas if you, for example, look into Icelandic creation stories in the Edda — I’ll read a little thing at the beginning of the Edda:
“Erst was the age | when nothing was:
Nor sand nor sea, | nor chilling stream-waves;
Earth was not found, | nor Ether — Heaven —
A Yawning Gap, | but grass was none.”
So in other creation stories, the nothing was the actual beginning of everything. Or, if you look into, for example, Japanese culture, there is a word for the space between two things. If you have two objects, the word ma describes the space between things, whereas we would say here — or I would have said before — there’s nothing. There’s an actual word for the apparent nothingness. So I think to look at silence from this perspective is very, very interesting. And in both culture, literature, music, it opens an immense possibility of what silence, and therefore music, could be.
Peter Isackson: Yes, I mean, I suppose you can go into the technical side and say there isn’t a musical phrase that doesn’t use silence. For it to be a musical phrase, it means that there is silence after it and before it. And it’s a kind of frame which is active in itself. That’s one way of looking at it.
John Cage’s perspective on silence
Peter Isackson: But I’ll throw out another metaphysical question to try and reframe the way people make this radical distinction between music and silence: Would you agree — and I don’t necessarily agree with it, I’m just throwing it out there to see whether it makes any sense — could you say music is complex and silence is simple? Or would you want to say the opposite?
Emily Hehl: No, I think for me it’s actually music and sounds are almost the same in a certain way, because both require listening in order to be perceived. And I think the whole definition of silence itself is something that John Cage turned over completely. I mean, if we want to talk about music and silence, then John Cage is probably the first man to talk about, with his famous composition that probably most listeners know, 4′33″. But he didn’t only compose—
Peter Isackson: That means four minutes and 33 seconds.
Emily Hehl: Exactly, of apparent silence. But what you will hear is that there is nothing as acoustic silence. I think it’s important to talk about something like acoustic silence — the physical state of silence — and something we feel as silence, some kind of an inner silence. Because I think you can feel an inner silence in an acoustic, very loud city, like I’ve just been to Asia and Hong Kong and Korea, and I was shocked, because wherever you go, there is loud music on the streets. Every speaker has some kind of music. It was a real cultural shock for me, but it felt quite empty at the same time because there was, for me, no purpose for this music or this sound at that point. So that was a very lively example of inner and outer silence not being the same kind of path. And I think about this inner silence — so many people in cultural history have tried to express their feelings of this inner silence. And there is this term of how we need to “break the silence.” And so there’s all of these kinds of descriptions of silence which are completely independent of the, I would say, physical state of silence. And yeah, would you agree with that?
Peter Isackson: Oh yes, totally. But going back to your comment about Asia, about what you experienced in the streets of Hong Kong. I mean, that reminds me of my youth in California, where people had just discovered — I mean, we’re talking about the 1950s and 60s — people had discovered that it was easier to sell things if you had some uninteresting music, really, in the background that was just keeping their brains occupied or their senses occupied, in a way that they weren’t even aware of. We called that muzak, and apparently that’s a big thing in Asia.
Emily Hehl: I think so, too, yeah.
Peter Isackson: So that’s our commercial consumer society. And that makes me wonder about the John Cage piece, because obviously, that was a shocker when it happened. It was a performance that lasted four minutes and 33 seconds. And of course, physically, how did it work? There was a…
Emily Hehl: There was a pianist, and it was a few movements — I think three or four movements. And in between the movements, he would actually close and open the piano again. But then during the movement, he’s sitting there — or she — and waiting until the time is over to then start the next movement. And so there was no expected sound on the piano produced, but the actual sound the audience was confronted with was their own sounds. Like, if people cough in the audience, this was the performance. This is the piece that Cage wrote. It’s not the sound coming from the piano, but—
Peter Isackson: It’s not even the sound sources that are important. It’s the resonance and the echo of the random sounds.
Emily Hehl: Exactly, absolutely.
Peter Isackson: The ambience.
Emily Hehl: Yeah. And with this realization that there is nothing as acoustic silence, we would think, “Oh, if we shut up, there is silence.” But no, there’s always something if you give attention to it. And this piece did something to that. But it’s connected to a long research period of Cage, and he wrote a lot about this. He had an experience at Harvard University where he went into an anechoic chamber, which is meant to be the quietest place on Earth, basically. And he went in there, and even there, he heard two tones — a high note and a low note. And he was asking the guy in this chamber, like, “What is it? Why do I hear two notes when it’s meant to be this silent place on Earth?” And he said, “What you hear is your nervous system in operation and your blood circulation.” Whether this is true or not, I don’t know. I didn’t do any scientific research on it, but it’s an interesting perception to say, “You know what? Acoustic silence doesn’t even exist in that sense.”
Peter Isackson: That’s true. People who analyze the problem of tinnitus have — I’ve read things about it. I don’t have it. I’ve never suffered from tinnitus. My wife suffers from tinnitus, so that’s why I’m somewhat curious about it — but they say that it’s not reasonable to think that we should have silence. That, in fact, we don’t have silence because our bodily functions are actually producing something we don’t interpret as sound because it’s so permanent. And the way our brain functions with the ear is to be on the lookout for things that are happening outside. But things are happening inside, and that’s part of our system of processing sound.
Emily Hehl: Absolutely.
Peter Isackson: So to answer my own question, is music complex and silence simple? Silence is not simple.
Silence in opera and poetry
Peter Isackson: But I think you’ll agree that music is complex, because as a producer of opera — I mean, people who think about opera might say, “Well, this is very hypocritical of you to be talking about silence and music, because opera just inundates you and surrounds you with music that comes first of all from the orchestra, and then you’ve got the voices on top of it.” So tell me, is there an approach to understanding and integrating silence into an opera production?
Emily Hehl: For me, it is absolutely crucial. Because if you look closely in the scores — and therefore you really need the scores, you can’t listen to a recording, you need the score — composers often indicate when things should happen. And mostly the actual important actions happen in silences. Like, if you look at La bohème, for example, the moment where the candle goes out or the candle is being turned on, there is no music whatsoever. And I think this is very interesting that many, many composers in the history of opera put these crucial moments into silences because they don’t want to find music for it, or because they want to give the attention to the scene. And I personally think that the actual art or performance of music happens in between the notes and not in the notes. Like for me, it’s crucial — why does a piece of music even start? And what happens in between the music itself? It’s there, and it can be performed good, and even better, or moving, or whatever. But for me, the moments in between the notes is where performance and connection happens. So I try to really think from a standpoint of silence. In my studies, I was writing an opera together with an Irish composer based on silence. So we did an opera based on all these questions of silence. And we were diving also into a lot of poetry, because in poetry, silence is even more present, also in a visual sense. I think actually it’s quite interesting to look at silence in literature and music, because in literature, in between words, there’s basically nothing. So the only way to see the nothingness is the words. John Cage actually did a composition on that. It’s called “A Lecture on Nothing,” and it’s something that is written in a 4/4 kind of rhythm. And he spaces the words out, and therefore you see the silence in between, and you also hear it when you perform it. It’s a very interesting piece. “Lecture on Nothing” by John Cage.
Peter Isackson: I’ll look that up.
Emily Hehl: Yeah, it’s beautiful. But then in contrast, in music, you have an actual sign system for rests. So I think that’s the real opposite if you like literature or music, how these art forms deal with silence. In music, it’s considered a creative kind of state, whereas in at least Western literature, it’s more like the gap, the missing bit.
Peter Isackson: Well, you know, the final words of Hamlet as he’s dying on the stage is “silence.” It could be an example of interpreting musical notation, because the rest is silence, the rest of the notation.
Emily Hehl: Never thought about that, yeah.
Peter Isackson: But that brings us to — because you quoted that passage from the Edda — Shakespeare. One of my favorite Elizabethan poems was written by — I don’t know if you know Thomas Campion, who was a poet and a musician. He was a composer. He was one of those great Elizabethan composers — that was the era of William Byrd, Orlando Gibbons and Thomas Campion, who was also a poet. And I’ll read the poem to you, and I think you’ll appreciate it.
“Rose-cheeked Laura, come,
Sing thou smoothly with thy beauty,
Silent music, either other sweetly gracing.”
That is very Platonic. It develops, and it’s about beauty. But he sees the music as being silent and as being more expressive because it’s silent. But I’ll go further. Then he says:
“Lovely forms do flow
From consent, divinely framed.
Heaven is music, and thy beauty’s birth is heavenly.”
But then the next stanza is the one that I like the most:
“These dull notes we sing
Discords need for helps to grace them.
Only beauty purely loving knows no discord.”
The idea that — it tells me a lot about — I mean, it reminds me so much, as a part-time musician myself: “These dull notes we sing / Discords need for helps to grace them.” And when I studied music in high school, I studied harmony. And we were taught, in the background was the idea that discords are bad. You have to avoid them. And here is Thomas Campion, a fantastic musician — I think you’ll love it, you should listen to some of his pieces — telling us we need discords for helps to grace. So you construct harmony and the discords are what put something slightly out of joint, which makes you realize what you’re listening to and the value of what is harmonic. And I think it’s the same thing — that’s what you were saying about silence — is what makes the music become music.
Emily Hehl: Hmm. Yes, it’s a beautiful, beautiful experience. Thank you for that. And it reminds me also of — do you know George Oppen? Also a poet — American, British, I think — who also, in his poems, you can visually, actually see the silence. But there’s also all these unspoken things. I mean, if we then talk again about this inner silence, there are so many composers and poets who refer to that. I mean, even Wagner or Maeterlinck, Debussy, but then also more contemporary composers like, I don’t know, Eugène Ysaÿe, there is a whole list. The further we go in repertoire, the more important silence becomes. But already with Wagner, the roaring, the sounding silence was a very famous term for Wagner.
Peter Isackson: Oh, really? I wanted to ask about Wagner, because yeah, I’ve always had a problem with Wagner. Anyway, I’ve always taken seriously the remark sometimes attributed to Mark Twain, that goes, “I was told that Wagner’s music is better than it sounds,” which is a great remark. But what impresses me with Wagner — because I’ve had a love-hate, mostly hate, but some love for Wagner — is his ability to stretch things out and to avoid resolution. Because music is based on — I mean, the whole harmonic principle is creating things that are harmonic sequences and then resolving. And yeah, there are classic ways of resolving from the dominant to the tonic and so on. But Wagner really pushed it as far as you could go, as if he was holding off the silence as long as possible, but leading you to expect the silence.
Emily Hehl: Yes, very true. Yeah, he wrote about — like his term is das tönende Schweigen, which means that the silence is very much audible, actually. He used this term, I think, for Tristan. But yeah, I think just the concept of silence started long before John Cage in music. And I mean, of course, there are many composers who use silence as material for composition, as also poets use silence as material for their literal composition.
Cultural perception of silence
Emily Hehl: But I think if we talk about silence in music, there are so many other factors connected to it, because we’ve, in our first conversation, talked about the frames of perception of music. Like, our classical concert is based on silence. We talked about this back then, that there was this kind of reform revolution where — because in the past, people were just talking and chatting and eating and perceiving music at the same time — but there was a very strict moment in history where people said, “And now we listen to music in silence.” So I think silence in music is a lot more than just the composition, but the whole culture of perceiving and listening to music. Which is beautiful, because I think if you question where this inner silence is coming from, it’s usually a lack of resonance. Like the question, where do I need to say something in order for it to be heard, or in order for it to get a response? If we talk about breaking the silence, if there is some kind of a resonance, then you can eventually overcome this feeling of silence. And in order to create this, you need someone to listen, and therefore you again need silence. So I think silence can be something very, very important. I don’t want to do a bit of silence-bashing here. I’m a big fan of silence. But I think it’s not as simple as we think it is.
Peter Isackson: No, and I’ll give you another example. I was explaining this to a colleague — that I very much get unnerved, really, by the kinds of things I see now in the videos people produce on TikTok and the short videos where people explain things. The way they edit their films, they edit out all the silence. So you get to the end of a sentence, and the next sentence has already begun. And I say they’re cheating because silence is where we can digest. The little pause, even a tiny pause between two sentences, and the sense of rhythm that you get when you’re speaking — especially in a language like German or English or Italian — not so much in French. But that rhythm is what allows us to process things. And then the rhythm at the end of a sentence, as I was saying about musical phrases as well, is where you can digest what you’ve just received.
Emily Hehl: As we do at night, as well.
Peter Isackson: That moment is the most important moment. It makes me think as well about another aspect of music, which I actually worked on with some young Indians in India a couple of years ago, where we did some work for underprivileged Indians. And given the way they speak the Hindi language or any of the Indian languages and then use that system of musical structure when they’re speaking English, it makes it kind of difficult for English speakers to understand them. And one of the things I noticed is that the Indian — at least their perception of English, and I haven’t studied this in detail — they see the staccato aspect of English as being the thing to rely on. So what you get is a very staccato production of English, whereas English also, even though it is a stressed language, it’s legato. And that’s why in English, in contrast to the other European languages, the vowels are relaxed — which means that it’s very difficult to distinguish the vowels in English, which makes the consonants more important. So it is staccato, but the legato is what gives the legato moment between the accents — is where things are processed.
Emily Hehl: Yeah, I fully agree. And I think it’s very interesting to — yeah, when traveling or when being abroad — to look at how a certain culture deals with silence, because it is so, so very different. And also what you said, like these resting moments, it’s so crucial. But again, this is a way of looking at silence not as nothingness and the absence of something, but as something actually very, very valuable and necessary. And I think that’s something that in at least the German or Western culture that I’ve experienced, this idea of silence is not very present. People are regularly afraid of silence, and feel that it would be the lack of something. And I think in music, this is so substantially different, that we can learn a lot from silence and music.
Peter Isackson: So the message, I think, is that silence is getting bad press. And that’s a direction our culture has taken, which is highly regrettable.
Emily Hehl: Yeah. But also something I think that has been there from Christianity on. Like again, in the beginning was the Word. Like, that’s how the Western culture, also from a religious perspective, was designed, one could say. Like, the concept of silence in this Western kind of culture is just very, very different. I think not very healthy, necessarily.
Peter Isackson: There was something else you wanted, I think, to talk about: degenerate music? And I was wondering…
Emily Hehl: Oh right, I completely forgot about that. (Laughs)
Peter Isackson: I didn’t get the connection with silence.
Emily Hehl: I mean, if we again look at music as a broader thing than just one piece, then of course we can look at the performance aspect, as we just did a little bit, or the aspect of perceiving music, but then also at the aspect of repertoire, and what is being kept in repertoire and what isn’t. In our last conversation, we were talking about Auguste Allmé, who’s a basically forgotten composer. So like, this apparent silence of, for example, female composers or whatever. Or also pieces and works of music that were destroyed in the ‘30s in Germany and then are now slowly being rediscovered. I think that’s very important as well. If we look at the repertoire of music that we’re currently performing, to not assume that this is everything that has been there. Like, if we would look at things that are there as something that is just referring to what is not there, we would have a lot broader perspective on the world and on the musical repertoire. Because next to Mahler were many, many composers in his time that are not being performed anymore; maybe for reason, maybe not. I honestly forgot I mentioned it, but now that you say it, I think it’s a way of looking at repertoire and what do we play? What do we—
Degenerate music and the unspeakable
Peter Isackson: What is degenerate music? I mean, the Nazis had their idea…
Emily Hehl: Exactly. That’s what I was referring to. Because of course, me growing up in Germany, that’s the most discussed part of history. And this kind of silence that was created from such a big group of composers is astonishing, it is, yeah. So this responsibility also to either revive these pieces or to keep things alive that are currently in the danger of being made silent, I think, is another aspect of silence and music for sure.
Peter Isackson: What about the unspeakable? That’s another thing that we think about.
Emily Hehl: I think the unspeakable is a beautiful, romanticized word we’re using a lot, and that has been used a lot, especially in the 18th and 19th century, and that many composers of that time always refer to — also Wagner or Debussy. And I think it’s something we all know, which is that we feel things which we seem to not be able to express. And music, from time to time, succeeds in expressing these things — or at least gets us closer to expressing things or feeling things. But I think the unspeakable is one of the most mysterious moments of silence. Yeah.
Peter Isackson: So what do you mean by unspeakable? Because if we take it literally, it’s something you cannot speak. There must be a reason for not speaking it. So are we reflecting about the reason for not speaking it? What characterizes it as unspeakable?
Emily Hehl: I think that’s very individual. I’m not even referring to this as a personal experience. It’s just in the research of this opera I did a few years ago, we were doing a lot of research on silence in culture. And for example, people who experience things and they say they can’t speak about it because it’s too brutal. Or if you, for example, look at the poem, “Todesfuge,” a very, very famous poem that Paul Celan was writing after his experience in the concentration camps. And he published this poem, and he was accused of speaking about things no one should be able to talk about, and he was accused for talking about it. Because what happened back then in the ‘30s and ‘40s was something that was unspeakable — that no word could express the horror. And I think that’s something that is not only a description of this time, but about many, many things that happen to people — that they say no words can actually describe what it means, in a positive or in a negative sense.
Peter Isackson: Wasn’t it Adorno who said that—
Emily Hehl: Exactly, it was Adorno, yeah.
Peter Isackson: —That it was impossible to write poetry after the Holocaust?
Emily Hehl: Exactly, yes. And I don’t agree with that, because I think everything is worth being talked about. And I think we’re now even in a culture where we may be talking too much — where a bit more silence would be necessary. Which then again refers to the thing we said before, which is that you need silence in order to hear something. Like, of course, if there’s too much of this roaring silence, it’s a very oppressing feeling. But if everyone is talking at the same time, no one will hear what is actually happening. And the inner silence won’t be resolved, because there is no moment of resonance.
The act of listening
Emily Hehl: And I think that’s the whole thing about witnessing or experiencing some kind of liberation of this unspeakable or inner silence, whatever we want to call it; someone who listens to you is the most crucial thing. And therefore I think listening is as important as speaking. And therefore the silence is as crucial—
Peter Isackson: Which is the point Cage was making, right? And it occurs to me, in the case of 4′33″, that he may have been doing several things at the same time. He was making a comment about music itself — what it is and who we are as we listen to music. So it’s about the act of listening. I think he was probably making a point — and you’ll be able to say more about this than I — about composition. What this says about the notion of composition. For example, does a musician, a composer actually compose, or does the music compose itself? That’s another type of question. But where does musical inspiration come from? Does it come from the mind of the composer? Or does it come from some collective source? And I tend to believe that music always comes from a tradition and different traditions, and then it’s crystallized in some way by the composer. But it’s done because silence has also intervened. Otherwise it would be pure imitation.
Emily Hehl: Absolutely.
Peter Isackson: And then the third thing is, was Cage intending to make a comment about the consumer society? Will people pay for something that isn’t produced, organized and well-executed? Everything has a value in terms of what kind of effort went into it and what kind of marketing and branding we can do with it. So I expect — I don’t know whether Cage was a social critic or critic of the consumer society — but I expect that there’s that dimension to it as well.
Emily Hehl: I think so, absolutely. And two things I want to say about that the kind of thing you describe also with the listening and responding, if we look at jazz — and you’re the specialist in that one — that’s the only way how jazz could even possibly work. If we don’t have a kind of written composition, if we look outside the classical repertoire of music, most other forms or roles of music can only work by silence and people listening and responding. And then the other thing you said about this marketing kind of aspect, almost. We’re now in a time where meditation becomes very popular, or these kinds of silent camps where you go in order to not talk for a few days. And this, again, is being, I think, very much popular on the market. So it’s an interesting change in time, which I think can be something very good, something very productive. But it’s also dangerous because again, this silence becomes something to be a part of marketing something.
Peter Isackson: Yeah. Well, I think we’ve pretty much used up our allotted time.
Emily Hehl: We have.
Peter Isackson: And I’m sure we could both go on for quite a long time about this. And I think the message — because we were talking about marketing at the end of it — the message is, we need to better brand silence so that people can buy into it.
Emily Hehl: Yeah, yeah. As you said, the rest is silence, so.
Peter Isackson: Exactly. Yeah, let Hamlet have the last word.
Emily Hehl: Absolutely. Thank you, Peter.
Peter Isackson: Okay. Thank you, Emily, and we look forward to the next meeting.
Emily Hehl: Absolutely. Thank you.
[Lee Thompson-Kolar edited this piece.]
The views expressed in this article/video are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.
” post-content-short=” Peter Isackson: Welcome to FO° Talks. I’m Peter Isackson, Fair Observer’s Chief Strategy Officer. It’s my immense pleasure to welcome back the talented opera and theater director Emily Hehl. This is our third edition of a series of conversations we’re calling The Culture of Culture. Our…” post_summery=”Fair Observer Chief Strategy Officer Peter Isackson and opera and theater director Emily Hehl explore the paradoxical role of silence in music, culture and human experience. They reflect on composers like John Cage and Richard Wagner, as well as poetry and cultural traditions, to reveal silence as a powerful, overlooked element. Silence is essential, expressive and deeply meaningful.” post-date=”Apr 12, 2025″ post-title=”FO° Talks: The Culture of Culture, Part 3: In the Beginning, There Was Silence” slug-data=”fo-talks-the-culture-of-culture-part-3-in-the-beginning-there-was-silence”>
FO° Talks: The Culture of Culture, Part 3: In the Beginning, There Was Silence
Atul Singh: Welcome to FO° Talks. With me is Gary Grappo. He’s the former chair of Fair Observer. He has been an ambassador for the US. He has had a glorious diplomatic career spanning many decades in many countries. He speaks many languages, and few people have a more nuanced view on geopolitics than Gary. And so without further ado, Gary and I are going to dive into the new geopolitical landscape of the Middle East. Gary, welcome.
Gary Grappo: Thank you very much, Atul, and for your flattering introduction. And it’s always a pleasure to be with you and to talk about what’s happening in the world as we speak. And in today’s interview, we’ll be obviously talking about the Middle East, where the situation remains quite fluid and very dynamic.
Atul Singh: What is this new geopolitical landscape we are talking about? How is it different to the old one? And when does this new era begin?
Gary Grappo: Well, the fundamental problems of the Middle East are unchanged. We have governments that are largely, widely unpopular. We have an extensive amount of oppression, particularly in the Arab countries; we have continuing instability in several of the countries, with militia groups quite active, terrorist organizations quite active; and we still have the ongoing problem, of course, of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, although the tenor of that has changed considerably as well. But what has changed is the dynamic. Over the course of the last several months, of course, we have seen significant diminishing of the capabilities of Hamas in Gaza. We had a ceasefire that lasted almost two months and is now finished, and Israel has relaunched both its ground and air campaign against Hamas in Gaza. We can get into the details of that and what that may portend. Further to the north, we have a largely decimated Hezbollah. Israel, by dint of cleverness and truly impressive technological innovation and then massive air attacks, was able to eliminate at least the top two, if not top three, levels of the Hezbollah organization in southern Lebanon, while at the same time decimating its arsenal of weapons, although not entirely destroying it. And so it presents much less threat to the people of Israel. At the same time, we finally — after waiting almost two years — we have an actual government in place with a president and a prime minister in Lebanon. The Lebanese people, for the first time, will have a government that appears committed to addressing the real challenges that that country is facing, both on the political front and most especially on the economic front. We can get into what to anticipate as that moves forward. Probably one of the most significant developments has been the fall of the Assad regime. Father and son lasted some 53–54 years and ruled with an iron fist, including over the last ten or 12 years during the Syrian civil war. They saw the complete devastation of the Syrian economy, deaths that ran into the hundreds of thousands, and huge numbers of Syrian refugees fleeing to Jordan, Turkey, even to Europe and Lebanon. It was then replaced with a government which initially showed some positive signs of moving forward, despite its jihadist heritage — actually quite steeped in jihadism. But we’re now seeing what I refer to as a default position in the Middle East. And that is, you see a change in government, hopes and expectations are high, and then cracks begin to appear. In this particular case, we are seeing an increase in the number of Assadists — that is, remnants of pro-Assad forces — attacking Syrian government forces, and those are leading to some actually quite pitched battles and to the exacting of revenge against the Alawite minority in the western and northwestern parts of Syria, with fairly large numbers of fatalities. There were also reports of some Christians being killed as well — not, at least from my perspective, unanticipated at all. And then finally — and we can get into other elements — but the situation in Iran has dramatically changed as a result of two Israeli attacks: in April of last year and then in October. That has greatly diminished the capability of the Iranian regime to protect itself from future attacks, providing Donald Trump with a potential, perhaps, of maybe reaching some kind of a negotiated solution with respect to Iran’s nuclear weapons program. So that’s the lineup. We can talk also, if you’d like, about what’s happening in Yemen right now. There’s certainly been an uptick in the last five days of activity there as well.
Instability in Israel
Atul Singh: So what you’re saying is part of the warp and woof of the Middle East. The Middle East has been unstable. You can argue that after Sykes-Picot, once the Ottoman Empire was replaced by the British and French empires, and after they unraveled and left behind nation-states in largely ethnic and tribal territories, the instability has never ended. What’s new? What’s new about this, Gary? How is it different to what transpired earlier?
Gary Grappo: Well, certainly what is new is the character of the conflict between Israel and some of its neighbors. And when I say that, we have to be cautious, because the states that border Israel don’t necessarily present a threat to Israel at all. Certainly not Egypt, not Jordan, not Lebanon and not even Syria, to be quite frank, although Israel is keeping its powder dry with respect to the future of Syria. But we still have the security threats to the State of Israel emanating from Hamas in Gaza and still from Hezbollah in southern Lebanon. And then the Iranian regime has not changed at all. There is certainly the realization on the part of the leadership, including that of the Revolutionary Guard Corps, that they do not have the defense mechanisms that they thought they once had, with their so-called Axis of Resistance now greatly weakened as a result of conflicts with Israel. But the fundamental lay of the land, so to speak, in terms of the unpopularity of governments, inability of governments to respond to the needs of their peoples — probably, with the exception, obviously, of the monarchies, which do a much better job in that regard and therefore enjoy a measure of legitimacy that other governments do not have — that all remains the same. And the fear that governments have of their populations, that at any moment streets could erupt over whatever the issue du jour happens to be — whether it’s the Israeli–Palestinian issue, whether it’s the economic situation, whether it’s oppressive government security forces, whether it’s the inability to hold the governments accountable to their people — all of those things still register quite prominently among the peoples of the Middle East.
Atul Singh: Alright, so Gary, what you’re painting is a fundamentally unstable situation. Let’s begin with Israel–Palestine, since you mentioned that is an issue that animates the Arab street, and there’s a tension between the Arab street and the Arab palace on that issue. And of course, we can talk about whether Israel has been just or unjust, whether in its response to the terrorist attacks of October 7, whether they’ve been proportionate or disproportionate. But for me, our deeper concern is the inherent instability we see in Israel itself now. We are speaking just after Bibi Netanyahu and his cabinet have fired the head of Shin Bet, the internal intelligence agency of Israel. Now, this sort of politicization of intelligence agencies — and indeed the military — has not happened in Israel. Israel has had a fantastic military, a fantastic intelligence and a really cohesive state until quite recently. And now that internal cohesion in Israel seems to be breaking, and that for me perhaps is even more worrying than the usual fault lines everyone talks about.
Gary Grappo: There’s no question that Israel is facing some rather difficult internal political challenges. The specific one that you mentioned on the firing of the head of Shin Bet is overlaid with the quite emotional upheaval over the situation of Israeli hostages who remain in Gaza. Of course, there are some 59–60 of those. How many of them are still alive? I guess the Israelis perhaps may know, but there are most definitely some of them who are not alive today. And so that’s a fault line.
Atul Singh: Sorry to interject, but I think even the Israelis cannot know for sure, because as of now, we know that they have not quite managed to break Hamas completely. They’ve done a lot of damage, but Hamas has proved more resilient than anyone could have estimated given the disparity in force.
Gary Grappo: Yes. No, Hamas is, despite the devastating losses they’ve suffered in manpower and in weapons and in overall structural cohesiveness of the organization, they’re still standing. And we saw that during the ceasefire, when they made a show of their continued presence in the territory. And Israel knows that, and I think that’s why Israel finally decided that since the ceasefire was obviously not going to move into a phase two — I will just say quite bluntly — there was never any possibility of that happening. It looked good on paper — the phase one, the phase two and the phase three. There was never any chance of moving into phase two. There really wasn’t. And so Hamas still exists as an organization. They are attempting to rearm. It’s going to be difficult because their supply lines have suffered rather dramatic deterioration. They can’t get the supplies in they previously had received, for example, say, from Hezbollah in southern Lebanon or from Iran. So they’re going to be hard-pressed to replace their stockpile of weapons and other material. But they are recruiting quite strongly, as a matter of fact. And I think we have to acknowledge the fact that it’s pretty fertile territory for the recruitment of fighters, given what has transpired since October 7. So their strength is probably back up to at least 20,000 fighters — not nearly with the capabilities that they might have had post-October 7. They’ve lost those veteran fighters — many, many of them. But they’ll get there. And I think that’s why Israel decided to capitalize while it could, in going after this still-less-than-previously-very-capable Hamas fighting force. But to get back to Israel, the issue over the firing of the Shin Bet chief is overlaid with the dissension in the Israeli public over the state of the hostages and whether the government is doing enough or not to secure their release. And then underpinning all of that, if you recall, before October 7, there was quite a bit of attention devoted to what Bibi was trying to do to undermine the authority of the Israeli judiciary, and that still remains so. So we do see a lot of political cracks within Israel internally. And I’ll make the final point — and I know Bibi Netanyahu is very mindful of this — and that is: Israel must decide on its state budget by the end of this month. If they finish the month without a state budget, it effectively means the collapse of the government. They will have to call for new elections, which would take — in Israel, given its election laws — three months. So all of this internal churn is having an impact. And then, of course, there’s all the back and forth over the person Bibi Netanyahu himself and how Israelis view him, how much or not it can be debated. Netanyahu needs war to maintain his position as prime minister. All of that is being debated today in Israel. So yeah, Israel faces its problems within itself, in addition to the external threats.
Lebanon’s prospects
Atul Singh: And so let’s move on from Israel to Lebanon. Lebanon, you mentioned, seems to have greater hope now. But Lebanon still has a fractious, multi-ethnic society, which in the past even struggled to collect rubbish, leave aside deliver other elements of governance. Hezbollah ran a parallel state, which was arguably more powerful than the state itself, at least in the areas it dominated. Is there hope for Lebanon as a state, or are we going to see Lebanon limp along as a failed state?
Gary Grappo: I think there’s more hope today in Lebanon than there has been — most certainly in the last 10 years, maybe in the last 25 years. There genuinely is an opportunity here. Now, Lebanon has been put nearly on its back. Its economy, which was considered a middle-income country at one point, has now been reduced to almost poverty level. Most of the country is living at or below that today. The infrastructure has suffered considerably, particularly the neighborhoods in Beirut and in southern Lebanon and in the Beqaa Valley, which is on the east near the border with Syria. So a lot of work needs to be done on the Lebanese economy. But the Lebanese people are some of the most industrious — in fact, I would argue the most industrious people in the Middle East after Israel. And there can be a natural affinity between Lebanon and Israel in terms of how they approach innovation, how they approach business, how they approach development, if they can overcome some of these problems. Now, this is where Lebanon is going to need some help. And I would argue, if I were sitting before Donald Trump, that if you really want to do some good not only for the people of Lebanon and for our interest in Lebanon, but also for Israel, we need to invest in Lebanon. We need to invest in their armed forces. We need to work with the armed forces as closely as we can to ensure they are able to disarm Hezbollah, which is not going to willingly lay down all of its arms. It’s obliged to do that going back to a UN Security Council resolution following the 2006 war. And the terms of the latest ceasefire called for the enforcement of that, as well as the withdrawal of all Lebanese armed forces north of the Litani River, which is around 20 miles north of the Israeli border. And Lebanon is supposed to — the Lebanese armed forces are supposed to have that responsibility and that authority. It’s uncertain how effectively they can carry that out. They are going to need some help — in fact, considerable help. And this is where I think the West, particularly the United States — I would also argue France and other countries — could help Lebanon. One of the good things is they were finally able to name a president, and they have a prime minister, both of whom are opposed to Hezbollah. They want to see the ceasefire terms fully enforced. They have taken on that responsibility. It’s just the ability to do that is a bit constrained at the moment. And then finally, I will say that Hezbollah is greatly weakened within Lebanon today. They do not have anywhere near the political stature they once had. Even though they still maintain a sizable presence — not a majority, but a sizable presence — in the Lebanese parliament. There are going to be elections for the parliament, I want to say, in two years. And the hope is that if Lebanon can show some genuine progress, that the Hezbollah presence in the parliament can be even further reduced. Just as an indication, we’re seeing that the level of popularity of Hezbollah, even among Lebanese Shia, is reduced from what it has historically been. So these are important points to consider and offer a genuine opportunity for hope and progress in Lebanon. And we should take stock of that and try to capitalize on that in the interest of Lebanon and overall stability in the Middle East.
Atul Singh: Donald Trump has, I believe, two daughters — or three, probably two, if I remember correctly — and one of them is married to a Lebanese gentleman, and her father-in-law is apparently now mediating. He’s Maronite, and hopefully, if he’s involved, do you think there will be US investment and attention to Lebanon?
Gary Grappo: If he has the ear of Donald Trump, then there is a possibility. Now, I haven’t heard much about what he’s actually doing at the moment in Lebanon. He’s been given some other responsibilities, too, so I don’t know how he’s dividing his time and efforts. Nevertheless, yeah, if you have the ear of Donald Trump, obviously you’re going to be an influential person, and you’re going to be viewed as someone with influence and people will pay attention to you. We haven’t yet seen his influence demonstrated clearly in terms of his relationship with the president vis-à-vis the president’s daughter. You would think he would. So that remains to be seen.
Rising pressure in Jordan
Atul Singh: Moving on from Lebanon to Jordan, we know that the monarchy feels the heat. The King of Jordan has not been terribly enthused about Donald Trump’s plan for Gaza, turning it into a riviera. We know that the majority of Jordan is now Palestinian. We know that Palestinians in Jordan are increasingly in solidarity with Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza. So from a geopolitical point of view, it seems that Jordan seems to be quite unstable. The king is not getting any younger either. So what lies ahead there?
Gary Grappo: There hasn’t been much attention given to Jordan, and that’s unfortunate, because Jordan is facing some challenges. There is this very restive Palestinian population within Jordan. Estimates vary — anywhere between 60 and 80% of the population of the country. It seems to be in a perpetual economic crisis. They don’t have the natural resource wealth that other countries in the region have, and they are dependent to a great extent on American largesse. The American aid program, if it continues, is quite substantial, and the king needs that, which is why the king — after Donald Trump’s statement about his ambitions for Gaza — was anxious to fly to Washington and meet with the president in order to maybe talk him down from this grandiose plan for Gaza. But he was quite diplomatic about it. It was not confrontational, but also made it clear that this was not something that Jordan would be able to accept. But he knows how to be deferential when he has to be to the United States — and specifically to Donald Trump, who likes that. And so he ended up leaving, having made his point, but not losing Jordan’s status in terms of how it’s viewed in Washington. But it faces continuing economic challenges, which are quite dire — whether it’s unemployment, whether it’s the level of business activity, economic growth, development and so forth. The other problem that many folks have not focused on is the security challenges that Jordan faces, coming not only from the West Bank, where you have the appearance now of these small militia groups that are causing a great deal of instability in the West Bank — confronting settlers, confronting the IDF. There’s some of that also present in Jordan. The Jordanian security forces are quite competent.
Atul Singh: [Are these groups directly tied to Hamas? Or are they more independent, acting on their own?]
Gary Grappo: Both. Some will have some kind of tie to Hamas but don’t take guidance from Hamas. Others may take some guidance from Hamas, and some are entirely independent and are operating on their own. In fact, it’s uncertain the extent to which some of them actually even coordinate their activities with one another, which is why they haven’t been all that effective. And the Israelis have been able to tamp them down as they appear but not eliminate them. The suspicion is that the Iranians may be behind some of this in terms of provoking them, maybe providing them with funds, even weapons that are smuggled in via Syria and Jordan. So it’s all kind of opaque at this point, but it presents problems for Jordan. And there are some interesting reports coming out of Iran that the Iranians view Jordan as a particularly weak point, and that if their efforts to re-establish a link between Iran and Hezbollah through Syria — and that’s not working out so well up to this point — that they may attempt to use Jordan. Now, they’ll find very stiff challenge in Jordan. The Jordanian forces are not to be trifled with. They’re very effective, very capable. They have an excellent intelligence service. They cooperate very closely with both the Americans and the Israelis. So they’ll find the going very tough, but—
Atul Singh: [Did King Abdullah himself serve in the Jordanian Armed Forces or receive military training?]
Gary Grappo: Hm, I want to say he did, but I can’t be sure. I know his father did, but I can’t be sure about Abdullah. But I think so, be that as it—
Atul Singh: [Well, regardless, the king seems to command deep loyalty from the armed forces. That’s a critical pillar of stability in a region where rulers often take great care to ensure military loyalty.]
Gary Grappo: Absolutely. And the king enjoys their loyalty 100%, which is very important in the Middle East. And they are indeed very loyal to the king and will remain so. And so I have every reason to believe that with the continued cooperation with the Americans and the Israelis, that they’ll be able to thwart any effort on the part of the Iranians. But it’s still a challenge that the Jordanians now have to confront. But I am worried about the internal political stability because of the large Palestinian presence there. I don’t think it’ll turn terribly violent, other than maybe potential pockets in some areas. But nevertheless, it’s something I’m sure the king is very much aware of, and the Israeli and American intelligence services are also quite aware of and trying to provide the king with whatever support he may need. So it’s worth keeping an eye on developments in Jordan.
Can the country of Syria survive?
Atul Singh: Let’s talk about Syria. You’ve already mentioned that it has followed a familiar pattern. And you’ve mentioned the killings of Alawites. You’ve also mentioned the former Assad regime soldiers mounting attacks on the new regime. Of course, we know that Turkish intelligence, MIT, did support the current rulers of Syria. So what happens now with the Kurds, who represent one area and one ethnicity of Syria? The Sunnis — also not just Sunnis who are in the plains in that road going all the way from Damascus to Istanbul, formerly Constantinople — but also the Arabs living by the Tigris and Euphrates. They are different. Those peasants are different to the more urban population. And in fact, arguably, a drought led to their migration to the cities and triggered the Arab uprisings in Syria. And then, of course, we have the issue of the Alawites, who are along the coasts and who were persecuted by the Sunnis under none other than Selim I. And of course, when they ruled, they weren’t particularly kind and loving and peaceful either. So there is a whole cycle of violence there. Can Syria even survive as a country de jure?
Gary Grappo: That may be the ultimate question, and that question has been posed more than once. It’s not coincidence that the centrifugal sectarian forces of Lebanon mirror those almost, in some cases, identically to those in Syria. You have a multiplicity of sectarian groups — whether religious or ethnic — and it makes it very, very difficult to have a unifying identity for Syria, despite efforts by previous regimes to create one. Assad tried to create one, and it ultimately came down to oppression. If you opposed Assad, you ended up either dead or in jail. And that’s how it was enforced. I think al-Sharaa, who is the interim president — we’ll see how long the interim period is — former head of the Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham, the jihadist group that emerged victorious after the fall of Assad, he said all the right things, which new Arab leaders often do, with all these wonderful aspirations of Syrian unity and respect for its multi-identities within the country. But the default position is these groups go at one another, and certainly they go after the government. And you mentioned a few of these. But there are Druze down in the south. There are Ismailis who are closer to being Shia, actually, than the Alawites, who were represented in the person of Assad and his father. You had Turkmen up in the very northern part of the country — the remnants of the Turkish population after the fall of the Ottomans. You have the Kurds up in the northeast. And you mentioned a very good point: that the Arabs who typically settle in some of the cities stretching from Damascus in the south to Aleppo in the north have a very different perspective on things than the desert Arabs who live to the east. And also their views on Islam — Sunni Islam. They’re all Sunni, but how they view it, how strongly they adhere to it, where they tend to be more conservative or not, all of that. There are many complexions. And even in the western areas on that main highway that goes from Damascus to Hama, Homs and Aleppo, from city to city, it changes. And those are four very big cities in Syria. That all changes. You have several Christian groups that inhabit the country. And so all of these are pulling at one another. All of these are vying for influence, power, and wealth in a country which — we have to remember — has been destroyed. 80% of its economy has been effectively destroyed as a result of that 12-year civil war. And then you have another six million or so Syrians residing outside the country, who are forming actually a new identity of themselves and of Syria, whether they reside in Jordan or Turkey or Lebanon, or even in Europe. So all of these are pushing and pulling against one another, presenting enormous challenges to the government and the government’s ability to actually govern. And the default position — and that’s kind of a situation where you have the sectarian strains pulling at one another — the government brings down the hammer. That’s what Assad did. And that’s what the predecessors of the Assads did. Although they have had brief experiences with democracy, they didn’t last. They didn’t last.
Atul Singh: [So even when Syria flirted with democracy, it couldn’t overcome those deep sectarian divisions, could it?]
Gary Grappo: Yes, they even tried that! But that’s another point, because let’s bear in mind there are external players in all of that mix. This is not just Syria alone. There’s Lebanon, of course, to the west. There’s Turkey, which is probably the most significant influence today to the north. Iran has not given up on Syria and will try to re-establish its pipeline of weapons of war material and money into Hezbollah in southern Lebanon. There are folks who were greatly affected by the fall of the Assad regime and the collapse of the huge Captagon industry that was resident in Syria. Basically, that’s how the Syrian regime made money. They sell Captagon — which is the Middle Eastern equivalent almost of meth — and were making billions. And that’s how the army earned whatever funds it could to support itself. It wasn’t nearly enough, and obviously collapsed very easily. And there are others in the mix. The Iraqis are watching very, very closely what happens. This may present some opportunities for the western Arabs of Iraq to influence Syria as well. And then you have the Americans, the Europeans and the Israelis exerting their influence. The Israelis, by the way, have moved beyond the neutral territory between their borders and have now settled on — I’m talking about military forces — on actual Syrian territory. And they’re going to wait and see how things play out to ensure that whatever result does not present a threat to Israel. And so they have that new buffer zone that they have established.
Atul Singh: Yes, some of the Israelis say that there’s no way they can give it up. And they say that the Druze actually in Syria want Israeli protection. And the Druze are a great buffer zone against a potential fundamentalist Sunni regime in Damascus.
Gary Grappo: That’s 100% correct. Of course, there is a significant, relatively speaking, Druze population in Israel, which does quite well. They do not experience many of the problems that the Israeli Arabs have in Israel, and they’re quite pleased, for the most part, with their status in Israel. And of course, they have their contacts with their brothers in Syria. And it’s a natural affinity that the Druze would have toward Israel. They’re far more trusting of Israel than this new government. And they’re trying to figure it out. They’re trying to feel their way through this new government. They’re not sure exactly how much authority, how much power they will be given. And so it’s not surprising that they’re maintaining pretty close ties with Israel and will find a way to cooperate with Israel if they feel that their interests may be threatened by this new government in Damascus.
Atul Singh: Alright, you haven’t mentioned the Russians. They have Latakia and they have Tartus still, and I’m sure they are not going to disappear quietly into the sun.
Gary Grappo: You’re right. And they don’t have quite the presence they had before the fall of the Assad regime. There are supposedly ongoing negotiations to maintain both their air base at Hmeimim and their naval base at Tartus. The naval base in particular is vitally important for the Russians, and they desperately want to hold on to that. They’ve lost all other influence in Syria today, not only because of the fall of Assad, but of course having to overextend itself in Ukraine, in that misbegotten war. And so they’re struggling. And it’s not clear that the government may necessarily want them, particularly given the close relationship between Russia today and Iran. One thing you can say about the regime in Damascus now is they don’t want the Iranians back. They most definitely don’t want Hezbollah back. And we’re already seeing fighting take place between the government forces of Syria and Hezbollah, which is a very interesting development — and from the purely selfish perspective of the Americans and Israelis — not bad at all. Now, Hezbollah is probably also allying with these pro-Assad factions in the western part of the country, which is something to be watched. And again, Atul, I just come back to all the centrifugal forces at play in Syria, which argue against, unfortunately, the best hopes of the Syrian people after the regime fell.
Egypt: the ticking time bomb
Atul Singh: Alright, let’s move on from Syria, and let’s talk about Egypt, the other neighbor of Israel. One ex-MI6 officer told me that he believes that Egypt could be the ticking time bomb in the region because of its population, because of the salinization of the Nile Delta, and because of persistent youth unemployment and resentment against the regime. He also said that as of now, Sisi is a pretty effective ruler. The military has managed to clamp down pretty hard on the Muslim Brotherhood. And as of now, there is no immediate risk. But the structural problems persist in the economy, and the political problem exists in society, and there is such democratic deficit and a demographic time bomb that Egypt will ultimately implode. What do you say to that, Gary?
Gary Grappo: Egypt is a perfect illustration of the essential problem of the Middle East that I outlined at the outset. And that is the fact that you have unpopular governments, unaccountable to their people and fearful of their people, and maintaining authority through their security forces — essentially oppression — while at the same time the economic and social needs are not being met adequately. And there’s no recourse. And in the case of Egypt, you have very effective internal security forces. They have almost eradicated the Muslim Brotherhood from Egypt — ruthlessly, too. And they packed up and left while they could. And those who couldn’t ended up either dead or in jail. And there are a number of jails that are chock-a-block full of former Muslim Brotherhood members. So for the time being, as you mentioned, the problem is contained. But the challenge remains: how do you reconcile a country — it’s the largest population by far in the Middle East — that is unable at the present time to meet the needs of those people? Education, health care, employment and so forth. The government was able to attract money to build this mammoth new capital, which by all accounts is quite impressive, outside of Cairo. Most people cannot afford to live there, only probably the top 10–15%. Even some Egyptians who work there in the government can’t afford to live there. And so that’s presenting problems for the people of Cairo especially, which is the largest city by far in Egypt, if not in the entire Middle East. And then the environmental problems that you mentioned are not going away. They are not going away. If you look at coastal Egypt, which extends considerably south up the Nile, one can foresee in 20 years and in 40 years — I’ve looked at these projections — how the salinization effectively takes over the Nile Delta and even flooding, including in the second-largest city of Alexandria. If you look at the population — Alexandria, Cairo, the Nile Delta — that is a significant percentage of the population of Egypt. I want to say at least a third, it could be even more than that. When they lose their ability to live somewhere that’s livable and also earn an income, what happens? Well, you can have internal unrest. You can have massive refugee flows. And we have seen in the example of the Syrian civil war what happens when that occurs. And my guess is many of those refugees would seek to go to either Turkey — maybe Lebanon, although there’s not much space for them there — but more than likely the southern Mediterranean countries of Europe. And so all of that certainly bears watching, and it further underscores the importance of the Sisi regime to find a way to deflate these growing pressures within his society — outside of the use of his security forces. It also argues for greater investment on the part of the Gulf countries in development in Egypt — particularly creating economic opportunity. You create economic opportunity, and then the options begin to open up. And that hasn’t materialized yet. So that’s the pressure cooker of Egypt today. The pressure is manageable, as you indicated — for now. What will it be like in 10 years? I can’t predict, and I wouldn’t even try to.
The Gulf: A regional ray of hope
Atul Singh: Alright, you’ve mentioned the Gulf countries. So let’s now talk about the Gulf. And the Gulf includes, of course, small countries like Qatar, that punch way above their weight. They have created Al Jazeera. Dubai, which is the financial center now of the Middle East, where you now have the Abraham Accords in some kind of entente with Israel. You also have countries like Bahrain and Oman, where you were ambassador. And then, of course, the big boys — Saudi Arabia. Now Yemen doesn’t quite come. It is an important place, because the Houthis have proved that they can de facto block off the Suez Canal. The Bab al-Mandab Strait is de facto unusable, and ships are going around the Cape of Good Hope, just like pre-Henry the Navigator times or Henry the Navigator times. So talk about the Gulf, now that you’ve mentioned the Gulf — and it’s a diverse picture, as listeners can already divine.
Gary Grappo: Yes. Setting aside the case of Yemen, because it’s just — yes, it occupies the same Arabian Peninsula, but it’s not like any of the other Gulf countries. The Gulf countries, unlike the rest of the region, are actually doing rather well economically and even socially. You have cradle-to-grave healthcare systems. You have respectable education systems. The level of extremism and jihadism is very, very low, if it exists at all. And to the extent that it might exist, the security forces are very effective in tamping them down. And most of them are quite active on the regional and international diplomatic scene. You mentioned the case of Qatar, but I think the two major players are Saudi Arabia and the Emirates.
Atul Singh: [Yes. They really are the powerhouses of the Gulf now, especially when it comes to diplomacy.]
Gary Grappo: Exactly. Both of them are extraordinarily wealthy countries. On a per capita basis, I’d say the Emirates is probably much wealthier and Qatar wealthier than them all, and are doing lots of things on the international scene to raise their profile. I mean, just take the example of these negotiations over Ukraine. They’re taking place in Saudi Arabia! Who could have imagined such a thing five years ago?
Atul Singh: Yeah, that’s unbelievable! The Europeans are turning and tossing in complete indignation.
Gary Grappo: Yes. So, back in the day — certainly my day, and up to maybe about five or ten years ago — when you had to do these kinds of negotiations, everyone flocked to Geneva. Now they’re going to Jeddah or to Riyadh, perhaps Doha or even Abu Dhabi. So the Gulf states are doing quite well, and we should all wish that we would find that kind of stability. Obviously, none of them is a democracy, and in all likelihood, they’re not going to be for a very, very long time. But they’re quite stable.
Atul Singh: Including, if I may interject, Saudi Arabia, because some people fear for Saudi Arabia, because Mohammed bin Salman has ruled it with a very strong hand, an iron fist, and there is fear that there might be factions brewing within his own family that might turn against him, lead even to assassination. So there is that fear, as you know, amongst intelligence circles. This is what I hear, both from the Israelis and the British.
Gary Grappo: Yes. And it’s varied from king to king. And I will say it’s certainly present now. But I think one thing that makes this situation in Saudi Arabia different today is that socially, the country is in a much better position. Saudis do not face the kind of restrictions in social interaction and activity that they used to face. When I was there, you had this very distinct segregation of the sexes and there were very few opportunities for people to engage in social activity outside of the home. That has changed! You have America’s Cup regional competition. You have had major tennis tournaments, golf tournaments — even, God help them — American professional wrestling. You’ve had rock concerts. Movie theaters are starting to proliferate.
Atul Singh: They even have Cristiano Ronaldo with his girlfriend and many children from many different women! (laughs)
Gary Grappo: Yeah, yeah. So they’ve opened the floodgates socially, and that’s reduced a lot of the tension. And that was a brilliant move on the part of Mohammed bin Salman. On the economic side, they’ve created new opportunities. Now, I’ve been reading recently that because of the low price of oil that maybe their coffers will not be as enriched this year as in earlier years. They’re used to that. They’ve faced those times before, and they know how to deal with that. They’ll have to ratchet back their ambitions on the NEOM project in western Saudi Arabia, and they’ll manage to do that. Having said all of that, I will say that despite some concerns that I have on his positions on human rights, Mohammed bin Salman has done a good job of managing that country. The only thing now they’re waiting on is what happens to his father, King Salman. I mean, he’s probably not long for this world. Well, none of us is, but he in particular. And when he becomes the king — he’s effectively behaving like the king now, with some limits — I think we could see even more changes that will be occurring in his country. He seems to have forged respectable relations — sometimes close relations — with other countries, including in the region. He faces this nemesis down in the south, Yemen. He’s managed to extricate his forces from the actual conflict, but the conflict still continues. So he’s done, I have to say, a credible job, first and foremost in maintaining stability and mollifying the population of Saudi Arabia, as have all the other Gulf countries. Oman was facing some economic problems because of oil prices and so forth a few years ago. That’s begun to change. And we’re now seeing some impressive growth figures in Oman. The new sultan has now kind of asserted himself, and we’re seeing his unique imprint in the governance of the Sultanate. All of the Gulf countries seem to be doing very well, or at least respectably, not facing any of the challenges that the other countries in the region are. In fact, they’re seen as a potential solution, including in the conflict in Gaza, with future investment to redevelop, rebuild Gaza, if and when that conflict ends.
Iraq, Kuwait and the shadow of empires
Atul Singh: Alright, so the Gulf is a ray of hope in the region. We’ve covered a number of countries. We’ve got two big former empires left — correct me if I’m wrong, and please chime in and add if I’m missing any major country. Of course, some may say you’ve missed out Kuwait, you’ve missed out Iraq. And we’ve mentioned Iraq. We can talk about Kuwait and Iraq briefly. Perhaps you begin with them. But the two countries that come to my mind are the descendants of the Ottomans and the Safavids, the two great empires of the region. But over to you. Let’s cover Kuwait and Iraq lest we offend anyone. Iraq is very similar to Syria. Both Syria and Iraq were run by Ba’athists. Both were bloody regimes run by minorities. Syria was run by an Alawite family. And of course, we know that Iraq was run by a Sunni family from Tikrit, the Saddam Hussein clan. He and his boys were terrors, to say the least. Iraq is also multi-ethnic. And few people know Iraq better than Gary. So we have Kuwait and Iraq. Kuwait presumably is doing all right. Iraq — you can tell us more. And then let’s move on. Please move on to Turkey and Iran.
Gary Grappo: I’m not sure I’ll have much to contribute with respect to Turkey. I don’t follow Turkey as closely as I do the Arab countries. But with respect to Iraq, I will say, because of the weakened state of affairs in Iran, that it does present some opportunities to Iraq. It is worth noting that the Iraqi leadership has indicated fairly clearly that it wants the very limited American presence in that country to remain. Now, the various Iranian-aligned militia groups in Iraq have indicated that if American forces have not withdrawn by the end of this year, they will resume massive attacks against that American presence, and perhaps an American presence elsewhere, including in the very eastern part of Syria. They certainly have some ability to do that. It’s going to be limited. And I think they understand that, were they to do that, they would find overwhelming response certainly from the Americans and maybe from the Iraqi government itself. It’s unclear how strongly the Iraqi leadership wants to assert its independence from Iran. The Iranians have had so much influence in that country since the departure of the Americans. But the card deck has been reshuffled, and not all the cards are held by Iran today. The Iraqis have a few more than they have had in the past. And so there is some opportunity. We’re seeing new oil investment, for example, in the country. They have resolved some of the problems that they have had previously with their own Kurds up in the north. And so Iraq has something to look forward to, some potential. But again, they are riven by the sectarian problems that have been there ever since the fall of the Ottoman Empire. Very similar to Shia, Sunni, Kurds and to a lesser extent, Christians and other minority groups. And so that remains a very significant challenge for them, particularly given the fact that the way the Iraqi Council of Representatives is established, where seats are apportioned according to sect, various groups are locked in. And that creates a bit of a road jam in terms of maybe getting things done. And we’ve seen in the past demonstrations of younger Iraqis wanting to do away with this system of preferences — to just open it up completely and let Iraqi citizens vote for those they believe best able to serve the interest of the State of Iraq and the Iraqi people. So I would say that Iraq is still a bit of a question mark — potentially in a somewhat better position, but unclear how they might capitalize on that, particularly given some of the internal problems that they have. They are going to need significant foreign investment if they’re truly going to be able to develop their oil potential. We should also mention, given our brief discussion about the problem in Egypt — environmental problems, in the fact that the water flow in the two main rivers, the Tigris and the Euphrates, has been diminishing over the years. Climate change, one cause. The other is the dams that Turkey has built, and to a lesser extent, Syria. It’s mostly Turkey which has reduced the water flow that reaches Iraq. And it’s something to be aware of because agriculture was a major factor in the Iraqi economy and in the Iraqi employment scene. So all of these are challenges that the government is going to have to face. With respect to Iran, this is the real challenge — certainly for Israel, for the United States and for the West in general. The Iranian government has suffered, over the course of the past year, a series of setbacks they could never have anticipated. They overestimated their own power and influence and they grossly underestimated the capabilities of the Israelis, particularly with the support of the United States. The current state of affairs: They are not able to effectively defend themselves against an Israeli air attack. The one that occurred last October — two waves of the most advanced fighters built by the United States, the F-35, the stealth fighters — their radar systems completely failed to detect them. And as a result, the Israelis were able to carry out their attacks without restraint. They delivered all of their ordnance and wreaked havoc on the air defenses that Iran had. And they’re not going to be replaced anytime soon. They were Russian-made, and the Russians are not going to be shipping any military equipment outside Russia.
Atul Singh: Very quick question: There is also the matter of the regime’s popularity at home, which seems to be the biggest risk. Add to that an economic crisis which is worsening, and Donald Trump has been no friend to Iran. In fact, he threw out the Iran deal that Barack Obama negotiated. So the noose around Iran is likely to tighten. Speaking of internal stability, the other imperial power, Turkey, isn’t doing that well either. There are protests as we speak in Turkey because Ekrem İmamoğlu, the secular Republican People’s Party’s candidate, was locked up by President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s regime. Erdoğan has been in power forever, but still, that’s a far more democratic country than a country ruled by mullahs. And in Iran, there’s also the specter of the different minorities resenting Farsi or Fars dominance. The Baluchs don’t like it, the Azeris don’t like it, the Kurds don’t like it and so on and so forth — not to mention the Chinese Sunni minority left. So William Butler Yeats’ words — “Things fall apart; the centre cannot hold” — certainly seems to be the fear for the Iranian regime.
Gary Grappo: That’s the major challenge of this current regime. And that is, in addition to the external threat that they face from Israel. By the way, in those attacks that occurred in April, Israel took out one of the main factories for the manufacture of ballistic missiles. So Iran’s vaunted ballistic missile capability has been significantly diminished as well. And this was their final defense. This was intended to be the defense that would protect the Islamic Republic. And those defenses have been greatly weakened vis-à-vis any potential attack from Israel. But most especially, if the Americans were to join the Israelis, there’s no way to repel it. And they would suffer devastating losses. And you can be sure that in addition to going after what’s left of the missile forces and other defense areas, they would be going after IRGC camps and doing maximum—
Atul Singh: Very quickly, explain IRGC to our viewers and listeners.
Gary Grappo: Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. This is basically a military force apart from the Artesh, which is the standard military force: Army, Navy, Air Force and Marines. That’s the Iranian defense forces under the Ministry of Defense. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps reports to the Supreme Leader. And as the name implies, they protect the Islamic Revolution, which is basically the regime. That’s their job. And they do this in many ways. They probably attract more resources on a per capita basis than does the regular military. And they certainly have the ear of the Supreme Leader the way the military forces do not, and so they are given preeminence. And they are seen as a much greater threat to Israel or even to Iran’s neighbors than the Iranian armed forces.
Atul Singh: So think of them like the Praetorian Guard of the Roman Empire.
Gary Grappo: That’s a good way to put it, except much larger and very ideologically committed.
Atul Singh: More fanatically.
Gary Grappo: Yes. And it’s not just them. They have militia groups that work for them, and these are the ones who enforce domestic law in Iran, particularly with respect to religious law — and most especially when it comes to ensuring, for example, that women are covered. These are the guys going around on black motorbikes with baseball bats and nailing women who are not properly covered, enforcing Islamic law.
Atul Singh: Isn’t the use of baseball bats very American? The irony!
Gary Grappo: Yeah, we pretend not to use baseball bats as weapons, but it can be a very effective one!
Atul Singh: Al Capone used it.
Gary Grappo: Yes, yes. It’s not unknown as a very effective, bloody weapon. So these are some of the external threats that Iran is facing. And then one cannot overestimate the challenge they face internally. There is a lot of dissension there. I read some of these various polls that are taken — you don’t know how much to attribute to them — but where popularity now is at or below even 20%. They are almost universally despised — the Iranian leadership in that country — for a variety of reasons, not the least of which is the appalling economic situation.
Atul Singh: And no jobs for the youth.
Gary Grappo: No jobs. The Iranian rial continues to fall and explore new depths, and there’s no way that they can shore it up. And add now Donald Trump to the mix. He has now doubled down if not tripled on his maximum pressure campaign and is really exploiting every opportunity in terms of secondary sanctions. And for those who don’t quite understand the nature of US economic sanctions: When the US sanctions a particular nation, organization, business, entity or person directly, that’s primary sanctions. A secondary sanction is going after someone who does business with any of those. So for example, Iranian exports: Iran is putting its oil onto ghost ships. They load them onto tankers in a port in Iran. They’re taken out somewhere not far offshore, out of sight. The transponders are turned off. A ghost tanker shows up — it’s not registered in any country — and they transfer the oil to the ghost tanker, sometimes mixing it with oil from a legitimate oil exporter, maybe Saudi Arabia, maybe the Emirates, maybe Oman, Kuwait, whatever. And then it goes to its final destination, where it’s offloaded. The United States has begun sanctioning the ghost ships when they find them and sanctioning the ports and the refineries who take on that illicit oil from Iran. This has made everybody involved in the illicit import and export of oil very, very wary. And for the first time, the United States is going after ports and businesses in India and in China who are not particularly excited about getting on the wrong side of the law when it comes to the Americans. They do not want to be sanctioned. It’s a death sentence. You can’t do business in dollars. And if you can’t do business in dollars — and it’ll effectively mean euros, too — what are you left with? So those sanctions are going to be very effective. In fact, Joe Biden started doing this toward the end of his administration — I would say October, November, certainly December — and Donald Trump has screwed it down even more tightly. And we’re going to see declining exports of oil from Iran, which is a principal hard currency earner.
Atul Singh: So let me tell you a story. I ran into a former British Special Forces soldier, and he was in the smuggling business. He was earning $20,000 per night for captaining a tanker. And he would take the tanker and he would go to one of these ghost tankers — Iranian tankers — transfer the oil from the ghost tanker into whatever tanker he was captaining, and then sail and offload that oil. And basically, that earned him $20,000 per night for this high-risk operation, shall we say. (laughs) Shall we say, he has a very nice house in England right now!
Gary Grappo: And he’s exactly the kind of people that the Americans are looking for now. These are the kind of people they want to go after.
Atul Singh: So maybe he’s one of the lucky ones who got away!
Gary Grappo: Well, he got out of the business just at the right time, because I think this administration really wants to screw down the lid as tightly as possible. Now, on the positive side — as we all know, it’s been prominently reported in the news — Donald Trump has communicated to the Supreme Leader he’s willing to sit down and begin negotiations to end Iran’s nuclear weapons program. The Iranians would be well advised to accept that. I’m not sure they’re going to, to their detriment. This is going to greatly disappoint the people of Iran, who are only going to become more frustrated and more angry with their government. And it’s going to increase the pressure internally on that government. So here you have rising dissent in Iran. You have a growing, acute economic situation in that country which shows no signs of being able to improve itself. And then these external threats that the country faces, without the defenses it previously had expected to rely on. And so the lineup of factors against the current regime in Iran is all very negative. You’d be pretty hard-pressed to find a bright spot. Maybe Yemen. And I tell you, you’ve got to be pretty desperate to look at Yemen as a bright spot. So now they have their relationships with Russia and with China. I will say that China is not going to jeopardize its trade relationship — which is already facing difficulties with the United States — for Iran. They’re not going to do it. They will cut the rope if they have to, when it comes to Iran. Russia, on the other hand, needs Iran, and Iran needs Russia. And so that relationship will probably remain in place and likely even strengthen. But still, the various challenges facing that regime are all bad to abominable, which is why it would be a good idea to negotiate with the Americans and get this out of the way. Remove sanctions. It would change everything. And for what? All they would have to do is cease their nuclear weapons program. I don’t know whether the leadership is willing to concede that.
Atul Singh: The Ayatollah is now aging dramatically and may not last very long. So we have no idea what comes next.
Donald Trump has a real opportunity
Atul Singh: So, let’s talk about Donald Trump. You’ve mentioned him a few times. What is the new Middle East policy of his administration? And what can we expect in the next three and a half years or four years of his presidency? A little less than four years, of course. Now we are in March.
Gary Grappo: Yeah, yeah. I would say that Donald Trump inherited, with respect to the Middle East, probably the most opportunistic set of circumstances that any American president has ever had coming into office. I mean, we’ve covered the various areas of the Middle East, and in almost every respect, it’s an opportunity for the United States. I will say, however, that the Middle East is the place where American ambition goes to die. And we’ve seen that time after time after time. The last genuinely successful American adventure — I’m not sure that’s the proper word for it — in the Middle East was brokering the peace accord between Egypt and Israel. Just going back to Bill Clinton, the collapse of the Camp David Accord in 2000, we’ve seen the efforts on the part of George Bush in Iraq that turned out to be disastrous not only for the region but for the United States. Barack Obama started out nobly, seeking to address the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, also fell on very bad times and he eventually just gave up his hands. His new Secretary of State after Hillary Clinton left, John Kerry, wanted to pick up the ball and thought, “No, he could deliver the goods,” — collapsed, frustrated again both by the Israelis and the Palestinians. And of course, Obama tried to negotiate the JCPOA, which looked pretty good on paper. It wasn’t certainly a perfect agreement. He was succeeded by Donald Trump, who proceeded to tear it up about a year into his first term as president. And the situation progressed to the point where, at the end of his administration, the situation in Iran had worsened, despite his promises that by tearing up the agreement, it would improve. Don’t forget, we had maximum pressure back then, too. And it did not work to the extent that he had promised. Joe Biden seemed to be doing okay until October 7. And it just exploded — and this was not his fault, obviously. And that’s the whole problem of the Middle East; you can’t control events as President of the United States. And that situation exploded, he cast his lot with Israel, which you had to expect the United States would do. And that only worsened. But on the other hand, it allowed Israel to address other problems, namely Hezbollah. And just lucky with the collapse of the government in Syria and the weakening of Iran—
Atul Singh: Maybe it was related, because they couldn’t rely on Hezbollah this time around. It has been weakened. It was a great opportunity. And with, of course, Turkish backing — MIT backed — you have this group which is now ruling Damascus. So I think it is related to a great degree.
Gary Grappo: Oh, oh, most definitely, the collapse of Hezbollah presented a real opportunity for HTS to go after Assad. And I think there was also the recognition that the Assad regime was a house of cards, that it was not capable of defending itself. And that’s just apparent from how quickly HTS moved from the northwestern part of the country — up in Idlib — all the way down to Damascus in a matter of what, two and a half weeks? And took control of the government. And its previous backers, Hezbollah, quiet, nothing. Syria or Iran, nothing. Russia, nothing. It was Assad — all of them. And he did not have the forces. It wouldn’t have taken much, but he didn’t have that. So Donald Trump comes in as president, and all these problems that earlier presidents have had to contend with are either gone or much diminished. So he has a real opportunity here. I’m pleased that he does not want confrontation with Iran and has offered this opportunity to negotiate. But on the other hand, I don’t think he’s going to shy from a confrontation. Just as in the case of his dealing with Hamas, United States broke protocol, broke precedent, and actually had an official meeting between Americans and Hamas. Never done before, ever! …That we know of. Maybe on the intelligence side, there may have been some. But this was policy people, and they laid all the cards out for Hamas and gave them an opportunity: “Do this, it’s in your interest.” Hamas refused to do it. And now we see Israel going in without constraints and Donald Trump fully behind them, 100%. I don’t think it’ll reach the intensity that we saw perhaps a year or so ago in Gaza, simply because Hamas is not the threat that it was at that time. But it’s going to be long, it’s going to be bloody. We’ll see more loss of life, tragically, innocent life in Gaza. But I think Israel is attempting to go in for the real kill this time. I don’t think they’re going to be successful, but they will wreak havoc, certainly within Hamas and what’s left of Gaza. So you would hope that the Iranian leadership will learn something from that example. That Donald Trump tried to work with Hamas, tried to show them, there’s a way out of this, “You just got to take it.” They refused. And now they will pay a very heavy price. If Iran is listening, paying attention and can set aside some of its ideology and fanaticism, they could find a way out of their predicament. I’m not sure—
Atul Singh: So you expect the Iranian regime to fall, as a number of people do? A number of people are now predicting the end of the Iranian regime by the end of Donald Trump’s term?
Gary Grappo: Well, that would be a wonderful thing, of course. We would certainly like to see that.
Atul Singh: So you’re happy with Donald Trump on at least one thing?
Gary Grappo: No, I… but the mechanism for that downfall is unclear yet. If someone is going to make the case that there will be an internal collapse — that the internal dynamic will force the collapse — I’m very suspicious. That I think would take longer than the next four years. It could happen. And the principal argument against it is because of the commitment and dedication and power of the IRGC. They will defend it to the bitter end, and it will be a very bloody, bitter end. Not the kind of end that happened with the Shah, with the Grand Ayatollah taking off in an airplane and going somewhere, although God knows where he could go. Maybe Moscow. That seems to be the new refuge of tyrants. But that, I think, is a bit far-fetched at the time being. However, I think the clock is ticking on an eventual Israeli attack against Iran, if Iran continues to show that it’s unwilling to negotiate and moves its nuclear development program further down the road toward possible weaponization. It hasn’t done it yet, but it’s building all the infrastructure it could possibly need for it. I think the Israelis will want to capitalize before it’s too late on the vulnerability of the regime, and they will attack. And the only question that remains is: Will the Americans join them? If the Americans join them, it will be a devastating attack on the complete defense structure of Iran. And that could spell the end of the regime in Iran. So what rules after that? Because we’re not sending ground troops. Nor are the Israelis sending ground troops. So the regime collapses. Who takes over? I’ll just throw out one possibility: the IRGC. It becomes a military regime, something like we see in Egypt. They do away with a lot of the religious nonsense that was imposed by the Ayatollahs or the mullahs. They reach some kind of an understanding on their nuclear program, simply because they will have no choice. And you have a military regime, and if they can reach an agreement with the various powers with respect to their nuclear program, maybe the sanctions will be dropped and they can prosper. I think any grand ambitions for a democracy in Iran or anywhere else in the Middle East have to be dismissed, just completely. What do we want most? We want stability. That’s what we want. We want regimes to clamp down on extremist organizations, with the various militias in Iraq and in Syria and elsewhere. And with that, I think everybody — including in the Middle East — will be very, very happy, even if they don’t get to choose who governs them.
Atul Singh: On that note, Gary, we’ve spent a lot of time going over so many countries and coming up with various scenarios. It’s been a pleasure, as always, and we’ll have you back before too long.
Gary Grappo: I look forward to that, Atul. We’ll have to discuss Yemen at this time. I think it’s an interesting case study. It’s a bit of an outlier, but nevertheless is becoming a significant problem area in the Middle East. So perhaps next time we can address the challenge of Yemen.
Atul Singh: Alright, everybody, stay tuned for Yemen next time. Until then, thank you very much, Gary. See you soon.
Gary Grappo: My pleasure, Atul.
[Lee Thompson-Kolar edited this piece.]
The views expressed in this article/video are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.
” post-content-short=” Atul Singh: Welcome to FO° Talks. With me is Gary Grappo. He’s the former chair of Fair Observer. He has been an ambassador for the US. He has had a glorious diplomatic career spanning many decades in many countries. He speaks many languages, and few people have a more nuanced view on…” post_summery=”This discussion covers the shifting geopolitical landscape of the Middle East, exploring regional instability, internal fractures and emerging power dynamics. It examines challenges in countries like Israel, Syria, Iran and Egypt, alongside the relative stability of Gulf states. It concludes with analysis of US policy under President Donald Trump.” post-date=”Apr 11, 2025″ post-title=”FO° Talks: The New Geopolitical Landscape of the Middle East” slug-data=”fo-talks-the-new-geopolitical-landscape-of-the-middle-east”>
FO° Talks: The New Geopolitical Landscape of the Middle East
Atul Singh: Alright, we move on now to New Troubles in Gaza, Israel, Syria and Turkey. And since Glenn has been the head of the Office of Transnational Threats, since Glenn was active in the War on Terror and Glenn has a lot of friends in Israel, and I’m sure in the Mossad, let’s hand the floor over to Glenn to talk about, at least, Gaza and Israel, to begin with.
Glenn Carle: Well, the structure of Atul’s and my discussion today, and thus of the world that we’re trying to address, is to begin with farce and then to discuss hope, and now to move to tragedy.
Atul Singh: It’s a great structure.
Glenn Carle: Yes. Well, such is life, I think, for us all. The Middle East has, all of our lives, been in chaos. It’s long been known by anyone who focuses on the Middle East that it’s a part of what the CIA has called for many, many years, and scholars have, the Arc of Instability, where you have increasing existential climate and environmental factors, apart from human action: falling rainfall, increasing desertification, declining fertility of soil, an uncontrollable demographic bulge — in particular, of young males. It’s young males that create all the trouble in the world. And that’s not a facetious comment, actually. It’s flippant, but it’s also accurate. On top of which are, to use the Marxist framework, the superstructure of political institutions that have been ill-adapted prior to decolonization and since, to address any of these problems, and then being victim of the great power conflict and the pawns thereof. So there’s always been a problem, but the current issues, I think, have become even more acute, clearly because of the last two years, I guess it is already, of the Gaza war. We’ll call it the Gaza war. And before that—
Gaza conflict and the limits of military strategy
Atul Singh: October 7 is when it begins. So it’s not yet two years. October 7, the attack.
Glenn Carle: Not yet two years, yeah, it’s a year and a half.
Atul Singh: Yeah, so Hamas attacks and then Israel responds.
Glenn Carle: Yeah. But I think the criticism hasn’t extended sufficiently to embrace the destabilizing effects on the entire Middle East of the American invasion of Iraq, which led to the collapse of Syria, much as one might have opposed and disliked the Assad government. And thus to 50% of the Syrian population of 30 million people becoming refugees, more than half of whom now reside largely in Germany, leading to the problems that we just touched upon, at least indirectly, before.
Atul Singh: Glenn, sorry, they reside elsewhere. They reside in Lebanon, they reside in Turkey and, of course, some of them have gone all the way to Germany. So not all of them are in Germany. Half of them are out of the country.
Glenn Carle: No, but about five million of them are in Germany and Europe. Yeah, five of the 12, I think. So, let’s talk about specifically Gaza, and then Syria and then Turkey. And if you talk about Gaza, that means talking about Israel. And I’ll have to be quick. Netanyahu’s policy has been to destroy Hamas. The problem he is confronted, although many deny and disagree with, is the same problem that the United States faced in the way it framed, defined and understood the “War on Terror” — which is, of course, an incoherent concept to begin with. I mean, how do you fight a war against terror? Well, we fought a war against a specific organization or organizations, thinking that there could be, in military terms in the United States, a kinetic — which means a lethal — solution, by killing enough people and breaking up an institution or an organization. It’s true we did largely destroy al-Qaeda and kill a lot of people. But you don’t kill a sociological problem or a political dispute almost ever by using a conventional military. Military strategists and trainers, for all of my adult life — all of our adult lives — have been concerned about the problems of asymmetric warfare. Why did the United States lose in Vietnam? Why did Britain lose in what became the United States? And why do I think Israel has created an unsolvable problem for itself in Gaza? You can’t really eliminate the frustrations of the Palestinians and thus their enduring hostility and actions against Israel, by killing Hamas. And you can’t completely kill Hamas as it is. Gaza has been almost literally destroyed. Dozens of thousands of people have been killed, and Hamas remains extant. The consequences there are that, I think, really, Israel clearly has won a short-term victory and almost certainly will win a medium-term victory. Strategically, existentially, Israel was not threatened prior to October 7 or on October 7, and hasn’t been and will not be threatened now. Also not receiving, I think, adequate attention is what’s happening in the West Bank. Gaza has been destroyed, Hamas has been seriously weakened, Israel’s strategic security is, in some ways, unchanged because they were not existentially threatened prior to the beginning of the Gaza war.
West Bank, demographics and internal Israeli politics
Glenn Carle: But on the West Bank, the same thing is happening, and there are three ways forward: You can expel all of the Palestinians, which is an increasingly plausible solution that the far right of Israel is advocating, both from Gaza and, progressively de facto, from the West Bank.
Atul Singh: You can send the Palestinians from Gaza to Egypt, and you send the Palestinians from West Bank to Jordan, and voilà! We don’t have a problem. That is the thinking of the Israeli far right.
Glenn Carle: Exactly. And medium-term, which is years in duration — what’s medium-term, five years? Ten? Israel will be fine. But that doesn’t address the enduring enmity and hatred that existed before, and that probably guarantees — what it does likely do is destabilize Egypt and Lebanon and Jordan in ways that, long-term, will make the region even more unstable than it is now. And just as Lebanon has been destroyed and Iraq was largely fractured, and Syria has been destroyed, so you might see an exacerbation of all of those tendencies long-term. From the success of the right wing of Israel and the Israeli army to destroy, in many ways, the operational capabilities of Hamas in Gaza and eliminate the Palestinian populations. Also linked to that and Israel is that demographically, you will, in the medium- to long-term future — not ten years, fifteen — have a majority of the Israeli population that is actually Muslim. So Israel has a choice then: Is it a democracy, or is it a Jewish oligarchy? And that’s—
Atul Singh: Very quickly, that’s because 20% of Israel is Palestinian, and they are Israeli citizens. They are not in the West Bank, they are not in Gaza. They are in Israel. And when Glenn is talking about, in the long run, you could have them as a majority, it’s because their birth rates are higher than Jewish birth rates. Although the ultra-Orthodox might just compete with them and make sure that Israel remains Jewish. But the secular Israelis who form the tip of the spear of the Israeli state, they are the ones who serve in Mossad, in Sayeret Matkal, in Shin Bet, in their elite units, whether it’s Yahalom or whatever. They are the ones who are secular, do not generally have many children. Therefore, they are electorally, progressively weaker and weaker. And they are the ones under threat in some ways, because, as we have just observed. within Israel, something big happened. First, the Israeli cabinet decided to fire Ronen Bar, the head of Shin Bet. That is Israel’s internal intelligence agency. And everyone hears about Mossad, but they should know about Shin Bet. Shin Bet is an extraordinary organization. Shin Bet has some extraordinary officers.
Glenn Carle: The domestic intelligence service. Israel’s FBI.
Atul Singh: Exactly. Eh, a little different. FBI does investigation, Shin Bet does intelligence.
Glenn Carle: Don’t go into the weeds, we’re going to run out of time.
Atul Singh: Yeah. We’ll extend the time this time a little bit because of the ground we have to cover. But Ronen Bar joined the Israeli Defense Forces in 1984. He was an officer in Sayeret Matkal. He was head of Shin Bet’s Operations Division. He became the head of Shin Bet. And he’s a highly educated chap, he’s got aquiline looks, he’s ridiculously fit and good-looking. I’m told by friends who know him that he is a top man. And for the Israeli cabinet to just kick him out — well, kicking out the Shin Bet chief is obviously a political prerogative, but there is due process. And there’s not just the law, but there is convention, there is a certain tenor. And it was done under a cloud. Why? Because there is, as most people who follow Israel closely — and as I was informed this morning by some Israeli friends — the Qatari connection affair, which is a corruption scandal engulfing Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. Good old Bibi, that’s his nickname. Now, what has happened is that the nearest political advisors of Bibi were involved in paid jobs promoting the interests of the Government of Qatar. Now, why is this a bit iffy? It’s because Qatar was spending $15 million — or a pretty significant figure — to Hamas, and that’s where the leaders of Hamas stay. And in March 2025, Shin Bet Chief Ronen Bar affirmed that the agency was investigating the affair. Now, this is a complex and multifaceted affair, as he acknowledged. And Ronen Bar was then kicked out whilst he’s investigating corruption which involves the Prime Minister. Now the Israeli Supreme Court has stepped in. The Israeli Supreme Court had said, “Hang on a minute, hang on a minute! You can’t just do this!” So they’ve issued an injunction to prevent Bar from being fired by Bibi. So what is happening in Israel is not just the conflict with Gaza, not just the tensions in the West Bank, not just the great successes in Lebanon. What is happening in Israel is a fundamental pull and push on the institutions of the state. It is indubitably true that a lot of Israelis find these institutions elitist, because the people who head Shin Bet, the people who head Mossad, the people who go into Sayeret Matkal tend to be officers who perform very well. Often, they may be from better-educated families. They’re almost invariably secular so far and the religious Jews who have the vote say, “Hang on a minute.” It’s a bit like people turning against elites everywhere and saying, “You can’t tell us what to do.” The difference between Israel and other societies is that this is a society which is, in some ways, a Spartan state. It has hostile neighbors. In many ways, as an MI6 friend said, it’s a modern-day Crusader state amongst a sea of hostile shores. And so if you’re playing footsie with the tip of your spear, with the sword in your scabbard, you’re playing with fire. And that is the fundamental tension within the Israeli society. And of course, there are demonstrations. Of course, people don’t like this. And people say that Bibi Netanyahu needs war to avoid scrutiny, and Bibi Netanyahu does not want any scrutiny. And by kicking out Ronen Bar, he’s postponing the inevitable. That may be true, may not be true. He’s certainly an impressive leader, he has more than nine lives, he’s much more resourceful than a cat. He’s cobbled together one coalition after another. And in democracy, things can get messy. But this is getting really, really, really messy. Of course, remember— Yes, sir.
Polarization and risks of civil unrest in Israel
Glenn Carle: I think the fundamental dynamic that you’re describing, and consequence of the Gaza crisis and the war is: Wars always polarize. And Israeli society is struggling with the ascendancy of its religious far right. So many times I’ve heard — probably many of us have, but certainly I did in Israel — that colleagues of mine or people of whom I had heard were denigrated and characterized by other Israelis as, “Oh, well, he’s not actually Jewish.” Why? Because he was a secular, reformed Jew, as opposed to an ultra-Orthodox. So we’re seeing this polarization.
Atul Singh: Yeah, and you’re right. On the one hand, thousands are rallying for a hostage deal, while there are others who say there can be no deal and we have to go hammer and tongs and destroy Hamas. So you’re absolutely right. The polarization is intense.
Glenn Carle: And I think the consequences are that Netanyahu — aligned with the far right in Israel — has defined the policy and will come to shape the nature of the policies in Gaza and the West Bank for the foreseeable future, and continue the polarization of Israel. And the consequences are much larger than in Israel, though. We’ll see these statements have contributed to—
Atul Singh: Sorry, carry on. There’s just an anecdote I want to put in when you finish. (laughs)
Glenn Carle: —Have contributed to the cataclysmic collapse of Syria. I won’t go into all the details, and I don’t think I’m capable of going into all the details — there are so many factions involved — but the larger point is that the changes… Ahmed al-Sharaa is the new leader of Syria, someone who’d been relatively briefly a member of what was called al-Qaeda — it wasn’t actually al-Qaeda — but a jihadist group in Syria, now rehabilitated because he, I think, really was a religious nationalist opponent of the secular regime of Assad. In any event, we now see growing stresses in an already destroyed society, which is Syria. And that will have consequences well beyond Syria itself, as it already has, as we touched upon in Germany.
Atul Singh: Very quickly, to add to this polarization: The polarization in Israel is so intense — going back to Israel — that there are newspaper reports of Ben-Gvir, an Israeli far-right minister, and the Shin Bet chief Ronen Bar almost having a physical confrontation, a physical fight. And two or three of Israel’s Special Operations officers told me their biggest fear in Israel is civil war. And they just have to look across the border, just across the Golan Heights, to see the civil war going on in Syria. Now, Glenn talked about broad context, and I’ll just give you one tiny detail. Well, many of the Alawites were loyal to the Assad dynasty, and by the end, it was really a sectarian dynastic regime. It began as a Ba’athist socialist regime which tried to create some idea of a secular Syria. But by the end, it was a sectarian regime — Alawites supporting the Assad dynasties, backed by Iran, a Shia power in the region, and of course, supported by Russia. And some of the Alawite officers loyal to Assad rebelled. The rebellion was forces that are now in charge in Damascus put the rebellion down and then conducted vendetta, killing many Alawites. And remember, the Alawite–Sunni schism goes back to Selim I, when he was hunting them down in 1520 or something like that. And the Shia–Sunni divide is centuries old. So that can always flare up in the region. As Glenn said, that has potential far beyond Syria’s borders.
Syrian Collapse and Turkey’s authoritarian turn
Glenn Carle: I think that’s the relevant concern for us today, or now. Of the roughly 25 million Syrians, 12 million are refugees or more — 5.4 million of whom are in Turkey and Germany and elsewhere. To give it one little sense of the catastrophe that is overflowing and affecting Europe and everywhere else. 72% of Syrians — the entire country — can only literally survive because of foreign aid, food aid and others. Half of all of the hospitals in the entire country no longer function. So the consequence has been not just refugees, but in part, the rise of the AfD, the neo-Nazi far right in Germany and elsewhere. This has both destabilized and empowered Turkey, which is the last thing I’ll talk about. Now, we’ve all heard, I think, about the big headline of the moment, which is that the Erdoğan government has arrested the mayor of Istanbul, who was the likely opponent of Erdoğan in the upcoming presidential election. This is just the continuation of the increasing totalitarian bent of the Erdoğan government and the erosion and destruction — one hopes, not ultimately — of the secular Turkish democracy.
Atul Singh: By the way, the mayor’s name is Ekrem İmamoğlu, and he has been a decent mayor. As, indeed — remember — Recep Tayyip Erdoğan was. He began as mayor of Istanbul, and he did a decent job, which is why he became prime ministerial candidate. And then, of course, he changed the constitution and then he became president. And then, of course, in his presidential terms, many terms, he’s built Aksaray the famous 1,000-room White House exactly on the spot where Mustafa Kemal Atatürk’s hunting lodge once stood. So, jokingly, many of my Turkish friends call him Sultan Recep Tayyip Erdoğan because he’s literally looking back—
Glenn Carle: He clearly aspires to that level of centralized control.
Atul Singh: Indeed. One quick thing, Glenn — I’ll add and then cede the floor to you. He looks back to the Ottoman Empire for inspiration. He wants to rekindle the Ottoman heritage. He wants Turkey to be a leader of the Muslim world, especially the Sunni world. He speaks out about Palestine and Kashmir. He definitely wants to intervene in neighboring countries, and in Syria, he has. So he’s very much neo-Ottoman. Over to you, Glenn.
Glenn Carle: Yeah. Well, all of us, every country and society, looks to its moment of greatest glory. So the Greeks still think that Pericles is ruling Athens, and the British think that Queen Victoria commands the sun. And the Americans think that we have just stormed Omaha Beach in France. And the Turks think that Suleiman the Great is building more mosques. The consequence of the arrest — and I would argue, in part because of the stresses on everywhere, Turkey in this instance, of what’s happening in the Middle East — are the largest demonstrations in over a decade. And I am pessimistic, because whoever controls the guns tends to win the arguments in a demonstration. And the changes of government in Turkey, which haven’t been peaceful, have come largely from the military, and the military seems to be well under the control of Erdoğan at present. What are the consequences larger than this, I would say? As I mentioned, the further cementing of Erdoğan’s near-dictatorship. The Middle East is being largely ignored by this administration. The Trump administration said — this is a paraphrase, but this is literally what came out of the White House: “Well, human rights are nice, but we have really nothing to say about the domestic affairs of Turkey,” which means that — also, the US administration will not just turn a blind eye to but will abet whatever the Israeli government does with regard to the Palestinians in the Middle East. And then this has implications also for what the US will do or won’t, and Israel will do or won’t towards Iran, which will affect the entire Middle East, which makes it more likely that with all this instability, Iran will seek a nuclear weapon. And it also is more likely that Iran’s government could collapse from internal opposition or external stress, which could well be military, by Iran or the US.
Atul Singh: Or a combination of the two.
Glenn Carle: And the destruction of the current Iranian regime could be a good thing. But any radical change is going to be terribly painful for many, many millions of people, however it plays out. And so the Middle East is in probably the greatest turmoil, even if it’s not immediately apparent, of any time in recent decades.
Atul Singh: Alright, on that note, we’ve come well past our allotted hour. It was lovely to have you all here for the March edition of FO° Exclusive. We will see you next month. Until then, be safe. Greetings, wherever in the world you happen to be.
Glenn Carle: Salaam.
[Lee Thompson-Kolar edited this piece.]
The views expressed in this article/video are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.
” post-content-short=” Atul Singh: Alright, we move on now to New Troubles in Gaza, Israel, Syria and Turkey. And since Glenn has been the head of the Office of Transnational Threats, since Glenn was active in the War on Terror and Glenn has a lot of friends in Israel, and I’m sure in the Mossad, let’s hand the…” post_summery=”This discussion explores escalating instability across Gaza, Israel, Syria and Turkey, linking regional turmoil to long-term consequences. It highlights humanitarian crises, shifting demographics and democratic erosion. Editor-in-Chief Atul Singh and retired CIA Officer Glenn Carle emphasize the global implications of Middle Eastern conflicts, warning of deepening unrest and geopolitical fallout.” post-date=”Apr 09, 2025″ post-title=”FO° Exclusive: New Troubles in Gaza, Israel, Syria and Turkey” slug-data=”fo-exclusive-new-troubles-in-gaza-israel-syria-and-turkey”>
FO° Exclusive: New Troubles in Gaza, Israel, Syria and Turkey
[This is the seventh part of a nine-part series. To read more, see Parts 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 here.]
Israel has always considered Syria a militant, very pro-Arab, brutal country, but stable under its Assad family dictatorship. Simply put, Israel sees Syria as a danger to its existence. While Israeli intelligence services often criticize the West for not understanding the Middle East, they themselves have also been wrong about Syria. Even under the Soviet umbrella, former Syrian President Hafez al-Assad kept Syria out of wars with Israel and only provoked the rival state from behind the veil of terrorist groups.
Israel avoids Syrian war
When the Soviet Union began to collapse in 1991, Syria entered peace talks with Israel via the Madrid Peace Conference. Its willingness to engage came as a surprise for the West and Israel themselves. The talks over the years ended with little change. In 2011, Syria became embroiled in its civil war.
Israel did not get involved in this war. It held the Golan Heights as it had for many years, and it kept its head down. The Israeli government did not want to repeat the same mistake it had with Lebanon, when it became mired in the 1982 Lebanon War for 18 years before withdrawing in 2000.
The Assad regime collapsed in December 2024. Israel remains as uninvolved in Syria as possible. Israel protects the Golan Heights area but is also committed to defending the Druze community in southern Syria if necessary.
[Will Sherriff and Lee Thompson-Kolar edited this piece.]
The views expressed in this article/video are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.
” post-content-short=” Israel has always considered Syria a militant, very pro-Arab, brutal country, but stable under its Assad family dictatorship. Simply put, Israel sees Syria as a danger to its existence. While…” post_summery=”Israel has long viewed Syria as a hostile but stable threat, historically avoiding direct conflict by staying out of Syria’s civil war and focusing on defending the Golan Heights. Despite misjudging Syria at times, Israel has remained wary of repeating past entanglements like the 1982 Lebanon War. It now monitors Syria defensively.” post-date=”Apr 08, 2025″ post-title=”FO° Talks: Josef Olmert on Syria, Part 7: The Israeli–Syrian Connection Continued” slug-data=”fo-talks-josef-olmert-on-syria-part-7-the-israeli-syrian-connection-continued”>
FO° Talks: Josef Olmert on Syria, Part 7: The Israeli–Syrian Connection Continued
Glenn Carle: Well, let’s go from the, obviously, profoundly depressing subject for me so people don’t have to watch me fume and steam anymore, impotently, and turn to something which I find is a more hopeful topic, which is Germany’s Radical New Economic Policy, or the beginnings thereof, at least.
Atul Singh: Alright, so Germany. We’ve covered Germany in the previous edition, and we talked about the election. We told you how the CDU/CSU had emerged as the top dog. We told you about the rise of the far right and what has happened, as we predicted, which was almost inevitable because, obviously, the CDU/CSU combination, the Christian Democratic Union, wasn’t going to ally with Alternative for Deutschland, the Alliance for Germany. It will certainly steal some of the clothes, CDU will steal some of AfDs clothes. But the CDU has got into bed with the SPD yet again — they got into bed during Angela Merkel’s time. It’s not something new. They have an old marriage, they bicker, they spat, they break up and then they get back again. So hey-ho, there you go.
Debt reform and economic transformation
Atul Singh: The CDU/CSU bloc and the SPD have announced a preliminary deal to form a coalition on 8th March. Excellent. Both of them have put a debt reform plan which has won the battle of the Greens. This has gone through both houses of German parliament now. And they’ve said, “Look, we are going to exempt defense spending from the country’s constitutionally enshrined debt limit” — that’s known as the debt brake, this was a 2009 constitutional provision — “and we are going to create a special €500 billion fund (roughly $545 billion) for infrastructure development.” This €100 billion, which is $109 billion, will go to the Special Climate and Transformation Fund, which is the pet issue of the Greens. The Greens have already got nuclear energy out of Germany, for which they’ve paid a hefty electoral price, and now they get their pound of flesh to put this release of the debt brake in terms of greater investment in Climate and Economic Transformation. Now, note there are risks to this policy, because a lot of Germans think that this policy has imposed extraordinary costs and a lot of suffering on the German consumer, on the German worker, on German businesses. So the coalition, there are risks to it, as our colleague at Fair Observer, Alex Gloy, who’s a brilliant German economist whom you must read, has spoken about and will speak about at great length in the coming days. So roughly, let’s assume German GDP is around 4.5 trillion, okay? And right now, what we know is that German debt is historically lower, alright — compared to the southern Italians, definitely much lower. And if Germany boosts its debt by even a trillion, its debt–GDP ratio would still be lower than all other major Western economies. So there’s headroom, as many Germans have argued. And also, Friedrich Merz, the leader of the CDU/CSU bloc and the future chancellor, he has a background in corporate law, much more successful than mine — I left that world, I clearly wasn’t bright enough or diligent enough. So here I am partnering with Glenn Carle, and the two of us are trying to make sense of the world and sort of pushing through multi-billion-dollar or multi-trillion-dollar deals, which Friedrich Merz has. He’s gone from billion-dollar deals to trillion-dollar deals, I suppose.
Challenges and risks of the new policy
Atul Singh: And what he has done is he’s taken the view that, “Look, we can no longer rely on the export-oriented model alone. Why? We are living in an age of protectionism. Chinese demand has plummeted. Russian energy costs have soared. American protectionism has kicked in, it kicked in even under Joe Biden in the guise of the Inflation Reduction Act. Now under Trump, we have tariffs looming. So if we don’t stimulate domestic demand, what is our economic growth model?” In fact, Germany has stagnated for two years. And we haven’t even talked about Germany’s infamous red tape, which the previous chancellor, Olaf Scholz himself, talked about, and Glenn has mentioned many times, you need 200 permits to build something simple. Perhaps not 200, but you get the point — it’s ridiculous, it’s self-defeating, it’s a self-inflicted wound.
Investment in infrastructure and defense
Atul Singh: So we haven’t gotten into that, but here, Merz said, “Okay, we have to change the structure of the economy. We need structural change. How do we achieve that structural change?” Well, Germans are still going to save because Germany is an aging population, people fear for the future. People are not 25, but they’ll go out and get drunk and party and then go to a nightclub. A few may go to KitKatClub and the other posh clubs, or the other wonderful clubs of Berlin. But most people will lead prudent lives, and they are Protestants at the end of the day, culturally, even though Bavaria and Baden-Württemberg are certainly Catholic. Culturally, they are Protestants. It was Prussia that reunified Germany in 1867, first by beating Austria in 1871 — it completed that process by beating France, two Catholic nations. So culturally, Germany is Protestant; they are going to be prudent. So what do you do? Well, you need government expenditure. German infrastructure is no longer cutting-edge, is no longer leading, and it makes sense for Germany to refurbish its once-wanted infrastructure — so train stations, train tracks, cranes, roads, ports, bridges, the list could go on. Alright, so that’s one. Green Infrastructure, charging stations, perhaps funds to develop new battery technologies, all other clean energy alternatives such as wind power or solar — which in Germany doesn’t make sense, they don’t get that much sun. It makes sense where I’m sitting in Jaipur, Rajasthan, which is ridiculously sunny and on the edge of the desert to the west of here. But anyway, let’s invest in clean, green energy and move forward. And of course, what makes sense now, given the increasing Russian threat, is investment in defense. Going back to the times of Friedrich the Great. Germany is now back in some ways. As we know, NATO was established, as someone once quipped, to keep the Americans in, the Russians out and the Germans down. And now, of course, with Trump threatening to pull the US out of NATO or at least putting pressure on NATO; threatening to take Greenland away from Denmark, which is an ally; taking over Panama, that’s already done; maybe having Canada as the 51st state, or maybe 51st, 52nd, 53rd, whatever states and so on and so forth — Germany is having a bout of extreme nervousness. And Germany thinks, “Hang on a minute. We have a Trump-led US on one side and we have Vladimir Putin, a German-speaking former KGB colonel, very close, just after Poland, and so we should prepare.” So Germany has decided to invest in defense as well.
Potential long-term risks and political implications
Atul Singh: Now all this promise of investment in infrastructure and defense has boosted long-term yields because investors have priced in higher borrowing. On March 5, German yields jumped by 0.3 percentage points. This largest single-day rise in almost 30 years. Even the Euro surged, alright. Mind you, the dollar has dropped. The Euro has surged, that’s a new thing. So we have an export-oriented economy with a current account surplus that is nearly 3% of the GDP, an economy that exports capital now resorting to new fiscal laxity to spend more on defense and infrastructure. Some people are calling it the beginning of a new European growth model, because it shows that Germany is willing to take risks, finally. However, there are risks to this risk-taking. Let’s say if the Germans lose fiscal discipline, then what happens? Let’s say so many immigrants in Germany from conflict-ridden areas who do not come from Protestant background, they want more and more welfare, more and more boondoggles, and then politicians start promising them the boon. Then Germany could very easily turn to the Italian growth model, which is not much of a growth model, ladies and gentlemen. And of course, then the risk of AfD coming to power, just as Giorgia Meloni has come to power. And remember, Merz has broken his campaign promise: He said he wouldn’t release the debt brake, he said he wouldn’t increase spending. He promised, basically, a steady hand on the tiller. And instead, this corporate lawyer who is not terribly charismatic, in keeping with the German tradition of having dull leaders — they’ve still not forgotten Adolf Hitler, the ghost of Adolf dances in German nightmares every night. So this dull chap has taken a rather radical decision. And one of the big risks is that German voters are not in a mood to fight Russia. Neither the AfD, which got over 20.8% of the vote, if I remember correctly, and parties on the far left, one of which nearly got 5% of the vote, 4.97% of the vote. And if you add up the votes, well, most people voted for some kind of stability. There’s no mood amongst German voters to take on Russia. And if you have increased spending, then you have the risk of inflation, which is exacerbated by US President Donald Trump’s protectionism. And if the economy was eventually to turn south thanks to inflation, thanks to spending, thanks to loss of fiscal discipline, thanks to a new political populism, then this shedding of post-war German debt diversion — which will certainly boost animal spirits in Germany and in Europe in the short run and will create export opportunities for foreign firms, which can now sell more to Germany — it could lead to risks in the long-term and threaten the entire European economy. So yes, as of now, the relaxation of stringent borrowing laws will release a new burst of growth, but it has risks the coalition could collapse. It has risks of creating longer-term problems and it could presage the rise of the AfD which can say, “Look, none of the politicians you voted for kept their promise.” Over to you, Glenn.
Glenn’s perspective on Germany’s economic shifts
Glenn Carle: Well, someone said — I can’t remember who this sage was — that the “consistency is the hobgoblin of little minds.” And then, in keeping with today’s reverence — you’re my reverence today for John Maynard Keynes — he was asked one time why he had changed his position on a certain economic point, and he said, “I don’t know about you, sir, but when circumstances change, I change my mind. What about you?” So what’s changed, and why is Germany possibly at this significant turning point? The big change is what’s happened in Ukraine and what’s happened in the Oval Office, and thus to the American relationship with Europe. The structural problems that Germany has slowly not been able to address successfully is demographic of fewer workers per pensioner; cultural and demographic, again, with a need for workers and a dramatic increase in the number of immigrants to Germany in particular, as you alluded to, from a different civilization and religion, which creates social tensions. And then from Vladimir Putin’s consistent efforts, with continuing success over 20 years, to reconstitute the Russian Imperium in what Russians call the near abroad and we all call the central European states. So the leaders of Germany are struggling with all of these things and nothing, to quote another great mind, Samuel Johnson, who’s in the English language quoted more frequently than anything except for the Bible. Samuel Johnson said — I’m paraphrasing — “Nothing focuses the mind like the hangman’s noose.” And with Germany confronting conceivably, literally existential issues, but certainly civilization-changing tensions, there is a possibility that the German leaders, currently the chancellor, will be obliged to and able to rise to the occasion with fundamental shifts in tax structure, regulatory framework and allocation of resources. The €500 billion increase on defense can be very stimulatory if coupled with some regulatory issues, deregulation, it could be a historic moment that we are living. However, a lot of these problems have been known and German leaders have struggled to address them for decades already. I think the fundamental change is that there is just about to be 22%, I think it is, of a sovereign state immediately to the east of Germany being swallowed up by Eastern hordes. The historic fear of Germans and that that is combined with these structural, economic, social rigidities make it possible and obligatory for the German leaders to succeed. So it’s not at all one issue, but it has focused the mind and the German leaders seem to offer some real potential for historic change in the structure of Germany’s economy, society and thus of Europe, because Germany is the key to Europe.
[Lee Thompson-Kolar edited this piece.]
The views expressed in this article/video are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.
” post-content-short=” Glenn Carle: Well, let’s go from the, obviously, profoundly depressing subject for me so people don’t have to watch me fume and steam anymore, impotently, and turn to something which I find is a more hopeful topic, which is Germany’s Radical New Economic Policy, or the beginnings thereof, at…” post_summery=”Germany is beginning a major economic shift, suspending its constitutional debt brake to fund €500 billion in infrastructure, defense and green initiatives. This marks a break from fiscal conservatism amid geopolitical pressures, demographic challenges and rising protectionism. While potentially transformative, the policy carries political and economic risks, including populist backlash.” post-date=”Apr 07, 2025″ post-title=”FO° Exclusive: Germany’s Radical New Economic Policy” slug-data=”fo-exclusive-germanys-radical-new-economic-policy”>
FO° Exclusive: Germany’s Radical New Economic Policy
[This is the sixth part of a nine-part series. To read more, see Parts 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 here.]
After the Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) Sunni militant group toppled Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s regime in December 2024, all eyes have been on the Middle East. Other nations have been vying for influence during this period of instability, in particular the United States and Turkey. Former US President Joe Biden removed the bounty on Abu Muhammad al-Julani (now Ahmed al-Sharaa), interim president and leader of HTS. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan visited Syria in order to help with the political transition. Since HTS is a Turkish proxy, Turkey is looking to replace Iran’s leadership position in Syria.
However, not much attention is placed on Israel in regards to Syria’s future. While there are Israeli military movements in southern Syria, offense isn’t in Israel’s interest, only defense. Their stake in the region comes from two things: one, Iran’s past influence on Syria as the proclaimed number one enemy of Israel; and two, Israel’s history with Syria, especially regarding the 1991 Madrid Peace Conference.
The Madrid Peace Conference was the US’s hope for a stable region
Almost exactly eight months after the first Gulf War ended, the US intended to facilitate peace between their ally Israel and Jordan, Palestine, Lebanon and Syria. The Conference comprised three big meetings, all of which involved Israel and another Middle Eastern country. The third meeting, between Israel and Syria, was the most anticipated. Relations between Syria and Israel were strained at best.
The only reason Syria agreed to attend was to give a gesture of goodwill to the US. During the first Gulf War, then-Syrian President Hafez al-Assad cooperated with the Coalition spearheaded by the US, the United Kingdom and Saudi Arabia. This came as a shock, as Syria had previously opposed US involvement during the 1980 Iran–Iraq War. Their sudden alignment with the US was done to make up for their involvement in the Iranian coalition against the Arab world during that war. As such, they had agreed to come to the peace talks.
The peace talks were fruitless
The first thing Israel requested was the release of the 4,000 Jews still living in Syria. In their situation, their travel, emigration and human rights were restricted. Syria was unprepared for this request and denied allegations. Eventually, US pressure forced Syria to meet the demand.
The talks yielded no results beyond the release of Syrian Jews. Neither side had any interest in achieving peace. Assad only agreed because he sensed the changing environment of the Middle East due to the collapsing Soviet Union, and to show goodwill toward the US. Additionally, the Israeli government was not ready to make territorial concessions. Both of these reasons doomed the talks from the very beginning.
However, this does not mean the peace talks were for naught. The readiness of Syria to enter the talks, despite having positioned itself as Israel’s primary enemy, marked a shift in regional relations. The Madrid Peace Conference can still be considered a turning point even if the results were not immediately felt.
[Cheyenne Torres and Lee Thompson-Kolar edited this piece.]
The views expressed in this article/video are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.
” post-content-short=” After the Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) Sunni militant group toppled Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s regime in December 2024, all eyes have been on the Middle East. Other nations have been vying…” post_summery=”With President Bashar al-Assad’s regime fallen, global powers have competed for influence in Syria, while Israel maintains a defensive stance to counter Iran’s former presence there. Despite Israel’s limited involvement, its historical tension with Syria shapes its strategic interests. Peace talks failed to yield lasting agreements, but Syria’s willingness to engage marked a diplomatic shift.” post-date=”Apr 06, 2025″ post-title=”FO° Talks: Josef Olmert on Syria, Part 6: The Israeli–Syrian Connection” slug-data=”fo-talks-josef-olmert-on-syria-part-6-the-israeli-syrian-connection”>
FO° Talks: Josef Olmert on Syria, Part 6: The Israeli–Syrian Connection
Atul Singh: Welcome to the third edition of 2025’s FO° Exclusive. Last month, we covered old ghosts coming back to life in Germany, global markets being extremely nervous and the new US–Europe–Russia–Ukraine soap opera. In March 2025, our top three issues are:
- Risk of US Recession Now Rises in 2025
- Germany’s Radical New Economic Policy
- New Troubles in Gaza, Israel, Syria and Turkey
So, number one: Risk of US Recession Now Rises in 2025. So those of you who’ve been reading the financial press are probably fretting about the risk of the US recession. The US economy is certainly in danger of recession this year.
Glenn Carle: Pardon me — pardon me for interrupting. I shouldn’t be smiling, there’s nothing funny here. As a child, I always was terrified of clowns. Clowns are supposed to be, apparently, for children, happy, and they’re always part of circuses and so on. I always found them terrifying and frightening, the perversions of reality. And we are living a clown show in the American government, at the top of the American government. And so, there is nothing funny about it, and it is terrifying and the consequences are so potentially — and in the making — catastrophic that I prefer that you take the lead on this, and I will just make funny faces and say horrible things.
Atul Singh: Well, clearly, clearly, I have an easy job. Okay, so what’s going on? To give you color: US President Donald Trump’s policies are increasing economic uncertainty and heightening the probability of recession. Both the S&P 500 and the Nasdaq Composite have been falling. The University of Michigan’s consumer sentiment index has dropped to 57.9, the lowest level since November 2022. Consumers’ long-term inflation expectations have risen to levels last seen in early 1993. Now, I repeat: early 1993. For those of you who are young, that is when Bill Clinton was in the White House. It was a glorious time, as Monica Lewinsky can attest!
Glenn Carle: I don’t know her, I was in the White House.
Atul Singh: Exactly. And this may put upward pressures on interest rates and slow down economic activity.
The Trump administration’s economic philosophy
Atul Singh: Now, importantly, the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta — it is one of the 12 regional banks that are part of the US central banking system. That maintains a model that forecasts a quarterly change in US GDP. The bank’s GDPNow model has recently been predicting a fall in GDP. So, we know that numbers are not looking particularly propitious. But more importantly, perhaps, in a Fox News interview — because whether you like it or not, Fox News is an important metric, as is Truth Social, of understanding what may go on, what might happen and signal to — it seems to be the case, at least when it comes to comments on Europe and strikes on overseas targets — things have come a long way since you were in the White House, Glenn.
Glenn Carle: As you will explain to us, there seems to be a growing and tremendous surprise that if you hack a hole in the bottom of your dinghy with an axe, that all of a sudden, the water starts to come in and you sink. I mean, it’s as simple and absurd a situation as that. Yes.
Atul Singh: Hey, oh, there you go. But the important thing is that Trump has himself refused to rule out a recession. That’s super important, because he’s saying there’s a period of transition, because what we are doing is very big. Now, some of our Republican sources in the Trump administration have drunk the Kool-Aid. They genuinely believe in the great president and they think that recession is short-term pain that will bring long-term gain. It is like working out in the gym. Want to build muscles? You work until the point of exhaustion, you tear a few muscles, you’re in pain, but in the long term, you look like Arnold Schwarzenegger. That is the goal, apparently.
Glenn Carle: It is worth underscoring the degree of sincerity of many of the supporters of the Trump administration. I encounter this all the time, and those of you who are not in the US — perhaps that is surprising, I’m not sure. But in any event, I will grant sincerity to a significant portion of the true believers in the administration and those who have supported it so that it won a majority.
Atul Singh: Now, importantly, a good guide to understanding the Trump administration is Stephen Miran. Now, who is Stephen Miran? He’s the Chair of the Council of Economic Advisers. So, he’s the person, in theory, advising Donald Trump what to do, and he published a paper in November 2024, which is important if you want to understand what is this administration trying to do? Now, I’m sharing my screen, and I will share with you this paper, okay? And this paper shows to you that this is a user’s guide to restructuring the global trading system. It’s an audacious plan. It’s a bold plan. It has a number of assumptions. Now, one of them is that international trade and financial systems are fundamentally biased against the US. I’ll read the second paragraph for you: “The root of the economic imbalances lies in persistent dollar overvaluation that prevents the balancing of international trade, and this overvaluation is driven by inelastic demand for reserve assets. As global GDP grows, it becomes increasingly burdensome for the United States to finance the provision of reserve assets and the defense umbrella, as the manufacturing and tradeable sectors bear the brunt of the costs.” Sincere, bold, audacious — certainly the case. You could grant Steve Miran credit for identifying at least part of the problem correctly. Imbalances in trade certainly cause working-class losses, certainly cause a loss in manufacturing jobs, and anything that’s tradable. If the US currency is, arguably, overvalued, it will suffer if someone sends in goods manufactured in China or Vietnam or Japan or Switzerland, even — any place where the currency is weaker and has been weakening, visibly, the dollar. That suddenly gives them a leg up when it comes to exports. Now, that is the problem. What is the solution, then? The solution asks for—
Glenn Carle: Well, hold on for a second. They — Miran and this faction, now dominant of the Republican Party — characterize that as the problem. It pretty clearly, fundamentally misunderstands the basic rules of international trade. The dollar becomes strong because the American economy is attractive and strong, and the US has a trade deficit because it has a more productive economy, which makes the economy strong, and so foreign goods are relatively cheaper. But the investment in the dollars leads to the creation of cutting-edge technology, which is not Second Industrial Revolution-level manufacturing. But they disagree with all of that.
Atul Singh: Glenn, certainly that’s a point of view which comes from traditional international economics theory. And as for that theory — as you move up the value chain — then a lot of the lower-productivity jobs and the low-skill manufacturing goes overseas or goes to economies at a lower stage of technological development. Certainly, if your dollar is in demand, then it means that you may be running a current account deficit, but you’re running a capital account surplus. That is, dollars are coming into your economy. Other people are buying your dollars and putting in their savings or investment into your economy, which, of course, leads to more cutting-edge technologies, thanks to more capital. But remember that whilst American investors/slash/shareholders may profit and American consumers — certainly, buying stuff on Amazon or Walmart — profit, American workers often pay the price. Because when factories move from Michigan, or they move from the so-called Rust Belt — Ohio, Indiana, wherever — then they do not overnight suddenly become computer programmers working for Google and creating great software, or, for that matter, moving to high-end manufacturing, which has taken off in places like Batesville, Mississippi or Akron, Ohio. That is also true, but a lot of the workers going there will be highly educated, highly skilled. And those who lose their jobs are not people who are naturally, seamlessly shifting over. Some of them, yes, but not all of them. So, there are winners and losers here. And the losers never got compensated, which is why this angst about loss of manufacturing. There’s also a wrinkle here that at some point, an excessive demand for dollars can make a lot of your products and services uncompetitive, or, at times, can cause distortions. And that is why, in 1973, the US went off the gold standard, because the gold standard allowed for the devaluation of the dollar. Similarly, in 1985, there were the Plaza Accords, in which allies such as Germany and Japan in particular, also France and the UK, deliberately agreed to revalue their currencies and allowed for a devaluation of the dollar, which the Japanese believe led to the crash of their market and their long slump. Not only, but it contributed to some degree. And, of course, other countries have taken note and are very wary of it.
Tariffs, trade and protectionism
Atul Singh: But let’s go on to explore what the Trump administration believes, because it’s important for our listeners to understand what is it that they are trying to do. Our sources in the Trump administration — I’ve talked to a few over the last few days — take the view that tariffs are a key tool to ensure that protectionist countries, which include many allies, open up their markets to US goods. Now, that may not be what Donald Trump believes, but that is what a lot of — I would argue — even Democrats have come to believe when it comes to protectionist countries. They think that whilst the US offers a level playing field to foreign companies, many other countries do not reciprocate. And I’ve heard that complaint repeatedly about China. I’ve heard that about Japan, even. And I’ve heard that increasingly of late when it comes to India. American executives keep talking again and again and again about tariff and non-tariff barriers, about quality controls, about all sorts of barriers to entry and, of course, favoring of local oligopolies and even monopolies. So even the ones who are registered Democrats say some good may come out of these tariffs, because it’ll get these protectionist countries in line. So, it’s interesting to note that they don’t view tariffs, perhaps as the more doctrinaire members in their administration do, as a revenue source. But they do see it as a tool to bring about some kind of fairness. And put very simply — I mean, fundamentally, their argument is: “Okay, look, tariff and non-tariff barriers against US goods and services are unfair, and so far we’ve tried many things; they haven’t worked. Therefore, we should be unafraid of using unorthodox methods to bring countries taking advantage of the US into line.” Alright, fine, an argument. Then they go on to say they view the devaluation of the dollar as a key policy goal. Now, this is where divergences start appearing within the US business and the US policy establishment. Because certainly, the Democrats don’t want devaluation of the dollar. Certainly, many Republicans who are fiscally conservative and libertarian don’t want devaluation of the dollar. They want the markets to decide, demand and supply to decide. But then there are the true believers, as Glenn talked about, and the true believers believe what Miran has said. And they say the root of economic imbalances lies in persistent dollar overvaluation that prevents the balancing of international trade. So, what do they want? You read a lot about a potential Mar-a-Lago Accord that will craft a new global monetary system. So what they want is a new 1985-style Plaza Accord, and they see the US trading partners to agree to a weaker dollar; to commit to providing low-cost, long-term financing to Washington, DC. One idea is that long-term bonds could be rolled away to century bonds. And other ideas are that, okay, you could have similar, long-term new bonds which you could issue. So our sources say that if the Trump administration plays hardball, if it threatens tariffs, if it removes security guarantees, trading partners will eventually come to heel. That is the logic.
Internal contradictions and fiscal policy uncertainty
Atul Singh: Now, remember, the administration is not speaking in one voice. The US Treasury Secretary, Scott Bessent, is saying, “Well, the strong dollar policy is still in place.” And this is worrying my friends from Wharton on Wall Street. They say, “Hang on a minute. What is the policy? Do you want a weaker dollar? Do you want a stronger dollar? Do we listen to Stephen Miran, or do we listen to Scott Bessent? What exactly is the government policy?” Now, add to the uncertainty around what is the monetary policy? There is the DOGE, the Department of Government Efficiency, and it has been active. It has fired many employees. And yet, those of you who have been following figures: US federal spending still rose to a record $603 billion in February, despite all the cuts. And this is worrying markets, too. This is spooking markets a bit. But despite all of this cutting, there hasn’t been enough cuts to make a difference. And, of course, some of the DOGE-led spending cuts could have dramatic effects. Thousands of federal employees have gone. Thousands of grants and contracts have gone. There’s fear that not enough thought might have gone into slashing these grants and contracts. And so, the economic growth that the Biden administration drove — and a lot of it was driven by government spending, too, if you go through the numbers, as I asked a friend who was in the US Treasury, a senior economist in the US Treasury, to do so. He said, “Yes, the Biden stimulus was a huge factor.” And he said that, “Yes, of course, manufacturing rose, but a lot of the growth was driven by government spending. So DOGE cuts might actually prove to be highly contractionary for the US economy.” So should that all kick in together, what happens? Well, will the recession be as severe as 2007–2009? Maybe. If the Trump administration keeps knocking bricks out of the wall, will the wall cave in? Perhaps. What we can certainly say in a year of uncertainty is that the US may experience recession in 2025. And that recession could be a deep and painful one. But as yet, although there are multiple signals that point to a recession, there’s no strong consensus about the timing and the extent of it. So, that is, in a nutshell, what we believe, or what is our judgment on prospects of the US recession. Over to you, Glenn.
Broader economic theory and social implications
Glenn Carle: The surprising aspect to me of FOI’s analysis is the rapidity with which a recession may arrive. There’s always latency in economic policy changes. Interest rate changes take from six to 18 months, generally, depending on which rates we’re talking about, to be detectable in their effects on economic growth rates. And similarly with spending cuts, there’s a lag. So that we assess that this could happen within 2025 is, I think, remarkable and reflects the immediate, powerful anxiety that the measures are taking. You know, John Maynard Keynes pretty well pointed out that this is — he said this facetiously, but it’s literally true: It doesn’t really matter what spending is done so long as there is spending done. And one could take suitcases full of money, dig a hole, put them in the ground and then have people dig them up as their economic activity, and the economy would be stimulated. Of course, that can also be inflationary. But if you spend more than the economy has — this will sound stupid — the economy will have more money. If you spend less, it will have less, and that will be recessionary. What is the administration planning to do? A lot of things, as you pointed out, are contradictory with themselves. Even if one accepts or rejects their philosophy, their framework, it is internally inconsistent what they are doing with regard to their own competing philosophies. If you have tariffs, that is inflationary. It depresses GNP growth. It does not raise revenues from abroad. It increases costs to consumers. If you cut the budget, their expenditures, which is one effect of firing many federal employees, then you will have a depressionary — if that’s a word — impact on the economy, if the changes are significant enough. Not given much attention is the assault on the IRS, the Internal Revenue Service — the tax collection agency of the United States government. And by firing whatever it is, ten or 15% of the workforce, the assessment is that you will reduce tax revenues for the government by between ten and 20%, which is tremendous for the economy. And that, too, will lead to the deficit, which will increase interest rates, which will depress economic activity. It’s not a mystery why Republicans are so hostile to the IRS. They simply don’t want to pay taxes and don’t care about the consequences. They’re, in that regard, libertarian. The small government, no expenses, personal incomes being high for those who have them — all being superior to other things. So, all of these changes will increase the deficit. Because all of the cuts have come on the ten to 15% of the federal budget that is, quote, “discretionary,” really, and not yet on where the budget is overwhelmingly devoted — which is in Social Security, medical insurance, which is Medicare and Medicaid, programs for the general population and for the poor, and in the military. So, it really is largely incoherent. Much of it is posturing. And the thing we haven’t talked about, which I think gets to the heart or one of the central points of what they’re trying to do is, as you pointed out: Free trade does have losers, and losers always make more noise than winners. The benefits of an open economy are diffused. Everyone will say — I’ll make up the figures, but to underscore the point — everyone will have 5% more income, say, so they’ll be at 105 compared to if 100 is the default. However, a percentage of the population, a small percentage, will go from 100 to zero. Say, the textile industry in North/South Carolina 40 years ago. Or Detroit, the automobile industry. You can choose the industry that will suffer. There’s no question about that. And it’s true that a coal miner or a factory worker in the Northeast will struggle to take a job in computer programming in Arizona. However, this creative destruction — which is classic economic theory, painful for many — if the labor market is flexible, people do move, which is why the Southwest has, for decades and decades, been growing, and the Northeast — the traditional industries — has slowly been declining in absolute numbers. But overall, the winners of the classical trade are greater than the losers. But the pain is concentrated, and that’s largely a sociological, cultural phenomenon that this administration is attempting to address in ways that I obviously think are fundamentally wrong. But it’s not incoherent to try to respond to those focused pains.
Atul Singh: But, Glenn, whilst classical free trade theory is broadly directionally correct in terms of a more open economy tends to be more competitive, have greater benefits, and those benefits accrue to the greatest number — it is also true that sometimes you do need some kind of a governmental intervention. The Internet came about because of DARPA and DARPAnet. So sometimes, you know, you probably need a small garden, but with a high gate. You do need that intervention. And especially in cutting-edge technology, and especially when it comes to certain manufacturing — you do need it. So we can’t be doctrinaire about any set of beliefs. But the important thing here that we want to underscore is that “animal spirits” — to quote John Maynard Keynes again, a great Cambridge man — Cambridge is in the UK, not where Glenn went to school. He went to Harvard in Cambridge. But we are talking about Cambridge UK. And John Maynard Keynes had a point when it came to animal spirits. And right now, animal spirits are down because VUCA — as we talked about right at the end of the year: the volatile, uncertain, complex and ambiguous world — that is kicking in. And even commodity traders are talking about it. It’s not just a theoretical phenomenon. They’re rattled by the uncertainty of everything, and the animal spirits are down. So that is why we can expect a recession much quicker than the 12–18 month policy lag, which operates in normal times.
Glenn Carle: To conclude this depressing rubricare topic: Where are the animal spirits frightened and fleeing? And there’s one clear place, and that’s the White House. There was not fear because there was consistency and coherence before. There is not now, whatever one thinks of this.
[Lee Thompson-Kolar edited this piece.]
The views expressed in this article/video are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.
” post-content-short=” Atul Singh: Welcome to the third edition of 2025’s FO° Exclusive. Last month, we covered old ghosts coming back to life in Germany, global markets being extremely nervous and the new US–Europe–Russia–Ukraine soap opera. In March 2025, our top three issues are: Risk of US Recession Now…” post_summery=”Analysts warn of a likely US recession in 2025 due to economic policy shifts under US President Donald Trump. Key concerns include dollar overvaluation, trade imbalances and contradictory fiscal strategies. The administration’s actions have lowered investor confidence, amplifying uncertainty in both domestic and global markets.” post-date=”Apr 05, 2025″ post-title=”FO° Exclusive: Risk of US Recession Now Rises in 2025″ slug-data=”fo-exclusive-risk-of-us-recession-now-rises-in-2025″>
FO° Exclusive: Risk of US Recession Now Rises in 2025
[This is the fifth part of a nine-part series. To read more, see Parts 1, 2, 3 and 4 here.]
The Islamic Republic of Iran has a mission to spread Shi’ism in the Middle East, which is why it created the Shia Crescent. Their greater goal is to destroy the state of Israel.
An unintended consequence of the American invasion of Iraq in 2003 was that Iran became a very powerful force in Iraqi politics due to democratic elections. The Shia of Iraq and Iran may be very different, but they’re both influenced by Iran.
Iran is connected to Iraq, Syria and Lebanon. These three nations were key elements in the creation of the Shia Crescent that encircles Israel with pro-Iranian, Shia-dominated powers. Syria and Lebanon became the main targets for Iranian influence. The Iranians invested heavily in Syria, even sending citizens there — according to rumors, up to 800,000 earned Syrian citizenship. The current and upcoming rulers in Damascus won’t tolerate this for long.
Crushing defeats
Iran turned Syria’s Qalamoun area, the mountains on the Syrian–Lebanese border, into a smuggling point. Here, long-range missiles were smuggled to the Lebanese Shia paramilitary group, Hezbollah.
Fed up with the arms-dealing, Israel waged a low-intensity war with Syria in 2012. Syria became a major place of Iranian investment, on top of their efforts in Iraq and Lebanon. They sent thousands to support Syrian President Bashar al-Assad in the civil war — not just Shia Iranians, but also people from Afghanistan and other Shia communities. Due to their dire economy, they were investing money they didn’t have, estimated at tens of billions of dollars.
The downfall of the Assad regime in December 2024 is a disaster for Iranian plans to create the Shia Crescent around Israel. Israeli defeated Hezbollah in Lebanon after 11 months of Lebanese aggression. This defeat was far more devastating than their previous in the 2006 Lebanon War.
The Iranian defeat is resounding. There were elements in Syria who opposed the Iranian involvement and were ready to support Israeli military efforts. The Iranian presence in Syria even caused a rift within the Assad clan. Maher al-Assad, Bashar’s younger brother, was in Iran’s pocket, while Bashar had his own reservations. Before that, Russia did not like the Iranian involvement, as it viewed Iran as competition to be the dominant force in Syria.
The Russians allowed Israeli activities in Syria, but these were always targeted at the Iranians. The Syrians will not accept a Turkish occupation by President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. The Turks will face problems in Syria, especially in Kurdish areas.
What will happen now?
The Syrians will not allow domination by Sunni-run Turkey. This is a historic rivalry. Iran wanted to use Syria against Israel, but failed.
Will Iran realistically assess the cost-benefit? Will they still be committed to destroying Israel? Or will they realize they’re now under siege and need to be careful?
This could lead to two options: One, they minimize their involvement in Syria and Lebanon. But then, they’ll feel under siege. Two, they speed up their nuclear program to deal with the perceived danger. This might pressure US President Donald Trump to talk to the Iranians. The situation could create conditions for a dialogue, though they would have to make concessions.
[Lee Thompson-Kolar edited this piece.]
The views expressed in this article/video are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.
” post-content-short=” The Islamic Republic of Iran has a mission to spread Shi’ism in the Middle East, which is why it created the Shia Crescent. Their greater goal is to destroy the state of Israel. An unintended…” post_summery=”Iran’s goal of surrounding Israel with pro-Shia allies through the Shia Crescent suffered a major blow with Assad’s fall in 2024 and Hezbollah’s defeat. Despite heavy investment in Syria, internal opposition and Israeli resistance unraveled Iran’s influence. Iran must now choose between retreating or escalating its nuclear ambitions.” post-date=”Apr 04, 2025″ post-title=”FO° Talks: Josef Olmert on Syria, Part 5: Iranian Alliance and Investment” slug-data=”fo-talks-josef-olmert-on-syria-part-5-iranian-alliance-and-investment”>
FO° Talks: Josef Olmert on Syria, Part 5: Iranian Alliance and Investment
US Vice President J.D. Vance recently visited Greenland and made several troubling statements along the lines of “America needs Greenland” and “Greenland must be protected.” He added — somewhat cryptically — that this is what US President Donald Trump wants, “so it must be done.” The rhetoric was elliptical. The logic was elusive. The diplomatic finesse was, shall we say, minimaliste.
One cannot help but raise an eyebrow at these remarks. Greenland is not an unclaimed wilderness. It is an autonomous nation within the Kingdom of Denmark. It has its own government and a clearly defined relationship with Copenhagen. The notion that the US might take it — by purchase or through protection — raises more than legal questions. It reveals, once again, a disregard for international law and the principle of self-determination.
What drives this renewed American interest? Likely a convergence of strategic appetites. Melting ice has opened Arctic sea routes. Greenland holds untapped mineral resources. Washington may also want to block Russian activity in the High North. The region looks to US eyes like a grand chessboard.
But beneath the strategy lies something more disturbing: mépris — a casual contempt for existing norms and alliances. The suggestion that Denmark has failed to protect Greenland is not only unfounded. It is diplomatically coarse. It reflects a broader tendency in this administration to treat sovereignty as negotiable and diplomacy as theater.
A Danish diplomat recently addressed these tensions with calm precision. One might say the contrast speaks volumes. Where Copenhagen offers continuity and respect, Washington offers spectacle and improvisation.
One can only hope that the people of Greenland — and their right to chart their own future — will not become collateral in someone else’s imperial dream.
The views expressed in this article/video are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.
” post-content-short=” US Vice President J.D. Vance recently visited Greenland and made several troubling statements along the lines of “America needs Greenland” and “Greenland must be protected.” He added — somewhat cryptically — that this is what US President Donald Trump wants, “so it must be done.”…” post_summery=”US Vice President J.D. Vance recently visited Greenland and echoed past US interest in the island. He claimed America must protect Greenland and cited President Donald Trump’s wishes. The speech raised fears that Washington may ignore Greenland’s autonomy and strain ties with Denmark.” post-date=”Apr 03, 2025″ post-title=”Vice President J.D. Vance Disregards Greenland’s Right to Self-Rule” slug-data=”vice-president-j-d-vance-disregards-greenlands-right-to-self-rule”>
Vice President J.D. Vance Disregards Greenland’s Right to Self-Rule
[This is the fourth part of a nine-part series. To read more, see Parts 1, 2 and 3 here.]
The collapse of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s dictatorship in December 2024 is a loss for both the Iranian regime and its strategy, known as the Shia Crescent. This is a territory that stretches from Iran to the Lebanese–Israeli border at Golan through Iraq and Syria.
Through the Shia Crescent Iran sought to encircle and destroy Israel and spread Shia Islam throughout the Middle East. Syrian–Iranian relations were at the core of Iran’s strategy towards Israel. The peace treaty between Syria and Iran lasted from 1979 to 2024; both the treaty and alliance were considered unusual.
Alawites and Shia Islam
The Ba’ath Party considered Syria to be a secular state whereas Iran was declared an Islamic Republic. The contradiction of a secular state supporting an Islamic regime became an issue for Syria, as it was the only country to support Iran in the Iran–Iraq War (1980–1988).
Furthermore, Hafez al-Assad, then-leader of the Syrian Ba’ath Party, was an Alawite. The Alawite sect always maintained secrecy about its religious practice. As a result, people began to question whether they were Shias. It has historically been difficult to claim that Alawites are Shias — at best, the sect is considered an off-shoot of Shia Islam.
The Iran–Syria alliance was formed in the interest of the Assad regime. Both Hafez and his son, Bashar, understood that Syria would require Iran’s help if the Sunni population challenged them. Iran and Russia’s support, as well as Lebanon’s support via its Shia paramilitary group, Hezbollah, ensured the survival of Bashar al-Assad’s regime for almost 14 years.
Lebanon joined Iran’s Shia Crescent because Shias make up a majority there.
Ultimately, the loss of Iranian influence does not indicate that Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s vision of neo-Ottomanism has won the current Syrian situation.
[Aniruddh Rajendran and Lee Thompson-Kolar edited this piece.]
The views expressed in this article/video are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.
” post-content-short=” The collapse of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s dictatorship in December 2024 is a loss for both the Iranian regime and its strategy, known as the Shia Crescent. This is a territory that stretches…” post_summery=”The fall of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s regime in 2024 marked a major setback for Iran’s Shia Crescent strategy, which aimed to extend influence from Iran to Lebanon and encircle Israel. Syria’s alliance with Iran was crucial to this goal. Assad’s deposal has greatly weakened Iran’s regional influence.” post-date=”Mar 31, 2025″ post-title=”FO° Talks: Josef Olmert on Syria, Part 4: Iran’s Shia Crescent” slug-data=”fo-talks-josef-olmert-on-syria-part-4-irans-shia-crescent”>
FO° Talks: Josef Olmert on Syria, Part 4: Iran’s Shia Crescent
Atul Singh: Welcome to FO° Talks. With me is Thomas Greminger. He is the head of this Geneva Centre for Security Policy. He is one of Switzerland’s star diplomats. He is a scholar, a soldier and a man of the world. Welcome, Thomas.
Thomas Greminger: Thank you very much, Atul. Great to be with you again.
Atul Singh: Brilliant. So this is a brave new world we are living in. We are recording this on Monday, 17th of March, and in 2025, how do you see this brave new world in which we find ourselves in?
Thomas Greminger: It’s clearly a world that is spellbound by the new US administration — its announcements, its early actions. A new administration that has chosen a different path than classical diplomacy in the way they manage external relations. It’s a path of disruption, of provocation. Demands are not submitted to partners by arguments, but by that provocation or by building up a threat posture, and then one waits for a reaction and then decides either to withdraw or to maintain the threatening stance or to start negotiating. So I think it’s a totally different style. And of course, one of the big challenges is to figure out to what extent is an announcement here a threat, and to what extent, you know, is this a serious policy move? And I think that is currently what most of the world is caught up with — trying to figure out how to respond to these new approaches, disruptive, transactional approaches by the US government.
Atul Singh: I see. So, disruptive approaches of the US government. But it is not just a matter of style; it’s also a matter of substance. Out goes the post-World War II order, the US is talking of taking over Canada, Greenland, not to mention Panama. The EU is deemed anti-US. Suddenly, Russia is an ally — or maybe not an ally, but a potential friend — and Ukraine is run by a dictator. So there is a lot of change in substance, too, isn’t there?
Thomas Greminger: I think we still have to see to what extent there is really also a substantive change. In some ways, yes, we do see the imposition of tariffs — and not just, you know, threatening imposing tariffs. We do see concrete policy action. But a lot, for the time being, remains on a declaratory level. And I think that’s also one of the challenges — to figure out: are they serious? Is it not more than a threatening posture?
European security, NATO and strategic autonomy
Thomas Greminger: I mean, when it comes to one of my favorite topics — European security, the war in Ukraine — on the one hand, you have clearly a new impulse by President Trump. He clearly wants to achieve a ceasefire as soon as possible. But at the same time, I think we are still struggling with, well, what would then be a good deal for President Trump? I think this is still not really tangible. What would be a process that would take us to a ceasefire and perhaps later on to a settlement after conflict? I mean, what we’ve been seeing is a resumption of US–Russian dialogue. That is, as such, I think, positive. It’s good that these two major powers talk to each other again. How far they’ve come in this resumption of talks is a lot less certain. But then again, coming back to Ukraine — What is a good deal? What is a process? Who sits at the table? Who deals with it? On the US side, that’s also a big question mark. You know, initially, we all thought it would be General Kellogg. Now, it seems that he is rather sidelined, and it seems to be Mr. Witkoff who does the heavy lifting in that. But again, I think when it comes to real substance, we do not have a clear sense yet. You know, also: Are we really witnessing now a fundamental shift in alliances? Is it now the US and Russia against Europe? You know, I’m not so sure yet that this is what we are really witnessing. You can hear, of course, declarations that you could interpret in this way. But when it boils down to real policy changes, I think we’ll still have to be a bit more patient and see what is really happening then on the ground, if I may say so.
Atul Singh: Alright, so you’ve talked about what’s happening on the ground, which leads me on to my next question: What is actually happening on the ground? What are the key trends you observe in this brand new world?
Thomas Greminger: Well, clearly there is — I mean, allow me to remain — the new US administration. There is clearly this short-term transactionalism that dominates over long-term alliances. We see—
Atul Singh: That’s number one.
Thomas Greminger: I think we see that when it comes to European security, when it comes to the imposition of tariffs. I think there is significant evidence for this. A second trend that I perceive, again coming out of Washington, is not only a transactional but also a hard-power-based approach to foreign and security policy. And in a way, there seems to be an abandoning of US soft power politics. So, you know — I mean, basically eliminating development cooperation, dissolving USAID, cutting contributions to multilateral organizations — all this is very fundamentally undermining soft power protection of the United States. And perhaps, you know, a third point — but this, again, takes me back to the US–Russia relation — again, I think what is notable is that there is an attempt for a reset. There has been a resumption of dialogue, but we haven’t really seen the really tough issues being addressed. There seems to be a normalization of diplomatic relations — fine — but I haven’t seen, for instance, any strategic stability issues being addressed, even though this would be quite urgent, given, you know, New START running out next year. And also, when it comes to potential Russian demands like lifting of sanctions, etc — we haven’t really gotten a sense of how far the US government is willing to go here.
Switzerland’s neutrality under pressure
Atul Singh: Right. So, let’s move on to Switzerland, where you sit. And the US has put Switzerland on a list of non-friendly countries. What does this really mean?
Thomas Greminger: Well, first, you know, we need to be precise. Switzerland is not on a channel non-friendly countries list. I’m not even sure if this category exists. But we are on a list of countries with unfair trade practices. But, I mean—
Atul Singh: I stand corrected. I stand corrected.
Thomas Greminger: But, I mean, this is serious enough, and obviously this is taken very seriously by Switzerland. Why is this so? Well, Switzerland has a bilateral trade balance with the US with a very considerable surplus, by about $25 billion. And so I think that triggered, you know, this move to put us on that list. What, however, is not being said is that, at the same time, Switzerland has a deficit in services of around $20 billion. So, all in all, you know, if you count it all together, it doesn’t look that bad. But I think the important thing is that, you know, Switzerland is taking this seriously. The Swiss State Secretary for Economic Affairs is, as we speak, in Washington, is trying to figure out why. What are US expectations behind this move? And I would suppose, you know, she would argue with, you know, an extremely open space market. She would certainly point to the fact that we have this deficit when it comes to the service balance. And she would probably also point to the fact that Swiss multinational enterprises employ around 400,000 people in the United States. So I think there isn’t really an interest, you know, to trigger any sort of trade war between the two countries. What I like is, you know, that Switzerland is taking it seriously and is trying to address it through quiet diplomacy and not, you know, through this public diplomacy, not through loudspeaker diplomacy, but diplomatically.
Atul Singh: You’ve got an excellent ambassador, Ralph Heckman, in Washington, so that should help. And, of course, you’re huge investors in research and development. So the Swiss have invested quite a bit in the US and employs, you said, quite a few people — so that should help as well. So let’s talk about moving on from Switzerland to Europe. For decades, Europe and the US have been in a transatlantic alliance, and you just mentioned that the new fashion is transactional short-term gains, not long-term alliances. So are we to infer that this fabled transatlantic alliance is now dead?
Thomas Greminger: I don’t think so. Look, these strong transatlantic relations have been built over decades, and they’re simply too strong to be fundamentally questioned by one US president, by one US administration. I mean, I wouldn’t doubt that these relations are currently undergoing a serious test, and clearly there is a particular challenge to European partners who have to step up their contribution to counter military threats on their eastern flank. But, you know, even here, I would also see an opportunity. And that is this US pressure on transatlantic relations, in a way, also represents an opportunity to advance a more autonomous European security policy. And, you know, that takes us a bit also back to Trump’s first administration. I think already back then, this was the most significant boost to European strategic autonomy thinking. But obviously this was pre-war. Now we are in a war scenario, and the war clearly has again underlined how important these transatlantic relations are. So we are, in a way, in a different situation. But what we are currently seeing over the last days and weeks is a strong mobilization on the European side in terms of more security efforts — also, I think, a will to be more autonomous. And in that sense, you know, Trump may, at some point, even become a hero of European strategic autonomy.
Atul Singh: Excellent. But the alliance question: The alliance, you think, will persist? It’ll outlast Donald Trump?
Thomas Greminger: It will. It will. And, you know, I don’t think that, for instance, he would seriously consider pulling out of NATO. I think there is just too much at stake, not only from a pure security point of view. I think, you know, we need to be very clear. This has always also been an important way of assuring US interests in an absolutely fundamental market for the United States. It has been a way of projecting US power to the European continent. And I think abandoning all of that would — even if you think short-term, transactional — even in such a logic, this wouldn’t make sense.
Atul Singh: Alright. So let’s talk about what you’re saying repeatedly — transactional, transactional, transactional world we live in now. So, have we moved from a rules-based order to a transactional spheres of influence world?
Thomas Greminger: I think this is an excellent point. And indeed, if you look at the mindset of, let’s say, the presidents of the three major powers — the United States, China, the Russian Federation — I think you could make a case that they have a sphere of influence mindset, and that for them, you know, the respect for state sovereignty of neighboring countries and regions isn’t particularly strong. And I think these principles that heads of state have subscribed to over the last 50 years — that is, you know, that every state has the freedom to choose its own security arrangements, to be sovereign in its foreign policy choices — I think these are principles, values, that are not held very highly by all three of them. I mean, what is, of course, particularly surprising is that you would now also put the United States in that camp. But clearly, when you hear references to taking over Greenland, Canada, the Panama Canal, then I think this is a clear indication of a sphere of influence mindset. Scary.
Atul Singh: Yeah. I mean, so if that is the world we live in, is protectionism and hardball bargaining the new reality in this brave new world? And what does this mean for small countries like Switzerland?
Thomas Greminger: It’s clearly very challenging. If you cannot wield major power in a world that is dominated by power politics, you obviously have a major issue. And I think what it means for smaller countries like Switzerland is to be, you know, extremely attentive, smart, flexible, adaptive. Don’t put all your eggs in one single basket. You know, diversify your partnerships, diversify your supply chains. You know, try to avoid being too dependent on one of these major powers. A question that we keep discussing here in Switzerland is: Is neutrality still a tool, you know, that serves us well in this kind of world? And I would definitely argue yes. I think a smart neutrality policy — the reactive policy, you know, that shows that neutral Switzerland can be useful to the international community — is still a very appropriate way of dealing with these challenges.
Atul Singh: I see. So, some argue that this neutrality has weakened over time. After all, I mean, look at the Swiss moving towards the US in the Russia–Ukraine war. And of course, one could argue that neutrality might also be under pressure because of the financial pressure the US is exerting. Take the example of UBS. UBS got a lot of Swiss government support, but it’s threatening to move headquarters elsewhere. That might have been less likely if, perhaps, Switzerland was part of the EU.
Thomas Greminger: I mean, you are absolutely right. Being neutral these days is not, you know, an easy way of conducting your foreign and security policy. But then again, you know, what are the alternatives? The alternatives are: You join a camp, and you do what is called “bandwagoning” by political scientists. But then you’re caught in a camp; you’re bound by the decisions of such a camp. I don’t think that this is — in such a polarized world — always an advantage. And the other alternative is constant hedging. And I think that’s what you see with more major actors also in the Global South. That’s, I think, what Indians, for instance, call “multi-alignment,” right? But I think for a smaller country like Switzerland, that has less power than, let’s say, India, Brazil, South Africa — I think neutrality brings along more predictability. But it’s not a rigid concept. And, you know, this takes me back to your initial question. Things have radically changed when it comes to Swiss neutrality policy once we came out of the Cold War. During the Cold War, Switzerland had a very rigid interpretation of neutrality — it was called “integral neutrality” — which basically meant, you know, no significant foreign policy. But then, you know, once we came out of the Cold War, Switzerland had to kind of reinvent its foreign policy and neutrality policy became much more open. And when you read the still-valid neutrality report of 1993, you see that, for instance, adopting economic sanctions is fully in line with the defined neutrality policy after the end of the Cold War. That this then creates dilemmas at given points in time is absolutely true. We had, in 2014, a big discussion in Switzerland: Should Switzerland adopt fully the imposed EU sanctions? In 2014, we decided no. We just, you know, make sure that Switzerland is not being used to circumvent sanctions. But we did not fully adopt them. And one of the key arguments was: Back then, Switzerland was in a mediating role as Chair of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. Now, when you compare that—
Atul Singh: Just for our viewers and listeners: They should know, 2014 is when Russia took over Crimea. So that’s what Thomas is referring to.
Thomas Greminger: Exactly. So we have basically two things: Illegal annexation of Crimea, and you have destabilization efforts in the Donbas. But you did not have — and that takes me to 2022 — you did not have a full-fledged aggression against a neighboring country, as in 2022. And given the severity of that breach of international law, given the fact that Switzerland had no particular role in 2022, given also, of course, the huge solidarity of the Swiss population with the aggressed state — with Ukraine — I think the Swiss government had no choice but to adopt these sanctions fully. Of course, this was criticized then by Russia. But I still think, you know, politically this made sense and is compatible with a modern interpretation of neutrality policy.
Defense, neutrality and the future of Europe
Atul Singh: Excellent. Speaking of neutrality, one would be remiss if one did not point out that Europe is rearming again. And Germany has exempted defense spending from its constitutional debt brake. Poland has talked about acquiring nuclear weapons. So, is NATO on the way out, and a new European defense alliance is about to take its place? Will it mean that some countries will take a more aggressive stance against Russia and others might just choose to be neutral?
Thomas Greminger: Well, I think the jury is still out of what form this will take. Will Europe focus on strengthening a European pillar of NATO? I think that is clearly an option. Or would it go for investing mainly in strengthening the security side of the European Union? Or, thirdly, would it be a construct that is different to NATO and EU, which would have the advantage of also integrating non-EU and non-NATO members? The European Political Community, you know, has been mentioned. But obviously, the downside is there are no established security structures, mechanisms, etc. So I think it’s still open how this part of the European security architecture will look like. I think what is clear is you will see a much more significant European effort in that — less reliance on US support. This obviously also implies that Europe will have to compensate for currently still existing important capability gaps. I think they will have to be made up. It also implies that Europe will have to cooperate in security matters to a much different way. You know, let’s be honest — I think right now, security in Europe is still very much nationally driven. Procurement is nationally driven. And I think this needs to change. You know, you cannot have twelve different tank models in the future of European security. I think you will have to focus on two or three, right? So it’s not about moving military expenditures up to 5%. I think that’s simply not necessary. What is necessary is change the cooperation mindset when it comes to defense and security in Europe. And I think there is still quite a bit to be done. But clearly, what I’ve been seeing over recent weeks and months shows me that I think Europeans have understood and they got the message, and they are now working on it.
Atul Singh: So, you say Europeans have got the message and they are now working on it. Does that mean that the Europeans are not going to buy US weapons as much anymore? Because you said you need two or three tanks — one of them, of course, is Challenger in Europe — and a key reason to buy US arms has been interoperability. But if the Europeans cannot rely on the US as much as they used to, then they’ll have to build their own weapons systems. And there is already talk of the fear of the kill switch or the US not giving you software updates as part of a trade war, even. So, it is not just increased spending — it is developing a homegrown defense technology, research and development — almost a military-industrial complex, isn’t it?
Thomas Greminger: It’s true. I think a lot will depend on how this is now being managed on both sides of the Atlantic. I think if it’s smartly managed, I would see European security being strengthened, transatlantic relations even being strengthened. If it’s poorly managed — if this threat posture remains the dominant feature of US policies — indeed, I think you’re absolutely right that one of the consequences could indeed be that Europeans buy less and less American weaponry and, you know, will basically then resort to European systems only. Which probably wouldn’t be smart from a military, from a security point of view, either. But okay — I mean, if there is bullying from Washington, Europe might not have another choice than to do that. But again, I hope this is not the scenario that we are going to see. I hope, you know, reason sets in and complementarity will remain an important principle in European security. Bear in mind that Europe will have to step up its own investment, its own effort.
Atul Singh: Thomas, most European countries have very generous social welfare systems — generous especially when compared to the US With rising defense spending, can Europe manage both guns and butter? And what is the future, then, of the European economy?
Thomas Greminger: Yeah, again, I think that’s an excellent question. This guns-and-butter dilemma I think is a real dilemma. And there is obviously a threat of crowding out social expenditures if defense expenditures will have to be kept on a very high level for a very long time. And there is also a risk of inflationary pressure, you know, if this defense spending has to be kept high for a long time. So I think it all depends on the timeframes that we are talking about. And this, of course, then takes us to developments in Europe over the next few years. Will we see an end to the war in Ukraine? Will we gradually come back to a European security order that contains cooperative elements? Or will we stick, for decades to come, in a kind of new Cold War with enormous defense expenditures on both sides? I think if the latter is the case, then indeed, you know, this guns-and-butter dilemma will become much more critical. If the former happens, we may at some point in time again see the peace dividend, you know, that will allow us to sustain social expenditures and also deal with all the challenges of an aging population, for instance, of rising health expenditures, etc.
A new Cold War?
Atul Singh: So you’ve mentioned a new Cold War, and I couldn’t help thinking: What will be the shape of this new Cold War? Let’s hope it never gets that far. Let’s hope we have a peace dividend. But in case we don’t, will this Cold War be between the US and the EU? Will it be between the EU and Russia? Will it even be between the EU and China? Because there are lots of tensions, strained tensions, and Xi Jinping has not deigned to visit Europe. So what will be the shape of this new Cold War?
Thomas Greminger: Yeah, again, I think the jury is still out. Well, until a few months ago, one would have said, well, it’s probably the West against the rest, or against China and Russia. Now, with this attempt to reset US–Russia relations and this declared strategy of President Trump to kind of, you know, pull Russia out of China’s embrace, we may see different developments. And then, of course, a lot will also depend on how, for instance, Europe will position itself. Will Europe try to kind of remain and keep an independent stance, or will it side exclusively with the US? You know, when you look at the relevance of economic relations between China and Europe, I don’t think that this would be a very favorable strategy for both China and Europe. And I get clearly a sense that China is trying very hard to reach out to Europe. This may not be reflected in heads-of-state visits lately, but diplomatically, what I perceive is a strong outreach by the Chinese. And I think they would want to deal with a Europe that is as independent as possible.
Atul Singh: Excellent. Thomas Greminger, thank you so, so much for your time. It’s always a pleasure to have you with us. We hope you’ll come back soon. There’s lots to discuss in this brand new world, in this fast-changing world. And we wish you all the best with all your endeavors.
Thomas Greminger: Thank you very much, Atul. Thank you for inviting me.
[Lee Thompson-Kolar edited this piece.]
The views expressed in this article/video are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.
” post-content-short=” Atul Singh: Welcome to FO° Talks. With me is Thomas Greminger. He is the head of this Geneva Centre for Security Policy. He is one of Switzerland’s star diplomats. He is a scholar, a soldier and a man of the world. Welcome, Thomas. Thomas Greminger: Thank you very much, Atul. Great to be…” post_summery=”Thomas Greminger discusses the disruptive, transactional approach of the new US administration and its global implications. He highlights shifting alliances, challenges for European security, and Switzerland’s evolving neutrality. Greminger stresses the need for strategic autonomy, adaptability, and diplomacy amid rising geopolitical tensions and a potential new Cold War.” post-date=”Mar 30, 2025″ post-title=”FO° Talks: Trump, NATO, Russia-Ukraine War: A Swiss View on the New World in 2025″ slug-data=”fo-talks-trump-nato-russia-ukraine-war-a-swiss-view-on-the-new-world-in-2025″>
