Fair Observer Founder, CEO & Editor-in-Chief Atul Singh and retired CIA Officer Glenn Carle unpack two major trade agreements recently concluded by the United States — one with the European Union and another with Japan. They analyze the terms of each deal and explore their deeper implications for global trade, economic stability and the evolving world order.
Atul identifies that both trade deals were finalized while US President Donald Trump was in Scotland, golfing and promoting his properties. European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen visited him in what Atul describes as “homage to Emperor Trump,” resulting in a preliminary EU–US agreement.
US–EU trade agreement: strategic concessions and investments
Under the deal, the US imposed 15% tariffs on European exports — especially automobiles — while exempting aircraft, shipbuilding equipment, chemicals and raw materials. In exchange, the EU agreed to increase imports of American fuel and AI chips and committed to investing $600 billion in the US.
US–Japan trade agreement: lower tariffs, preferential treatment
The US–Japan deal mirrors the EU agreement in many ways but includes unique provisions. Tariffs on Japanese cars and other goods were also set at 15%, while Japan pledged $550 billion in US investments. Notably, Japan secured a guarantee that it will always receive the lowest tariff rates on chips and pharmaceuticals relative to other US trade partners. Unlike the EU deal, there was no joint statement issued with Japan.
Atul’s six takeaways
Atul outlines six key insights into the significance of these agreements:
- Avoiding trade wars: He believes these deals have prevented a full-blown trade war, avoiding a repeat of 1930s-style protectionism.
- US global dominance: He calls the US “the 800-pound gorilla in the room,” asserting its central role in shaping global trade.
- Assertion of US power: The US is clearly “throwing its weight around” in international negotiations.
- EU and Japan’s appeasement: Both partners appear to have yielded to US pressure.
- Death of the rules-based order: Atul argues that the World Trade Organization is now irrelevant, and the era of multilateralism in trade is effectively over.
- Rise of VUCA: He warns that these deals are short-lived and unstable, ushering in a future of volatility, uncertainty, complexity and ambiguity in global commerce.
Glenn’s expansive analysis
Glenn largely agrees with Atul but adds depth and concern to the discussion.
- Impact on Canada: Glenn highlights that Japanese cars will now face lower US tariffs than Canadian ones — despite Canada being a major ally and top trading partner. He warns that these bilateral deals distort trade flows, capital allocation and economic efficiency.
- Shift from norms to power: He reflects on global critiques of US hegemony, noting that while past accusations of imperialism were often overstated, today’s reality makes them ring true. The world is moving from a flawed normative system to a raw power-based model.
- Consequences for global order: According to Glenn, almost no country can afford to challenge the US, and while the deals may appear beneficial to Americans, they will erode global and even domestic economic efficiency. He calls this shift “historic and terrible,” driven by figures like Chinese President Xi Jinping, Russian President Vladimir Putin, Trump and his Republican backers.
- Rising economic instability: Glenn echoes Atul’s concerns about rising VUCA, forecasting inflation, higher interest rates, and supply chain disruptions.
Warning against economic complacency
Glenn critiques what he sees as misplaced economic optimism. He explains that macroeconomic effects take time: Short-term interest rate changes usually show results after six months, while long-term impacts take up to two years. Since the Trump administration’s trade measures are still in their early stages, Glenn warns that the economy hasn’t yet absorbed their consequences.
He points to the historical dangers of high tariffs, recalling the Great Depression and its root causes in trade and capital flow disruption. He finishes with a stark analogy: “The consequences are real… gravity exists, and if the motor stops, the plane will come down.” The implication is clear: Economic reality will catch up, and the outcome won’t be pleasant.
Closing note
Atul concludes this section by highlighting Fair Observer’s broader economic coverage, with insights from economists like Alex Gloy from Germany, Masaaki Yoshimori from Japan and Manu Sharma from India.
[Lee Thompson-Kolar edited this piece.]
The views expressed in this article/video are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.
” post-content-short=” Fair Observer Founder, CEO & Editor-in-Chief Atul Singh and retired CIA Officer Glenn Carle unpack two major trade agreements recently concluded by the United States — one with the European Union and another with Japan. They analyze the terms of each deal and explore their deeper…” post_summery=”In this section of the July episode of FO° Exclusive, Atul and Glenn discuss US trade deals with the EU and Japan, highlighting their strategic terms and geopolitical implications. These agreements, they argue, reflect the rise of bilateralism, the waning influence of the World Trade Organization and an increase in global economic instability. They appear favorable for the US, but long-term consequences include diminished efficiency, distorted trade flows and mounting uncertainty.” post-date=”Aug 15, 2025″ post-title=”FO° Exclusive: Japan, EU Strike Trade Deals as Trump Slaps India With Tariffs” slug-data=”fo-exclusive-japan-eu-strike-trade-deals-as-trump-slaps-india-with-tariffs”>FO° Exclusive: Japan, EU Strike Trade Deals as Trump Slaps India With Tariffs
Fair Observer Founder, CEO & Editor-in-Chief Atul Singh speaks with Sebastian Schäffer, the Managing Director at the Institute for the Danube Region and Central Europe, shortly after his return from Ukraine. Schäffer offers, in Singh’s words, a “calm and considered view” of the war with Russia, drawing from his on-the-ground experiences. This conversation explores daily life under conflict, Ukraine’s push for European integration, the future of NATO and European security, risks to European unity and Schäffer’s vision of a just peace.
Life under constant threat
Schäffer states that if his trip had been a travel blog, it would bear the headline, “Playing Russian Roulette and the Piano in the Parliament,” referencing the danger of drone and missile attacks and a memorable anecdote from Ukraine’s legislature. He describes multiple daily air raid alarms and the personal calculus of whether to seek shelter, which varies depending on proximity to the front. Tools like Telegram updates and the Kyiv Digital app help Ukrainians decide how to respond.
Attacks have surged in recent weeks. Schäffer attributes this to Russian President Vladimir Putin’s determination to subjugate Ukraine — something he believes will not succeed. Singh challenges his optimism, citing desertions, economic collapse and waning Western support. Schäffer, however, maintains his view, stressing the value of seeing the situation firsthand.
Ukraine’s path to the EU
Schäffer strongly supports Ukraine’s membership bid to the European Union, arguing that the will to join extends from leadership to the general population. His “piano” anecdote — about reforms to prevent proxy voting in parliament — illustrates Ukraine’s commitment to governance reforms. He notes Ukraine’s rapid adoption of EU regulations and insists the country is ready “on paper,” but warns that rejection by the EU would endanger the entire European integration project.
NATO, defense spending and security architecture
Schäffer is equally committed to Ukraine joining NATO, calling it the only way to secure its sovereignty. However, NATO could collapse if the United States refuses to act on a future Article 5 breach — that is, if the US does not respond to attacks on fellow NATO countries.
Singh brings up a critique from Washington: that Europeans are soft and taking advantage of American defense. In response, Schäffer clarifies that not all European countries underinvest in defense. The two speakers mention exceptions like Poland, Greece and the Baltic states, while acknowledging Germany, Spain and Italy’s reliance on US protection. Schäffer supports calls for greater European defense spending and coordination, envisioning a stronger security architecture even without a consolidated European army. His concern is whether Europe can act quickly enough to maintain unity and deter threats.
Risks to European unity
Schäffer identifies divisions over the Russian threat as a key vulnerability. Hungary, Slovakia and internal political splits in Poland exemplify differing threat perceptions. Russian provocations, such as drone surveillance of German bases, meet unprepared responses due to regulatory and equipment gaps.
Domestic politics — like Germany’s far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD), former Parliament member Sahra Wagenknecht’s leftist party and instability in the Netherlands — further complicate consensus. Schäffer accuses the AfD of Kremlin ties, while describing Wagenknecht’s alignment as ideological. He frames defense spending as both an economic stimulus and a security necessity.
The “guns and butter” dilemma
Singh questions whether democracies can mobilize for war when significant portions of the population prefer, in analogous terms, “butter” over “guns.” Schäffer replies that opponents are far from forming a majority and insists Europe is already at war in all but name. If Ukraine falls, hostile forces could operate from its territory, bringing air raid alarms to major European cities. Supporting Ukraine now, he argues, is far cheaper than fighting a wider war later.
Conditions for a just peace
Schäffer lays out three non-negotiable conditions: restoring Ukraine’s 1991 borders, securing Russian compensation (possibly through frozen assets) and prosecuting war crimes. Singh deems these unrealistic, suggesting they amount to total war with Russia. Schäffer concedes they are aspirational but insists they represent justice. He envisions weakening Russia’s capacity and provoking internal change rather than direct all-out war.
Singh asks what cost he’d bear. Schäffer replies, “everything that it takes;” aid to Ukraine would go to prevent a larger, worse conflict.
Reconstruction and economic support
Singh raises the subject of Ukraine’s economic collapse and fears of corruption. Schäffer insists that democracy is alive in Ukraine and that reconstruction is feasible with political will. He points to integrating Ukraine into the EU, opening markets and leveraging its innovative potential. His core message remains: The cost of Ukraine’s defeat would far exceed the cost of its support.
[Lee Thompson-Kolar edited this piece.]
The views expressed in this article/video are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.
” post-content-short=” Fair Observer Founder, CEO & Editor-in-Chief Atul Singh speaks with Sebastian Schäffer, the Managing Director at the Institute for the Danube Region and Central Europe, shortly after his return from Ukraine. Schäffer offers, in Singh’s words, a “calm and considered view” of the war…” post_summery=”In this episode of FO° Talks, Sebastian Schäffer shares first-hand insights from Ukraine, underscoring the urgency of EU and NATO integration to secure its future. NATO and European unity face serious risks from political divisions, underinvestment in defense and Russian provocations. He advocates immediate, full-scale support for Ukraine, arguing it will prevent a far costlier European war.” post-date=”Aug 14, 2025″ post-title=”FO° Talks: Will France, Germany, Poland and UK Send Troops to Ukraine to Fight Russia?” slug-data=”fo-talks-will-france-germany-poland-and-uk-send-troops-to-ukraine-to-fight-russia”>
FO° Talks: Will France, Germany, Poland and UK Send Troops to Ukraine to Fight Russia?
Christopher Ford, the former Assistant Secretary of State for International Security and Nonproliferation, offers an insider’s view of efforts to stop the spread of nuclear weapons. He defines nonproliferation as the “set of policies, institutions and practices” designed to prevent more countries from acquiring these destructive arms. The United States has made this a top foreign policy priority for decades, aiming to keep nuclear weapons from spreading beyond existing holders.
The success of nuclear nonproliferation
Ford highlights the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), signed by 191 nations, which commits nuclear states not to assist others in obtaining weapons and binds non-nuclear states not to pursue them. The UN-affiliated International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna, Austria, enforces these commitments through inspections, ensuring nuclear technology remains for peaceful purposes.
Libya is a success story: In 2003, Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi abandoned his nuclear program after deciding it carried “enormous risks” and chose diplomacy over the costly, dangerous path of building a warhead.
Iran and the power of deterrence
Iran’s nuclear ambitions remain a key test. Exposed in August 2002, its program has been the focus of years of diplomatic effort to prevent weaponization, even as Iran continues to advance its capabilities. Ford sees “cautious optimism” after recent Israeli and US strikes on Iranian nuclear sites, calling such actions “the leading edge of nonproliferation policy.”
Ford concludes: “If the message of this current Iran thing is that if you try to pursue nuclear weapons in violation of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, that you might well have American bunker buster bombs coming down on your underground tunnels. I mean, as a nonproliferation guy, I don’t mind that being the message.”
[Lee Thompson-Kolar edited this piece.]
The views expressed in this article/video are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.
” post-content-short=” Christopher Ford, the former Assistant Secretary of State for International Security and Nonproliferation, offers an insider’s view of efforts to stop the spread of nuclear weapons. He defines nonproliferation as the “set of policies, institutions and practices” designed to prevent more…” post_summery=”In this episode of FO° Talks, Christopher Ford, former US Assistant Secretary of State for International Security and Nonproliferation, explains the tools and challenges of stopping the spread of nuclear weapons. He highlights Libya’s disarmament as a success while assessing Iran’s contested program. Ford supports strong deterrence, including military action, against treaty violators.” post-date=”Aug 13, 2025″ post-title=”FO° Talks: US, Western Allies Will Always Prevent Iran From Making the Nuclear Bomb” slug-data=”fo-talks-us-western-allies-will-always-prevent-iran-from-making-the-nuclear-bomb”>
FO° Talks: US, Western Allies Will Always Prevent Iran From Making the Nuclear Bomb
Fair Observer Founder, CEO & Editor-in-Chief Atul Singh and retired CIA Officer Glenn Carle discuss a variety of pressing issues that took place in July 2025. From American and European political drama to successes on Wall Street, they address the month’s notable international happenings.
Legislative drama in Washington
US President Donald Trump secured a major legislative victory with the passage of the One Big Beautiful Bill Act (OBBBA). The bill cleared the House of Representatives before heading to the Senate, where it passed by the slimmest margin possible — 51 to 50 — after Vice President JD Vance cast the deciding vote on July 1. Atul quips that while the 24-hour Senate session showed “stamina,” he could not offer equal praise for senators’s intellect. The bill then returned to the House, passing 218 to 214 largely along party lines on July 3.
Trump signed it into law on July 5, aligning its enactment with the July 4 Independence Day holiday. Atul describes the timing as “all jolly good cause for celebration,” sarcastically adding that “Trump gets to be emperor.”
Despite celebratory rhetoric from the administration, economists projected that the act would inflate the US deficit by $3.4 trillion over the next decade.
Elon Musk responds: outrage and a new political vision
Former Special Government Employee Elon Musk, already estranged from Trump, publicly condemned the OBBBA. He expressed outrage over its fiscal implications and questioned the point of having a debt ceiling if lawmakers repeatedly raise it.
Musk proposed the creation of a new political party to disrupt the dominance of both Republicans and Democrats. He pledged to finance primary challenges against any Republican who voted for the OBBBA, signaling the deepening divide between himself and Trump.
Paramount’s settlement and the CBS shake-up
American mass media and entertainment conglomerate Paramount Global agreed to pay $16 million to Trump’s future presidential library as part of a legal settlement over a lawsuit involving CBS News. Atul dryly comments on the payout: “How wonderful.”
Simultaneously, CBS canceled The Late Show With Stephen Colbert. Known for his sharp critiques of Trump, comedian Stephen Colbert had become, in Atul’s words, “inconvenient” to keep employed.
Trump had previously approved Paramount’s $8 billion merger with American entertainment company Skydance Media, raising eyebrows. Atul questions whether the $16 million payment was “an act of goodwill for the great leader” or simply “protection money to capo dei capi [Italian: ‘boss of the bosses;’ mafia leader],” suggesting deeper transactional politics at play.
Wall Street booms amid budget woes
Despite deficit concerns and political turbulence, the US stock market soared. The S&P 500 hit a record high, appearing unfazed by trade tensions.
American technology company Nvidia became the world’s first $4 trillion company — its value has surpassed India’s $3.5 trillion GDP. American computer and apparel corporations Oracle and Nike, respectively, also saw major gains. Atul sums up the financial landscape by stating the market was “performing swimmingly well.”
Economic turbulence and policy shifts abroad
In Great Britain, UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer refused to support Chancellor of the Exchequer Rachel Reeves on controversial welfare reforms. Reeves broke down crying in Parliament, and the political drama caused British bonds to plummet.
Meanwhile, French Prime Minister François Bayrou declared France “addicted to public spending” and announced a spending freeze. Additionally, he unveiled sweeping cuts, including benefit reductions, a new solidarity tax on the wealthy and even proposals to eliminate public holidays like Easter Monday and Victory in Europe Day. Atul predicts major public protests against this move.
In South America, Jeannette Jara won the Chilean left’s presidential primary, becoming the first communist candidate since the 1973 CIA-backed coup against former President Salvador Allende. Atul sardonically comments, “For all the efforts of the CIA in 1973, you’re still left with the challenge of communism.” Glenn humorously responds, “It was part of the plan.”
Other headlines from around the world
Atul concludes this segment of FO° Exclusive by quickly running through other noteworthy events. Gang violence in Haiti claimed over 3,000 lives in a worsening humanitarian crisis. Australia banned teenagers from accessing the video-sharing platform, YouTube, marking a sharp move in digital regulation. Just as Atul and Glenn prepared to broadcast this episode, Trump announced 25% tariffs and additional import taxes on Indian goods. The administration linked the move to India’s continued purchase of Russian oil.
[Lee Thompson-Kolar edited this piece.]
The views expressed in this article/video are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.
” post-content-short=” Fair Observer Founder, CEO & Editor-in-Chief Atul Singh and retired CIA Officer Glenn Carle discuss a variety of pressing issues that took place in July 2025. From American and European political drama to successes on Wall Street, they address the month’s notable international…” post_summery=”In FO° Exclusive’s July 2025 episode, US President Donald Trump signed the One Big Beautiful Bill Act into law, prompting concerns over its $3.4 trillion fiscal impact. Elon Musk opposed the bill, calling for a new political party. US markets soared, media dynamics shifted and global events — from UK welfare chaos to an Australian YouTube ban for teenagers — added to the drama.” post-date=”Aug 12, 2025″ post-title=”FO° Exclusive: Elon Musk Wants to Take On Republicans and Democrats With America Party, Can He?” slug-data=”fo-exclusive-elon-musk-wants-to-take-on-republicans-and-democrats-with-america-party-can-he”>
FO° Exclusive: Elon Musk Wants to Take On Republicans and Democrats With America Party, Can He?
June was an eventful month in 2025. Fair Observer Founder, CEO & Editor-in-Chief Atul Singh and retired CIA Officer Glenn Carle look back at the key developments, from the US budget stalling in the Senate to a Boeing plane crashing in India. They then announce the two main topics of this episode of FO° Exclusive: the intensifying confrontation involving Iran, Israel and the United States, and the ongoing breakdown of US political and cultural norms.
US budget gridlock and domestic crisis
The US budget is at an impasse. While May brought economic uncertainty, the current situation has worsened. The federal budget remains stuck in the Senate, and a debt crisis now brews. This stalemate adds to the perception of dysfunction in Washington, DC, with fiscal paralysis threatening broader economic stability at home and abroad.
Ukraine’s deep strike into Russia
A dramatic escalation in the Ukraine conflict made global headlines. Ukrainian forces reportedly smuggled 117 drones deep into Russian territory — reaching as far as Eastern Siberia — and struck multiple airfields. According to the program, the operation damaged 41 Russian aircraft, including strategic bombers. Atul likens this unprecedented strike to the covert missions of the United Kingdom’s Special Air Service during World War II. Russia responded with retaliatory airstrikes on Ukrainian territory, further intensifying the war and underscoring Ukraine’s growing reach and resolve.
Poland’s presidential election and political clash
In a closely contested runoff, Karol Nawrocki of the right-wing Law and Justice Party defeated government-backed centrist Rafał Trzaskowski with 50.9% of the vote. The result introduces serious friction into Poland’s government, which operates under a parliamentary system with a separately elected president. Prime Minister Donald Tusk, a centrist, must now navigate governing alongside a hard-right president from a hostile political camp.
Atul explains that Poland is a very young democracy, having only shed communist rule in 1991. Political divisions within Poland mirror broader ideological splits across the West.
Europe’s spending crisis and NATO commitments
Across Europe, signs of economic and political strain mount. The UK reversed several policy commitments and announced new spending cuts, signaling deeper fiscal retrenchment. Meanwhile, NATO member states have reportedly agreed to increase their defense spending to 5% of GDP by 2035 — caving, as Atul puts it, to US President Donald Trump’s demands.
Atul questions the feasibility of this pledge, given the already high debt levels in many of these countries. He suggests that the resulting budget pressures could lead to reduced social services, diminished support for immigrants, and higher taxes, particularly for middle-income earners.
Colombian assassination attempt
A shocking incident occurred in Colombia, where an unseen attacker shot conservative senator and presidential candidate Miguel Uribe Turbay in the head. The senator survived, however. This assassination attempt underscored the country’s volatile political climate and ongoing security concerns. The hit on Urbe Turbe added to a growing list of violent political episodes in Latin America in recent years.
Deadly plane crash in India and regulatory failures
A tragic aviation disaster struck India when a Boeing plane crashed shortly after departing from Ahmedabad airport. The craft failed to properly take off, gradually descending and hitting several buildings. The crash killed not only the hundreds of passengers but also civilians in those buildings. Preliminary investigations pointed to an electrical failure as the cause.
Atul criticizes Boeing for the plane’s technical issues while Glenn blames the crew who maintained the craft. Public criticism quickly focused on the Indian Director General of Civil Aviation, Faiz Ahmed Kidwai, who was formerly in charge of farmer welfare.
The incident reignited broader concerns about the Indian Administrative Service, which routinely places generalist bureaucrats into technical leadership roles. This practice raises serious questions about domain expertise and regulatory competence.
Vietnam’s partial repeal of the death penalty
Amid the grim headlines, Vietnam made a notable reform by eliminating the death penalty for eight crimes, including embezzlement. Atul views this move as a step in the right direction for human rights, although Glenn opines that it might have been partially self-serving — intended to shield government officials from harsh legal consequences. Nevertheless, the decision was recognized as a progressive shift within Southeast Asia.
Trump and Musk’s public falling out
Trump and former Special Government Employee Elon Musk experienced what Atul describes as a “spectacular falling out,” attracting widespread public attention. The dispute reflects the fracturing alliances among powerful conservative and libertarian figures. It also reinforces the blending of politics and celebrity culture in contemporary media.
Nippon Steel’s takeover of US Steel
In a major economic development, Trump approved Japanese steelmaker Nippon Steel’s acquisition of American steel manufacturer US Steel. The move was framed as a diplomatic win for Japan and a sign of strengthening economic ties between the US and Japan. It also signaled a potential shift in Republican trade posture, showing a willingness to allow foreign takeovers under certain geopolitical circumstances.
[Lee Thompson-Kolar edited this piece.]
The views expressed in this article/video are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.
” post-content-short=” June was an eventful month in 2025. Fair Observer Founder, CEO & Editor-in-Chief Atul Singh and retired CIA Officer Glenn Carle look back at the key developments, from the US budget stalling in the Senate to a Boeing plane crashing in India. They then announce the two main topics of this…” post_summery=”To begin the June 2025 episode of FO° Exclusive, Atul and Glenn cover a month marked by heightened geopolitical tension, domestic political dysfunction and terrible tragedies. Highlights include Ukraine’s deep drone strike into Russia, Poland’s hard-right presidential victory and Europe’s economic tightening amid NATO spending pledges. Meanwhile, a fatal plane crash in India and an assassination attempt in Colombia underscore systemic governance issues.” post-date=”Aug 11, 2025″ post-title=”FO° Exclusive: Poland: Nationalist Nawrocki Sworn-in as Russia–Ukraine War Rages On” slug-data=”fo-exclusive-poland-nationalist-nawrocki-sworn-in-as-russia-ukraine-war-rages-on”>
FO° Exclusive: Poland: Nationalist Nawrocki Sworn-in as Russia–Ukraine War Rages On
Fair Observer Founder, CEO & Editor-in-Chief Atul Singh and Jason Ward, founder and principal analyst at the Center for International Corporate Tax Accountability and Research (CICTAR), discuss how multinational corporations shift profits to avoid taxes, and the resulting consequences for governments, markets and public services. Ward emphasizes that these avoidance schemes are not sophisticated — they’re “simple tricks” that deprive countries of revenue needed for infrastructure, health, education and legal systems. As a result, essential public goods are underfunded while inequality deepens. This hollowing out of national budgets affects not just developing countries but also wealthy ones, limiting their capacity to respond to crises, invest in the future or compete economically.
Microsoft and Ireland: windfall gains from past loopholes
Ward highlights the technology titan Microsoft as a central case study, pointing to a nearly $30 billion audit by the Internal Revenue Service — the largest of its kind. Historically, Microsoft routed massive revenues through Ireland while paying very little tax, exploiting a now-defunct loophole where companies could claim tax residency in jurisdictions like Bermuda while operating legally in Ireland. This practice was widespread among US tech giants and made Ireland a magnet for profit-shifting activity.
But recent global tax reforms have shifted this dynamic. Ireland’s closure of schemes like the “double Irish Dutch sandwich” and its increase of the corporate tax rate from 12.5% to 15% — in response to the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)’s Pillar Two minimum tax agreement — now force companies like Microsoft to pay significantly more tax, even on revenue not generated in Ireland. These windfall revenues are helping Ireland establish a sovereign wealth fund, though Ward warns the gains may be short-lived; companies may adapt and reroute profits elsewhere once new workarounds are found.
Starbucks and Switzerland: fictional coffee trade
To illustrate another strategy, Ward discusses the coffee company Starbucks’s operations in Switzerland. Since 2011, every green coffee bean Starbucks purchases is, on paper, bought and resold through its Swiss subsidiary, Starbucks Coffee Trading Company SRL, with an 18% markup. This markup, taxed at low Swiss rates, shifted an estimated $1.3 billion in profit from consumer markets like the United States and China to Switzerland. The trade is “purely fictional” — the beans never physically enter Switzerland. The entire transaction is constructed on paper, allowing Starbucks to reap massive tax advantages while governments in actual sales markets lose out.
This “very clever accounting trick” is widespread in global commodities and results in the systematic extraction of tax revenues, even from some of the world’s poorest countries. Global commodity hubs like Switzerland are designed to provide such fiscal advantages to corporations, making them complicit in the erosion of global tax bases.
Uber and the Netherlands: IP and artificial debt
Ward turns to the transportation service Uber to demonstrate how companies use intellectual property and debt structures to shelter profits. Uber, which defines itself as a tech company, directs global customer payments to a Dutch entity, returning only the driver’s share. After shifting its intellectual property (IP) from Bermuda to the Netherlands through a fictional transaction, Uber created large volumes of internal debt, allowing it to minimize its tax obligations. The Dutch entity essentially “buys” the IP, creating debt on its books, which can then be used to write off future profits as interest payments.
Uber has processed more financial flows through the Netherlands than even JPMorgan Chase Bank. Similar tactics are used by other firms, namely the online streaming company Netflix and the fast food titan McDonald’s. Particularly, companies in IT and pharmaceuticals can easily manipulate the location and value of IP assets. These industries are ideal for profit shifting because their key value drivers — algorithms, branding or molecular formulas — are intangible and easy to relocate on paper.
Big Pharma: public subsidies, private gains
Ward scrutinizes pharmaceutical companies like Merck and Pfizer for benefiting heavily from public spending and subsidies while reporting minimal tax liability. By housing patents in low-tax jurisdictions like Ireland, Switzerland or Bermuda, these firms book profits in favorable locations while avoiding tax in the high-revenue US market. Despite massive public subsidies for research and development and government drug purchases, Merck, for instance, reported a global profit of $20 billion but a US loss of $1.8 billion — effectively paying no tax domestically. The Senate Finance Committee and even US President Donald Trump have scrutinized this practice.
Ward also cites biotech company CSL, which claimed its Swiss workforce generated ten times the profit of its Australian employees. This shocking statistic raised eyebrows during debates over new tax transparency laws.
The pattern across Big Pharma is clear: Governments fund the science and purchase the drugs, while the companies siphon profits offshore. This double-dipping — benefiting from public support while dodging tax — undermines both fiscal responsibility and public trust.
Transparency and reform: global efforts gain traction
Ward outlines reform efforts aimed at halting the global “race to the bottom.” Australia has passed groundbreaking tax transparency laws requiring multinationals to disclose key financial data — revenues, profits, taxes paid and employee numbers — in known tax havens. This initiative, though not exhaustive, sets a new global benchmark. It also builds on Australia’s ten-year push for public accountability, driven by citizen awareness campaigns and investigative journalism.
CICTAR has also filed shareholder resolutions demanding country-by-country reporting, including one at Merck that received 23% support despite opposition from management and proxy advisors. The European Union has implemented a similar framework, though with more loopholes and limited jurisdictional reach.
These reforms represent a growing consensus that transparency is essential for meaningful enforcement. Without it, governments remain blind to how much revenue is being lost and where.
Toward a fairer global system
Fortunately, tax laws are seeing several hopeful developments. The US Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) is pushing for greater corporate tax disclosure. China is also taking a harder stance on tax avoidance, including by multinationals. This change potentially positions the country as a constructive player in global reform.
The momentum for global tax coordination is shifting from the OECD — a body Ward criticizes as favoring wealthy nations — to the more democratic United Nations. Although UN processes are slower and messier, they offer more space for regional cooperation and developing-country influence. This shift could be transformative if emerging economies work together to demand fairer treatment and tighter standards. Ward acknowledges the institutional challenges within the UN but believes its legitimacy and broader participation make it a more just venue for negotiating rules that affect all nations, not just the most powerful.
He remains skeptical about the future of OECD’s Pillar One plan, which targets large tech firms like Google and Microsoft. He notes that unilateral digital services taxes initially created enough pressure for companies to seek multilateral solutions. But if Pillar One fails in the US Congress, those unilateral measures may return. He warns that Trump’s approach of defending the US corporations’ ability to dodge taxes is short-sighted and undermines US tax revenue. This stance weakens the global tax system and deprives Americans of the revenue needed to fund critical services and infrastructure.
The case for transparency and fairness
Ward insists that transparency is primarily about competitiveness and innovation. Companies should succeed by offering better products, services and ideas, not by exploiting tax loopholes. Dominant firms that avoid taxes distort competition and entrench monopoly power, while smaller businesses are left at a disadvantage.
For investors, unions and citizens alike, robust transparency is key to building smarter markets and healthier economies. A more accountable tax system is essential to creating a fairer global order. Tax justice is not a fringe concern — it’s a foundational issue for economic development, democratic governance and global equity.
[Lee Thompson-Kolar edited this piece.]
The views expressed in this article/video are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.
” post-content-short=” Fair Observer Founder, CEO & Editor-in-Chief Atul Singh and Jason Ward, founder and principal analyst at the Center for International Corporate Tax Accountability and Research (CICTAR), discuss how multinational corporations shift profits to avoid taxes, and the resulting consequences for…” post_summery=”In this episode of FO° Talks, CICTAR Founder Jason Ward explains how multinational corporations exploit legal loopholes to shift profits and avoid taxes, depriving countries of vital public revenue. He emphasizes the urgent need for transparency and reform. With growing global momentum, only robust disclosure and democratic coordination can restore fairness and competition in global markets.” post-date=”Aug 05, 2025″ post-title=”FO° Talks: Do Google, Microsoft, Starbucks Make Billions of Dollars by Avoiding Taxes?” slug-data=”fo-talks-do-google-microsoft-starbucks-make-billions-of-dollars-by-avoiding-taxes”>
FO° Talks: Do Google, Microsoft, Starbucks Make Billions of Dollars by Avoiding Taxes?
This conversation between Fair Observer Chief Strategy Officer Peter Isackson and retired General AK Singh, a seasoned Indian military commander with deep ties to Soviet, NATO and Russian commands, offers a wide-ranging strategic assessment of the Ukraine conflict. Singh’s insights explore not only the war’s military dimensions but also its geopolitical roots, global ripple effects and what it reveals about shifting power structures.
A war that “should not have been”
Singh opens with the assertion that the Ukraine war was avoidable. He blames “international centers of compellence” — namely, US neoconservatives and a compliant EU/NATO bloc on one side, and Russia on the other. Ukraine, he argues, is the real victim: a “means” caught in the middle and devastated. He criticizes Western media for shaping public perception and pressuring social media platforms to take sides. He questions the West’s moral consistency, citing the unequal outrage over civilian deaths in Ukraine versus Palestine, Afghanistan, Syria or Libya.
In terms of economic warfare, Singh calls sanctions a “double-edged” tool that is ineffective against Russia’s resilient “fortress economy.” He points out that India has drawn lessons from the conflict, bolstering its defense self-reliance and maintaining a pragmatic foreign policy. Isackson agrees that the war could have been avoided and faults Western media for ignoring the historical buildup.
Red lines and long-range risks
The discussion turns to a crucial question: Should the West authorize long-range strikes into Russian territory? Isackson asks what this would mean for the war. Singh calls it a “critical juncture.” European countries may support the move, but the US remains cautious due to Russia’s vast nuclear arsenal and doctrine that allows using “all means” if the state is threatened. He warns that such attacks could corner Russia, potentially triggering a drastic response. Still, he expresses hope that cooler heads will prevail.
Politics and the path to escalation
Isackson raises the role of US politics in shaping the war’s trajectory, especially in the face of the US’s 2024 elections. He suggests efforts may be underway to prolong the conflict until November. Singh agrees, calling the presidential election an “overbearing influence.” He notes internal US divisions, with the Pentagon and Department of Defense reportedly opposed to escalation, while the State Department and intelligence agencies push for it. He expresses concern over CIA Director William Burns’s support for risky decisions, despite his understanding of Russian red lines.
Singh emphasizes that Ukraine’s fate is tethered to US decisions, not Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s leadership, which he calls “delusion” in the eyes of the Global South. He doubts the strategic value of delivering F-16 fighter aircraft or launching operations like the Kursk incursion, asserting that “everybody understands that Russia cannot be defeated.” The key question is how much Russia will gain — especially securing Ukraine’s Donbas region and halting NATO expansion — before the war ends.
Propaganda, publics and power
Isackson challenges the disconnect between Singh’s assessment and official Western rhetoric that insists on Ukrainian victory. Singh points to internal Russian unity, comparing current public support for Putin to wartime solidarity in World War II. He urges the West to stop chasing illusions and instead pursue backchannel diplomacy — especially between the US and Russia. He criticizes Western narratives that paint negotiation as “appeasement,” stifling chances for real peace.
Singh stresses that basic trust between Russia and the US has eroded. Citing retired German Chancellor Angela Merkel’s remarks that the Minsk Accords merely “bought time,” he argues Russia will not fall for such tricks again. He anticipates a turning point within months, as Ukraine’s capacity to sustain the war continues to weaken.
Kursk: tactical gain, strategic mistake
Isackson and Singh sharply analyze the Kursk operation. Singh doubts Ukraine could have launched it without Western backing. Though Ukraine gained territory, he sees no strategic benefit. With no coherent defensive line and mounting casualties, Ukraine faces a dire choice: entrench and risk losing supply lines, fall back to a shallower position or try to rescue troops from Donbas. He highlights the importance of the Ukrainian city of Pokrovsk as a logistical hub.
Isackson mentions that Western officials justify Kursk as a “morale boost,” but Singh sees it as a mistake without a defined “end state.” He contrasts MI6’s more cautious tone with Burns’s more hawkish stance. While the US offers rhetorical support, he argues that Ukraine bears the actual costs — “half a million dead,” mass displacement and destruction — while the US risks little.
Regime change fantasies and geopolitical blindness
Talk of regime change in Russia is brushed aside. Singh sees strong support for Putin and no viable challengers. Isackson compares this to Vietnam, where the US prolonged an unwinnable war. Singh says the US elite isn’t being honest with the public and that sanctions have failed to hurt the average Russian. He laments a lost opportunity for post-Cold War reconciliation with Russia, which instead “was poked” into closer Chinese ties.
He argues that US foreign policy is captive to the military-industrial complex, which profits from prolonged conflict. He contrasts this with India’s emphasis on peace and diplomatic flexibility. Drawing on his experience with both Soviet and NATO forces, Singh finds it surprising that so few retired US military officials publicly challenge prevailing policy.
The rise of BRICS and a multipolar order
Isackson brings up BRICS and its growing appeal. Singh says the Global South no longer wants to be pulled into superpower rivalries. BRICS, representing a large share of the global population and GDP, offers an alternative where their interests are better safeguarded. He predicts that US unilateralism will recede and sanctions will push countries toward a new parallel economic system.
India’s decision to buy Russian oil is cited as pragmatic and in its national interest. Isackson notes BRICS’s challenge to the dominance of the US dollar. Singh adds that the outdated structure of institutions like the UN Security Council must change. It’s “scandalous,” he says, that India still lacks a permanent seat.
A final warning: eyes on the Middle East
In closing, Singh argues that Ukraine is unlikely to cause a global catastrophe, but the Middle East might. He warns that one incident involving Israel and surrounding powers could escalate uncontrollably. Isackson says that today’s youth seem desensitized to nuclear threats — unlike his generation, which was shaped by events like the Cuban Missile Crisis.
Singh praises Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán for bluntly acknowledging the risks and criticizes other European leaders for underestimating the dangers. Isackson agrees and sees leaders like Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu as more volatile than Zelenskyy. He warns that both are trying to draw the US deeper into their wars.
Singh closes by noting Putin’s restraint — seen by some as fear, but which he views as a deliberate effort to avoid crossing a dangerous line. Isackson recalls that Putin once proposed a security framework to avoid war, which the West has largely ignored.
[Lee Thompson-Kolar edited this piece.]
The views expressed in this article/video are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.
” post-content-short=” This conversation between Fair Observer Chief Strategy Officer Peter Isackson and retired General AK Singh, a seasoned Indian military commander with deep ties to Soviet, NATO and Russian commands, offers a wide-ranging strategic assessment of the Ukraine conflict. Singh’s insights explore not…” post_summery=”In this episode of FO° Talks, Fair Observer Chief Strategy Officer Peter Isackson and retired Indian General AK Singh hold a critical assessment of the Ukraine war, arguing it was shaped by Western strategic missteps and media narratives. Singh warns that escalation risks provoking a Russian response, and questions the effectiveness of US policy and the credibility of Ukraine’s leadership. The speakers also explore shifting global power dynamics and emphasize the need for diplomacy to prevent wider catastrophe.” post-date=”Aug 04, 2025″ post-title=”FO° Talks: An Indian Military Mind on Ukraine’s Remarkable Kursk Invasion” slug-data=”fo-talks-an-indian-military-mind-on-ukraines-remarkable-kursk-invasion”>
FO° Talks: An Indian Military Mind on Ukraine’s Remarkable Kursk Invasion
Fair Observer Founder, CEO & Editor-in-Chief Atul Singh and retired CIA Officer Glenn Carle open this section of their discussion with signs of American institutional decline: a muted presidential parade, unrest in Los Angeles and a growing perception that the United States now mirrors unstable developing nations. Atul laments the collapse of the principles that once defined America — rule of law, stable institutions and merit-based leadership. He warns that ideological extremism has replaced civic norms, with “totalitarians on the left and authoritarians on the right” dominating discourse and weakening the national center.
A focal point of this erosion is Harvard University, long a symbol of American soft power. Atul states that a legal battle now prevents the university, with its $53 billion endowment and large population of elite foreign students, from admitting any more international students. He sees this as part of a broader crackdown, including a sweeping immigration campaign that Donald Trump has pushed. Under this campaign, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) carries out what is described as the largest mass deportation program in US history. It regularly ignores due process and answers protests with military deployments — a rare escalation in US domestic affairs.
Revolutionary shifts in governance and power
Glenn contextualizes these developments as more than political turbulence. They are, in his view, signs of a systemic revolution. He argues the US faces its most profound crisis since 1861, but unlike the American Civil War, today’s upheaval directly targets foundational institutions. At the heart of this shift are two radical ideological projects: Project 2025, which seeks to shrink the federal government to just border control and defense, and the theory of the unitary executive, which would grant the president unchecked authority, modeled after authoritarian regimes like China’s.
Glenn calls the theory “literally revolutionary in intent” and traces its intellectual roots to Carl Schmitt, a legal philosopher who served Adolf Hitler’s Nazi regime during World War II. These ideas, he warns, are not theoretical — they’re being translated into policy. The federal deployment of Marines and National Guard troops to California, despite no declared emergency, marks a dangerous centralization of military authority. These actions represent to Glenn a conscious attack on the current American order, aiming to reshape governance, dismantle the post-New Deal consensus and exclude multicultural voices from cultural and political power.
Cultural crisis, social fragmentation and the decline of discourse
Atul and Glenn identify cultural and economic undercurrents fueling this crisis. Atul acknowledges that elite institutions like Harvard are not above criticism — he condemns their chilling effect on speech and the regulatory capture that shields large corporations. But he insists that these problems stem from deeper societal fault lines: a gutted working class, a crisis of affordability in education and housing and a collapsing media ecosystem. The ratio of journalists to public relations professionals has gone from 1:2 in 1998 to 1:10 today, turning political debate into constant spin and leaving voters uninformed.
Glenn underscores the racial and cultural dimensions of this upheaval. He describes a white male elite unwilling to accept the demographic and cultural evolution of America, lashing out to preserve dominance. Harvard, in this context, becomes a symbolic enemy — a stand-in for everything multicultural, intellectual and global. The result, he warns, is a paradigm shift in what is considered normal or acceptable in American society. Glenn reflects on French political philosopher Alexis de Tocqueville’s warning: When every voice carries equal weight but lacks authority or knowledge, democracy devolves into chaos and the tyranny of the majority takes hold.
[Lee Thompson-Kolar edited this piece.]
The views expressed in this article/video are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.
” post-content-short=” Fair Observer Founder, CEO & Editor-in-Chief Atul Singh and retired CIA Officer Glenn Carle open this section of their discussion with signs of American institutional decline: a muted presidential parade, unrest in Los Angeles and a growing perception that the United States now mirrors…” post_summery=”In this episode of FO° Exclusive, Fair Observer Founder, CEO & Editor-in-Chief Atul Singh and retired CIA Officer Glenn Carle examine the collapse of US political norms, focusing on legal and cultural assaults on immigration law and institutions like Harvard University. They trace these events to deeper ideological efforts to reshape American governance and society. The result, they argue, is a systemic crisis that challenges democracy itself.” post-date=”Aug 02, 2025″ post-title=”FO° Exclusive: Trump Attacks Harvard as ICE Raids Continue in Los Angeles” slug-data=”fo-exclusive-trump-attacks-harvard-as-ice-raids-continue-in-los-angeles”>
FO° Exclusive: Trump Attacks Harvard as ICE Raids Continue in Los Angeles
Founder, CEO and Editor-in-Chief Atul Singh interviews Professor Viral Acharya, the former Deputy Governor of the Reserve Bank of India (RBI), about why India’s economic growth has slowed recently.
Part of the slowdown stems from a correction following the post-COVID economic bounce. After the pandemic, pent-up demand surged, and monetary and fiscal stimulus fueled growth. Low interest rates lowered debt payments, and many state governments cut stamp duties. Equity and housing prices rose, making the wealthy feel very rich and boosting their consumption. Now, this demand has declined.
Reasons for the slowdown in growth
The post-COVID bounce rested on a narrow base. Both the informal and rural economies suffered. They were not as financially developed, and the wealth effect from monetary stimulus was weak. Furthermore, the rich did not spend what the poor in these sectors earned. This led to a K-shaped recovery, where different parts of the economy perform divergently, like the arms of the letter “K.”
Second, the savings glut among the wealthy is insufficient to drive the economy. Indian policymakers need to raise incomes for more people. The poor tend to, and want to, spend more. If they do not see higher incomes, the financial sector transfers money from the rich to the poor through unsecured consumer credit. This mirrors the growth of credit card debt in the US, which reached $1.17 trillion at the end of the third quarter in 2024, with an average interest rate of 23.37%.
The RBI has attempted to slow unsecured credit growth, but this alone cannot solve the core issue: how the government addresses the lack of real wage growth among the masses.
Over the last five years, agricultural job creation in India has been more than 50%, which is concerning because agriculture accounts for just over 15% of the country’s GDP and is a low-productivity sector. The states of Uttar Pradesh, Bihar and Bengal, in India’s hinterland, do not generate enough high-quality jobs. To improve this, the government must boost private investment by opening up the economy, creating demand for more productive labor and generating new jobs.
On the supply side, policymakers need to invest in education, health and vocational training so Indian workers can meet the increased demand from higher investment. India must shift away from low-quality, low-income jobs in agriculture that produce little demand, toward better opportunities that foster higher income and growth.
What should the Indian government do?
In policy terms, India needs to do two things. First, it must introduce another round of liberalization, which involves reducing protectionist barriers and lowering tariffs. Policy certainty for the next three to five years is crucial because businesses require predictability and confidence. India needs foreign businesses to establish operations in the country, as this facilitates technology transfers. These transfers, in turn, boost efficiency, increase productivity and enhance the economy’s competitiveness.
Today’s situation has improved since 1991, when the public sector was more dominant. Although the public sector remains inefficient, the industry’s concentration in a few hands is a concerning trend. While we are no longer in a pre-1991 world, reducing industry concentration remains a crucial priority.
Second, India should pursue growth that matches its high potential. Given the economy’s current low base, India should aim for higher growth rates.
What about the falling rupee and FIIs leaving the Indian market
The volatility of the rupee has been too low. While the RBI needs to maintain inflation credibility, it must also avoid excessive market interventions. Now, the RBI has loosened the strict management of the rupee’s volatility. As a result, the money that previously flowed in is now flowing out. Additionally, US markets are currently frothy, causing dollars to return to the US and exert downward pressure on both the rupee and Indian stock markets. In any case, Indian markets were also frothy and needed a sanity check.
[Kaitlyn Diana edited this piece]
The views expressed in this article/video are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.
” post-content-short=” Founder, CEO and Editor-in-Chief Atul Singh interviews Professor Viral Acharya, the former Deputy Governor of the Reserve Bank of India (RBI), about why India’s economic growth has slowed recently. Part of the slowdown stems from a correction following the post-COVID economic bounce….” post_summery=”India’s economic growth is slowing down because the post-Covid bounce has run out of steam. The growth is based on a narrow economic base and the government needs another round of 1991-style liberalization to boost the economy.” post-date=”Jul 17, 2025″ post-title=”FO° Talks: Why Is India’s Economy Slowing Down?” slug-data=”fo-talks-why-is-indias-economy-slowing-down”>
FO° Talks: Why Is India’s Economy Slowing Down?
Retired CIA officer Glenn Carle offers a provocative and deeply unsettling analysis of US President Donald Trump. He claims that Trump is what intelligence professionals would classify as a Russian asset, not a traditional spy who takes orders, but someone who has been cultivated and influenced over decades. He traces the beginnings of Trump’s relationship with Russian intelligence back to 1986, when Trump Tower caught the attention of Natalia Dubinin, the daughter of Russian Ambassador Yuri Dubinin. This, he says, eventually led to Moscow’s long-standing efforts to entice Trump with the idea of building a Trump Tower in Red Square.
How intelligence recruitment works
Carle explains that this type of influence operation involves spotting, assessing, developing and ultimately recruiting targets, often through subtle psychological manipulation. He describes how even small gestures, such as offering a favor, can establish bonds of loyalty or create a sense of indebtedness.
Trump, in Carle’s view, is especially susceptible due to his vanity and his consistent loyalty to those who flatter him. While Trump does not align with Russia on every issue — notably diverging on Iran — Carle notes he has parroted Russian state messaging and advanced Kremlin-aligned policies across many domains.
Domestic ideology and institutional erosion
Whitaker and Carle shift the conversation from foreign entanglements to the domestic sphere, where they see grave danger in the political movement surrounding Trump. Carle argues that Trump’s actions are part of a broader ideological push by elements of the Republican Party’s right wing to gut the federal government. This includes promoting the “unitary executive theory,” shrinking federal functions to defense and border control, and dismantling institutions built since the New Deal. These ideas, according to Carle, come not from Trump himself but from his inner circle and movement intellectuals.
The crisis of American democracy
Carle concludes with a stark warning: The United States is undergoing its deepest institutional crisis since the Civil War. Unlike the societal unrest of the 1960s, he believes the current moment poses a threat to the core structures of American governance. He cites attacks on the First Amendment and on the free media, reduction of social services programs, efforts to centralize military command and widespread distrust in democratic institutions. Although critics may dismiss these concerns as exaggerated, Carle insists they are very real — and dangerous.
[Lee Thompson-Kolar edited this piece.]
The views expressed in this article/video are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.
” post-content-short=” Retired CIA officer Glenn Carle offers a provocative and deeply unsettling analysis of US President Donald Trump. He claims that Trump is what intelligence professionals would classify as a Russian asset, not a traditional spy who takes orders, but someone who has been cultivated and influenced…” post_summery=”In this episode of FO° Talks, Fair Observer Chair Claire Whitaker and retired CIA officer Glenn Carle discuss US President Donald Trump’s relationship with Russian intelligence. Carle argues that Trump is a cultivated Russian asset and warns of a broader ideological project threatening American institutions. He describes the present moment as the United States’s most serious national crisis since the American Civil War.” post-date=”Jul 13, 2025″ post-title=”FO° Talks: Did Russia Recruit Donald Trump as a Spy? Former CIA Officer Reveals” slug-data=”fo-talks-did-russia-recruit-donald-trump-as-a-spy-former-cia-officer-reveals”>
FO° Talks: Did Russia Recruit Donald Trump as a Spy? Former CIA Officer Reveals
Israel’s military campaign against Iran is fueled by a blend of motivations — some strategic, some political, and others deeply existential. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu sees this moment as a historic opportunity to protect Israel, cement his legacy and hold on to power in a time of domestic upheaval. For Netanyahu, this is not just a military campaign — it’s a personal and political imperative.
Core motivations behind Israeli actions
- Existential threat. Israel regards the Islamic Republic of Iran as a fundamental, long-term threat to its survival. This belief is rooted in Iran’s open hostility, support for anti-Israel proxy groups, and ongoing nuclear ambitions. While Iran claims its nuclear program is defensive, Israel sees it as a direct challenge to its existence.
- Political survival and personal legacy. Netanyahu’s leadership is under intense pressure at home, with growing protests and the threat of corruption charges if he loses office. In his eyes, a successful military campaign could reinforce his position and define his legacy.
- Combating terror and regional destabilization. Israel presents itself as taking on what the West won’t: challenging a radical regime that funds terror groups and exports instability across the Middle East. This, in Israel’s framing, is about neutralizing not just Iran but its entire proxy network.
- Rallying domestic unity. In a country bitterly divided over judicial reforms, religious military exemptions and political polarization, war acts as a temporary unifier. Netanyahu’s critics, however, argue that the timing is convenient — war distracts from internal dissent.
- Shifting alliances and strategic autonomy. Having abandoned hopes of European support, Israel is laser-focused on securing American backing. It sees the United States as its only indispensable ally and is acting accordingly.
Israel’s multi-layered strategy against Iran
Israel’s short-term military goals are to:
- Strike nuclear facilities. Israel’s immediate objective is to degrade or destroy Iran’s nuclear infrastructure, with reports already suggesting nuclear-targeted strikes have taken place.
- Decapitate military leadership. Israel is systematically eliminating senior Iranian commanders, aiming to cripple Tehran’s ability to respond coherently and quickly.
Israel’s medium- to long-term goals include:
- Regime change. Although not openly stated in diplomatic circles, regime change is a desired outcome. Israeli leadership sees this campaign as the beginning of that process.
- Fragment Iran. The most ambitious version of Israel’s strategy envisions Iran fractured into ethnic and regional enclaves, much like post-civil war Syria — Baluchis secede, Iranian Azerbaijanis unify with Azerbaijan, Kurds establish autonomy or independence.
- Collapse through internal pressure. Beyond bombs, Israel is counting on relentless economic pain — unemployment, inflation and widespread disillusionment among Iran’s youth — to eventually bring the regime down from within. The idea is that a society pushed to the brink will revolt.
- Create a more liberal Iran. The long-term vision is a secular Iran, possibly led by a Western-leaning youth movement. A post-clerical Tehran would focus on trade and growth — “commerce, not chaos” — benefiting regional stability and Israel’s strategic position.
Doubts, risks and global implications
Is a regime change realistic? Critics, including UK intelligence agency MI6, call the idea of toppling the Iranian government through airstrikes and assassinations “delusional.” While urban elites might be disillusioned, Iran’s rural, conservative base — and more importantly, its armed forces — remain loyal to the regime.
The strikes may have blowback. Far from weakening Tehran, Israeli strikes may actually rally domestic support around the regime. Many Iranians, regardless of ideology, might resent foreign attacks, especially from Israel, which is widely condemned in the region for its war in Gaza.
Across the Atlantic, the US is walking a tightrope by offering air defense support to Israel but stopping short of direct strikes on Iran. While political pressure in Washington to back Israel remains high, the administration of US President Donald Trump is wary of being pulled into another Middle Eastern war without a clear exit strategy.
Other global powers sit on the sidelines. Europe is unlikely to back Israel militarily, especially amid outrage over its actions in Gaza. Russia is preoccupied with Ukraine but might make a quiet deal with Israel to stay out of Iran in exchange for concessions elsewhere. China wants Iranian oil but lacks the naval power to intervene far from home.
So, despite regional escalation risks, a global conflict remains improbable in the short term. But proxy wars, oil disruptions and economic ripple effects are all very much on the table.
Israel’s domestic fault lines and strategic memory
Israel itself is not without problems. The country is deeply divided over religion, governance and civil-military relations. While war might rally short-term unity, prolonged conflict risks deepening these internal fissures. Protests, especially among reservists, could reignite if public support wanes.
Any talk of regime change in Iran revives painful memories of past Western interventions — especially the 1953 US/UK-backed coup that removed the democratically elected Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddegh and installed Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi. That event ultimately helped fuel the 1979 Islamic Revolution. Today’s Iranian regime still invokes that betrayal to justify its distrust of the West.
Where might this go?
This episode could lead to a temporary de-escalation. Both sides could eventually pause the conflict to claim political wins: Iran to protect its leadership and wealth, Israel to showcase operational success.
The fighting could escalate into a broader war. Iran could target US or European assets, ignite regional tensions in the Gulf or activate proxies like Hezbollah or the Houthis. Global oil markets would be the first to feel the shock.
This conflict could see a prolonged stalemate. Months of inconclusive fighting may drag on, sapping both economies and fueling domestic unrest, without delivering strategic breakthroughs for either side.
Final reflection
The future is murky. What’s unfolding is more than just a clash between two nations — it’s the unraveling of an old order. The post-Sykes–Picot map of the Middle East is dissolving, with fragmented states, emboldened non-state actors and a rising risk of a regional war with no clear end.
[Lee Thompson-Kolar edited this piece.]
The views expressed in this article/video are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.
” post-content-short=” Israel’s military campaign against Iran is fueled by a blend of motivations — some strategic, some political, and others deeply existential. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu sees this moment as a historic opportunity to protect Israel, cement his legacy and hold on to power in a time…” post_summery=”Fair Observer Founder Atul Singh and Fair Observer Chief Strategy Officer Peter Isackson discuss Israel’s recent strike on Iran. The attack reflects a mix of existential fear, political calculation and long-term strategic ambitions, including regime change and regional reshaping. While Israel seeks to degrade Iran’s nuclear and military capabilities, critics warn that such efforts may backfire or spiral into wider conflict.” post-date=”Jul 12, 2025″ post-title=”FO° Talks: Denuclearization or Regime Change: Why Did Israel Strike Iran?” slug-data=”fo-talks-denuclearization-or-regime-change-why-did-israel-strike-iran”>
FO° Talks: Denuclearization or Regime Change: Why Did Israel Strike Iran?
In this episode of FO° Talks, Fair Observer Founder Atul Singh and former Israeli Government Official Josef Olmert unpack the June 13 Israeli strike on Iran. The operation had been in the works for years and showcased what Olmert called an “exceptional” intelligence breakthrough. Rather than the anticipated cyberattack or initial strikes on nuclear sites, Israel began by eliminating 20 key military commanders to paralyze Iran’s response capabilities, catching Tehran off guard.
The strike and its military impact
With the Iranian leadership disabled, Israel launched a powerful wave of attacks on Iran’s nuclear infrastructure. The site at Natanz was rendered inoperable, Farchan was hit and more attacks may follow, especially on the fortified Fordow facility. The Israeli military handled this operation with unprecedented speed and depth, eliminating the top opposition and smuggling helicopters. The attack also killed 14 elite scientists, severely hampering Iran’s nuclear ambitions.
Iran’s response and Israeli resilience
Iran retaliated with ballistic missile strikes. Israel’s air force, operating with near-total dominance over Iranian airspace, managed to take out launch sites before many rockets could be fired. Though Iran hit targets like Israel’s Hifa refinery and the Weizmann Institute, it failed to deliver any strategic damage.
Despite limited casualties, the psychological impact inside Israel is real. Rumors of mass flight are false; thousands of Israelis abroad instead rushed to return home.
Israel’s next steps to weaken Iran
With air supremacy secured, Israel’s next moves depend on political decisions. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu could continue targeting military leadership, strike economic assets like oil infrastructure or symbolically humiliate the Iranian regime to encourage domestic unrest. Each path carries trade-offs: A bolder approach could trigger global pressure for a ceasefire, while restraint risks giving Tehran time to regroup. It’s a “catch-22,” with no easy solution.
Israel’s goals go beyond physical damage. It aims to make Iran’s nuclear program a wasted investment and sap the regime’s strength to project power. Central to Israel’s strategy is creating space for opposition. Iran, meanwhile, seeks to retain its status as a regional superpower, but Olmert believes it has already lost much of its credibility.
Prospects for regime collapse
Although a revolution may seem unlikely, such changes can come rapidly, faster even than Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad’s regime collapse. While Iran’s minorities — Kurds, Baluchis, Arabs, Azeris — may play a role, the country’s internal complexity makes fragmentation improbable. The regime retains support from religious conservatives and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, though it has lost the younger, educated urban population. The absence of live appearances by Iranian leaders may signal the nation’s eroding legitimacy.
Strategic risks and the global response
Risks remain, including potential Iranian missile strikes on nuclear facilities like the Israeli city of Dimona or major airports. Olmert considers such scenarios unlikely but not impossible. He believes Tehran’s current behavior, including hints at closing the Strait of Hormuz or manipulating oil prices, reflects desperation. Moves like these would likely provoke US intervention, which would not serve Iran’s interests.
While Gulf countries officially denounce Israel’s actions, they are quietly pleased, even celebratory. Still, Muslim public opinion from Turkey to Indonesia has swung against Israel, feeding a siege mentality within Israeli society. Olmert warns that Iran might deliberately escalate toward catastrophe to trigger international demands for a ceasefire. G7 and NATO leaders may eventually pressure Israel.
Domestic politics and the long game
Has Israel overreached? Olmert says that the answer hinges on the fate of Iran’s regime. Netanyahu faces political challenges, but if he emerges with a decisive win, he could gain room to compromise on other fronts, including Gaza.
That said, Olmert notes Israel’s long-standing failure to convert military success into political capital, often constrained by its allies. The endgame, he argues, depends less on battlefield outcomes than on political shifts in Tehran.
[Lee Thompson-Kolar edited this piece.]
The views expressed in this article/video are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.
” post-content-short=” In this episode of FO° Talks, Fair Observer Founder Atul Singh and former Israeli Government Official Josef Olmert unpack the June 13 Israeli strike on Iran. The operation had been in the works for years and showcased what Olmert called an “exceptional” intelligence breakthrough. Rather than…” post_summery=”Former Israeli Government Official Josef Olmert analyzes Israel’s recent strike on Iran as a calculated and unprecedented move that decapitated the Iranian leadership before hitting nuclear sites. While Iran’s retaliation has caused limited physical damage, it has not shifted the strategic balance. The conflict’s trajectory now hinges on Israeli political decisions and whether Iran’s regime can weather the shock.” post-date=”Jul 11, 2025″ post-title=”FO° Talks: Israel Strikes Iran. Tehran Hits Back. What Now?” slug-data=”fo-talks-israel-strikes-iran-tehran-hits-back-what-now”>
FO° Talks: Israel Strikes Iran. Tehran Hits Back. What Now?
[This is the final part of a four-part series. To read more, see Parts 1, 2 and 3 here.]
Josef Olmert: Hello. Hi to my watchers, to my readers, to my followers. This is the fourth and last in my short series on US–Israel relations. And the idea is really to lead us to the current situation with US President Donald J. Trump, his second administration, with a brief review of his first and the in-between period of the US presidency of Joseph Biden — Joe Biden Jr. — as president. And then we’ll come to the current situation, with the exception that I have to make already now: that we are in a situation that is unfolding. And there might be people who say, “Oh, it’s too early even to talk about US–Israel relations under Donald Trump.” So what I’m going to do is, therefore, to talk about what I consider to be situations that already are fully now results, and maybe inevitable results, of what we already discussed, and how they are happening right now — not talked about, but happening.
Therefore, if we make any predictions for the future, they will be based on what I would consider to be a more solid ground. That’s about the methodics of all that. And I need to say, because I do get reactions, comments, responses from people who watch, read, and they are asking questions that lead me to say what I’m saying to you now.
The American Jewish community and Israel’s image problem
Josef Olmert: So today, very briefly, just to remind you: In our previous episode, we discussed more in-depth processes, mostly in the American Jewish community, that led to changes in attitudes towards Israel. And we touched upon, therefore, what was happening in Israel at the same time that might have led to these changes in American attitude towards Israel, but also the rise of new movements in the US that were either more or less supportive of Israel. Of course, the evangelical Christians on the one end being more supportive; the left-wing, the progressive movement on the other side, in the Democratic Party mainly, that has been much more negative, still is, and becoming more and more negative.
And that brings us, really, to the situation that we are going to delve into in great detail today in our episode.
Trump’s first term: populism, promises and policy shifts
Josef Olmert: And I would say to you that when President Trump was running for president in 2015, 2016, he was not taken seriously, not just by Jews, but also by ordinary America, of course, the commentators. And I cautioned people at the time — it’s not like an “I told you so, period” — but I cautioned people, because I talked to people about the significance of the politics of identities and populist politics altogether, in the unfolding political climate in the US, as well as in other Western democracies.
And by the way, I gave the comparison with Israel. I analyzed the fact that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, Bibi Netanyahu, at that time was already in his sixth year as prime minister in his second term, after the one that he was in from 1996 to 1999 — this one was from 2009; we talk about 2015, 2016 — that Netanyahu also succeeded in Israel with the politics of populism and identities. And this is a successful political card.
And Trump made promises about Israel, and everybody said, “No, I mean, don’t take them seriously.” And he fulfilled, to a large extent, a great deal of his promises. For example, the moving of the embassy to Jerusalem, which was, by the way, the policy of every American president before him, with the exception that they didn’t fulfill their decision because of whatever reason that they gave. That was basically based on the idea, “Yes, we say to the Israelis and to the Jews and to the pro-Israel community, we want to move the embassy — but we can’t do it now.”
Trump did it. Trump also withdrew out of the Iran nuclear deal, as was expected by the Netanyahu government in Israel.
Let me say something here: Netanyahu was not wrong in his opposition to the nuclear deal as was devised by President Obama’s administration. Where were the problems that he had, and they have to do with what’s happening now, so therefore I’m saying them now:
He didn’t know the limits of, or the ways in which to express, his opposition to the Obama administration policy, and therefore he made a terrible mistake of showing in Congress and giving his speech — that was in March of 2015. In January of 2015, that is to say, two months before, the speech was announced by then-Speaker John Boehner. (By the way, I have a picture with John Boehner in my study, because I met him before — I met many other people.) And I then cautioned from getting biting gifts — I cautioned Netanyahu not to do the speech. That was a big mistake.
It comes back to what we discussed before in the previous episode about bipartisanship, or lack thereof, under Netanyahu. It was a big mistake.
The other mistake, which might have even been bigger, was that while he said no to the deal as was devised by Obama — with the support of other powers, as part of Obama’s internationalist policy — he did not offer any alternative. He basically created the impression from day one that all he wanted was to see an American military operation against Iran — or else to justify an Israeli one. But even then, he was not preparing one.
In 2011, the Israeli military establishment was waiting for a word from Netanyahu that he was giving the green light for an attack on Iran. He asked for three days to make a decision. He then said no. And there still are reports to that effect that even today, he basically did not approve all kinds of plans that were supposed to finance projects that were designed to improve technological abilities that were to be connected with an attack on Iran and so on and so forth.
So Netanyahu basically said to Trump, “Cancel the agreement, period,” without offering an alternative.
Why is this important? Because it’s the same mistake he has done since the beginning of the war in Gaza, on the 7th of October 2023, to this very moment. While he said, “no, no, no, no, no,” to everything offered by other people, to other countries, including the best friends of Israel, he does not provide any alternative.
Then Trump, for example, said something which is again interesting: that when the US, with Israeli support, decided to eliminate the arch-terrorist Qasem Soleimani, the head of the Quds Force of the Revolutionary Guards in Iran, Netanyahu said yes. And then he said no, he would not be part of it. Which, by the way, caused ongoing damage in the relationship between him and Trump, because Trump — and that we know already — doesn’t like what seems to be weak people, leaders, losers. For Trump, the fact that Netanyahu did not show up in the end, as opposed to what Trump did, was an indication of lack of stamina, resolve, real determination.
But there were also examples of how Israel was so helpful to the American administration. For example, in the war against ISIS, I don’t know how many of my watchers and listeners and readers remember that Trump, in public, said something that compromised the invaluable, great support that Israel gave to American intelligence to locate ISIS targets in Syria. Israelis were furious. But Trump said, “He’s a great friend.”
MAGA and the limits of right-wing support
Josef Olmert: Trump gave a lot of support also in the UN, the national organizations. But Trump also was the leader of MAGA, and that’s the point that I want to emphasize here. And we saw it after the incident in Charlottesville — if I even call it an incident, I believe what happened there in 2017, referring to “good people on both sides.” I immediately wrote an article in which I said, “There are no ‘both sides’ where there are swastikas.”
When Trump referred to “good people on both sides,” he also referred to those that were marching with people that waved the swastikas. That led me into discussion with myself about MAGA.
First of all, it was “America First,” which was a bad memory to me. For those who remember history — I mean, I don’t remember it from that time, but I know it — there was Charles Lindbergh with his America First Committee. That was basically a pro-Nazi domestic American organization that didn’t want America to join the Second World War. You can argue, “Okay, he just used the words; he didn’t mean very much.”
The MAGA movement is a nativist movement. The MAGA movement is isolationist. When you look at the roots of the MAGA movement, when you look at the terminology used, the symbols used, the organizations that were at the forefront of the movement, you have to come to the conclusion that this movement cannot be the pro-Israel movement that existed in the past under the great US President Ronald Reagan — when the world was divided according to the Cold War, and Israel was on that side, the good side. Or under US President George W. Bush, let alone previous presidents from before. Because their opinion about how the world is divided is totally different.
And nativist movements in America or in Europe, by definition, have more than a nucleus of antisemitism, because any movement which is also based on xenophobic feelings is bound to be antisemitic. And no antisemitic movement can be good to Jews, can be good to Israel. It’s as simple as that.
And it was very convenient to many Israelis to accept the better sides of Trump’s policies, but to ignore the roots of it that were based on assumptions and ideologies and terminologies which, as I said, by definition are not good to Jews and Israel.
And how many more times can I say it? How, with more decibels, stronger volume, to say it in order to make the point? Because it is a point that is still debated, even among Jews: What makes you really anti-Israel?
The MAGA movement was on the right side. The alternative to the MAGA movement as a mass mobilization political movement is the “woke” movement, which is, again, anti-Israel. The two most important political movements — and I say movements, not parties — in terms of mobilizing public opinion in the US from right and left, as developed in the last ten to 15 years, are not pro-Israel. And it’s just a question of time when these movements affect the political parties that they try to influence from the outside or by infiltrating from the inside. They already did it in the Democratic Party, and they are doing it now — and have done it — in the Republican Party.
And it will bring me to the current situation momentarily.
Biden’s presidency and the fracturing of democratic support
Josef Olmert: Joseph Biden Jr. — interesting fellow. I, by the way, met him personally: I had dinner with him in Tel Aviv in December of 2002, ahead of the invasion of Iraq. He came to visit the Middle East with a colleague from the Republican Party, Senator Chuck Hagel, a Republican from Nebraska who later became the moderate Republican defense secretary under US President Barack Obama; a much more moderate Republican than the Republican Party already at that time.
And Biden gave a brilliant prediction and analysis of what would happen in Iraq after the war. Because everybody knew there was going to be a war, the Bush administration would do it at that time. Much later on, I wrote an article in The Huffington Post, where I blogged for seven, eight years, praising Biden for the fact that he read and understood the situation in Iraq very properly. I also talked about the ethnic and sectarian divisions in all this.
The problem really is — and this is not something that we need to develop in this particular episode, because it’s much beyond the topic that we are discussing — Biden, who came to be president, was not the Biden of earlier years. And we understand it, Now we know more truth about it.
The Biden administration, from the beginning of its term, in all kinds of subtle ways that became much more obvious during the early stages of the war in Gaza — and much later on, as the war dragged on — developed the sense that we have problems with Israel. Exactly on the main core point of what the Israeli lobby and pro-Israeli lobbies all the time emphasized: that Israel is the only democracy in the Middle East, a beacon of freedom, of human rights, of civility and all that comes with it.
The attack on Israel with regard to that was already at the time of Jimmy Carter. But who remembers Jimmy Carter? He was way back.
Now, Biden, whether wittingly or not — I would say intentionally — slowly, gradually, systematically, consistently built up the case in all kinds of ways, undermining this Israeli argument or claim to fame, if you will.
The forefront of it was what’s called “The Squad” in the Democratic Party. And it was much beyond it. It infiltrated and crept into the trade union movement, the labor movement that in the past was one of the beacons of support for Israel; minority communities — African Americans, but also Asian Americans, which is very interesting; Latinos — tolerating the infiltration of Qatar and other states into universities in America, Saudi Arabia and others — relying on people that were clearly not in the pro-Israel camp anymore, but were at various levels of being anti-Israel.
And the fact is that while still a majority of the Democratic caucus in the House voted with Israel, there was a growing number of the progressives that were already taking their distance. So you could see the cracks in the bipartisan coalition for Israel.
The Netanyahu speech was, in that case, a gift he gave to these people. A stupid gift. Terrible mistake, as I said.
Trump’s second term: strategic ambiguity
Josef Olmert: The Trump administration these days — let’s move on now. First of all, in the last campaign that brought Trump again to the presidency — he didn’t even talk about Israel. He talked about Israel or the Middle East, made very, very superficial, almost insignificant comments or references. The promises were not there, you know.
Everybody took for granted that Trump is pro-Israel and will continue to be. The person that completely misread all this was Benjamin Netanyahu, again, in Jerusalem, believing that somehow Trump is going to be the same Trump of the first administration. He ignored the fact that in second administrations, presidents do tend to change.
I would remind people here that even Ronald Reagan — a great friend and supporter of Israel — he is the president that gave the first kosher certificate to the PLO before he left his second term. He was the one who authorized the beginning of official contact between the US and the PLO in 1989, as an example. But I can give you other examples.
Then came the inauguration, and I noticed something very interesting: While the inauguration was taking place, immediately afterward, US Special Envoy Steve Witkoff — I don’t get into too many details about him and his connections with Qatar, all this I leave to investigative journalism — but I don’t need to get into investigative journalism to analyze what he said on Inauguration Day, about what would be the four main pillars of American policy in the Middle East, the name “Israel” was not mentioned. The name “Iran” was not mentioned. The name “Hamas” was not mentioned.
Remember, it is in January of 2025, and the war was already raging from October of 2023. That was the first red light.
But forget about this. Maybe it was a ceremonial occasion. You don’t get into details, you just give main, big points and so on and so forth.
Gulf-centric policy and Israel’s marginalization
Then, of course, let’s see what has happened since then.
Some of his appointments have definitely been very pro-Israel. For example, Elise Stefanik, a congresswoman from New York, to be ambassador in the UN — and she made the point already, before: She’s going to fight hard about anti-Israelism in the UN as the first, if not the most important, but one of the main missions. This appointment, by the way, was canceled for all the obscure reasons. Why did he cancel her appointment, arguing that, “we need her in Congress,” when he did not cancel other appointments of people that had to resign from Congress and lead to early elections? I mean elections like in Florida. Well, I’m just leaving you with the question.
Ambassador Mike Huckabee — great, great supporter of Israel, there’s no question about it. But was he appointed as a policymaker? Or as the person that is supposed to say the good stuff to the Israelis, as opposed to the leaks coming consistently from the White House that are the bad stuff? Good cop, bad cop? Yeah — I leave my audience with this question.
All kinds of other appointments — I was skeptical about Pete Hegseth as defense secretary, for all kinds of reasons. I was skeptical about National Security Advisor Mike Waltz for all kinds of reasons. I did welcome the appointment, of course, of Marco Rubio as Secretary of State, for all kinds of reasons.
But — you know — instead of getting into every little detail, like this appointment, that appointment, let’s try to talk about three or four particular issues that are typical of what has happened, and still is happening, and would lead me, therefore, to a conclusion at the end of this discussion.
Take, for example, the question of fighting terrorism. Proud American President Donald Trump surrendered. Yes, he surrendered to the Houthis in Yemen. He gave up to terrorists because he allows them, maybe even encourages them indirectly, to keep attacking Israel, but not attacking America. Sure, it’s a pro-American move: “We don’t attack America.” But is it a pillar of your foreign policy to abandon a friend and ally like that?
Cautionizing, legitimizing attacks on Israel by saying, “You can do that. What can I do?”
Donald Trump started the negotiations with Iran with changing views about what the demands from Iran are. And we still don’t know the final outcome of all that. But if the final outcome would be that Iran is still allowed to maintain a nuclear program — even for civilian purposes — it means that he doesn’t do anything different than what the Obama administration did.
Donald Trump put pressure on Israel to stop the war in Lebanon, exactly at the time when Hezbollah was ready to get the final blow from Israel. Yes, in the Lebanese situation, after 11 months of relative inaction by Israel, finally, Netanyahu, under pressure, decided to take the initiative. And it paid off so well to Israel, because this was the area in which you can talk specifically about the total defeat, almost, of the terrorists. Why “almost?” Because something else was needed to finalize the job. And then the American administration put a stop to it.
Donald Trump promised hell to Hamas in Gaza if they don’t release all the hostages within a short period of time. Nothing of this happened, of course. Edan Alexander was released — it is great news, fantastic news — but he is one hostage and an American citizen, which is also raising questions about the division between Americans and Israelis. You fight terrorism, you fight terrorism — it is one problem.
And I can go on with some more examples like this.
Where does it come from? Where was the Israeli reaction? And therefore, how do we put it all in perspective? Where it comes from is Trump’s version of isolationism. And many people will say it’s great, it’s a good American interest. So if that’s an American interest, not to get into war almost at all cost, I will be the last one to criticize it. But I need to mention it in the context of the Middle East. Because what does it mean? It means that we tolerate the terrorists, that we coexist with them. And for the sake of clarity, I will refer not just to people like the Houthis or Hezbollah or Hamas, but Iran.
Donald Trump doesn’t really care, apparently, about the fact that these systems will continue to exist. If he believes that by coming to some accommodation with them, he will be able to tame them, that’s a terrible, terrible mistake. Taming the shrew — ah! Impossible.
But if it falls into the basic tenets of how he views American isolationism and his supporters, then I can understand that there are implications.
Donald Trump wants political solutions that will be short-sighted — short of one situation that he raised and then did nothing about, which I immediately criticized, arguing it’s not going to happen because it’s just not even a half-baked cake. This is the talk about removing all the people of Gaza. It’s — let me use a non-diplomatic word — nonsensical.
But what helps him in that is that, yes, he has done already now some things that are very pro-Israel. He unfroze the embargo on arms to Israel that was basically imposed by Biden. He ordered his people in the UN organizations to continue to support Israel, even though it hasn’t yet come to any big test, like, say, a resolution in the Security Council about possible sanctions against Israel. That remains to be seen.
And at the same time, he makes it very clear that the focal countries of his new policy in the Middle East are the Gulf states: Saudi Arabia and Qatar, mainly, and the UAE, because they have something that Israel doesn’t have. They have the resources, the money.
And to give a kosher certificate, for example, to Qatar is the total opposite of anything which is like fighting terrorism. It is the greatest possible encouragement of terrorism because of what Qatar is and who the Qataris are. It’s as simple as this.
Israel’s paralysis and the waning American umbrella
Josef Olmert: What helps him with all that is — and that brings me back to what we already discussed — the total paralysis of the government of Israel under Benjamin Netanyahu. Netanyahu has no alternatives to anything, has no proposals to anything, has no initiatives — because he cannot do anything if he wants to maintain his current coalition, which is based on some lunatic — I would say lunatic — extreme right-wing parties, led by Israeli Minister of National Security Itamar Ben-Gvir and Israeli Minister of Finance Bezalel Smotrich. And for Netanyahu, this is the number one interest.
So even if Netanyahu were to change a little bit on all kinds of issues, or even to a large extent, it may not have changed completely the overall perspective that Trump has about how he should do his own policies and conduct them. But when Netanyahu does nothing and offers nothing, it makes it so much easier.
And that is the same mistake that Netanyahu has done throughout his political career — and definitely when it came also to the Obama administration: to say no with great, polished English is all very nice and easy. But to say yes requires courage, resolve, determination, leadership, which he lacks.
And what happens now is that because of the distance that is being created between Trump and Israel — he’s in the Middle East, but not in Israel. He’s praising Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, he’s meeting the terrorists like Mohammad al-Julani in Syria, Qatar and Saudi Arabia, the model countries for relations with the US. More and more countries are encouraged now to take more and more anti-Israel positions because they believe that the balance is changing. The umbrella of defense provided to Israel by the US is weakening, if not in the process of disappearing — which is, again, something very bad to Israel.
A troubling future for US–Israel relations
Josef Olmert: I can go on and on. I think I’ve said enough to lead me to interim conclusions.
Beware, Israel. The second administration of Donald J. Trump is going to be the greatest challenge to Israeli foreign policy in our memory, definitely in my memory. And I’m not a young person.
Israel will have to understand that America is changing. And with it are changes in American foreign policy, also in the Middle East.
And I will sharpen the point here by saying: The changes about Israel between this administration of Trump and the first one — in terms of the action but also the image, the perceptions — are just so important. These changes will not be the ones that will lead to a rebellion against Trump in the Republican Party, even by the greatest supporters of Israel, short of maybe a few. If there will be a rebellion against him, but it will be over other issues: the effect of the tariffs, the economic situation, the index of living, inflation, success or failure on the southern border and so on and so forth.
And that’s where we are standing, from the perspective of being in Israel now with less and less bipartisan support. If the Republican administration is the one that is changing the way I described, Israel cannot expect the Democrats to pull the chestnuts out of the fire for Israel. That could not happen.
So I have to leave my audience with this perspective: that for those who care about Israel and for Israel — and I’m one of them, of course — this is a very troubling, pessimistic, but I believe realistic assessment of the situation.
Thank you all.
[Lee Thompson-Kolar and Kaitlyn Diana edited this piece.]
The views expressed in this article/video are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.
” post-content-short=” Josef Olmert: Hello. Hi to my watchers, to my readers, to my followers. This is the fourth and last in my short series on US–Israel relations. And the idea is really to lead us to the current situation…” post_summery=”In the final episode of this four-part series, Professor Josef Olmert examines the transformation of US–Israel relations under US President Donald Trump’s second administration, and expresses that American isolationism and political polarization are undermining traditional bipartisan support for Israel. He contrasts Trump’s unpredictable stance with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s strategic paralysis, calling both detrimental. Olmert concludes with a stark warning: Israel faces its greatest foreign policy challenge in decades.” post-date=”Jul 10, 2025″ post-title=”FO° Talks: From MAGA to Gaza: How Trump Changed US–Israel Relations Forever” slug-data=”fo-talks-from-maga-to-gaza-how-trump-changed-us-israel-relations-forever”>
FO° Talks: From MAGA to Gaza: How Trump Changed US–Israel Relations Forever
Britain no longer runs an empire, but the imperial influence persists in surprising places. Former colonies still speak English, use common law and house financial centers like Singapore and Dubai, which are modeled after London. Not only England but also Scotland and Ireland played an outsized role in shaping this legacy. Thanks to the empire on which the sun never set, the impact of England, Scotland and Ireland reached far beyond the British Isles.
Harshan Kumarasingham knows this firsthand. Born to Sri Lankan heritage, raised in New Zealand and now teaching in Scotland, his life reflects the British Empire’s global web. Importantly, this noted scholar’s ideas of “Eastminster” and “vice-regalism” explain how imperial power morphed, not vanished, after the end of the empire.
From Westminster to Eastminster
Great Britain’s Westminster model of democracy evolved over centuries. Once Britain acquired its empire, colonial administrators exported this model to the colonies. Yet they modified the model right at the start. All power was ultimately concentrated in the hands of the viceroy, who was deputizing for the British crown. So, the colonies inherited a vice-regal form of government with the trappings of the Westminster model.
After independence, colonies moved rapidly from the Westminster model to the Eastminster one. After World War II, independence came suddenly. Colonies did not have time to evolve political norms or other institutions. They inherited the apparatus of the state from the colonial government that answered to London, not to the natives. Unlike the UK, the colonies did not experience the slow evolution of democracy over time.
Local elites took over the centralized oppressive structures of colonial governments. Most postcolonial leaders had studied in British institutions such as Oxford or Cambridge. Jawaharlal Nehru, India’s first prime minister, went to the same school as Winston Churchill, the British wartime leader. The likes of Nehru adopted the English language and British ideas, even when they were fighting their colonial masters.
After independence, the local elites chose the modified Westminster model that Kumarasingham calls the Eastminster model themselves. Nobody forced India, Sri Lanka or Pakistan to choose this model. The postcolonial elites chose this model willingly, but, over time, adapted it to their own purposes.
Eastminster model has a concentration of power
As mentioned earlier in this write-up, the colonies had experience of vice-regal government. At the end of the day, the viceroy was in charge and the natives did not matter. So, even when democracy came to the colonies, the Eastminster model allowed leaders to concentrate power.
It is the Eastminster model that has allowed Indian leaders like Indira Gandhi in the 1970s and Narendra Modi today to concentrate power. This model allowed Sri Lanka to move from a prime ministerial form of government to a presidential one. In Pakistan, Muhammad Ali Jinnah became the governor-general, not the president. The full title of the British viceroy was the viceroy and governor-general of India and Jinnah knew exactly what he was doing when he took that title. It concentrated all power and authority in his hands.
Many Eastminster states now blur the lines between democratic rule and monarchy. They face weak checks and balances. These leaders can silence the opposition. They also enjoy broad symbolic authority, much like the colonial governors who preceded them.
Settler vs subject states
Of course, not all colonies are the same. Settler dominions — Canada, Australia and New Zealand — where the population came from the British Isles, at least in the early days, managed to adopt the Westminster model successfully. The prime ministers of these countries answer to their parliaments. They function in a system of checks and balances and are ultimately answerable to their people.
Unlike settler colonies, the leaders in subject colonies like India or Kenya had little in common with their people. They had become anglicized and were importing alien traditions to their native lands. To their credit, these Eastminster elites often tried to govern fairly. India’s Nehru, Pakistan’s Jinnah, Sri Lanka’s Don Stephen Senanayake and Malaysia’s Tunku Abdul Rahman wanted to include minorities and create modern countries. But all of these leaders ruled top-down, not bottom-up.
Note that this top-down structure was baked into these subject colonies. The British did not create social hierarchies in these colonies. Yes, they certainly reinforced and exacerbated them. After independence, these hierarchies did not go away.
Elected monarchies and the rise of illiberalism
The Eastminster model is increasingly throwing up populist leaders who now act like monarchs. Ironically, many of them have humble beginnings. Modi sold tea outside a train station. Kenyan President William Ruto was a barefoot schoolboy who used to sell chickens at a roadside stall. Yet both of them have concentrated power in their hands and act like kings.
The issue in the Eastminster model is not the background of the leaders. In many countries, plebeians have replaced patricians. The issue in Eastminster democracies today is chronic institutional weakness. Unlike Westminster democracies like the UK or New Zealand, Eastminster parliaments lack real opposition. Unreformed colonial-era bureaucracies hold too much sway. Nehru’s state-led economic model is a classic case in point that handed power to powerful bureaucrats and left little room for rivals. Hence, Eastminster systems often lack the basics of liberal democracy: debate, pluralism and strong courts.
Thanks to weak institutions, many democracies are turning illiberal. Turkish voters have thrown in their lot with Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, a strongman who has been in power forever. In Eastminster, many leaders rule by fiat. Democracies have often failed to deliver and people prefer food and stability over rights and freedoms. Singapore, an authoritarian democracy, clearly proves this point.
The problems of Eastminster are now infecting Westminster. The UK elected Boris Johnson and is now flirting with Nigel Farage. America has elected Donald Trump again. The West can no longer assume that elections equal liberty. Nor can former colonies. All must rethink what democracy really means — and what they want from it.
[Atul Singh and Kaitlyn Diana edited this piece]
The views expressed in this article/video are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.
” post-content-short=” Britain no longer runs an empire, but the imperial influence persists in surprising places. Former colonies still speak English, use common law and house financial centers like Singapore and Dubai, which are modeled after London. Not only England but also Scotland and Ireland played an outsized…” post_summery=”British imperial rule left behind more than railways and the English language. Former colonies adopted a modified Westminster model. This Eastminster model concentrated power and led to the dominance of elites because of weak opposition and undeveloped institutions. This vice-regal legacy still shapes politics in the former colonies.” post-date=”Jul 09, 2025″ post-title=”Eastminster and Vice-Regalism: How the British Empire Still Shapes Former Colonies” slug-data=”eastminster-and-vice-regalism-how-the-british-empire-still-shapes-former-colonies”>
Eastminster and Vice-Regalism: How the British Empire Still Shapes Former Colonies
Fair Observer Chair Claire Whitaker speaks with Dr. Lakshyaraj Singh Mewar, Prince of Udaipur — owner of the iconic Lake Palace, philanthropist, education advocate and Indian cultural ambassador. They explore how royal families like his remain relevant in a modern democratic India. Prince Lakshyaraj reflects on the nature of royalty as something one is born into, like one’s name, parents or cultural identity — not chosen, but deeply cherished. For him, relevance comes from continuity of service, a tradition his family has upheld for 1,500 years. Today, that legacy continues through active philanthropy that addresses enduring human needs.
The enduring bond between people and royalty
Love and respect for royalty remain strong in India, much like in the United Kingdom. Far from contradicting egalitarian values, Singh Mewar believes this bond strengthens them when the institution of royalty is used to serve the people. He shows this commitment through nine Guinness World Records, including the largest clothing donation and the largest distribution of educational supplies. His foundation, the Maharana Mewar Charitable Foundation, undertakes a wide range of projects: promoting girl child education, supporting war widows, preserving art and heritage and maintaining livelihoods in fading industries. At the heart of his work is a desire to keep “inspirational and aspirational value” alive in society.
A deep commitment to education
Education is a central pillar of Singh Mewar’s mission, though he wasn’t academically inclined in his early years. Today, he runs two schools under his foundation — launched by his grandfather and expanded by his father — and is now pursuing a PhD after completing his Master’s degree. He views education not merely as formal instruction but as a broader path to peace, well-being and global progress. His doctoral research focuses on how young children manage stress — a universal challenge that transcends national boundaries. He finds it troubling that children today spend more time on devices than in active, creative play.
Philanthropy rooted in responsibility, not privilege
As a modern royal, Singh Mewar embraces the responsibility to use his influence for good. He engages across platforms — government, schools, communities — to shape policy and encourage meaningful change. Real impact, he insists, comes from genuine involvement, not ticking boxes. For him, giving back is not a duty imposed by title but a moral responsibility rooted in gratitude toward one’s country, heritage and upbringing.
The Lake Palace: luxury, livelihoods and legacy
Claire and Singh Mewar also discuss the Lake Palace, a globally renowned symbol of beauty and luxury. Singh Mewar addresses the perceived tension between running such a lavish property and engaging in social service. He believes there is no contradiction: tourism, especially through landmarks like the Lake Palace, creates economic ripple effects that benefit entire communities. The hotel generates extensive employment and plays a pivotal role in placing Udaipur on the global map.
The Lake Palace has become synonymous with Udaipur. Today, nearly every household in Udaipur’s old city is connected to tourism in some way.
Looking to the future: India’s youth and the age of AI
Singh Mewar is strongly optimistic about India’s future. He celebrates the country’s youthful energy. With more than half its population under 35, India stands at the cusp of generational change. Singh Mewar sees this generation as bursting with ideas, creativity and conviction. India has tremendous potential in the age of AI, and he urges young people not just to “go through life,” but to “grow through life.”
Heritage and modernity are not opposites but allies, and the past can be a powerful foundation for building a brighter, more inclusive future.
[Lee Thompson-Kolar edited this piece.]
The views expressed in this article/video are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.
” post-content-short=” Fair Observer Chair Claire Whitaker speaks with Dr. Lakshyaraj Singh Mewar, Prince of Udaipur — owner of the iconic Lake Palace, philanthropist, education advocate and Indian cultural ambassador. They explore how royal families like his remain relevant in a modern democratic India. Prince…” post_summery=”In this episode of FO° Talks, Prince Lakshyaraj Singh Mewar of Udaipur shares how his royal heritage inspires a lifelong commitment to public service, philanthropy and education. From world record-breaking charity work to preserving heritage and promoting tourism, he sees tradition and progress as deeply linked. With faith in India’s youth, he champions meaningful involvement and optimistic, purpose-driven growth.” post-date=”Jul 04, 2025″ post-title=”FO° Talks: Meet Lakshyaraj Singh Mewar, Prince of Udaipur” slug-data=”fo-talks-meet-lakshyaraj-singh-mewar-prince-of-udaipur”>
FO° Talks: Meet Lakshyaraj Singh Mewar, Prince of Udaipur
Atul Singh and Glenn Carle delve into the complex and evolving power dynamics of the Middle East, particularly focusing on the roles of the United States, Israel and Iran, and the significant shifts observed since Hamas’s notorious attacks in Gaza on October 7, 2023. They provide a deep dive into the perspectives and objectives of each of these major players, the strategic implications of recent events and the potential long-term consequences for the region and beyond.
The speakers introduce the three primary actors: the US, Israel and Iran, framing the discussion around the American attack that occurred in the weeks preceding the conversation.
Israel’s perspective and objectives
The dominant political faction in Israel, led by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, is the right-wing, on whom Netanyahu’s political survival depends. Netanyahu is running a coalition government that includes hardline far-right figures like Minister of Finance Bezalel Smotrich and Minister of National Security Itamar Ben-Gvir. Netanyahu is keen to prolong his rule because he fears trial in court on corruption charges. Smotrich and Ben-Gvir have extreme objectives, including seizure and colonization of the West Bank and Gaza. This implies the expulsion of Palestinians and the destruction of the Iranian regime.
Israel assesses that Iran poses an existential threat because Tehran is developing a nuclear weapon. Israeli leaders deem this as “absolutely unacceptable,” because this would put “Israel’s and all Jews’ survival … on the brink of extermination.” Therefore, Israelis consider regime change in Iran to be fundamental and necessary to alter the current strategic equation. This task is believed to be beyond Israel’s sole capabilities — it requires US involvement.
Atul and Glenn highlight recent Israeli actions, including the decapitation of top Iranian leadership. This was a “spectacular special ops Mossad” operation and “one of the great intelligence operations in history.” Israelis also hit a number of Iranian nuclear and missile sites and claimed control of Iranian airspace. Despite Iranian counterclaims, the Israelis experienced far fewer casualties (an order of magnitude less) than they had anticipated, which led to a less pessimistic reality than their initial fears. This suggested Iranian counter strike capabilities were less powerful than feared. However, the economic dislocation for Israel has been immense.
There is a strong belief among Israelis that the Iranian regime is a “paper tiger,” which is utterly corrupt and infiltrated at all levels. Atul and Glenn cite the killing of the Palestinian leader of Hamas, Ismail Haniyeh, in a VIP guest house — equivalent to killing someone in Blair House that is next to the American White House — as evidence of the deep Israeli infiltration into the Iranian regime. This suggests that this regime, despite its outward appearance, is not as cohesive, effective or united as it was after the 1979 revolution.
For Netanyahu, the timing of the attack on Iran was crucial: “If not now, when? If not us, who?” He views himself as the “savior of Israel” and the “guarantor of Israeli security.” With Hamas weakened, Hezbollah’s top leadership dead and the Assad regime in Syria gone, Israelis perceive a significant opportunity to strike Iran. Netanyahu believes the Iranian proxies present minimal danger, giving Israel a historic opportunity to attack Iran.
The ultimate goal for Israelis is regime change in Iran. A new liberal, tolerant and friendly regime could potentially restore the pre-1979 amicable relationship between the two nations. Atul and Glenn believe that the 1979 revolution, which brought in a “crazy Islamic regime” based on Shia ideology, fanaticism and opposition to the US, was an unnecessary development. The US was manipulated by the UK in 1953 to conduct a coup against a democratically elected Mohammad Mossadegh. In 2025, some even believe the best course of action would be to eliminate Ayatollah Khamenei. Israelis think they can exert pressure and squeeze Iran due to its declining birth rate and persecution of Sunni minorities.
Atul and Glenn also explain the Begin Doctrine, which underpins Israeli national security. Per this doctrine, “none of Israel’s enemies or potential enemies should have or be able to have nuclear weapons.” Israel followed this doctrine to destroy an Iraqi nuclear reactor in 1981 and Syrian nuclear facilities in 2007. Note that Netanyahu attempted to apply this doctrine against Iran twice between 2009 and 2013.
Netanyahu champions a hardline national security strategy but not all of Israel supports it. Many Israeli politicians, as well as intelligence and special forces personnel, oppose Netanyahu and his right-wing allies. The former head of Shin Bet left after much controversy. Historically, a strong majority of the Israeli population has favored a two-state solution and a negotiated solution with Iran, but this group is not currently in power. Many Israeli politicians and security professionals view the far-right’s desire for regime change as “a bridge too far.”
The US perspective
The US intelligence community’s assessment, as presented by Director of National Intelligence Tulsi Gabbard, differs from Israel’s dominant view: Iran is not manufacturing or possessing a nuclear weapon, and Ayatollah Khamenei has not reauthorized its manufacture. However, Iran has been “secretly developing weapons-grade fissile material,” which has only one use: a nuclear weapon. Iran is estimated to be anywhere from “days,” as Israelis assert, to “a good number of months” away from manufacturing one.
US President Donald Trump faced a dilemma: He had vowed not to engage in “forever wars” (precluding an invasion) but also stated he would not allow Iran to develop a nuclear weapon. He ultimately aligned with the right-wing Israeli assessment that Iran’s capability to manufacture a weapon constituted an existential threat, irrespective of whether they currently possessed one. Faced with an “impossible dilemma,” Trump chose a minimalist attack on Iran’s nuclear capabilities and declared victory. He came to realize that regime change in Iran was not feasible and attempting it would make the interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq “look like a birthday party.”
Iran’s perspective and resilience
The Iranian regime’s top priority is survival. Many analysts view them as “not crazies at all” but “very subtle and astute,” repeatedly signaling a desire for a resolution short of open war. In response to the US attack, Iran informed the Qatari government (and thus the US) in advance of their planned response, which involved a one-off missile attack on America’s largest base in the Middle East — symbolizing a strike at the heart of the US presence — before stopping.
Despite Israeli beliefs, Iran is more cohesive than its enemies imagine. It has demonstrated an ability to survive chaos, notably during the eight-year war with Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein in the 1980s. Note that Western powers and the CIA backed Saddam. After the attacks, Iran could experience zeereh parcham — “rally to the flag” — and nationalism could make regime change far more difficult.
Atul and Glenn emphasize that Iran retains the potential to manufacture a nuclear weapon because “knowledge” cannot be killed, even if all involved scientists were assassinated. Iran is a “sophisticated society with millions of brilliant people who can study science.” They also note that Iran’s nuclear program was initiated by Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, not the mullahs. The Iranian moral police have reportedly “dialed down” because of protests. There is little likelihood of an imminent revolution. Significantly, 20% of Iran’s population still lives in villages and largely supports the current regime. The Iranians want “nuclear insurance.” They note that poorer neighboring Pakistan has managed to avoid foreign interference for all its faults because it has the nuclear weapon.
Note that the Iranian counter strike was not “painless for Israel.” It hit business districts and apartment buildings, causing immense economic strain.
Broader implications and strategic changes
Atul and Glenn highlight profound strategic and structural changes to the power dynamics in the Middle East since October 7, 2023. Israel’s “brilliant decimation” (more than decimation because that means a tenth) of Hezbollah and Hamas has forced them into a defensive posture. The Assad regime in Syria has fallen as well. Israel has achieved lasting structural change.
However, the deeper issue of Iran’s nuclear potential remains unaddressed. While the Iranian regime may be weakened and subject to collapse in the long run (“stable until the day it’s not,” “things last until they don’t”), it has survived to fight another day. If the mullahs fall, they are unlikely to be replaced by women protestors in the streets. Rather, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) might replace the mullahs unless the women can convince a section of the military to side with them.
The British, drawing on a longer historical memory, express skepticism about swift regime change. They recognize Iran’s “imperial memory” and argue the nation is more cohesive than its enemies imagine. The Brits also point out that killing top military officers, while providing short-term tactical advantage, might lead to their replacement by younger, more competent and potentially more aggressive higher-testosterone individuals (“proper nutters” who are happy to have bullets with their names on them).
The most recent conflict has broader implications:
- The US is now back in the Middle East, leading to lower attention and lesser support for Ukraine.
- China will have a freer hand in the Far East. It can now increase pressure on Taiwan’s sovereignty through more incursions into international and Taiwanese waters. The Chinese will shift the status quo of what is acceptable before military intervention.
- Pakistan will feel less constrained and controlled by the US, potentially leading to increased assertiveness against India and “fireworks by September.”
The current situation is a “fragile truce,” with both Israelis and Iranians believing there is “unfinished business.” While there may be no immediate large-scale flare-up, Iran will “lick its wounds” and strive to obtain nuclear weapons for “insurance” against foreign intervention and regime change.
The “most likely happy solution” from a Western perspective is proposed as an “Mohammed bin Salman (MBS) evolution,” where the Iranian regime evolves without collapsing. The current doctrinaire mullahs who are in their 70s and 80s are replaced by more educated and internationalist successors.
[Lee Thompson-Kolar edited this piece.]
The views expressed in this article/video are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.
” post-content-short=” Atul Singh and Glenn Carle delve into the complex and evolving power dynamics of the Middle East, particularly focusing on the roles of the United States, Israel and Iran, and the significant shifts observed since Hamas’s notorious attacks in Gaza on October 7, 2023. They provide a deep dive…” post_summery=”In this episode of FO° Exclusive, Fair Observer Founder Atul Singh and retired CIA Officer Glenn Carle explore post-October 7 Middle East power shifts, focusing on Israel’s push for regime change in Iran, US strategic recalibrations and Iran’s resilient nuclear ambitions. Israel’s right-wing government views Iran as an existential threat, while the US intelligence community remains cautious about the nuclear timeline. Despite internal pressures, Iran shows cohesion and calculated restraint, sustaining regional tension in a fragile, evolving balance.” post-date=”Jul 04, 2025″ post-title=”FO° Exclusive: What Will the Middle East Look Like if Iran’s Islamic Regime Falls?” slug-data=”fo-exclusive-what-will-the-middle-east-look-like-if-irans-islamic-regime-falls”>
FO° Exclusive: What Will the Middle East Look Like if Iran’s Islamic Regime Falls?
In this episode of FO° Talks Predata CEO Sanjay Mittal joins Fair Observer Chief Strategy Officer Peter Isackson to dive into what they call the DeepSeek revolution in AI. They argued that DeepSeek — an open-source model built on Meta’s Llama 3 — dominant proprietary systems from companies like OpenAI and Google. By achieving comparable performance with fewer resources, DeepSeek shows how necessity can drive smart, efficient innovation. Unlike closed models, DeepSeek invites scrutiny, thanks to its transparent design.
Mittal and Isackson highlighted how open-source AI can democratize the field. Developers and researchers can collaborate more freely, build faster, and better understand how these systems work—advantages that secretive models can’t offer.
They also explored “distillation,” a process that creates smaller, faster models fine-tuned for specific tasks. When paired with AI agents—tools that act autonomously—these streamlined models can power more practical and accessible real-world applications.
To close, they tackled deeper questions: Does AI truly “think,” or does it just mimic patterns? How should we interpret its growing efficiency and capability? And could we eventually build artificial general intelligence—machines that think and learn like humans? While they didn’t claim to have final answers, they made one point clear: the future of AI may depend as much on openness and shared effort as on raw computing power.
The views expressed in this article/video are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.
” post-content-short=” In this episode of FO° Talks Predata CEO Sanjay Mittal joins Fair Observer Chief Strategy Officer Peter Isackson to dive into what they call the DeepSeek revolution in AI. They argued that DeepSeek — an open-source model built on Meta’s Llama 3 — dominant proprietary systems from…” post_summery=”In this FO° Talks episode, Sanjay Mittal and Peter Isackson discuss DeepSeek, an open-source AI model built on Llama 3 that rivals proprietary systems. They highlight its transparency, efficiency, and potential to democratize innovation. The conversation also explores model distillation, AI agents, and whether AI can truly think.” post-date=”Jun 25, 2025″ post-title=”FO° Talks: Taking Stock of the DeepSeek Revolution, with Sanjay Mittal” slug-data=”fo-talks-taking-stock-of-the-deepseek-revolution-with-sanjay-mittal”>
FO° Talks: Taking Stock of the DeepSeek Revolution, with Sanjay Mittal
Atul Singh: Welcome to FO° Talks. With me is Casey Given, the executive director of Young Voices. He is an interesting chap who has started organizations and, indeed, is now running a platform that gives voice to young intellectuals who are finding their voice. Casey, welcome and thank you for your time.
Casey Given: Thanks. It’s so great to be here.
Atul Singh: Brilliant. So Casey, let’s talk about civil liberties and free speech. From your background, it seems you’ve always cared about these issues. What do you really mean by civil liberties and free speech?
Casey Given: Ooh, good question. Well, I think I would just go with the definition of at least my priors. I am what would be called a classical liberal or libertarian. So I’m really interested in free speech and civil liberties, really more in the sense of the individual liberty standpoint.
Atul Singh: Are you a John Stuart Mill sort of liberal?
Casey Given: Yes, exactly. So I would say that. But of course, as an American, the Bill of Rights, I think, is really the type of liberties that I seek to preserve and defend, especially through my organization as a vehicle.
Atul Singh: I see. And so, the Bill of Rights. So give us a little more meat, then. What do you see as the role of the state? Should the role of the state be minimal? Should the role of the state be limited to foreign policy and defense and perhaps running the Federal Reserve — or maybe not? Or should it extend to other areas, such as regulating the environment or providing welfare to those who have been left behind?
Casey Given: Yes, all good questions. We were just talking before the stream about my undergrad days at UC Berkeley, and I used to love getting into these size-of-the-state articles—
Atul Singh: Where I taught, by the way. You didn’t take my class. (Both laugh)
Casey Given: And we were both knocking it! I wish I had taken your class. But I used to get into arguments all the time with my fellow students about minarchy versus anarchy. And to some degree, as I get older, I’m less interested in that. I like to describe myself as a directional libertarian, in the sense that I think the size of the state should be directionally smaller. But that’s not—
Atul Singh: You’re not an absolutist anymore. Let’s say in the UK context, you’re not someone who’ll say, “Let’s get rid of the National Health Service.”
Casey Given: Exactly, yes, that’s a great example. Or in the American context, of course, things like Social Security, or — you specifically mentioned welfare. I think that overnight abolition is a ridiculous concept. But I think that there’s plenty of halfway measures to reform these programs that desperately need it.
DOGE and the case against tariffs
Atul Singh: Yeah. So I read your column in The Hill, and you had predicted that the Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE) would find it hard going in Washington. And the budget seems to have proved your point. And indeed, Elon Musk has talked about the big and beautiful bill and said it can either be big or beautiful — it can’t be both. Are you dissatisfied with the budget, which is going to increase trillions of dollars of government debt and boost the deficit?
Casey Given: Yes, absolutely I’m dissatisfied with it. I was a cautious optimist for Elon Musk’s Department of Government Efficiency. And now that he’s leaving, I still think it was a good faith effort. But the thing is, in many ways, he was getting all of the blame for the dysfunction, when I think there should be more blame exactly on Congress, which is an actual branch of government that has basically absolved itself of any responsibility and has given into the big government, wasteful spending, as seen in the budget. So I think it’s very disappointing. I think that conservatives in Congress aren’t actually being conservative. And that’s why I still firmly identify as a libertarian rather than a conservative or Republican, is that I think that we need to actually activate the branches and have smart governance.
Atul Singh: So let’s talk about what you would like to see. Would you like to see a cutting down of regulation for small business? Would you like to see a cutting down of, say, defense spending, Medicare, Medicaid or Social Security? Would you like to see an increase in taxes to balance the budget a little bit? What is it that you would like to see? And since you’ve said you’re a libertarian, where do you stand on tariffs?
Casey Given: Yes. Well, first, to return to DOGE, I think that a lot of the cuts that they made were directionally sensible. There’s just so much waste when it comes to the feeding off of the trough of pork-barrel spending when it comes to NGOs, where their mission is not exactly clear. Of course, that is a drop in the bucket, and I absolutely understand the points that critics have of DOGE — that the real wasteful spending, or at least statistically, the biggest areas of the federal budget are, of course, entitlements: Social Security, Medicare and defense spending on the discretionary side.
So to really tackle those, I would say that with defense spending, obviously, there needs to be a lot more auditing of the Department of Defense. I mean, it seems like regularly that they lose billions of dollars that they can’t account for, which is just completely unacceptable. And in terms of Medicare, with Social Security, I think that we need to raise the retirement age for the future. When it was created by FDR, 65 was well above the average lifespan. Now people are, fortunately, living so much longer. So I think it’s fair to raise the age of payout.
And Medicaid — I think that it’s really disappointing. I think that Elon, in a brief tweet, talked about a lot of fraud. I suspect that’s probably the biggest program where there’s a lot of wasteful spending, of people claiming to be disabled, etc., who actually aren’t. So I think there are ways to meaningfully save the budget. But again, as a directional libertarian, I think it’s not throw the baby out with the bathwater. I think that there needs to be halfway measures and more rational reform slowly.
Atul Singh: I mean, you’re making the case for a responsible right, really. What you’re doing is saying: Let us have sensible policies. And so talking about sensible policies, let me take you back to tariffs. Most people who are libertarians — indeed, going back to the original classical liberals — they stood for free trade. The Economist magazine began on the principle of free trade. And where do you stand on that? Because we are living in a very different era now, with industrial policy under Joe Biden and, before that, tariffs as an instrument of trade policy under Donald Trump 1 and Donald Trump 2.0.
Casey Given: Yes, this is the area where I would be the most critical of Donald Trump. I think that his tariff policy has been an absolute disaster. I think that it’s really, if anything, so far punishing our closest friends in terms of Canada, the EU, etc. And even if you believe in tariffs — this is something I often tell to my friends who are big Trump supporters — I think the way that he’s going about it is completely irrational, where he changes his mind every 24 hours. It’s like, if you’re going to set a policy, just by pure regime stability, is that markets will adjust if you just put the tax in place.
So I think that tariffs are destructive. I think the whole framing of a tariff deficit is completely twisted and not really what a state should try to pursue. Because, of course, trade is a mutual benefit. It goes back to Economics 101, which I won’t dare even have to bring up in front of an political economy professor, but I think it’s completely silly and destructive what the admin is doing. So I hope they’ll knock it off.
Free speech in Casey’s Berkeley days
Atul Singh: I see. So you have been libertarian, and you went to Berkeley, where you and I both spent time — you as a student, I as faculty — and I found Berkeley very ideological, very to the left. What was it like being a young libertarian in Berkeley — and, of course, even in George Washington University?
Casey Given: Yes, well, I should say also — I should probably reveal my age — that I’m 35. So I graduated in 2012, which I feel that in the scope of my life is not that far away — or doesn’t feel like it — but it really is, I think, a separate era of history, at least in the US. Of course, this was under the Obama years, but also in terms of campus attitudes towards free speech.
Greg Lukianoff and the Foundation for Individual Rights in Education really say that 2014 is when there was a new regime when it came to free speech and the growth of the administrative state in universities, etc., that kicked off the current wokeness age backed by law.
So I would say that I actually really enjoyed my time at UC Berkeley. It was certainly predominantly left when it comes to the average student body. But I would say even at that time, most of the people I encountered were very cordial. We had fun. I ran the college libertarian group, so we had debates with the College Republicans, with the Democrats, etc. It’s a top-tier school, maybe not in the humanities, but at least in STEM I would say—
Atul Singh: Oh, it’s one of the best in the world. I mean, for computer science, for physics, for so many disciplines, it is a school with Nobel Prize winners, cutting-edge research and really clever young people.
Casey Given: Yeah, and so I would say that most students were heads down, wanted to do the homework, and there was just a small faction of ideological, very lefty students that created trouble — which is often the case on college campuses.
Atul Singh: Got it. Now, the reason I asked you was whether your experience led you to run Young Voices, the organization you are supporting. You’re supporting young people of the right who are commenting on politics, policy, civil liberties, and I was wondering if your student experiences were formative or not in working on this?
Casey Given: Oh, absolutely. That is really where I solidified in my mind that I have a knack for leadership. I started the libertarian student group my sophomore year. And I also, in my senior year, became known on campus enough that I became the political columnist for the student newspaper, The Daily Californian, which really, I think, put me on my current trajectory, ultimately leading to my position as CEO of Young Voices. So in many ways, I’m living the fantasy that I had in my undergrad days of pursuing political commentary and running an organization like that full time.
Threading the needle between extremes
Atul Singh: So let me ask you a question: How do you thread the needle between the liberal establishment and the populist right? Because you clearly don’t fall into either camp. You very much, as you’ve said, want to be the responsible right. You are libertarian, but you’re directionally so. You’re not saying, “Let’s slash and burn, let’s throw the baby out with the bathwater.” So you’re in a tricky situation, Casey.
Casey Given: Yes, that is a very good question and one that I’ve thought about a lot. I feel like, in many ways, libertarians, at least of my ilk — I like the “responsible right” moniker, or “classical liberals” is probably what many of my peers call ourselves — really do try to walk a tightrope of not trying to throw out the liberal establishment, as you mentioned, but also not trying to be too radical, especially when it comes to populism or illiberalism or the national conservative economics, as they like to call themselves.
Atul Singh: The Steve Bannon approach that you need tariffs, you need economic nationalism, you need to bring jobs back for the working class, and a combination of immigration controls and tariffs will resuscitate the American working class.
Casey Given: Yes. So here’s how I thread the needle. I want to give both sides their due. I think that the Steve Bannon populist right has hit on something that I think is correct, in the sense that there has been widespread failure of institutions going back for decades now — failure to respond to security challenges, I mean even going back to 9/11, failed wars, the Covid pandemic, the 2008 financial crisis. We are living in an era — even down to everyday living, of crumbling infrastructure — where government institutions are failing, and people are feeling like they’re getting the short end of the stick. And I think that anger is justified in many ways.
However, I think that the way that it has manifested — especially with MAGA, of “we need to tear everything down” or “we need to punish our enemies” — that is ultimately a philosophy of destruction rather than a philosophy of building. And I think it’s very dangerous, again, to throw the baby out with the bathwater of trying to just completely destroy things or really express your anger rather than trying to actually reform.
So, I do respect people on the populist right who are trying to do a little more of the building. And I respect people on the left, too. Like, I’m very encouraged by trends on the left like the “abundance agenda,” who are really looking for more proactive good institution-building that involves markets. And I hope to see more of that on both sides — that solution-oriented, not just culture wars, destructive anger expressed in that way.
Young Voices’s funding, training and mission
Atul Singh: Alright, fair enough. Let me ask you a more pointed question: Who funds Young Voices, and how do you ensure editorial independence? We are a nonprofit, too, and we’ve had to fight really hard — and ours is a crowdsourced approach. So that’s why I ask this question, having gone through this myself.
Casey Given: Absolutely, that’s a question I get often. Young Voices — we are completely privately funded, 100%, from individuals, foundations and corporations. These are a mix of people who give anywhere from $1 to $100,000 or so. We have over 50 donors who give us above $5,000, I believe. So it’s a good mixture of people, and I think just having a diverse portfolio of supporters is a great way to keep ourselves independent and not be anyone’s toady, if you will.
But beyond the who question, we also have lots of practices in place. We have a code of ethics that’s on our website that specifically outlines our approach to editorial independence in the fact that no donor can ever influence or edit our drafts. And more so than that, actually, we’ve restricted the editorial independence of our writers as well. We allow our writers to more or less write whatever they like, so long as it is broadly within classical liberal principles. So we really take independence and ethics quite seriously.
Atul Singh: I see. Now, tell me: What exactly do you do in Young Voices, and how do you do it? We have an idea, but I’m very curious. Obviously, you have a number of people from the libertarian school or the classical liberal philosophy whom you’re schooling. How do you find them? What exactly do you do with them? And what is the vision?
Casey Given: Yes. Well, first of all, we’re a program that’s in high demand in the sense that what we do is offer editorial services, media training and placement services at absolutely no cost. That means we edit and pitch op-eds, we schedule radio and TV hits, we get people onto broadcast media, arrange in-person speaking events, etc., at no cost to the participant.
So just through the appeal of that offer, we get over 200 applications every year for our programs, of which we accept about half, or just under half. In terms of where we find our folks, we are trying to get better about actively recruiting because I think we’re more interested at this point in the quality of participants rather than the quantity of applicants.
And we find them from undergraduate groups that are classical liberal, libertarian, conservative groups — sourcing them — as well as probably the biggest area we’ve had success with, which is think tanks, both in DC, where we’re headquartered, but also across the country and in Europe, through networks like the Atlas Network or State Policy Network. We really try to find people who are getting their first roles, looking to build a career in the world of ideas and grow with us in that way.
Classical liberalism outlook: Europe and the US
Atul Singh: So let’s talk about Europe. Since you’ve mentioned Europe, you’re just back from Europe, we have a strong presence in Europe. In fact, part of our editing team is in Europe. Right from the outset, which countries are you focused on, and where are you finding classical liberals of great promise in Europe?
Casey Given: Yeah, so we are in about 20 countries across the continent. Of course, when I say that, I mean we’re working with individual writers in the country. So it’s not super institutional in that sense, but rather individual relationships. We have one employee based in the UK who does all of our editing and pitching across the continent.
But really from there, we’re not trying to put dots on a map, but rather work with people in the think tank and journalism world that we think are aligned with our values and are very excited to develop their careers in media.
Atul Singh: So no relationships with political parties yet in Europe? Not a single political party?
Casey Given: No. As a 501(c)(3), even in the United States, we don’t have any formal relationships with the Republican Party or the Libertarian Party or anything. We work purely with individuals.
Atul Singh: Purely with individuals. I see. The reason I asked is because in Europe, classical liberalism often means something different from what Americans mean. And often, the people you’d call liberals — liberals in Germany, for instance — are extremely free market. And liberals in the US are quite interventionist. Hence the question. And also, the change in the zeitgeist in Europe now is leading to a curious combination of populism, both on the left and the right, and classical liberalism is finding it hard to stay afloat.
Casey Given: Yes, it absolutely is. And I think that’s something that I hope to try to change. (Chuckles)
Atul Singh: I see.
Casey Given: And to answer a question that you didn’t ask, but I do think about this a lot: I do think it comes to that metaphor you used of threading the needle. You really have both sides: one, the left, that has the establishment, the neoliberal order; versus the right, which is increasingly more populist and aiming to destroy that order.
And so I think the middle ground is where classical liberals can really lean into and say that institutions are important. Elites are important — but they need to be held accountable. That’s really where I see at least my version of classical liberalism can do something. But I know that’s a message that is not really satisfying to one side completely.
Atul Singh: So let me ask you — since you have an employee in the UK, and I’m sure you go to the UK — and I, of course, lived and studied in the UK for a while. In fact, I’ve written a book chapter on Brexit, amongst other things, and I follow Britain very closely. Where do you see classical liberalism in the political landscape of Britain today?
Casey Given: Yes. I would say—
Atul Singh: This is the country that gave birth to the idea. It’s the land of John Stuart Mill, who, by the way, worked for the East India Company. And although he was very liberal, he did not advocate freedom for Indians, because he felt they were not in the majority of their faculties. (Laughs)
Casey Given: Wow, yeah. (Laughs)
Atul Singh: No turkey ever votes for Christmas. I suppose he didn’t want to lose his paymaster. (Laughs)
Casey Given: Exactly. He actually did the same for Catholics, too. I’m a Roman Catholic, so I would not, in his world, either have been granted—
Atul Singh: So both of us wouldn’t have had the vote. Women could have the vote, though, if they were Anglican and Protestant. (Both laugh) So he was progressive in many ways—
Casey Given: Exactly.
Atul Singh: But not too progressive. (Laughs)
Casey Given: Yeah. To answer your question, I do go to the UK at least once a year. It seems like at least politically, in the parties, it’s very difficult. I mean, I would say that, of course, historically the Conservatives — the Tories — have been the party that embraced more classical liberal ideas. With the current wipeout they had recently, it seems like their stock is really on the decline.
Atul Singh: Yeah. Rishi Sunak — he did the same degree as me. He did Philosophy, Politics and Economics as well. And he was, I think, two or three years my senior. And shall we say, he was very efficient, very clever, very hardworking, very good at time management. But he has the charisma of a dead mouse (laughs) and the convictions of a middle manager in Goldman Sachs. (Laughs)
Casey Given: Yeah, absolutely.
Atul Singh: That does not fly in electoral politics.
Casey Given: And I actually was in London in February for the ARC Conference, the Alliance of Responsible Citizenship. So I heard there was a lunch with — I always mispronounce her name. Is it Kemi, Kemli?
Atul Singh: Kemi Badenoch.
Casey Given: Kemi, yes. So I heard her give a speech. And it certainly seems like there’s more energy — she seems to at least be an improvement on Rishi. But it seems like all the Brits in the room afterwards were really not very happy with her.
Atul Singh: Well, she is very weak right now and is unlikely to stay in the job for long. So you don’t see very many people in that space. What about the US? What’s your great shining light for the US?
Casey Given: Yes, for the US, I would say that there’s really not too many classical liberal, libertarian voices in government either. I think, of course, the closest we have is like Rand Paul or Thomas Massie or whatnot. So I think it’s a little bleak right now politically. But I think the great thing about the US — the hope — is that we have so many nonprofits like Young Voices, but so many other think tanks like the Cato Institute, Reason magazine, Mercatus Center, the Atlas Network, etc. There are hundreds and hundreds of them that, I think, we have strong civil society NGOs in the US that, hopefully, if we’re doing our job well, the stock of classical liberalism will be on the rise.
Just to return to the UK really quickly, I think that’s the problem, that there’s not as strong of a nonprofit/NGO sphere for classical liberals there. Although I do think the one hope I would see is exactly that conference I just mentioned: ARC, the Alliance of Responsible Citizenship, which was explicitly classical liberal and had over 4,000 attendees. It was at the Expo Center in East London. So I think that there is hope. That would be, hopefully, the long-term hope in the UK — building more of that civil society, nonprofit sphere that will hopefully eventually manifest itself in politics.
And I would say in the US, hopefully — I think the libertarian, classical liberal movement is perhaps a few decades ahead in terms of at least the strength and the quantity. But I absolutely understand the frustration — especially donors might have — that we need to start racking up wins, especially when it comes to the political sphere.
Atul Singh: Excellent, Casey. Thank you very much for your time. We’ll have you back, and we will continue to publish Young Voices that you send our way. Good luck. You have your job cut out.
It is certainly living up to the Chinese proverb — or Chinese curse — “May you live in interesting times.” So you have your work cut out in interesting times.
Casey Given: Thank you so much. I really enjoyed this chat.
Atul Singh: Thank you.
[Lee Thompson-Kolar edited this piece.]
The views expressed in this article/video are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.
” post-content-short=” Atul Singh: Welcome to FO° Talks. With me is Casey Given, the executive director of Young Voices. He is an interesting chap who has started organizations and, indeed, is now running a platform that gives voice to young intellectuals who are finding their voice. Casey, welcome and thank you for…” post_summery=”Fair Observer Editor-in-Chief Atul Singh speaks with Casey Given, executive director of Young Voices, about civil liberties, responsible libertarianism and the challenges of threading a path between the liberal establishment and populist politics. Casey critiques big government spending, tariffs and institutional decay while advocating for classical liberal reform. He also reflects on his experience at UC Berkeley and building a global network of young public intellectuals.” post-date=”Jun 20, 2025″ post-title=”FO° Talks: The Case for a Responsible Right in the US” slug-data=”fo-talks-the-case-for-a-responsible-right-in-the-us”>
FO° Talks: The Case for a Responsible Right in the US
[This is the fourth part of an ongoing series. To read more, see Parts 1, 2 and 3 here.]
Peter Isackson: Welcome to FO° Talks. I’m Peter Isackson, Fair Observer’s Chief Strategy Officer. It’s my great pleasure to welcome back the talented opera and theater director Emily Hehl for this, our fourth edition of a series of conversations we’ve labeled The Culture of Culture. We’ve been focusing on how people produce and consume music, theater and all forms of storytelling. But we’ll begin by considering the relationship between music and, I would say, the sacred, which I think is basic to every culture on Earth. Music, as far as we can trace it back in different cultures, is always related in some sense to the perception of the divine, the celestial.
In the theoretical tradition that dates back to Boethius at least, you had something called the music of the spheres. So there was an idea that there was some essential harmony in the universe that was inaudible to humans, but which they could begin to express in their own attempts to do music, either in a sacred setting or in a secular setting. But I think in both cases, there was this idea of the divine, the celestial, universal, cosmic harmony.
Is that how you see it, Emily?
Emily Hehl: Honestly, until you mentioned that term, I had never really heard about it. But it’s a beautiful idea, and it makes sense that human nature starts looking for music in whatever is out there in the universe.
Peter Isackson: That goes back to Pythagoras, because he promoted music as an illustration of the fundamental mathematical principles that govern the universe and constitute something that really looks like a miracle. So we’re really in the domain of the sacred.
But I will insist — my specialty was late medieval or more Renaissance literature, and music of the spheres is a theme that comes back all the time. It’s something that’s in the mind of every writer, every musician. And what’s interesting about it is that they know it’s impossible to hear it. So it’s something that exists and which is perfect, and it was illustrated in that poem I mentioned the last time by Campion. So it’s something you can’t hear but you know exists, and then it becomes something you can aspire to.
Emily Hehl: Yeah, it’s beautiful. And it’s beautiful to see how fundamentally music was always involved even in science and next to the really fundamental columns of life and of science — to see that music was a part of that. I think it’s interesting to look back to Pythagoras and all these people, and then to see where we are with music today, and how we would maybe describe how existential music would be for us. I think it’s interesting to see the different weights shifted on that question.
Peter Isackson: That could lead to an interesting discussion. I won’t take it up now, but it might come back later.
Passion Plays and theatrical liturgy
Peter Isackson: And that — going back to Passion Plays and Bach’s Passions and all that — comes, in some sense, from the fact that during the Middle Ages, music was part of the quadrivium, which was part of the seven liberal arts. So it was essential in schooling, in education — it was an essential ingredient of education. I don’t think it is today.
Emily Hehl: And there’s even discussions, especially in Germany, going, is music education in school even necessary? Is it necessary that children think in school?
Peter Isackson: Yeah. That’s tragic, as far as I’m concerned.
Emily Hehl: Yeah, it really is. But as you say, back then in the Middle Ages, it was absolutely fundamental. And I think to come a little bit to the question we’re arriving at — okay, we’re both not experts in religion, at least I am not — but I think it’s interesting to see what is left today, and that is, of course, the age in music, and both of these have some trace in that medieval Easter time. We have the mystery plays, the Passions, which both developed in theater and in music. Both of these derived from liturgy.
And it’s interesting, because when I was in my studies, there was one theory that there was no theater in the Middle Ages because there were no records of theater. But it’s proven that that is actually wrong. And there are these Passion plays which are so known and are being retraced until this very day in different, contemporary art and performance forms.
Peter Isackson: Well, in the Middle Ages there was a tradition of theater. And you’re right, it was basically neglected because it didn’t resemble either classic Greek or Roman theater, or, obviously, Elizabethan and later forms of theater in Europe. But you had the miracle plays. You mentioned the mystery plays. And “mystery” actually meant “trade.” It wasn’t about mysteries. They weren’t mystery stories, and it wasn’t about the mysteries of the universe. And there were morality plays.
So the mystery plays — because mestier or métier was the guild that put on these plays. I don’t know that much about what the content of those plays was, but it was a vibrant tradition in the towns, because the guilds would do it, and it was a form of entertainment that contained lots of interesting ideas, I think, and which led to the emergence of theater in European countries basically in the 16th century.
Emily Hehl: Yes, absolutely, yeah. I’m currently reading a book, Till, about Till Eulenspiegel. He also derives from exactly that culture — the fools and so far and so on — like these traveling people. That’s really different from the Passions we’re now talking about regarding Easter. Because it’s interesting that the liturgy itself had so much theatrical potential that it developed some kind of a play within liturgy, and was then put outside of liturgy at some point, eventually.
And there was this very interesting form of simultaneous stages. That’s how they performed these plays. When it reached its biggest form, it had these simultaneous stages. So the audience would travel. It’s not that, okay, you have one set, and the set design would change, and we switch the places. It would be simultaneous stages where things happen in parallel, and the audience would travel. And I think if you then again look at contemporary kinds of compositions or contemporary theater forms, there are actually a lot of interesting correlations happening there with simultaneity.
Disappearing performers and sacred soundscapes
Peter Isackson: Absolutely. If you do the classic analysis of the development of European music after the fall of the Roman Empire, it was liturgical. You had the Ambrosian and then the Gregorian chant, which was a monody, and then that became progressively more complex around the 12th, 13th century. Polyphony came on, and so on.
But what’s interesting about that is that it was meant to be purely liturgical. Up to that point, it was purely a part of religious ritual. So it took place in churches, and it was a way of demonstrating or giving performative life to the ideas and the texts — obviously in Latin, which people probably couldn’t understand — but they could understand the drama of it. And that’s when the Passion plays or the mystery plays were in the vernacular. So that was for the people outside of the church, and adapted to their local culture.
And then when all that starts building and becoming more complex, what happens is that — one of the things that intrigues me is how the only musical instrument that accompanied the church music we’re talking about was the organ, which is an incredible instrument.
Emily Hehl: It is.
Peter Isackson: It contains the fullest range of sound one can imagine. So it gives an idea — maybe somewhere in people’s minds — that this could contain the music of the spheres. I don’t know, but…
Emily Hehl: Yeah, but I’m not sure if we talked about it — sorry — like just the organ, because it’s something that comes back to me again and again when we talk about the presence of a musician. If you have a cellist, the musician is very, very present in front, behind the cello. Whereas the organ is usually constructed in a way that you cannot see the person who is playing. It makes it something very magical. I’m not sure if that’s the right word for it.
Peter Isackson: And the organ is always up exactly in the heavens, really, on its way to the heavens, yeah.
Emily Hehl: Yeah. And that very detail — that the organist is meant to disappear inside the sound and behind the instrument — is something that is basically carried until today, very often in classical music concerts, because there’s still a kind of school where musicians are taught to basically disappear behind their instrument, to not be present with their body. Although I see them, you very often see musicians perform brilliantly, but you don’t really perceive them as a person, because they’re trying to put all they have into the music and the instrument.
And then there is the other approach to classical music, where the performer — the musician, himself or herself — is trying to be very present, because this person is absolutely necessary and a part of creating the music. But so I think what you described with this organ is already a big point, if we look back to it.
Peter Isackson: And it’s interesting that it was only, I think, in the 16th century that you started having other musical instruments associated with composition, especially the Venetians — Gabrieli and Monteverdi. And they added instruments — secular, let’s call them secular instruments — to the sacred chorale, and that changed everything.
I think about that, because when you listen to the Passion of St. Matthew, you realize it’s not just a choral work, it’s a total instrumental work with solos and just a wonderful, incredible variety of musical creation. And there, because you go from instrument to instrument… I don’t know how it’s done visually. I don’t know if you’ve ever worked on the mise en scène of a Passion, but that must be an interesting thing to do for someone like yourself.
Emily Hehl: It is.
Body, voice and dual identity on stage
Peter Isackson: How do you get these people to perform and to be seen in the performance, or to play their role or emerge as a role player in it? Because they do represent the characters of the Passion as well.
Emily Hehl: Exactly. I think you’re hitting a very, very interesting spot there, because the Passions and other forms — also oratorios, or these kinds of forms, which are in themselves a concert, purely musical — but through the musical form already evoke theater. One of our first conversations was talking about the classical music concert and where this could evolve. And I think these musical forms are exactly between a concert and an opera. I would say it’s in between.
Like, for example, the Matthew Passion by Bach — he composed, if I’m not completely mistaken, a work that is meant for three orchestras. It’s three different instrumental groups. And I experienced a staging, if you can call it so, of this very Passion in Berlin at Deutsche Oper. And what they actually ended up doing was putting the third part of the orchestra really in the back of the audience, so that you really experience a three-dimensional sound.
Peter Isackson: Wow.
Emily Hehl: And then the staging went a step further, where there was a group of children representing, again, the story, and the singers were just the narrators. But I think there’s this in-between thing where the singer is, on the one hand, just narrating — being that very private person telling a story — and at the same time turning into the character he or she is narrating about. And if this doesn’t happen in full costume, but just in whatever they would perform it in a church as well, you are in a very interesting, liminal space that could be called the performative, where it’s exactly about presentation and representation.
And this is a very, very thin line that is so interesting, because if I sit in an audience, what I’m worried about is if someone on a stage falls over. I’m worried for that person in private — not for the character. I don’t care about Hamlet. I’m worried about the actor, that he would hit his nose or something. So that’s a moment of compassion, of feeling with this person.
But at the same time, that’s the beautiful thing about acting and also singing. A painter has something to paint on, and you can hang it on a wall, and the painter doesn’t need his body for this painting to exist on a wall. Whereas in the art of live theater and singing, every artist needs his or her body and voice in order to become the artwork. But therefore, there’s always a private body left in there. Like, if for example — I don’t know — I have a problem with my foot, these kinds of things will merge into the character. And if the staging is done in the right way, it will always be possible for an audience to feel both.
Space, atmosphere and immersive ritual
Emily Hehl: And that’s the interesting point where my perception in the audience switches from one to the other, because I perceive myself as a perceiving person. And that’s when a sort of meta level also comes in, and that’s where performativity and so on start. It’s a completely new chapter, but it’s also the base of any kind of ritual and religious ritual — when I drink a sip of wine in liturgy, we know what it is, but we also know what it’s meant to be or what the symbol of it is. And this liminal sphere is a very interesting one.
Peter Isackson: Well, that’s something we’ve lost, I think, to some extent in our attempt to understand what all these performances are about. Because we’ve divided — I think our culture, modern culture has divided us very much inconsistently with the, I would say, philosophy of the consumer society: You’re either a producer or a consumer. And the producer produces for the consumer, and the consumer consumes for the benefit of the producer. And this idea of playing different roles or identifying with different roles, which may have been the norm…
Even with Shakespeare in theater, the fact that the stage was a proscenium going into the public, and the public was the lower-class public, surrounded the scene — the proscenium — and they could see the actors from different angles—
Emily Hehl: Absolutely.
Peter Isackson: —which you cannot do once you’ve got the proscenium arch that sets everything back. And you could say that gave people the idea of cinema and television. But theater was, back in the Middle Ages, all taking place outside — in the street or in a park or somewhere, in some natural environment that wasn’t designed for performance.
Emily Hehl: Yes. I think we could have a whole conversation about the proscenium and the fourth wall. Maybe it’s a term for some of our listeners — the idea that the sphere on stage is a completely separated sphere from what the audience is, there is no connection. Whereas what we have just talked about — the whole performativity aspect — but also concerts, it is one sphere.
And interestingly enough, concert spaces are very often designed in a round way, where the audience is even sitting behind the orchestra — like the Berlin Philharmonic, for example. And also what you said about Shakespeare — even in Shakespeare’s texts, he has these meta reflections on the space itself. After a theater play, there would be some kind of animal fights. There are several references to that. Or the fact that Macbeth is set two-thirds at night, but they were playing at daylight because there was no electricity — these kinds of things. If you really look back, the origins of theater in that sense… the actors were present as actors, and at the same time they were representing something, but they were present as who they are. And this gives them massive liberty, because there are direct jokes possible, or interaction.
And then on the other side, you have the more Russian acting school, where the best actor is the actor who disappears completely behind the role. Where you have, for example, Macbeth, but you cannot perceive who the actor is. But of course, you need the actor to impersonate Macbeth. And then there is the form where you can see both almost equally, or where it’s switching.
Peter Isackson: If you go back to Greek theater, of course, it was masked. You never saw the faces of the characters. So it was played by the cast. I don’t know what that means in terms of creative performance, but I also believe it was very close to chanted text rather than just spoken text. I can’t remember what I learned about Greek theater, but what that means is that, depending on where you are in time and place, you’re going to have different ideas of how to represent something which people are inevitably — that’s the whole point of art — going to identify with.
If you’re creating art, and if you’re performing art, you’re working on at least emotional identification taking place between the performers and the audience. Aristotle talked about catharsis and all that — the fact that it wasn’t just seeing something interesting that was intellectually stimulating. It was about actually being transformed emotionally by the experience.
We can’t draw any conclusions about the way to do it, because what we can see is that each culture and each period of history has found different ways of doing it, and probably different varieties of ways each time.
Emily Hehl: Yeah. And I think also what you say, like the whole thing you’re describing now is also part of these performance studies. Because it’s different if I perform a Passion in a church or in an orchestra concert hall or something. And also, like what I just talked about with the body — the body is just one factor that contributes to the so-called atmosphere that we experience.
And that’s something that was, I think, fundamental in the Middle Ages. And that’s something that is maybe, again, connected to the spheric or the holy, or these kinds of terms we’ve been using, is that the atmosphere of a church is different than that of a concert hall. If I experience something with candlelight, it will be different than a very bright LED top light. If there is the smell of something in church, this influences how I perceive something. If I sit very close, I can eventually feel the breath and the sweat of someone. Whereas if I’m very, very lonely, seated in a concert hall, that’s a different kind of experience. And concert halls were created in order to delete all of these sensual experiences — to concentrate on nothing but just the hearing.
But I think we’re in a time period where a lot of things have been designed to ban the senses from what we experience. And at the same time, if we look back in culture, we were so much connected to rituals and the sensual experiences of all these kinds of arts or art forms. And therefore, I’m not very surprised that there are more and more theater forms — forms of listening to music — coming back that actually think about the kind of atmosphere we’re listening with or listening in.
But it also forces us to step back from our human podium, saying we’re the ones defining everything. No, the church itself is contributing to the concert as much as the violinist is. The concert hall is an existing… it’s not a person, but it’s an agent, in a way. There’s power through that. The chair I’m sitting on is defining the way I’m experiencing a concert, up to a certain part. And I think to switch perspective in that sense — to a more, what Bruno Latour and all these philosophers have with network theory — just accepting the fact that the human is not the very first and only contributing factor to life experiences, but everything around us — my neighbor, the space, the smell, the temperature — all of this is contributing to it. And then we are already, again, in something spheric, one might say. Yeah.
Peter Isackson: Your remark about sitting on a chair made me think of a question to ask you: As someone who directs and organizes and sets up and stages operas and concerts, is there any concern on your part about how people are going to be seated?
Emily Hehl: Yes. Absolutely. Sometimes you can’t change it. Depending on the opera house you’re working in, you just sit in the chair. You’re like, “Oh, that’s a nice one!” or “Oof, it’s very uncomfortable!” There’s nothing you can really change about it sometimes. But then, if I sometimes do — for example, I did the Church Parables of Benjamin Britten, which are meant to be happening in a church — and at that very moment, if you go in smaller churches, you can even sometimes arrange the wooden benches. You know that people will not be sitting very comfortably, but you can already define the space.
And now I have two projects coming up where we’re very actively eliminating the orchestra from the pit to another space in order to get the audience closer. And I’m currently working on a concept for La Bohème by Puccini. And our main question is — because it’s on the one hand a bohemian story, but also it’s a story about suffering and a lot of very bad things. How close can you actually sit and experience that story?
Because with La Bohème, if it happens in a proscenium back there, we think, “Oh yeah, people are freezing, people are suffering, right?” We’re looking at it, we’re enjoying the beautiful music. But if it’s very, very close to me — happening inside our society — it’s a very, very different narration. So I think the placement of the audience is one of the most crucial questions to ask before even thinking about any kind of different design.
Reimagining opera for today’s audiences
Peter Isackson: That is a question that you can ask today as you’re preparing a production. But 50 years ago, 100 years ago, did people think about these things? Or were they just saying to themselves, “Well, the theater is… there’s some standard idea about what a theater is and how people are seated, and that is not our problem, because we’re working on the music and the drama?” Is that something new? Is this something that we can do now because of our control of technology, which we didn’t think we could do? I’m asking you a historical question you may not be able to answer.
Emily Hehl: I’m not sure if I can fully answer that, but I think for a long time, of course, people were intentionally building the theater and concert halls we’re now still performing in very intentionally, because they wanted the fourth wall, they wanted the proscenium. Wagner built his whole thing in Bayreuth in order to not see the orchestra. But it’s a whole idea from, let’s say, the mid-19th century, when all of these institutions were designed.
But I think also in the last maybe 50 years, or let it be 30 or 40, as this is not the kind of experience that our normal life is still mirroring, because we’re not in that time anymore — and these kinds of spaces seem to fall out of time, one could say — directors or conductors or whoever is in charge of designing the listening experience, also with the beginning of performance theory and so far and so on, people are indeed reconsidering the perceiving experience of an audience. So I think it’s a newer thing to consider — but actually a very, very old thing we’re going back to. I don’t think we’re inventing anything here.
Peter Isackson: No. I think probably, if you think about the design of theaters — especially concert halls and opera venues — the Italian theater, which I think was made for opera, right? It was used for drama afterward, which had different stages, different levels. That was an incredible innovation, and it’s a clear case of taking into account the needs of the audience and the perception of the audience.
Emily Hehl: Absolutely. And then also, once we had the buildings, pieces were composed for that very setting. So because we’re mainly playing there — honestly, we play mainly the repertoire of the last 200 years of opera. And these pieces were composed for that very setting — where an audience is here, there’s the orchestra, and there’s the stage. So you can’t just rip apart these kinds of things into settings, which Bach was using already for his Passions, for example.
And therefore, if we go back into Baroque music, it gives us a lot more possibilities to rearrange spaces — as, again, contemporary music does. But in between, there is a block of repertoire which is rather challenging to set in a different way. I’m trying anyway. Other people are trying, too. We’re failing as well, and people are complaining, “But I just want to see it as it’s meant to be!” and I understand that. (Both laugh)
But I think there is a big desire in our society, nevertheless, to experience things with our full senses and full bodies — and not just with a brain that is disconnected from the rest. And yeah, some pieces, like Passions, have that in their DNA, one could say. And so do contemporary compositions, which are actually about spherical kinds of sounds or even electronic things which are meant to a Dolby surround sound, which are more like in a church, and in these kinds of things. There are new forms, new compositions coming back.
Peter Isackson: Okay, well, we’ve gone a long way from the music of the spheres and the sacred origins of music to the practical problems of sitting, watching, listening and identifying with and relating to the performers. But we’ll have to stop there. We’ve exhausted our allotted time. So thank you, Emily, and we’ll be back for more in about three weeks’ time, I think.
Emily Hehl: Yes. Thank you, Peter.
Peter Isackson: Bye, Emily.
Emily Hehl: Bye-bye.
[Lee Thompson-Kolar edited this piece.]
The views expressed in this article/video are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.
” post-content-short=” Peter Isackson: Welcome to FO° Talks. I’m Peter Isackson, Fair Observer’s Chief Strategy Officer. It’s my great pleasure to welcome back the talented opera and theater director Emily Hehl for this,…” post_summery=”Fair Observer Chief Strategy Officer Peter Isackson and opera and theater director Emily Hehl explore the sacred origins of music, its historical ties to religious ritual and its evolution into contemporary performance. They examine how spatial, sensory and architectural elements influence audience perception and emotional engagement. This discussion bridges medieval Passions, Baroque innovations and modern questions of performativity and presence.” post-date=”Jun 15, 2025″ post-title=”FO° Talks: The Culture of Culture, Part 4: The Sacred Origins of Music” slug-data=”fo-talks-the-culture-of-culture-part-4-the-sacred-origins-of-music”>
FO° Talks: The Culture of Culture, Part 4: The Sacred Origins of Music
Atul Singh: Welcome to FO° Talks. With me is an old and dear friend, General BK Sharma. General BK Sharma is the Director of the United Service Institution, the oldest defense think tank in India. He is a soldier and a scholar who has extraordinarily rich experience in field commands, in diplomacy and in the world of letters taught in original scholarship. It’s really an honor to have you, General. Thank you for your time.
General BK Sharma: Thank you, Atul-ji. As always, good to be with you, and my greetings to your viewers.
Atul Singh: Thank you, sir. Now, today we’ll be discussing something extremely important. What does this latest conflict mean? What is The New Strategic Landscape in India–Pakistan Relations? And today, we have a top man from India, a man who is in New Delhi, to explain to us what this all means.
So, General Sharma, explain to us what happened in the Islamist terrorist attack in Pahalgam. And for those of you listening, Pahalgam is a tourist site in Kashmir, and Kashmir is a part of Jammu and Kashmir. And General Sharma actually comes from that part of the world and has a lot of experience in that part of the world, and so he’ll explain to us: A) what happened in the Islamist terrorist attack in Pahalgam, and B) why India blamed Pakistan for this attack. Over to you, sir.
General BK Sharma: Thank you very much, Atul-ji. At the outset, it was a heinous act of terrorism. At Pahalgam, it happened on April 22. It was actually a targeted killing against the Hindu community, in which 26 innocent male members were killed in front of ladies and children after asserting their religious identity. Now, why did this killing—
Atul Singh: One of them was Christian, just so that our viewers know.
General BK Sharma: Yeah, yeah. But…
Atul Singh: It wasn’t just Hindus. One of them was a Christian, and he said he wasn’t a Hindu and still he was killed.
General BK Sharma: So for them, anybody who’s not an adherent of their religion is actually a kafir, or non-believer. So why did this act of terrorism take place at that juncture? We have to go a little bit into post-abrogation of Article 370, which had accorded a special status to the state of Jammu and Kashmir. And post—
Atul Singh: For our viewers, they must remember that this happened in 2019, if I remember correctly.
General BK Sharma: August 5, 2019. And post-that, there was a total, I would say, normalcy in Kashmir. Though there was a little bit of resentment and alienation, there was no loss of human life. And slowly, the Kashmir Valley started limping to normalcy. And last year, there was a major election in the state in which the voter turnout was 64% — unprecedented. And past that, there was a lot of tourist movement to that area. Nearly 3.5 million tourists visited last year, and it also gave a boost to the local economy, and there was overall peace and prosperity.
Now, this was an eyesore for Pakistan, and they could not see Jammu and Kashmir coming back to normalcy. And that is how this act of terrorism was planned. One is to disrupt what is going on there, and second was to engineer clashes between the majority community and minority community. And this was the reason. And the confession of this heinous act was taken by the Resistance Front, which is an offshoot of Lashkar-e-Taiba, and that is how all fingers pointed towards Pakistan.
Lashkar-e-Taiba and Asim Munir’s role
Atul Singh: Very quickly, General, can you explain what Lashkar-e-Taiba is to many of our viewers worldwide? We, of course, in the Indian subcontinent — both in India and Pakistan and even places like Bangladesh and Nepal — are well aware of Lashkar-e-Taiba, but people elsewhere are not. So please give some color on that.
General BK Sharma: Lashkar means “army,” and Taiba means “pure” — it’s an army of God, which is a protégé of ISI, and they have been very active in cross-border terrorism.
Atul Singh: ISI is Inter-Services Intelligence. That’s…
General BK Sharma: Yes, that is the Pakistani intelligence agency. And they’ve also used the Lashkar-e-Taiba against Afghanistan and against India. And there’s a beautiful book which is written by Professor Christine Fair on Lashkar-e-Taiba. Your readers could get hold of that book and read.
Atul Singh: Yeah, Christine has written a good book. And Christine is here, I believe, in Georgetown.
General BK Sharma: Yeah. So then, from our past mapping and the present indicators, all fingers were pointing towards Pakistan. And therefore, it was time for India to take some punitive action against the perpetrators of this act of terrorism. And that is how Operation Sindhur was launched. Sindhur means “vermilion” in English. And that is the red dot that Hindu married ladies…
Atul Singh: That’s the vermilion in the parting of the hair that—
General BK Sharma: …put on their head. And since most of these ladies — about 25 of them — were widowed, it was a very sentimental buzzword which was given to this operation and which echoed with the sentiment of the people. This was some kind of a revenge against the loss of their husbands and things like that.
Atul Singh: I see. So that explains two things. That explains why Pakistan potentially did it, and why it had the incentives to do it, and why India blamed Pakistan. Now, let’s talk about the role of the then-General and now Field Marshal, Sayed Asim Munir Ahmad Shah, who is the Chief of Army Staff of Pakistan. In reality, the man who really runs Pakistan. And he’s a man with troops in Jalandhar. He’s the son of a teacher who was also an imam and the winner of the Sword of Honour in the Officers Training School, Mangla. So, he seems to be quite an ideological character. He was also head of ISI, and seems to be, in some ways, a high-flying officer. So, what do you think is his role, and what does this mean for the future?
General BK Sharma: See, if you study the profile of General Asim Munir, now Field Marshal, he’s been a very orthodox person right from his beginning. For example, when he was in Saudi Arabia on a diplomatic assignment, he did hifz of the Quran, which means memorizing the Quran by heart. And vis-à-vis many other top military officers of the Pakistan Army, he is not Western educated. Mostly, he has done some courses of instruction in Malaysia, Japan, but he has never been on the other side of the Atlantic Ocean. And right from the beginning, he has exhibited very orthodox and extremist tendencies and has been a hardliner vis-à-vis India, be it in his appointment as Director General of Military Intelligence or Director General of ISI.
In fact, when Pulwama had happened — that terrorist attack in 2019 when India had launched Operation Balakot — that time, he was DG ISI. He’s also been a political general. The rift that he had with Imran Khan, and he was the person responsible for putting him behind bars and virtually decimating Pakistan’s Tehreek-e-Insaf movement.
Atul Singh: That’s the movement overall led by Imran Khan, and it is the strongest political force in Pakistan today. But the elections have been manipulated by the military, and they have brought back members of the old political dynasties into power. And so Asim Munir, what General Sharma is saying, is a key architect of that new interference. In some ways, then, he reminds me of General Zia-ul-Haq, sir.
General BK Sharma: Yeah. So, what happened is that, since he had orchestrated the fall of Imran Khan, there was so much resentment against him. I am told by some of my friends that before this operation happened, the Pakistan military was very shy — even their personnel were very shy of going in uniform to public places, because there was very strong sentiment against them. Now, this guy made three important speeches invoking the Two-Nation Theory. One he made in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa area when he was addressing a loya jirga — that is the assembly of elders. When he talked about the Two-Nation Theory, which means that Hindus and Muslims are two different people, two different cultures, customs, traditions and aspirations, and therefore they cannot coexist. And this message of the Two-Nation Theory should be taken to the future generation.
He again repeated this speech on April 16 this year at Islamabad, while addressing Pakistani diaspora members. And thereafter, in a few days — just about ten days after that — the Pahalgam attack happened. And it was a copybook of what he had said: segregation of Hindus from other tourists there. And that is how that killing took place. Even after that killing on April 22, on April 26, he made another speech at Pakistan’s Military Academy at the time of passing out. Again, he reiterated the Two-Nation Theory and urged the passing-out Pakistani military candidates to fight or to wage jihad against infidels.
So, if you put everything together, and the way this act was committed by them, all fingers were pointing towards Pakistan. Though there are many people who say in a very gullible manner that India had no evidence and they should have only taken this action only after some evidence was shown to the world community. But well, did the United States of America show any evidence to anybody? For that matter, when they attacked the Indian Parliament in 2001, later on the Bombay terrorist attacks took place in 2008, and then there have been a series of attacks in which Pakistan’s complicity has been established beyond any doubt. That was the reason — based on the history of Pakistan and the acceptance by the Resistance Front — that India was left with but a Hobson’s choice to take some punitive action against Pakistan, because the very mother of this entire hatred and religious extremism or terrorism emanated from the very top man who’s de facto the emperor of Pakistan.
Escalation, airstrikes and ceasefire
Atul Singh: I see. So Asim Munir has a critical role to play. And my question then is, now he’s a Field Marshal after the conflict. So does this mean dim prospects for peace in the future?
General BK Sharma: Yes. At the moment, India has taken a very strident position, as you would have seen. Our Prime Minister has been absolutely resolute in saying that trade, water and talks cannot move hand in hand with terror. And he’s also said that India will call Pakistan’s nuclear bluff, and that the Pakistan military establishment and terrorists are in cohort with each other — they are chips off the same block. So, any act of terrorism in future will be taken as an act of war, and India will resort to three basic lines of response: one is prevention, second is preemption and third is punishment.
Atul Singh: We’ll dive into this later, but tell us about your views on the military escalation between the two sides, because that’s on everyone’s minds. And what are the major takeaways from what India called Operation Sindhur? You’ve just explained Operation Sindhur anyways, but still, I wanted to bring that term back up for emphasis, because this was an emotive term. This resonated with the public. This was meant to establish a precedent for the future. So, please explain.
General BK Sharma: In the past, India had used strategic patience against Pakistan in the wake of sensational terrorist strikes. But there was a major terrorist strike in Kashmir, in a place called Uri, in 2017, after which India decided to act in a more proactive and resolute manner, and we carried out about six trans-border raids against the terrorist infrastructure.
Another act of terrorism took place in 2019 when they killed about 46 personnel of Central Armed Police Forces, and India then launched an airstrike into Balakot against the terrorist camp. And then there was another — the next day, Pakistanis did something, and thereafter there was an intervention and things cooled off.
This time again, a heinous act of terrorism was abetted by Pakistan, and therefore the national sentiment was to go for more resolute, retributory action. And that is why, on the very first night — that is, the night of May 6 and 7 — the first phase of Operation Sindhur was launched by the Indian Air Force and Indian Army, targeting nine terrorist camps or terrorist facilities inside Pakistan-occupied Kashmir and two in Punjab.
The two most important of these were: one at Muzaffarabad, which is the headquarters of Lashkar-e-Taiba, and the second is in central Punjab of Pakistan — Bahawalpur — where Jamaat-ud-Dawa, and there is another terrorist organization that was headquartered there. Hafiz Saeed is the head of that organization.
And then you had Hizbul Mujahideen, which is a PoK-based organization. There were another seven camps which we had targeted. So, during this targeting, there were about 70 to a hundred terrorists who were eliminated, including about 12 members of the family of Hafiz Saeed and of Masood Azhar, who is head of Jaish-e-Mohammed, and his headquarters is located there.
Now, what is interesting here is that the funerals of these killed terrorists were state funerals, in which the top Pakistan military generals participated. Their dead bodies were wrapped in Pakistani national flags. What more evidence does the world require about Pakistan’s complicity in these terrorist attacks?
Anyway, on that night, India’s intention was not to target any civilian or military establishment. It was a pinpointed strike, and India made it very clear to Pakistan that we are not interested in any escalation. That night also, some air action had taken place — maybe I can talk about it a little later — in which, possibly, as the CDS — Chief of Defence Staff — had said during the Shangri-La Dialogue, that there were some tactical mistakes from the Indian side, and perhaps there would be some loss of aircraft that night. How many, we really don’t know.
The next day, there was a kind of retaliation by Pakistan, in which they launched about 500 drones, quadcopters and missiles against India. But these were thwarted by India’s air defense system, which is mostly indigenous. With part support from Russia, we had developed our own indigenous air defense system — totally automated with artificial intelligence and equipped with the S-400 air defense.
Atul Singh: Also, the Israeli Barak, right? That’s also there.
General BK Sharma: Barak and Akashteer, which are made by our own DRDO. So none of these Pakistani strikes were successful. There was hardly any damage caused by them. Thereafter, India again went for a major retaliation, and that was on the day of May 10, wherein we targeted 11 of their airfields.
Some airfields in the province of Sindh were as deep as 350 kilometers, using BrahMos, which is a cruise missile — a supersonic, hypersonic cruise missile. We used that and targeted 11 of these airfields, including an airfield called Noor Khan, which is right in the heart of Rawalpindi, very close to their Strategic Plans Division, which controls their nuclear assets. The Prime Minister’s house was just about eight kilometers away, and GHQ — General Headquarters Rawalpindi — was in close proximity.
Now, this was penetrating through the entire air defense system of Pakistan, which is based on HQ-9, a Chinese-supplied air defense network. And we also did electronic jamming of some of their facilities in Lahore and a couple of other places. And Pakistan had no answer to this. It was at that juncture that they panicked. Then there was a sort of a request from their DGMO around 3 o’clock in the afternoon to go for a ceasefire. And India agreed to that ceasefire. Maybe backdoor, there would have been some conversation with some American interlocutors, but the decision for India to accept the ceasefire was entirely its own and not due to any mediation or anything of that nature.
The reason for that was that we had already accomplished our mission in terms of precision targeting of terrorist camps, and then upping the ante in the escalation ladder by going against their strategic airfields. And that is how that ceasefire came into being and it holds.
Atul Singh: So, General Sharma, it’s very interesting you say that it was entirely an Indian decision — because from where I sit in Washington, DC, that’s certainly not the perception. The perception is that US President Donald Trump leaned on Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi. The perception is that Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Vice President JD Vance tag-teamed, and the Indians gave into pressure. So it’s very interesting to hear a perspective on Delhi which is very different from Washington. In a few years, historians will indubitably thrash out the truth of the matter. But let us move on and talk about the Pakistan–China strategic nexus, which you’ve often spoken about in the past.
General BK Sharma: Please permit me to respond to what you said. Suppose, when India was on the ascendant side, what was the compulsion for India to accept some mediation from any side? You tell me. And what was the reason for President Trump, even before the Indian side had announced it, to just do that message on Twitter or X and announce it? And what has happened subsequently? Indian political leadership had pointedly declined that anything of this nature occurred. They have agreed that, yes, there was some conversation between the top leadership of the US and ours, but the decision to accept the ceasefire was not at the behest of A, B or C — it was entirely an Indian decision. So therefore, I don’t understand why should India be shying away from accepting if there was any pressure from any side?
Atul Singh: Well, I’m talking about public perception, correct? So the truth of the matter may be something that will come out, as I said, when historians write it. I’m talking about public perception — not just here in Washington but in London. And the government can say all it wants, but the perception is that Donald Trump exerted pressure, and his administration exerted pressure because Pakistan was probably imploding, or probably about to threaten nuclear strikes. God knows what they did on their side, but that is the public perception, and that is where on the narrative front — there’s always a narrative war that goes on during any war. And I’m sure different parties around the world are peddling their own narratives for their own interests.
General BK Sharma: Well, let me tell you. I mean, even though we may say that nuclear weapons are very dangerous, and the rest of the world thinks that, well, South Asia is the nuclear flashpoint, I think the nuclear threats are far more close in Europe today than they are in South Asia. So, at least in the Indian military, we have a very responsible no-first-use doctrine. If any sobering effect is to be had, it is to be on Pakistan, which, like a child, flashes its nuclear weapon. And there is a very serious debate that, if any side is to be dispossessed of nuclear weapons, it is an irresponsible state like Pakistan, which every time plays the nuclear card and nuclear rhetoric.
Atul Singh: And that is the public perception — that Pakistan played that card yet again, and therefore took advantage of nuclear blackmail. And that is the public perception here.
The Pakistan–China nexus
Atul Singh: Anyway, moving on to something you’ve talked about over the years and something you have a fair degree of expertise on, because you go to China — in fact, you go to Russia as well, and you speak Russian — and so you are best placed to talk about the Pakistan–China strategic nexus during this conflict and its future complexion.
General BK Sharma: See, firstly, what has happened at this time — there is full Chinese complicity in what Pakistan has done. Right from the beginning, when Pahalgam happened, Chinese media was parroting the Pakistani narrative, making statements like “Pakistan is playing a very important role in combating terrorism.” And at the UN Security Council, when that resolution was being drafted, they again asserted themselves, as in the past — as they have done in the case of UN Resolution 1267. They again asserted, and they moderated or toned down the tone and tenor of that resolution.
Later on, whatever weapon systems Pakistanis have used are Chinese-supplied. Eighty-one percent of Pakistani weapons come from China. And they are giving them BeiDou satellite imagery. Their entire aerospace domain awareness actually is coming from China. They also gave them the JF-10C, which is a state-of-the-art aircraft. Besides, they are doing co-production of the JF-17 aircraft.
And it is assumed that on the night of May 6 to May 7, Pakistanis did enjoy a little edge in the aerospace domination and control due to the Chinese making available the satellite imagery and PL-15E missiles, which are supposed to be BVR missiles, which are beyond the visual range—
Atul Singh: Exactly, I wanted you to explain that.
General BK Sharma: —beyond the visual range missile, which could fire from a long stand-off distance. And probably, if those missiles were used, that could have probably led to certain losses on our side.
Now, subsequently, what the Chinese are saying is that “we — Pakistan and China — are like iron brothers,” and “we will give them all the future aid that is possible.” And there is talk of providing them Yaogan remote satellite systems, then new-generation KJ-500 AEW&C — that is, Airborne Early Warning and Control systems. Since HQ-9, this time, has not done well, there are reports of the Chinese supplying them with HQ-19 air and missile defense systems, guided multi-barrel rocket launchers. And there even is talk about microwave weapons, anti-ship ballistic missiles, Hangor-class submarines — which have a better stealth signature — and Type 054 frigates, which again have a better signature.
The reason for this is that it fits into the overall strategy of China to fix India in the South Asian orbit, so that space is available to Beijing to maneuver around in the maritime space. Also, this conflict has proved that Pakistan is the laboratory of Chinese weapons systems. And by just spreading this narrative that Chinese weapons have done reasonably, fairly well, they can also improve the prospects of selling these weapons to some of the East Asian, South Asian and other countries.
So, as we see here, the China–Pakistan nexus is strong, and it is bound to grow. And therefore, for any future conflict, India should not lift its eyes from the Line of Actual Control — that is, our northern borders vis-à-vis China — because there is a possibility of a scenario when the Chinese could do forward and aggressive military positioning there to relieve the pressure on the Pakistani front. So, these are the forces and complexions of the Pakistan–China strategic nexus at the political, diplomatic and military level.
Atul Singh: So, you mentioned the forward and aggressive movement of Chinese troops. So let me push you a little bit: Do you envisage a two-front war?
General BK Sharma: See, it’s not a question of envisaging. The question is: do they have the capability? The capabilities definitely are there. And what the Chinese did in 2020 — they tried to make a pitch for the 1959 claim line by throwing to the wind all the accords that they had signed with India since 1993.
So, any wise nation — any nation that is worth its self-respect — cannot totally wish away or close its eyes to an impending threat. So, going by China’s intent, its capabilities and its strategic behavior, this threat very much remains plausible, and India will have to prepare for it.
India’s new security doctrine
Atul Singh: Understood. So what you’re saying is that the possibility remains and preparation, therefore, is essential. Now, moving on to India’s new security doctrine — and everyone is saying there is a new security doctrine — what exactly is it, and what are its implications?
General BK Sharma: See, the new security doctrine that we’ve been talking about here is what we call the dynamic escalatory retaliation doctrine in multi-domain operations. And the strategic guidance for this comes from a political leader’s belief that there should be zero tolerance toward terrorism. We look at the entire ecosystem of terrorism: its sponsors and the foot soldiers put together. All acts of terrorism will be taken as acts of war, and we will also call Pakistan’s nuclear bluff — our Prime Minister is on record. And therefore, I don’t think any talks with Pakistan are in the near future or in the offing.
We are again, in a very firm manner, talking about the three P’s. And that is: prevention, preemption and punishment. And in terms of dynamic—
Atul Singh: The three P’s — describe them a little bit more. What exactly do you mean? What is the difference between prevention and preemption?
General BK Sharma: Prevention is that we have to button up our own internal security safeguards in terms of enhancing intelligence, in terms of anticipatory terrorist strikes and neutralization of some of the sleeper cells — and go for search and destroy missions to dismantle the entire ecosystem of terrorists, including their financing. So that is what we call prevention.
Preemption is that we will not now wait for anything. The moment we get any indication, any inkling that a terrorist attack is in the offing, or that Pakistanis are again building up their capacities along the Line of Control to launch terrorist strikes — we will take preemptive action.
And should Pakistan’s complicity be fully established, then we will go for retributive actions or punitive actions — punitive deterrence capability — against Pakistan. And all this now is going to be in the multi-domain operations, where we are going to combine non-kinetic and kinetic means.
For example, this time the whole punitive action started with the holding in abeyance of the Indus Waters Treaty. There are five rivers which flow from India into Pakistan.
Atul Singh: Let me stop you very quickly. Just explain to our viewers the difference between kinetic and non-kinetic, because military men understand it, but laymen don’t.
General BK Sharma: Yeah. So, non-kinetic means are non-military means. That means you’re not using your missiles or any explosive or any hard military platforms. So that entails, like, water as a tool of strategic coercion. Second is your use of cyber weapons. Psychological operations in the cognitive domain. So these are some of the non-kinetic means.
Whereas kinetic means are what we have been seeing day in and day out. So, in these multi-domain operations, we want to achieve a certain degree of supremacy in terms of sensor–shooter interface — sensors right from space down to the man with a binocular; shooter is from a pistol or a bayonet right up to maybe a space weapon.
And then we would like to look at flawless, seamless logistic supply chains, use of simulators for training in near-virtual or augmented reality environments. And the heart of this is EW — electronic warfare — cyber warfare, and then AI-driven command, control, communication, intelligence and surveillance systems.
So, we are heading in that direction. And at the moment, our effort is to produce indigenous systems so that we do not rely on any outside agency. And again, due to some disruption, then we won’t have to look over our shoulders. So this is what India’s dynamic escalatory retaliatory doctrine is, which is based on multi-domain operations and the technologies that disruptive warfare entails.
Indus Waters Treaty and strategic water disruption
Atul Singh: Now, let me ask you about the Indus Waters Treaty. This is the 1960 treaty that survived the 1971 war, that survived the 1998 Kargil conflict, that survived all the terrorist attacks — 2001, 2008 — and continued till 2025. It’s been suspended. Does that mean there will be water wars now?
General BK Sharma: Well, there won’t be any water wars, per se. But when we signed this Indus Waters Treaty — that means there are these five, six rivers. Three are the northern rivers, which is Indus; Jhelum, which flows through Kashmir and Chenab, which again flows from the southern part of the state of Jammu and Kashmir — or you can call it Union Territory.
Now, India uses 20% of those waters, and 80% flows into Pakistan. And three southern rivers in the plains, which are Ravi, Sutlej and Beas — India has 100% control over those waters.
So what we have done: When we signed this treaty, it was with a responsible state. The spirit was that this water would help them in their agriculture, and they would attain prosperity and stabilize and become a responsible state. But what we are witnessing today, we are dealing with a rogue and terrorist state.
So therefore, India, as an upper riparian state, reserves the right of putting this treaty into abeyance until Pakistan stops cross-border terrorism. This is our condition: You behave like a normal, civilized state which respects international treaty obligations, and then we can talk about the water.
We may have the capacity to alter the flow of these rivers and disrupt the cropping pattern in Pakistan, and thus use it as a tool of strategic coercion, with the hope that Pakistan stops cross-border terrorism. And then we can renegotiate the treaty all over again.
Atul Singh: Pakistan has said that will be a casus belli, and it would be a threat to the livelihood of hundreds of millions. Pakistan is largely an agrarian state, and they will have rivers of blood flowing should India try anything with the Indus Waters, including its tributaries’ waters.
General BK Sharma: Yeah. Well then, why is Shehbaz Sharif talking about initiating talks with India, including on water, terrorism and—
Atul Singh: Just so that our viewers know, Shehbaz Sharif is the Prime Minister of Pakistan. He is the brother of Nawaz Sharif, who was Prime Minister earlier. He comes from the Sharif political family. Over to you, sir.
General BK Sharma: So why is he talking about resuming these talks? Some hate is actually being felt there, right? And it is the people of Pakistan who will hold their government and their military accountable. That is exactly what was happening. Why is Pakistan’s economy today in doldrums? They’re going with the begging bowl to the IMF, Chinese, UAE, Saudi Arabia.
What has happened? India has not harmed their economy. So, a little push will come to shove.
Atul Singh: Very quickly, for historical context, our viewers should know that when India and Pakistan became independent, Pakistan actually had better irrigated land. Pakistan was better poised for economic growth. Pakistan was also a Cold War ally of the US, and Pakistan indeed had a certain degree of industrialization in the late ‘50s and 1960s.
However, in 2025, there is absolutely no comparison between the Indian economy and the Pakistani economy. Pakistan has gone to approximately 20+ times, apparently, to the IMF. I may be a bit wrong there — but Pakistan is broke. Pakistan’s military sucks resources out of the state, and the corruption in Pakistan has reached such astronomical levels that the moment money flows into Pakistan from abroad, property prices rise in Dubai.
So clearly that money is being siphoned off by elites. The elites have failed to provide drinking water, schooling, health and so on and so forth to the masses, and that is why Imran Khan held such an appeal for the masses — because he talked about this endemic corruption of the elites, and indeed, the disproportionate share of the economy that is monopolized by the military. Over to you, sir.
General BK Sharma: So, as I said, look — we will use water as a tool to moderate the behavior of Pakistan in a responsible manner. We are a responsible state. We respect international law. We will use it. And we can renegotiate the treaty the moment they give us these guarantees that they will not abet cross-border terror.
Atul Singh: But the question is — you say responsibility, and this is where I’m being asked by a number of my European and American friends — if you’re going to disrupt water flows, that will lead to famine in Pakistan. So is this the equivalent of a nuclear strike?
General BK Sharma: I’m sure good sense will prevail in Pakistan much before that, and such things will not come to pass. Sometimes you have to give a bitter pill to cure a sick mind.
India’s defense needs
Atul Singh: Okay. So we’ve talked about India’s new security doctrine. We’ve talked about its implications. You’ve talked about water as a non-kinetic tool of India’s new doctrine. This is my final question — what should India do to enhance its defense preparedness?
General BK Sharma: India has contested borders, both with Pakistan and China — and both of them are acting in tandem. Their political interests and their military interests totally coalesce vis-à-vis India. They are both autocratic, hegemonic states. India is the only democratic state, and therefore we have to be totally prepared for comprehensive national security to defend our sovereignty and our way of life.
So, in light of these series of events that have taken place vis-à-vis the Chinese and Pakistanis, it is high time that India should have a deep dive into its national security matrix. We definitely need a national security strategy.
Atul Singh: Do we not have one?
General BK Sharma: We do not have one that is articulated, and maybe we will not put one in the public domain, but we need to have one such document which is in sync with the geopolitical realities and the strategic security challenges which are staring us in the eyes.
Likewise, we need a national defense strategy — maybe a national military strategy — and a nuclear posture review in the light of whatever nuclear saber-rattling Pakistan does. India is just spending about 1.5% of the GDP on its defense.
Atul Singh: That is like a European country, almost like a European welfare state.
General BK Sharma: Yeah. So, given the threat perception, we need to increase our defense budget to maybe 2–2.5% of the GDP. Our procurement processes still move very slowly due to—
Atul Singh: At a glacial pace, as someone put it.
General BK Sharma: Yeah, red tapism and bureaucratic hurdles. We need to review and probably digitize that. Then we realize that, well, when the balloon goes up and the chips are down, you are all alone in the ring. So, we have to be self-sufficient in our defense technology. And that is why Atmanirbharta — what we call Make in India — must get a boost.
We still have to take long strides in terms of jointness, integration and theaterisation vis-à-vis the Chinese, who have theaterised commands. So we are in the process of creating theater commands. This must get accelerated.
Then, there still exist certain critical voids, particularly in the aerospace domain. Today, the strength of Indian Air Force squadrons comes to 31 squadrons, and are 4.5th-generation. Fifth-generation aircraft still are not in the offing in the near future, so we have to—
Atul Singh: Just to stop you there — so India has 31 functioning squadrons, and the sanction strength is 42, isn’t it?
General BK Sharma: Yeah, 42. So we have to boost up that strength and have our own aircraft like Tejas Mark 1 and Tejas Mark 2, for which we need engines — F404 or F414 engines — from the United States of America.
Then there is another AMCA series of aircraft that we want to indigenize, or do domestic production of that. That will take another ten years. So these must get speeded up.
A lot of investments have to be made in artificial intelligence, machine learning, big data analytics, supercomputing — because lethal autonomous weapon systems or quasi-autonomous weapon systems are going to be the weapons of the future. So investment in that.
Then, our strategic communication still is not up to the mark. We have seen it — that many a time, though India is morally on a high ground, our strategic narrative or communication is quite disparate and diffuse. So a lot of effort has to go into that.
We’ve seen all the wars in Ukraine and elsewhere — that today, it is not only the militaries, but the entire nation that fights together. So, we want to adopt a whole-of-government and whole-of-nation approach, in which not only the government agencies and military, but your academia, your research institutions, your industry partners — all act in tandem and toward a common purpose. So this needs to be institutionalized.
And last, I think we can say that we are living in a new era — an era that is characterized by VUCA.
Atul Singh: VUCA! That’s volatility, uncertainty, complexity…
General BK Sharma: Volatility, uncertainty, complexity, ambiguity. And I will add two more to that: hyper-connectivity, as you’ve seen through social media, and disruption.
So we have to gear up for that. And we cannot cope with this kind of strategic environment by having linear thinking or working in silos. So we need to develop skills in critical thinking, remove the cognitive biases, address the blind spots, overcome mental maps and groupthink. So we need a new crop of multi-domain experts who can put their minds together and find some very innovative solutions to these very complex national security issues.
These are some of the areas which are in the pipeline. And I think there is a sense of urgency in India today, that everything should not be taken, like what happens in most democracies, on a very slow basis. But there is a need to give an impetus to this.
And finally, I would just close my remarks by saying that there is a realization here. We all keep saying that India needs to heed three mantras. One is what Thucydides said: “The strong do what they can. The weak suffer what they must.”
Atul Singh: That’s the Melian Dialogue, Thucydides. The strong do what they can, and the weak suffer as they must.
General BK Sharma: And then what Paulo Coelho, my favorite author, said: “Love thy neighbor, but never sell your sword.”
And then I’ll allude to President Roosevelt. He said: “Speak softly, but carry a long stick. You will go far.”
Atul Singh: You’re talking about Teddy Roosevelt here! (Laughs)
General BK Sharma: Yeah. So these are the three mantras I think we should heed here in India. Be a responsible, pluralistic, democratic state, but at the same time, have strong deterrence and warfighting capabilities.
Atul Singh: Excellent. On that note, thank you very much for your time. Those of you who are watching this, make sure you subscribe to our YouTube channel. Make sure you share this video, and we’ll have General BK Sharma back in a jiffy. All the best, thank you.
General BK Sharma: Thank you.
[Lee Thompson-Kolar edited this piece.]
The views expressed in this article/video are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.
” post-content-short=” Atul Singh: Welcome to FO° Talks. With me is an old and dear friend, General BK Sharma. General BK Sharma is the Director of the United Service Institution, the oldest defense think tank in India. He is a soldier and a scholar who has extraordinarily rich experience in field commands, in…” post_summery=”Fair Observer Editor-in-Chief Atul Singh speaks with Major General BK Sharma about the recent Islamist terrorist attack in Pahalgam, India’s military response through Operation Sindhur and the evolving India–Pakistan–China security triangle. General Sharma emphasizes Pakistan’s ideological shift under Field Marshal Asim Munir and China’s deepening support. He outlines India’s assertive new security doctrine focused on preemption, punishment and deterrence.” post-date=”Jun 12, 2025″ post-title=”FO° Talks: The New Strategic Landscape in India–Pakistan Relations” slug-data=”fo-talks-the-new-strategic-landscape-in-india-pakistan-relations”>
