Atul Singh: Welcome to FO° Talks. With me is Thomas Greminger. He is the head of this Geneva Centre for Security Policy. He is one of Switzerland’s star diplomats. He is a scholar, a soldier and a man of the world. Welcome, Thomas.
Thomas Greminger: Thank you very much, Atul. Great to be with you again.
Atul Singh: Brilliant. So this is a brave new world we are living in. We are recording this on Monday, 17th of March, and in 2025, how do you see this brave new world in which we find ourselves in?
Thomas Greminger: It’s clearly a world that is spellbound by the new US administration — its announcements, its early actions. A new administration that has chosen a different path than classical diplomacy in the way they manage external relations. It’s a path of disruption, of provocation. Demands are not submitted to partners by arguments, but by that provocation or by building up a threat posture, and then one waits for a reaction and then decides either to withdraw or to maintain the threatening stance or to start negotiating. So I think it’s a totally different style. And of course, one of the big challenges is to figure out to what extent is an announcement here a threat, and to what extent, you know, is this a serious policy move? And I think that is currently what most of the world is caught up with — trying to figure out how to respond to these new approaches, disruptive, transactional approaches by the US government.
Atul Singh: I see. So, disruptive approaches of the US government. But it is not just a matter of style; it’s also a matter of substance. Out goes the post-World War II order, the US is talking of taking over Canada, Greenland, not to mention Panama. The EU is deemed anti-US. Suddenly, Russia is an ally — or maybe not an ally, but a potential friend — and Ukraine is run by a dictator. So there is a lot of change in substance, too, isn’t there?
Thomas Greminger: I think we still have to see to what extent there is really also a substantive change. In some ways, yes, we do see the imposition of tariffs — and not just, you know, threatening imposing tariffs. We do see concrete policy action. But a lot, for the time being, remains on a declaratory level. And I think that’s also one of the challenges — to figure out: are they serious? Is it not more than a threatening posture?
European security, NATO and strategic autonomy
Thomas Greminger: I mean, when it comes to one of my favorite topics — European security, the war in Ukraine — on the one hand, you have clearly a new impulse by President Trump. He clearly wants to achieve a ceasefire as soon as possible. But at the same time, I think we are still struggling with, well, what would then be a good deal for President Trump? I think this is still not really tangible. What would be a process that would take us to a ceasefire and perhaps later on to a settlement after conflict? I mean, what we’ve been seeing is a resumption of US–Russian dialogue. That is, as such, I think, positive. It’s good that these two major powers talk to each other again. How far they’ve come in this resumption of talks is a lot less certain. But then again, coming back to Ukraine — What is a good deal? What is a process? Who sits at the table? Who deals with it? On the US side, that’s also a big question mark. You know, initially, we all thought it would be General Kellogg. Now, it seems that he is rather sidelined, and it seems to be Mr. Witkoff who does the heavy lifting in that. But again, I think when it comes to real substance, we do not have a clear sense yet. You know, also: Are we really witnessing now a fundamental shift in alliances? Is it now the US and Russia against Europe? You know, I’m not so sure yet that this is what we are really witnessing. You can hear, of course, declarations that you could interpret in this way. But when it boils down to real policy changes, I think we’ll still have to be a bit more patient and see what is really happening then on the ground, if I may say so.
Atul Singh: Alright, so you’ve talked about what’s happening on the ground, which leads me on to my next question: What is actually happening on the ground? What are the key trends you observe in this brand new world?
Thomas Greminger: Well, clearly there is — I mean, allow me to remain — the new US administration. There is clearly this short-term transactionalism that dominates over long-term alliances. We see—
Atul Singh: That’s number one.
Thomas Greminger: I think we see that when it comes to European security, when it comes to the imposition of tariffs. I think there is significant evidence for this. A second trend that I perceive, again coming out of Washington, is not only a transactional but also a hard-power-based approach to foreign and security policy. And in a way, there seems to be an abandoning of US soft power politics. So, you know — I mean, basically eliminating development cooperation, dissolving USAID, cutting contributions to multilateral organizations — all this is very fundamentally undermining soft power protection of the United States. And perhaps, you know, a third point — but this, again, takes me back to the US–Russia relation — again, I think what is notable is that there is an attempt for a reset. There has been a resumption of dialogue, but we haven’t really seen the really tough issues being addressed. There seems to be a normalization of diplomatic relations — fine — but I haven’t seen, for instance, any strategic stability issues being addressed, even though this would be quite urgent, given, you know, New START running out next year. And also, when it comes to potential Russian demands like lifting of sanctions, etc — we haven’t really gotten a sense of how far the US government is willing to go here.
Switzerland’s neutrality under pressure
Atul Singh: Right. So, let’s move on to Switzerland, where you sit. And the US has put Switzerland on a list of non-friendly countries. What does this really mean?
Thomas Greminger: Well, first, you know, we need to be precise. Switzerland is not on a channel non-friendly countries list. I’m not even sure if this category exists. But we are on a list of countries with unfair trade practices. But, I mean—
Atul Singh: I stand corrected. I stand corrected.
Thomas Greminger: But, I mean, this is serious enough, and obviously this is taken very seriously by Switzerland. Why is this so? Well, Switzerland has a bilateral trade balance with the US with a very considerable surplus, by about $25 billion. And so I think that triggered, you know, this move to put us on that list. What, however, is not being said is that, at the same time, Switzerland has a deficit in services of around $20 billion. So, all in all, you know, if you count it all together, it doesn’t look that bad. But I think the important thing is that, you know, Switzerland is taking this seriously. The Swiss State Secretary for Economic Affairs is, as we speak, in Washington, is trying to figure out why. What are US expectations behind this move? And I would suppose, you know, she would argue with, you know, an extremely open space market. She would certainly point to the fact that we have this deficit when it comes to the service balance. And she would probably also point to the fact that Swiss multinational enterprises employ around 400,000 people in the United States. So I think there isn’t really an interest, you know, to trigger any sort of trade war between the two countries. What I like is, you know, that Switzerland is taking it seriously and is trying to address it through quiet diplomacy and not, you know, through this public diplomacy, not through loudspeaker diplomacy, but diplomatically.
Atul Singh: You’ve got an excellent ambassador, Ralph Heckman, in Washington, so that should help. And, of course, you’re huge investors in research and development. So the Swiss have invested quite a bit in the US and employs, you said, quite a few people — so that should help as well. So let’s talk about moving on from Switzerland to Europe. For decades, Europe and the US have been in a transatlantic alliance, and you just mentioned that the new fashion is transactional short-term gains, not long-term alliances. So are we to infer that this fabled transatlantic alliance is now dead?
Thomas Greminger: I don’t think so. Look, these strong transatlantic relations have been built over decades, and they’re simply too strong to be fundamentally questioned by one US president, by one US administration. I mean, I wouldn’t doubt that these relations are currently undergoing a serious test, and clearly there is a particular challenge to European partners who have to step up their contribution to counter military threats on their eastern flank. But, you know, even here, I would also see an opportunity. And that is this US pressure on transatlantic relations, in a way, also represents an opportunity to advance a more autonomous European security policy. And, you know, that takes us a bit also back to Trump’s first administration. I think already back then, this was the most significant boost to European strategic autonomy thinking. But obviously this was pre-war. Now we are in a war scenario, and the war clearly has again underlined how important these transatlantic relations are. So we are, in a way, in a different situation. But what we are currently seeing over the last days and weeks is a strong mobilization on the European side in terms of more security efforts — also, I think, a will to be more autonomous. And in that sense, you know, Trump may, at some point, even become a hero of European strategic autonomy.
Atul Singh: Excellent. But the alliance question: The alliance, you think, will persist? It’ll outlast Donald Trump?
Thomas Greminger: It will. It will. And, you know, I don’t think that, for instance, he would seriously consider pulling out of NATO. I think there is just too much at stake, not only from a pure security point of view. I think, you know, we need to be very clear. This has always also been an important way of assuring US interests in an absolutely fundamental market for the United States. It has been a way of projecting US power to the European continent. And I think abandoning all of that would — even if you think short-term, transactional — even in such a logic, this wouldn’t make sense.
Atul Singh: Alright. So let’s talk about what you’re saying repeatedly — transactional, transactional, transactional world we live in now. So, have we moved from a rules-based order to a transactional spheres of influence world?
Thomas Greminger: I think this is an excellent point. And indeed, if you look at the mindset of, let’s say, the presidents of the three major powers — the United States, China, the Russian Federation — I think you could make a case that they have a sphere of influence mindset, and that for them, you know, the respect for state sovereignty of neighboring countries and regions isn’t particularly strong. And I think these principles that heads of state have subscribed to over the last 50 years — that is, you know, that every state has the freedom to choose its own security arrangements, to be sovereign in its foreign policy choices — I think these are principles, values, that are not held very highly by all three of them. I mean, what is, of course, particularly surprising is that you would now also put the United States in that camp. But clearly, when you hear references to taking over Greenland, Canada, the Panama Canal, then I think this is a clear indication of a sphere of influence mindset. Scary.
Atul Singh: Yeah. I mean, so if that is the world we live in, is protectionism and hardball bargaining the new reality in this brave new world? And what does this mean for small countries like Switzerland?
Thomas Greminger: It’s clearly very challenging. If you cannot wield major power in a world that is dominated by power politics, you obviously have a major issue. And I think what it means for smaller countries like Switzerland is to be, you know, extremely attentive, smart, flexible, adaptive. Don’t put all your eggs in one single basket. You know, diversify your partnerships, diversify your supply chains. You know, try to avoid being too dependent on one of these major powers. A question that we keep discussing here in Switzerland is: Is neutrality still a tool, you know, that serves us well in this kind of world? And I would definitely argue yes. I think a smart neutrality policy — the reactive policy, you know, that shows that neutral Switzerland can be useful to the international community — is still a very appropriate way of dealing with these challenges.
Atul Singh: I see. So, some argue that this neutrality has weakened over time. After all, I mean, look at the Swiss moving towards the US in the Russia–Ukraine war. And of course, one could argue that neutrality might also be under pressure because of the financial pressure the US is exerting. Take the example of UBS. UBS got a lot of Swiss government support, but it’s threatening to move headquarters elsewhere. That might have been less likely if, perhaps, Switzerland was part of the EU.
Thomas Greminger: I mean, you are absolutely right. Being neutral these days is not, you know, an easy way of conducting your foreign and security policy. But then again, you know, what are the alternatives? The alternatives are: You join a camp, and you do what is called “bandwagoning” by political scientists. But then you’re caught in a camp; you’re bound by the decisions of such a camp. I don’t think that this is — in such a polarized world — always an advantage. And the other alternative is constant hedging. And I think that’s what you see with more major actors also in the Global South. That’s, I think, what Indians, for instance, call “multi-alignment,” right? But I think for a smaller country like Switzerland, that has less power than, let’s say, India, Brazil, South Africa — I think neutrality brings along more predictability. But it’s not a rigid concept. And, you know, this takes me back to your initial question. Things have radically changed when it comes to Swiss neutrality policy once we came out of the Cold War. During the Cold War, Switzerland had a very rigid interpretation of neutrality — it was called “integral neutrality” — which basically meant, you know, no significant foreign policy. But then, you know, once we came out of the Cold War, Switzerland had to kind of reinvent its foreign policy and neutrality policy became much more open. And when you read the still-valid neutrality report of 1993, you see that, for instance, adopting economic sanctions is fully in line with the defined neutrality policy after the end of the Cold War. That this then creates dilemmas at given points in time is absolutely true. We had, in 2014, a big discussion in Switzerland: Should Switzerland adopt fully the imposed EU sanctions? In 2014, we decided no. We just, you know, make sure that Switzerland is not being used to circumvent sanctions. But we did not fully adopt them. And one of the key arguments was: Back then, Switzerland was in a mediating role as Chair of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. Now, when you compare that—
Atul Singh: Just for our viewers and listeners: They should know, 2014 is when Russia took over Crimea. So that’s what Thomas is referring to.
Thomas Greminger: Exactly. So we have basically two things: Illegal annexation of Crimea, and you have destabilization efforts in the Donbas. But you did not have — and that takes me to 2022 — you did not have a full-fledged aggression against a neighboring country, as in 2022. And given the severity of that breach of international law, given the fact that Switzerland had no particular role in 2022, given also, of course, the huge solidarity of the Swiss population with the aggressed state — with Ukraine — I think the Swiss government had no choice but to adopt these sanctions fully. Of course, this was criticized then by Russia. But I still think, you know, politically this made sense and is compatible with a modern interpretation of neutrality policy.
Defense, neutrality and the future of Europe
Atul Singh: Excellent. Speaking of neutrality, one would be remiss if one did not point out that Europe is rearming again. And Germany has exempted defense spending from its constitutional debt brake. Poland has talked about acquiring nuclear weapons. So, is NATO on the way out, and a new European defense alliance is about to take its place? Will it mean that some countries will take a more aggressive stance against Russia and others might just choose to be neutral?
Thomas Greminger: Well, I think the jury is still out of what form this will take. Will Europe focus on strengthening a European pillar of NATO? I think that is clearly an option. Or would it go for investing mainly in strengthening the security side of the European Union? Or, thirdly, would it be a construct that is different to NATO and EU, which would have the advantage of also integrating non-EU and non-NATO members? The European Political Community, you know, has been mentioned. But obviously, the downside is there are no established security structures, mechanisms, etc. So I think it’s still open how this part of the European security architecture will look like. I think what is clear is you will see a much more significant European effort in that — less reliance on US support. This obviously also implies that Europe will have to compensate for currently still existing important capability gaps. I think they will have to be made up. It also implies that Europe will have to cooperate in security matters to a much different way. You know, let’s be honest — I think right now, security in Europe is still very much nationally driven. Procurement is nationally driven. And I think this needs to change. You know, you cannot have twelve different tank models in the future of European security. I think you will have to focus on two or three, right? So it’s not about moving military expenditures up to 5%. I think that’s simply not necessary. What is necessary is change the cooperation mindset when it comes to defense and security in Europe. And I think there is still quite a bit to be done. But clearly, what I’ve been seeing over recent weeks and months shows me that I think Europeans have understood and they got the message, and they are now working on it.
Atul Singh: So, you say Europeans have got the message and they are now working on it. Does that mean that the Europeans are not going to buy US weapons as much anymore? Because you said you need two or three tanks — one of them, of course, is Challenger in Europe — and a key reason to buy US arms has been interoperability. But if the Europeans cannot rely on the US as much as they used to, then they’ll have to build their own weapons systems. And there is already talk of the fear of the kill switch or the US not giving you software updates as part of a trade war, even. So, it is not just increased spending — it is developing a homegrown defense technology, research and development — almost a military-industrial complex, isn’t it?
Thomas Greminger: It’s true. I think a lot will depend on how this is now being managed on both sides of the Atlantic. I think if it’s smartly managed, I would see European security being strengthened, transatlantic relations even being strengthened. If it’s poorly managed — if this threat posture remains the dominant feature of US policies — indeed, I think you’re absolutely right that one of the consequences could indeed be that Europeans buy less and less American weaponry and, you know, will basically then resort to European systems only. Which probably wouldn’t be smart from a military, from a security point of view, either. But okay — I mean, if there is bullying from Washington, Europe might not have another choice than to do that. But again, I hope this is not the scenario that we are going to see. I hope, you know, reason sets in and complementarity will remain an important principle in European security. Bear in mind that Europe will have to step up its own investment, its own effort.
Atul Singh: Thomas, most European countries have very generous social welfare systems — generous especially when compared to the US With rising defense spending, can Europe manage both guns and butter? And what is the future, then, of the European economy?
Thomas Greminger: Yeah, again, I think that’s an excellent question. This guns-and-butter dilemma I think is a real dilemma. And there is obviously a threat of crowding out social expenditures if defense expenditures will have to be kept on a very high level for a very long time. And there is also a risk of inflationary pressure, you know, if this defense spending has to be kept high for a long time. So I think it all depends on the timeframes that we are talking about. And this, of course, then takes us to developments in Europe over the next few years. Will we see an end to the war in Ukraine? Will we gradually come back to a European security order that contains cooperative elements? Or will we stick, for decades to come, in a kind of new Cold War with enormous defense expenditures on both sides? I think if the latter is the case, then indeed, you know, this guns-and-butter dilemma will become much more critical. If the former happens, we may at some point in time again see the peace dividend, you know, that will allow us to sustain social expenditures and also deal with all the challenges of an aging population, for instance, of rising health expenditures, etc.
A new Cold War?
Atul Singh: So you’ve mentioned a new Cold War, and I couldn’t help thinking: What will be the shape of this new Cold War? Let’s hope it never gets that far. Let’s hope we have a peace dividend. But in case we don’t, will this Cold War be between the US and the EU? Will it be between the EU and Russia? Will it even be between the EU and China? Because there are lots of tensions, strained tensions, and Xi Jinping has not deigned to visit Europe. So what will be the shape of this new Cold War?
Thomas Greminger: Yeah, again, I think the jury is still out. Well, until a few months ago, one would have said, well, it’s probably the West against the rest, or against China and Russia. Now, with this attempt to reset US–Russia relations and this declared strategy of President Trump to kind of, you know, pull Russia out of China’s embrace, we may see different developments. And then, of course, a lot will also depend on how, for instance, Europe will position itself. Will Europe try to kind of remain and keep an independent stance, or will it side exclusively with the US? You know, when you look at the relevance of economic relations between China and Europe, I don’t think that this would be a very favorable strategy for both China and Europe. And I get clearly a sense that China is trying very hard to reach out to Europe. This may not be reflected in heads-of-state visits lately, but diplomatically, what I perceive is a strong outreach by the Chinese. And I think they would want to deal with a Europe that is as independent as possible.
Atul Singh: Excellent. Thomas Greminger, thank you so, so much for your time. It’s always a pleasure to have you with us. We hope you’ll come back soon. There’s lots to discuss in this brand new world, in this fast-changing world. And we wish you all the best with all your endeavors.
Thomas Greminger: Thank you very much, Atul. Thank you for inviting me.
[Lee Thompson-Kolar edited this piece.]
The views expressed in this article/video are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.
” post-content-short=” Atul Singh: Welcome to FO° Talks. With me is Thomas Greminger. He is the head of this Geneva Centre for Security Policy. He is one of Switzerland’s star diplomats. He is a scholar, a soldier and a man of the world. Welcome, Thomas. Thomas Greminger: Thank you very much, Atul. Great to be…” post_summery=”Thomas Greminger discusses the disruptive, transactional approach of the new US administration and its global implications. He highlights shifting alliances, challenges for European security, and Switzerland’s evolving neutrality. Greminger stresses the need for strategic autonomy, adaptability, and diplomacy amid rising geopolitical tensions and a potential new Cold War.” post-date=”Mar 30, 2025″ post-title=”FO° Talks: Trump, NATO, Russia-Ukraine War: A Swiss View on the New World in 2025″ slug-data=”fo-talks-trump-nato-russia-ukraine-war-a-swiss-view-on-the-new-world-in-2025″>FO° Talks: Trump, NATO, Russia-Ukraine War: A Swiss View on the New World in 2025
[This is the third part of a nine-part series. To read more, see Parts 1 and 2 here.]
Approximately two million Kurds live in Syria, predominantly in the northeastern region near Iraq and Turkey. During the country’s ongoing civil war, which began in 2011, Kurdish groups established an autonomous polity in the area, dubbed the Democratic Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria, Rojava.
Turkey is also home to a sizable Kurdish minority. In the past, it has combated the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), a Kurdish nationalist organization that Turkey and the rest of NATO consider a terrorist group. The Turkish capital of Ankara worries that Rojava maintains ties with the PKK. This concern has shaped Turkey’s approach to Syria throughout its modern history.
Turkish–Syrian relations
Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has sought leadership in the Sunni Muslim world. He is nostalgic for the era of the Ottoman Empire, which saw Turkey rule Syria and much of the Middle East until World War I (1914–1918). After the war, Turkey became a democratic republic and later allied with the United States during the Cold War of the 1950s. Turkey joined NATO in 1952.
During the 1950s and 1960s, Turkey viewed Syria as a stronghold of pro-Soviet influence in the Middle East. Turkey served as a founding member of the Baghdad Pact in 1955, which aimed to create a pro-Western alliance in the Middle East that excluded Israel. Syria instead formed an Arab socialist union with Egypt — the United Arab Republic — which lasted from 1958 to 1961.
In 1998, Turkey and Syria engaged in a military standoff at the border over Kurdish movements in Syria and water rights in the Euphrates River. At the same time, Israeli troops reportedly concentrated near the Golan Heights on the Israel–Syria border. This compelled Syria to sign the Adana Agreement, in which Syria turned PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan over to Turkish authorities.
Turkey continues to maintain influence in Syria in order to manage the perceived Kurdish threat. Turkey supported, among others, Abu Muhammad al-Julani’s (now Ahmed al-Sharaa’s) Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), a Sunni Arab militant group. HTS successfully deposed Syrian President Bashar al-Assad in November 2024 and now controls the Syrian capital of Damascus.
Erdoğan aspires to predominance in the Levant and, therefore, finds himself at odds with the other major regional power, Israel. As a Sunni Muslim power, Turkey is sympathetic to the Palestinian cause. However, Ankara has avoided direct confrontation with Jerusalem, and the two powers share a common rival in Iran. For the moment, Turkish–Syrian relations appear stable.
[Liam Roman and Lee Thompson-Kolar edited this piece.]
The views expressed in this article/video are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.
” post-content-short=” Approximately two million Kurds live in Syria, predominantly in the northeastern region near Iraq and Turkey. During the country’s ongoing civil war, which began in 2011, Kurdish groups established an…” post_summery=”Around two million Kurds live in northeastern Syria, where they established the autonomous region of Rojava. Turkey’s historical tensions with Syria stem from Cold War rivalries, border disputes and Kurdish movements. Today, Turkey maintains influence in Syria, balancing regional ambitions with caution toward rivals like Israel and Iran.” post-date=”Mar 29, 2025″ post-title=”FO° Talks: Josef Olmert on Syria, Part 3: Turkey and the Kurdish Issue” slug-data=”fo-talks-josef-olmert-on-syria-part-3-turkey-and-the-kurdish-issue”>
FO° Talks: Josef Olmert on Syria, Part 3: Turkey and the Kurdish Issue
[This is the second part of a nine-part series. To read more, see Part 1 here.]
The second part of this series focuses on a dominant political force in Syria: Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS). In Arabic, the acronym HTS signifies a powerful entity that is currently shaping the nation’s dynamics in Syria. To understand its significance, we must explore the historical and geopolitical context of its name. The term Sham, used in reference to the group’s identity, goes beyond modern-day Syria, as it encompasses a broader historical region that includes Lebanon, Israel, the West Bank and Jordan. This region, historically referred to as the Levant, is central to the identity crisis that has long plagued Syria.
The absence of Syria in the group’s name is no coincidence. The political identity of Syria has always been contentious, marked by its struggle to define its collective identity. For a group like HTS to adopt a term that refers to a larger, more expansive geopolitical entity rather than the current-day state of Syria indicates the ongoing challenges that surround Syria’s national identity. This absence illuminates a deeper issue: What is Syria’s true identity? Who are the Syrians? This question of identity has plagued the state for decades, leading to the political and cultural fragmentation we see today.
HTS and its radical jihadist roots
HTS grew out of another group called Jabhat al-Nusra (“The Front of Victory”). It is not an isolated entity but part of a broader global jihadist movement. Its founder, Abu Muhammad al-Julani (now Ahmed al-Sharaa), was previously involved with the al-Qaeda terror organization; his ties to jihadist ideology are well-documented.
While there are distinctions between different jihadist organizations, the ideological core often remains similar: Salafist jihadism. I find that the specific organizational structures and doctrinal differences between these groups don’t matter when discussing their broader political implications in Syria. Groups like HTS, al-Qaeda and ISIS may differ in tactics or governance, but they share a fundamental jihadist agenda rooted in a strict interpretation of Sunni Islam. This connection allows them to operate within a shared ideological space, irrespective of their political or organizational differences.
Julani’s relationship with Ibn Taymiyyah (1263–1328), a significant figure in radical Islamic thought, highlights another critical aspect of HTS’s religious roots. Taymiyyah’s influence on jihadist movements cannot be overstated. His infamous fatwa declaring the Alawites — the sect to which deposed Syrian President Bashar al-Assad belongs — as “worse than infidels” is particularly relevant in understanding the tensions in Syria today.
This view, espoused by Julani and other radical Sunni leaders, has fueled violence and conflict, especially between Sunni jihadist groups and Syria’s Alawite community. The hatred and violence toward Alawites, fueled by this doctrine, have led to reports of executions and destruction, particularly in areas like Latakia. Despite Julani’s recent statements attempting to soften his image and distance himself from his radical past, his actions and the ideology of HTS still bear the marks of the radical jihadist worldview.
Turkey’s influence and the regional dynamics
Turkey is emerging as a dominant force in Syria after the fall of the Assad regime. The nation has long been interested in the fate of northern Syria, with particular interest in areas like Aleppo. This interest dates back to the Ottoman era and continued even after the fall of the Ottoman Empire. The geopolitical significance of these regions is rooted in both historical claims and current security concerns.
Turkey’s position on Syria is shaped by several factors: the millions of Syrian refugees residing in Turkey, the Kurdish issue and the broader Sunni–Shia divide. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s preference for a Sunni-dominated Syria aligns with Turkey’s historical and ideological stance.
The Turkish government also has significant concerns about the Alawite community, especially since a sizable Alawite population resides in Turkey, particularly in the Alexandretta area that once was part of Syria. These historical and demographic factors make the Alawite question crucial to Turkey’s approach to Syria.
Moreover, while Erdoğan’s rhetoric supports radical Islam in some respects, I doubt he would tolerate a completely unregulated jihadist group like HTS on his borders; that could destabilize the region further. Turkey’s interests in Syria are complex, and while it has supported groups like HTS, its long-term goal is to ensure a stable, Sunni-dominated Syria.
The next steps in this evolving conflict will reveal whether Julani’s purported moderation is genuine or if the ideological and political fractures within Syria will continue to fuel instability.
[Shreya Verma and Lee Thompson-Kolar edited this piece.]
The views expressed in this article/video are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.
” post-content-short=” The second part of this series focuses on a dominant political force in Syria: Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS). In Arabic, the acronym HTS signifies a powerful entity that is currently shaping the nation’s dynamics…” post_summery=”Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham, a dominant political force in Syria, reflects the state’s ongoing identity crisis — right down to its name. Despite making efforts to appear moderate, the group’s roots in radical jihadism continue to shape its stance, especially toward the Alawite community. Turkey’s involvement in Syria further complicates the situation.” post-date=”Mar 28, 2025″ post-title=”FO° Talks: Josef Olmert on Syria, Part 2: Ethnic Groups, Factions and Jihadists” slug-data=”fo-talks-josef-olmert-on-syria-part-2-ethnic-groups-factions-and-jihadists”>
FO° Talks: Josef Olmert on Syria, Part 2: Ethnic Groups, Factions and Jihadists
Throughout my academic career, which has spanned over four decades, I have been deeply engaged in Syrian and Lebanese affairs in various capacities. As both an academic and government official, I have focused my studies on these regions, their complexities and political dynamics. I have also been a peace negotiator — I participated in discussions between Israel and Syria in the aftermath of the Madrid Peace Conference in 1991 and again in 1992. This long-standing focus on the Middle East has inevitably tied my work to the Assad family. First, with the regime of the older dictator, Hafez al-Assad, and later with his son, Bashar.
In this FO° Talks video series, I will be discussing the current political and societal changes occurring in Syria. They represent a continuation of the long-standing struggle of Syria to define itself and establish a collective identity. Over the decades, the Syrian state has experienced various political regimes, each attempting to resolve the inherent sectarian divisions and to forge a sense of unity. However, as we have seen recently, these attempts have continued to fail.
In Part 1, I aim to explore the broader context of Syria’s ongoing struggle for a cohesive identity and stability. This has been at the heart of the country’s challenges since the early 20th century.
Syria’s struggle for collective identity
The history of modern Syria dates back to 1920, when the French took over and established a mandatory regime over the region. Despite gaining independence in 1946, Syria has remained in a constant search for a collective identity — a unifying definition of who the Syrian people are and what the nation’s role in the Middle East should be. This search for identity has been complicated by the country’s diverse mix of ethnicities and religious sects. In an attempt to overcome these divisions, Syria has undergone numerous political experiments, each of which has ultimately failed to provide a stable foundation.
From 1946 to 1949, Syria briefly experimented with parliamentary democracy. This period was marked by elections but ended with Syria’s defeat in the 1948 Arab–Israeli War, when it sought to prevent Israel from forming its own state. After the war, Syria experienced three military coups in 1949 and the dictatorship of Adib Shishakli from 1951 to 1954. The ideology of Arab nationalism was central to these regimes, with slogans like “Syria, the heart of Arabism” (“Qalb al-Arab”) dominating political rhetoric.
From 1954 to 1958, Syria retried parliamentary democracy. This failed again; the Syrian state collapsed, which led the nation to briefly enter into a union with Egypt. The United Arab Republic as it was called dissolved in 1961. In 1963, the Ba’ath Party rose to power. This marked the beginning of an era in which Syria would be ruled by a one-party, authoritarian state.
The era came in two stages: From 1963 to 1970, the Neo-Ba’athist Party government operated with some degree of internal division and chaos. Then in 1970, Hafez al-Assad took control through a coup. Assad’s regime would endure until 2000, when his son, Bashar al-Assad, succeeded him and continued the autocratic rule.
However, despite all these attempts at forging a national identity and political stability, the core issue remained unresolved: Syria’s deep-rooted sectarianism. The country is home to a mix of Sunni Muslims, Alawites, Druze, Kurds and various Christian communities. Several of these groups were called compact minorities, and were relegated to a specific territory — for example, the Kurds lived in the Syrian northeast while the Druze lived in the southwest. The nation has a delicate social fabric, especially regarding the Sunni–Alawite rift deepened by the 1982 massacre in the city of Hama and the Arab Spring protests of 2010–2011. Assad’s regime attempted to suppress these historic divisions, but rather than uniting the population, it intensified the sectarian tensions.
This failure to create a unified identity based on shared values has been one of the central factors in the eventual collapse of the Assad regime and the country’s instability.
Rise of Islamism and the future of Syria
Fast-forward to the present day, and Syria is once again in the midst of a crisis. The most recent attempt to create a cohesive national identity seems to be failing as well, as we see the rise of Islamism and jihadist movements within the country. Although Islamism has a long history in Syria, dating back to the 1930s with the influence of the Muslim Brotherhood, it has never before played such a dominant role in shaping the political landscape.
The most prominent Islamist group today is Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), a jihadist organization that has become a significant player in the Syrian conflict. HTS is largely influenced by Turkey and represents a new era of Islamist ideology in Syria. Unlike the Islamist movements of the past, which were more localized and independent, HTS is now part of a broader regional jihadist movement. The group’s leaders, like Abu Muhammad al-Julani (who now goes by Ahmed al-Sharaa), have made attempts to present themselves as moderate, taking a more relaxed stance on Islamic governance. However, the underlying ideology remains one of violent jihad and the establishment of an Islamic state.
The current wave of Islamism in Syria presents a stark contrast to the earlier Ba’athist regime, which sought to create a pan-Arab identity. Despite the differences in approach, both regimes are driven by the same underlying desire: to create a collective identity for a fragmented nation. The key difference now is the role of foreign influence, particularly from Turkey and other regional powers, in shaping the course of Syria’s future.
What does this mean for Syria? Will the country move towards an Islamic regime? Will another form of governance emerge? The answers remain unclear. However, what is certain is that the quest for a cohesive national identity in Syria continues. The sectarian divisions that have plagued the country for so long remain unresolved, and each new regime has failed to bring about lasting stability or unity. Syria’s quest for a unified, stable identity is far from over.
[Aaditya Sengupta Dhar and Lee Thompson-Kolar edited this piece.]
The views expressed in this article/video are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.
” post-content-short=” Throughout my academic career, which has spanned over four decades, I have been deeply engaged in Syrian and Lebanese affairs in various capacities. As both an academic and government official, I have focused my studies on these regions, their complexities and political dynamics. I have also been…” post_summery=”Syria struggles to forge a cohesive national identity amid its sectarian divisions. Despite political experiments and regimes, including the Assad family’s 54-year dictatorship, Syria has failed to overcome its internal fragmentation. Today, the rise of Islamist groups like Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham signals another effort to create a collective identity.” post-date=”Mar 26, 2025″ post-title=”FO° Talks: Josef Olmert on Syria, Part 1: Historic Context” slug-data=”fo-talks-josef-olmert-on-syria-part-1-historic-context”>
FO° Talks: Josef Olmert on Syria, Part 1: Historic Context
In this discussion, Peter Isackson, Fair Observer’s chief strategy officer, and Flavius Mihaies, an investigative journalist with expertise in conflict zones, discuss the evolving geopolitical landscape amidst the ongoing war in Ukraine. The conversation delves into Europe’s response to the Ukraine conflict, the role of the United States and the confusion surrounding the continent’s strategy.
Flavius reflects on the dramatic shift in Europe’s political and psychological landscape following the arrival of Donald Trump in the White House. With his focus on “America First,” the US has distanced itself from European concerns, particularly regarding the war in Ukraine, which many Europeans see as critical to their security. However, while European leaders like French President Emmanuel Macron and British leader Keir Starmer continue to advocate for a more militarized Europe, their actions often conflict with the realities of military capabilities and the strategic interests of other nations.
The US–Europe military divide and the future of NATO
A key theme in the conversation is the growing military divide between Europe and the US, especially when it comes to the ongoing conflict in Ukraine. Flavius points out that the US remains the primary military power supporting Ukraine, while Europe struggles to define its role. As Macron and Starmer push for a more autonomous European defense, the logistical and economic challenges of creating a cohesive military force are becoming increasingly apparent. Flavius questions the viability of European nations achieving a unified defense system, particularly when European military capabilities are far behind those of the US and NATO’s role remains crucial. The disparity in defense capabilities is especially glaring given that European nations, such as France and the United Kingdom, are facing internal political divisions, with opposition parties questioning military strategies and even the very premise of increased defense spending.
From an American perspective, there is also skepticism about Europe’s ability to take on a larger role in the conflict. The US remains focused on short-term objectives, such as containing the growing threat from China, while Europe’s commitment to long-term military engagements like Ukraine’s war remains unclear. Flavius argues that despite these challenges, NATO, with US leadership, continues to be the only coherent force able to counteract Russia’s military ambitions. Without the US, Europe would struggle to maintain a unified front, both militarily and diplomatically.
Europe’s internal divisions and foreign policy challenges
Internal divisions within European nations are also contributing to the confusion surrounding the continent’s foreign policy, particularly in relation to the Ukraine conflict. Flavius notes that Macron’s push for a militarized Europe faces opposition from various factions within France itself, as well as from other European Union member states. While Macron may seek to position himself as a leader of a unified European defense, the reality is that many European citizens and political leaders are not willing to endorse such an aggressive stance. In France, for example, there is significant debate over whether to escalate military involvement in Ukraine, with some advocating for a referendum on the matter. This lack of consensus highlights the difficulty of crafting a unified European position.
Flavius suggests that Macron’s strong statements about European defense and nuclear capabilities may be driven less by a genuine desire to build military strength and more by his political survival. With his presidency nearing its end, Macron may be seeking to define his legacy as a leader of a new, stronger Europe. However, this desire to assert European autonomy is complicated by the reality that Europe’s strategic interests are still closely tied to the US, and Europe’s military capabilities remain insufficient to independently challenge Russia or assert control over its own security.
Proxy war and Europe’s role in negotiations
A central issue discussed is the confusion over Europe’s role. Flavius points out that while European leaders like Macron express concerns over the war’s implications, they are not involved in the crucial negotiations with Russia. Instead, the US has taken the lead in dialogues, notably through the recent talks in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, which have yet to bring European representatives to the table. Flavius suggests that Europe’s lack of direct involvement could be attributed to its reluctance to negotiate peace, as many European nations remain invested in prolonging the conflict. This situation has caused a rift between European leaders and the US, with Trump framing the war as a distraction, while Europe views it as existential.
Peter and Flavius also discuss Macron’s push for a unified European defense, though they both express skepticism about its feasibility. The economic and logistical challenges of creating a cohesive European military force are significant, and the lack of unity within Europe complicates this vision. Furthermore, the question of whether Europe’s security can be separated from US involvement remains uncertain. With NATO’s influence deeply rooted in the continent, Flavius questions whether Europe can truly build a defense system independent of the US
Cultural divide within Ukraine
Another important facet of the conversation is the cultural divide within Ukraine, which Flavius highlights in his article for The American Conservative. The internal conflict within Ukrainian society, particularly the cultural and religious divides between the West and East, complicates any resolution to the war. Flavius argues that the West has failed to address these deep social tensions, focusing instead on military support while ignoring the need for national reconciliation within Ukraine itself.
The division between Ukraine’s western and eastern regions, and their differing allegiances to Russia and the West, further complicates any prospects for peace. Flavius emphasizes that the failure to address these cultural and religious differences within Ukraine itself has left the country vulnerable to external influence and internal strife. Western involvement, while focused on countering Russian aggression, has ignored the complex internal dynamics at play in Ukrainian society. This cultural conflict may play a significant role in how the war is perceived and, ultimately, how it will be resolved.
Europe’s confusion and strategic uncertainty
The discussion concludes with a reflection on the future of Europe and the ongoing confusion surrounding its role in the Ukraine conflict. Flavius suggests that this uncertainty may persist as European leaders struggle to balance their domestic political agendas with the broader geopolitical reality. As Europe continues to grapple with its identity and strategic priorities, the US remains the dominant actor in shaping the future of the conflict, leaving Europe to reassess its place in the global order.
Peter adds that the lack of clarity about Europe’s position is troubling, especially when leaders like Macron advocate for drastic military and defense changes without considering the broader implications for European unity and long-term stability. The disjointed approach to the Ukraine conflict and Europe’s role in it reflects the growing difficulty in navigating the complexities of international relations in an era where global power dynamics are shifting.
Ukrainian religious issues
Flavius highlights a deeply embedded issue in Ukraine, one that stretches beyond its military struggles with Russia: internal divisions, particularly regarding religious freedom, and the failure of Western support in helping Ukraine build democratic institutions.
Flavius elaborates on the creation of a nationalist Orthodox Church in Ukraine, which replaced traditional liturgical practices with modern Ukrainian, supported by President Petro Poroshenko’s government. This move, intended to unify the nation culturally, led to tensions as the church increasingly seized properties from the traditional Orthodox Church. The Orthodox Church of Ukraine, which is heavily backed by the government, increasingly took over the traditional churches, leading to an exacerbation of social and religious divides.
Flavius points out that these religious conflicts are more than symbolic; they reflect the internal fractures within Ukrainian society, where religious identity and cultural nationalism are tightly bound. The violent seizing of church buildings from one denomination to another only fuels social unrest, creating a situation where returning soldiers, fighting on the front lines, find their local churches and communities taken from them, further dividing the people.
Western support and Ukraine’s struggle for democracy
Flavius emphasizes that Ukraine’s struggle is not only a military one but also a battle for democratic values. The West’s support for Ukraine has been disproportionately focused on military aid. While Europe and the US have provided significant amounts of military hardware, such as obsolete and second-hand equipment, they have failed to support Ukraine in strengthening its democratic institutions and civil society.
Ukraine has received financial and military aid, but civil society initiatives — such as those led by Ukrainian lawyers pushing for government transparency and accountability — have received little to no continued backing from the West. Flavius points out that the funding for establishing watchdog bodies, which had initially been supported by the US, dwindled over time, further weakening Ukraine’s internal governance structures. This neglect by the West, Flavius argues, leaves Ukraine vulnerable, as it is unable to build sustainable democratic institutions that could help unite the population in its fight for survival.
Peter raises the question of Ukraine’s potential to be a functioning democracy in the long term, especially given the martial law and the erosion of normal political processes during the ongoing war. While there are efforts from within Ukraine to build a democratic system, Flavius acknowledges that Ukraine still suffers from deep-rooted authoritarian tendencies stemming from its Soviet past.
Flavius cites anecdotal evidence from his conversations with clergy, where the fear of government intervention and property seizure was compared to the harsh Stalinist period. Although Ukraine has a segment of its population dedicated to building vibrant democratic institutions, these aspirations often clash with the lingering realities of authoritarian governance and the state’s control over religious institutions. With a limited ability to hold the government accountable, the future of Ukrainian democracy remains uncertain, especially if Europe and the West continue to overlook this issue.
Europe’s hypocrisy, relations with Russia and political future
The conversation then moves to Europe’s role in the conflict, with Flavius criticizing Europe for sending arms to Ukraine but failing to provide support for the country’s democratic development. While military support is seen as legitimate in the context of Ukraine’s fight for survival, Flavius points out that this kind of support is only one piece of the puzzle. Without European efforts to help Ukraine model itself as a full-fledged democracy, its potential for long-term stability remains in jeopardy.
Flavius emphasizes that Europe has failed to address Ukraine’s need for institutional reform and a functioning democracy. He argues that the lack of support for civil society and democracy is one of the main reasons Ukraine is in such a fragile state today. The hypocrisy lies in Europe’s contradictory approach: While proclaiming support for Ukraine’s sovereignty and democratic aspirations, Europe has largely ignored its responsibility to help Ukraine build those very democratic institutions.
The conversation then shifts to the larger geopolitical context, particularly Europe’s relationship with Russia. Flavius raises the point that Europe’s desire to weaken Russia has led to a complicated and unstable situation, especially for countries like Germany, which had long relied on Russian energy. The war in Ukraine has forced Europe into a precarious position, where the economic fallout from the severance of ties with Russia has left countries like Germany vulnerable.
Flavius explains that Russia’s role in Europe is crucial, and many European leaders are personally invested in maintaining some kind of balance with Russia. Countries like France have historically seen Russia as a strategic ally, and Flavius suggested that the failure to include Russia in a post-World War II security arrangement has exacerbated tensions. The lack of a security framework that includes Russia has contributed to the ongoing conflict, and as the war drags on, Europe is likely to face significant internal political shifts, particularly with the rise of right-wing parties opposed to continued military engagement in Ukraine.
Peter and Flavius discuss the political ramifications of the ongoing conflict for Europe. With the rise of right-wing and populist parties across Europe, many of which are anti-war, the current trajectory of European politics looks uncertain. Flavius notes that this shift is partly a reaction to Europe’s failure to manage the Ukrainian crisis effectively. The economic and social impact of the war, combined with growing disillusionment over Europe’s handling of the situation, is leading to a rise in nationalist sentiment across the continent.
Countries like Germany, Italy and France have seen the rise of parties like the Alternative for Germany (AfD) and Marine Le Pen’s National Rally, both of which are strongly opposed to militarism and have criticized the EU’s stance on Ukraine. This shift, Flavius suggests, could have long-term consequences for the political stability of Europe, particularly if these parties gain more power and influence in the coming years.
Ukraine’s demographic and economic crisis
In the final section of the conversation, Flavius turns to Ukraine’s demographic crisis, which has worsened over the past decade. Ukraine now faces one of the lowest birth rates in the world, with an average of just one child per woman — far below the replacement rate of 2.1 children per woman. This, combined with the country’s loss of population due to emigration and the effects of the war, poses a grave threat to Ukraine’s future.
Flavius points out that Ukraine had already lost around ten million people since independence in 1991, due to corruption and lack of opportunities. The war has led to further population loss, with millions fleeing the country and hundreds of thousands killed or injured. This demographic collapse, he argues, will have long-term consequences for Ukraine’s ability to rebuild itself after the war.
The conversation ends on a sobering note, with Peter asking about the possibility of conflict resolution in Europe, not just for Ukraine but for the broader European context. Flavius reflects on the deep challenges facing Europe, suggesting that the failure to include Russia in a new European security framework is at the heart of the current conflict. The rise of populism and nationalism in Europe, combined with the ongoing war in Ukraine, could destabilize the continent further if a resolution is not found.
Both Peter and Flavius agree that the political and social confusion within Europe is far from resolved and will continue to unfold in the coming months. The future of both Ukraine and Europe remains uncertain, but Flavius suggests that, for the sake of Ukraine, Europe must start addressing its internal divisions and reevaluating its approach to the region.
[Lee Thompson-Kolar edited this piece.]
The views expressed in this article/video are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.
” post-content-short=” In this discussion, Peter Isackson, Fair Observer’s chief strategy officer, and Flavius Mihaies, an investigative journalist with expertise in conflict zones, discuss the evolving geopolitical landscape amidst the ongoing war in Ukraine. The conversation delves into Europe’s response to the…” post_summery=”Fair Observer Chief Strategy Officer Peter Isackson and investigative journalist Flavius Mihaies discuss Europe’s confusion over its role in the Ukraine conflict and the military divide with the US. Flavius criticizes Europe for focusing on military aid without supporting Ukraine’s democratic development, leaving the country vulnerable. He also highlights Europe’s internal divisions and geopolitical uncertainty, exacerbated by rising nationalism.” post-date=”Mar 21, 2025″ post-title=”FO° Talks: Can Europe Digest Its Spurned Vassal State?” slug-data=”fo-talks-can-europe-digest-its-spurned-vassal-state”>
FO° Talks: Can Europe Digest Its Spurned Vassal State?
In his conversation with FO° Chief Strategy Officer Peter Isackson, former Swiss ambassador Jean-Daniel Ruch offers an analysis of the psychological and diplomatic quandary of European leaders taken by surprise when newly installed US President Donald Trump turned the policies of his predecessor, Joe Biden, on their head concerning the war in Ukraine.
Marveling at the difficulty of addressing a challenge that subverts the dominant narrative spread by politicians and the media over the past three years, Ruch regretted the evident lack of foresight and capacity to react positively to the sudden emergence of Realpolitik in European affairs. Focusing on what is now becoming clear — the necessity for the European nations to come together on a plan that will enable the region to define its strategic autonomy — the two analysts weigh the chances of success and examine the obstacles that lie ahead.
Why has it been so difficult for Western nations not just to embrace but even to entertain the idea of indivisible security, which should be a core concern of any nation’s approach to diplomacy? Trump appears to be the first US president sensitive to the seriousness of Russia’s requests, even before Putin, concerning NATO expansion and the warnings about a risk of war expressed by European leaders and even Biden’s CIA director, William Burns, when he was ambassador to Moscow in 2008.
Trump’s 180° switch produced a situation in which what Ruch calls the current cast of leaders must find a way of acknowledging a reality they cannot control. This means swallowing the humiliation of allowing themselves to be led and directed by the nation in charge of the transatlantic alliance, without realizing the risk that policies could be reversed overnight every four years.
The way forward will be arduous, but there are few choices. When political reality stares you in the face, tough decisions must be made. Ruch evoked one sliver of realistic hope that could issue from the courage of Ruch’s own traditionally neutral nation of Switzerland, poised to assume the presidency of the OSCE in 2026. At a time when European unity has never been more fragile, a concerted plan piloted by the Helvetic Republic of Switzerland could provide the occasion to define a new European security framework, no longer dependent on Washington, with the promise of installing an atmosphere of neighborly coexistence and geopolitical stability.
The views expressed in this article/video are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.
” post-content-short=” In his conversation with FO° Chief Strategy Officer Peter Isackson, former Swiss ambassador Jean-Daniel Ruch offers an analysis of the psychological and diplomatic quandary of European leaders taken by surprise when newly installed US President Donald Trump turned the policies of his predecessor,…” post_summery=”President Donald Trump reversed President Joe Biden’s policy on the war in Ukraine and alarmed leaders across Europe. European governments scrambled to respond as the United States shifted away from its recent stance. Former Swiss ambassador Jean-Daniel Ruch says Switzerland may lead a new effort to stabilize European security.” post-date=”Mar 21, 2025″ post-title=”FO° Talks: Donald Trump’s New Bombshells Leave Europe Shellshocked” slug-data=”fo-talks-donald-trumps-new-bombshells-leave-europe-shellshocked”>
FO° Talks: Donald Trump’s New Bombshells Leave Europe Shellshocked
Anton Schauble introduces Mark Tushnet, a leading scholar of constitutional law who has taught at prestigious universities and clerked for US Supreme Court Justice Thurgood Marshall. Mark’s recent book, Who Am I to Judge? Judicial Craft Versus Constitutional Theory, argues that no theory of constitutional interpretation is effective in constraining judicial decision-making, not just the more rigid ones like originalism. Anton, recognizing that theories are often seen as devices to prevent judges from imposing their personal preferences, asks Mark to explain how these theories fail to constrain judges in practice.
Mark explains that constitutional interpretation theories, such as originalism, have become dominant in describing Supreme Court actions. These theories are meant to limit the influence of judges’ personal biases on decisions, but Mark argues that, in reality, none of these theories effectively constrain judges. Despite their intellectual appeal, these theories often become so complicated and flexible that judges can manipulate them to reach preferred outcomes, ultimately rendering them ineffective in curbing personal bias.
Limitations of constitutional interpretation theories
Mark delves deeper into the core problem with constitutional theories: They lack practical applicability in judicial practice. He distinguishes between the academic practice of constructing theories of constitutional interpretation and the judicial practice of applying them. While academics develop these theories with the intent of creating a rigorous framework, judges don’t have the time or resources to engage with these theories in their entirety. Instead, judges become “selective theoretical actors,” choosing among incomplete or partially developed theories that don’t fully constrain their decision-making. Mark argues that judicial practice, therefore, becomes an exercise in applying these theories in a “half-baked” way, which often leads to policy decisions rather than neutral interpretations of the law.
Anton asks whether this is a flaw in the theories themselves or a reflection of the judges’ personal biases. Mark’s answer is nuanced, noting that while some judges may believe they are neutrally applying the law, their decisions inevitably involve policy choices, and they often work within incomplete or improvised interpretations of constitutional theories. This, Mark suggests, is a problem inherent in the theories themselves, as their complexity and vagueness allow judges too much room to influence outcomes.
Mark’s critique is not about rejecting the possibility of having a theory of constitutional interpretation, but rather about recognizing the gap between theoretical construction and practical judicial application. He emphasizes that theories, while designed to constrain, ultimately leave too many opportunities for judges to impose personal preferences. This is exacerbated by the complexity and open-ended nature of these theories, which make it difficult to apply them consistently and in a manner that limits personal biases.
Judicial decision-making as policy-bound
Mark continues to argue that even though the goal is to have judges interpret the law neutrally, judicial decisions often end up being policy-driven. This dynamic is evident in both common law and civil law systems. Anton asks whether this tendency is unique to the common law system or whether civil law systems, with their more detailed legal codes, face similar limitations. Mark expresses skepticism toward the claim that civil law systems inherently offer stronger constraints than common law systems. Though civil law systems may appear more structured in their decision-making, Mark argues that they face similar challenges in applying fixed legal norms to unique and complex cases.
The tension between legal theory and judicial practice becomes more apparent when one considers the challenges judges face when interpreting laws that must be applied to ever-evolving societal issues. Mark contends that the inevitable complexity of real-world cases, combined with the flexibility inherent in both common law and civil law systems, leads to a form of judicial decision-making that is deeply intertwined with policy choices, no matter the legal theory a judge espouses.
Originalism and living constitutionalism
Mark and Anton explore the two most prominent constitutional interpretation theories: originalism and living constitutionalism. Both have their critics and adherents, yet Mark critiques both as flawed practical tools. Originalism, with its emphasis on the US Constitution’s original meaning, can lead to seemingly progressive outcomes, as seen in cases like Employment Division v. Smith and McGirt v. Oklahoma. Mark points out that the richness and complexity of originalist materials allow judges to construct interpretations that can lead to a broad range of outcomes. This flexibility makes it possible for originalist reasoning to support progressive results, but it also reveals how originalism is, in practice, just as malleable as any other interpretive theory.
Living constitutionalism, which argues that the Constitution should evolve to reflect contemporary values, is similarly problematic in Mark’s view. While it seeks to align constitutional interpretation with modern principles, living constitutionalism relies on judges to interpret what contemporary values are. Mark challenges the assumption that judges, who are less democratically accountable than legislators, are better equipped to discern and implement the will of the people. He notes that living constitutionalists often prioritize “deep” values over transient majorities, but this can lead to an undemocratic concentration of power in the judiciary.
The role of judges
The conversation between Mark and Anton explores the evolving understanding of the role of judges in interpreting the law. As they discuss the limitations of strict theories like originalism or living constitutionalism, Mark argues for a more nuanced approach that embraces pluralism, experience and judgment. He contends that judges should think of themselves primarily as lawyers, with a responsibility to apply legal reasoning pragmatically rather than simply adhering to abstract theories. This allows for more flexibility and the inclusion of policy considerations, which should be balanced with the weight of prior decisions. While acknowledging the potential dangers of judicial activism, Mark highlights the importance of integrating personal judgment within the bounds of legal tradition.
Mark also critiques the idea that judges must strictly adhere to theoretical frameworks when deciding cases. Instead, he suggests that a good judge relies on their “lived experience” — an intuitive understanding developed through practical legal experience rather than abstract theorizing. This intuition helps judges navigate complex cases by blending experience and judgment. Furthermore, Mark rejects the idea that judges are merely deciding what the law “should” be, arguing that their decisions are legitimate as long as they are “visibly lawlike.” This approach, he believes, aligns judges more closely with democratic principles than rigid theories that may detach them from real-world legal contexts.
Holmes and Cardozo: ideal judges
In the latter part of the discussion, Mark reflects on two great justices, Oliver Wendell Holmes and Benjamin Cardozo, both of whom exemplified the qualities of a great judge without being overly constrained by theory. Holmes, deeply shaped by his Civil War experience, maintained a practical, fatalistic approach to the law, viewing it as a force beyond personal ideals. Cardozo, on the other hand, demonstrated intellectual curiosity, delving into fields like psychology and sociology to inform his legal reasoning. These justices were not bound by a singular theory but drew upon their broad experiences and knowledge to craft decisions that had lasting impact.
Mark advocates for a more expansive understanding of what qualifies a judge, urging the consideration of varied life experiences and intellectual curiosity over strict professional paths, such as prior judicial experience. He suggests that the current focus on high-level appellate litigators limits the diversity of perspectives on the Supreme Court. Instead, the ideal judge should possess wide-ranging experience, an openness to diverse fields of thought and a strong sense of human empathy. This blend of practical experience and intellectual exploration, he concludes, is key to producing wise and effective judicial decision-making.
[Lee Thompson-Kolar edited this piece.]
The views expressed in this article/video are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.
” post-content-short=” Anton Schauble introduces Mark Tushnet, a leading scholar of constitutional law who has taught at prestigious universities and clerked for US Supreme Court Justice Thurgood Marshall. Mark’s recent book, Who Am I to Judge? Judicial Craft Versus Constitutional Theory, argues that no theory of…” post_summery=”Anton Schauble speaks with Professor Mark Tushnet about the provocative claim that all theories of constitutional interpretation are wrong. Their conversation covers originalism, living constitutionalism and what judges actually think of themselves as doing. What should a judge do? Can they go beyond simply stating what the law means?” post-date=”Mar 19, 2025″ post-title=”FO° Talks: Every Theory of Constitutional Interpretation Is Wrong” slug-data=”fo-talks-every-theory-of-constitutional-interpretation-is-wrong”>
FO° Talks: Every Theory of Constitutional Interpretation Is Wrong
Discussing the implications of US policies on Europe and the growing threat to European unity, Atul Singh and Sebastian Schäffer explore the geopolitical challenges Europe faces and its role in the unfolding global order. Sebastian paints a grim picture for Europe, describing how the United States, long regarded as a trusted ally, has started to undermine Europe’s interests. He refers to several recent developments, including US President Donald Trump’s uncoordinated talks with Russian President Vladimir Putin, US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth’s comments about Europe’s responsibility for its own security and JD Vance’s assertion at the Munich Security Conference that Europe’s greatest threats lie within, rather than from Russia or China. These actions, Sebastian argues, reflect a shift in the global order, one where the US no longer plays a stabilizing role in Europe, leaving the continent vulnerable.
Sebastian believes Europe is now at a critical juncture. He emphasizes that while the European Union has been forged through crises in the past, the current moment is one of “endgame.” He warns that without decisive action, the world could enter what he calls the “authoritarian century,” marking the decline of democratic values. The failure to act swiftly could result in Europe’s disintegration, with some nations drifting towards authoritarianism or even exiting the European Union, as seen with Brexit.
The growing divide within Europe
Europe is unable to form a unified response to crises like the war in Ukraine. Sebastian notes that countries like Hungary are already aligning themselves with Russia, while other European leaders are hesitant to fully commit to defending Ukraine. The struggle to forge a united European front in the face of external threats could undermine the EU’s future, potentially leading to a collapse of its unity and the values it represents.
Sebastian highlights that the EU’s internal divisions are further compounded by economic, political and ideological rifts between member states. While some countries are increasingly skeptical of the EU’s centralizing tendencies, others remain firmly committed to deepening integration. These conflicting priorities are especially evident in the differing responses to Russia’s aggression and the broader security challenges in Europe. The rise of Eurosceptic and far-right movements in several EU countries further complicates efforts to present a united front against external threats. These movements could weaken the EU’s capacity to act decisively and protect its democratic ideals, especially if populist leaders gain more influence in key European nations.
The growing divide within Europe also threatens to undermine the EU’s cohesion in the long run. If member states can no longer agree on fundamental issues such as defense policy and foreign alliances, the future of the EU’s integration process could be in jeopardy. Sebastian warns that Europe is at a crossroads: It must either unify and strengthen its institutions or risk fragmenting under the pressure of internal and external challenges.
The role of nationalism and sovereignty
The rise of nationalism and calls for greater national sovereignty have also played a significant role in undermining European unity. Sebastian points out that while the EU has long been a model of economic integration, its political ambitions have been increasingly challenged by nationalist movements across the continent. Leaders like Hungary’s Viktor Orbán, Italy’s Giorgia Meloni and France’s Marine Le Pen have openly criticized the EU’s centralization of power and pushed for policies that prioritize national sovereignty over European cooperation.
These nationalist movements, often fueled by economic dissatisfaction and cultural anxiety, pose a significant challenge to the EU’s future. While the EU has been successful in promoting peace and economic prosperity, it has struggled to address the concerns of those who feel left behind by globalization and integration. In countries like Hungary, where there is a growing alignment with Russia, the EU’s ability to hold member states accountable for their foreign policy decisions is increasingly questioned. This growing nationalism could eventually lead to further fragmentation as countries prioritize their own interests at the expense of EU solidarity.
At the same time, Sebastian acknowledges that there is a countercurrent within Europe. Leaders like French President Emmanuel Macron have pushed for deeper European integration, proposing ideas such as a common European defense force and a more unified foreign policy. However, as Sebastian points out, this vision faces significant obstacles from nationalist governments and a general reluctance among some member states to cede more sovereignty to Brussels. The future of European integration will likely depend on the ability of political leaders to reconcile these competing forces and find a path forward that balances national interests with the need for a stronger, more unified Europe.
European security and unity
The discussion also touches on the future of European integration. While some view the economic benefits of the EU as its primary success, Sebastian refutes the notion that democracy and human rights should be secondary to economic prosperity. He argues that the EU’s past enlargements were not merely economic but also about stabilizing young democracies in Central and Eastern Europe. The integration of these countries has proven successful, both politically and economically, and demonstrates the EU’s broader role in promoting peace and democracy across the continent.
Sebastian also explores the possibility of Europe evolving into a “Fortress Europe,” advocating for a common defense and security architecture. However, the varying threat perceptions among member states make such a vision challenging. For example, while Poland faces a direct threat from Russia, countries like Portugal may not see the same urgency. This discrepancy in threat assessment could make it difficult for the EU to maintain its cohesion and respond effectively to the rising geopolitical challenges.
The conversation addresses the broader implications of the ongoing conflict in Ukraine. While some argue that a realpolitik approach is needed to end the bloodshed, Sebastian contends that a peace agreement that rewards Russian aggression would set a dangerous precedent. Europe, he argues, must not abandon its commitment to democratic values and should resist rewarding an aggressor like Russia. The future of Europe depends on maintaining its unity, strengthening its defenses, and staying true to the principles that have guided its integration for decades.
Bullying, geopolitical tensions and the US
International bullying, particularly the US’s, is increasing. Atul points out that the US is acting like a bully in international politics, citing its territorial ambitions toward Greenland and Canada, and threatening stance towards allies like Panama. He questions whether standing up to bullies would also mean confronting the US. Sebastian agrees, emphasizing that Europe must take a stronger stance against these actions, particularly with regard to threats toward nations like Denmark and Canada. He criticizes the US’s behavior, likening it to an imperial mindset, with Trump pushing for peace in regions like Gaza and Ukraine while simultaneously threatening allies.
Sebastian highlights the challenges facing Europe, including its military and economic weaknesses. He notes that Europe lacks the resources to defend Ukraine adequately, pointing to the lack of a unified defense strategy and economic instability. Additionally, Europe faces internal challenges, such as the rise of far-right political movements, which complicates its ability to form a unified front against external threats. In response to these realities, Sebastian discusses the necessity of a balanced vision for Europe — one that recognizes the importance of European integration, but also addresses the rising challenges posed by extreme political factions and the growing influence of external powers like the US and Russia.
The social market vs. turbo-capitalism: Europe’s model of stability
Shifting to a deeper analysis of Europe’s political landscape, the discussion turns to the larger ideological battle between the social market economy of Europe and the turbo-capitalism promoted by the US. Sebastian defends Europe’s social market model, pointing out that despite criticisms, it has been successful in fostering economic growth while ensuring a welfare state that protects citizens in times of need. This contrasts with the US’s system, where the lack of social safety nets can lead to economic ruin for individuals in the event of a crisis. Sebastian stresses that Europe’s regulatory framework, while sometimes criticized for being bureaucratic, has led to the protection of workers’ rights and a more stable economy compared to the volatility seen in turbo-capitalist systems.
Atul echoes this sentiment, noting that in the US and India, a lack of such protections can lead to catastrophic outcomes for ordinary people. Sebastian acknowledges that while Europe is not without flaws, especially in the context of rising far-right influence and political fragmentation, there is still a possibility for reform and progress. He argues that Europe must better communicate the advantages of its social market model, including labor rights, healthcare and worker protections, as the antidote to the negative effects of extreme market-driven capitalism.
The conversation concludes with a sobering look at the ongoing war in Ukraine. Sebastian acknowledges that any ceasefire will come with significant costs, particularly for the Ukrainian people, who will bear the brunt of the conflict’s consequences. He argues that Europe, while bearing the financial burden of reconstruction, must work together to strengthen its collective security and economic model, ensuring that it is not solely dependent on the US.
Ultimately, the EU’s role in securing peace and rebuilding after the war is crucial. While the road ahead is challenging, Sebastian remains optimistic that European cooperation could pave the way forward, even in the face of mounting global tensions.
[Lee Thompson-Kolar edited this piece.]
The views expressed in this article/video are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.
” post-content-short=” Discussing the implications of US policies on Europe and the growing threat to European unity, Atul Singh and Sebastian Schäffer explore the geopolitical challenges Europe faces and its role in the unfolding global order. Sebastian paints a grim picture for Europe, describing how the United…” post_summery=”The growing geopolitical challenges Europe faces highlight how US policies undermine European unity. Internal divisions and rising nationalism threaten the EU’s cohesion; Europe should strengthen its institutions or else it risks fragmentation. It is vital that Europe maintain democratic values and resist external pressures, particularly from the US and Russia.” post-date=”Mar 18, 2025″ post-title=”FO° Talks: Trump and Co. Sell Europe Up the River. Now What?” slug-data=”fo-talks-trump-and-co-sell-europe-up-the-river-now-what”>
FO° Talks: Trump and Co. Sell Europe Up the River. Now What?
In recent times, global markets have shown increasing signs of anxiety and uncertainty, as investors brace for a potential disruption in major economies, particularly the United States. The dynamics surrounding the US economy, alongside geopolitical developments and domestic policy shifts, are causing alarm among investors and analysts.
One of the most concerning aspects is the inversion of expectations regarding US and Chinese debt. Previously considered rock-solid, US government debt is now perceived as riskier than its Chinese counterpart. Meanwhile, gold prices, often viewed as a safe haven, are hitting record highs, further signaling the market’s growing fears.
This situation is particularly worrisome for investors and economists who have long raised concerns about the Chinese economy’s resilience. Despite China’s enormous size and influence, its economic stability is far from guaranteed. Factors such as a struggling real estate market, declining demand, financial brittleness and an authoritarian political system have all contributed to an uncertain future for the Chinese economy. Additionally, the controversial zero-Covid policy and the broader global trend toward protectionism have raised doubts about China’s ability to sustain or even grow its exports.
Despite these concerns, markets seem to have responded differently, with yields on Chinese debt even surpassing those of US bonds in some instances after the Ukraine war. This is particularly concerning, as it suggests that markets view Chinese debt as relatively more stable, despite the numerous vulnerabilities in China’s economic structure. The primary driver behind this shift, analysts suggest, is growing skepticism about the US economy’s future prospects.
Political paralysis and economic instability
The underlying cause of the increasing market instability can be traced to the political paralysis in the US government. Over the years, political dysfunction and gridlock in Congress have made it nearly impossible to pass meaningful fiscal reforms. The ongoing debt ceiling debates, disagreements over taxation and expenditure policies and the general dysfunction in addressing long-term issues have left the US economy vulnerable to shocks. As markets react to this uncertainty, investors have grown more wary of US debt, a once-reliable asset.
A key indicator of this growing unease is the sharp rise in gold prices. Historically, gold serves as a store of value, particularly during times of financial instability. The rising price of gold signals that investors are seeking safety in assets that are not tied to the performance of any particular government or currency. The surge in gold prices, alongside rising US bond yields, paints a troubling picture of the increasing likelihood of financial instability in the West.
The collapse of Silicon Valley Bank (SVB) in 2023 further highlighted the vulnerabilities in the financial system. The failure of the bank, triggered by rising interest rates and a subsequent loss of depositor confidence, resulted in a rapid bank run, with $42 billion withdrawn in a single day. While the federal government intervened to restore stability, the failure of SVB was a stark reminder of how quickly financial crises can unfold, especially in a fragile economic environment.
Broader implications for global markets
The impact of US instability on global markets cannot be overstated. As the US remains a key economic powerhouse, instability within its borders has far-reaching consequences for other regions, including Europe and China. The interconnectedness of global financial systems means that even small tremors in one economy can lead to cascading effects across the globe. Emerging markets, particularly in Asia and India, have already experienced significant market downturns since late 2023, underscoring the vulnerability of global markets to disruptions in the US and Western economies.
The immediate concern is the potential for a financial meltdown, a scenario that many analysts fear could occur sooner rather than later. With the US political system unable to address key economic challenges — such as the growing budget deficit and long-term debt — the risks of a recession or depression are increasing. Trade tensions, particularly between the US and China, are likely to exacerbate these challenges, potentially triggering a broader global slowdown.
A critical issue lies in the US government’s approach to economic policy. As the administration seeks to implement tariffs and reduce spending, the long-term effects could be damaging to both domestic and global markets. The US economy, which has been a driving force for growth in China and Europe, may face increasing pressure as tariffs dampen international trade and reduce employment in key industries. Further, cuts to research and development spending and other critical investments could stifle innovation, reduce economic dynamism and drive up the deficit.
Donald Trump’s return brings uncertainty
Compounding the situation is the rise of US President Donald Trump and his return to national prominence. His policies, especially his stance on tariffs and government spending, are reshaping the US economic landscape. While some may argue that his administration’s economic policies have led to short-term gains, the long-term consequences of his approach remain uncertain. The increasing protectionist measures and cuts to government spending in certain areas are likely to create more economic turmoil, particularly if the US economy fails to adapt to the changing global environment.
The combination of rising tariffs, reduced government spending and political gridlock is creating an environment in which financial stability is increasingly in question. While economists agree that the US must address its long-term debt issues, the current trajectory of economic policy is causing increasing concern. The lack of meaningful political reform and the failure to agree on solutions to address the growing deficit are exacerbating fears that the US economy could be on the brink of a major crisis.
Troubling times ahead
As global markets become increasingly nervous and volatile, the likelihood of a financial meltdown grows. While it is impossible to predict the exact timing of such a crisis, the combination of rising US bond yields, soaring gold prices and ongoing political dysfunction suggests that troubling times lie ahead. The interconnected nature of the global economy means that instability in the US will have far-reaching consequences, affecting economies in Europe, Asia and beyond.
Given the current trajectory, it is crucial for policymakers to address these concerns before the situation escalates further. However, with political gridlock preventing meaningful reform, the outlook for the global economy remains uncertain. As investors and analysts continue to monitor the evolving situation, one thing is clear: The world is entering a period of heightened volatility and unpredictability, and financial stability is no longer a given. The coming years will likely bring new challenges, and the world will need to adapt to an increasingly uncertain and complex economic environment.
[Lee Thompson-Kolar edited this piece.]
The views expressed in this article/video are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.
” post-content-short=” In recent times, global markets have shown increasing signs of anxiety and uncertainty, as investors brace for a potential disruption in major economies, particularly the United States. The dynamics surrounding the US economy, alongside geopolitical developments and domestic policy shifts, are…” post_summery=”Global markets are growing increasingly uncertain, due to concerns over US economic instability, political gridlock and rising gold prices. Despite vulnerabilities in China’s economy, its debt is seen as more stable than US debt, reflecting growing skepticism about the US’s future. These factors, combined with protectionism and geopolitical tensions, signal an imminent financial crisis.” post-date=”Mar 13, 2025″ post-title=”FO° Exclusive: Global Markets Are Now Extremely Nervous” slug-data=”fo-exclusive-global-markets-are-now-extremely-nervous”>
FO° Exclusive: Global Markets Are Now Extremely Nervous
Germany’s recent election results have brought to the forefront the deepening fractures within the nation’s politics and society. The election showcased a significant shift in the political landscape, with the rise of the Alternative for Germany (AfD), a far-right party that has gained considerable support, particularly in the former East German territories. This, in conjunction with a weakening of the center-left Social Democratic Party (SPD) and a fragmented political environment, reveals the complexities Germany faces in its efforts to govern effectively.
A divided political landscape
The election results underscored the ongoing fragmentation of Germany’s political system. The SPD, led by Chancellor Olaf Scholz, saw a significant decline, securing only 16.4% of the vote. While this result was expected due to the party’s struggles in recent years, it has led to a situation where the SPD has lost much of its influence in shaping the nation’s future. On the other hand, the Christian Democrats (CDU/CSU), while victorious, achieved only 28.6% of the vote. This result demonstrates that even the center-right, long the dominant force in German politics, is no longer able to secure a decisive win without relying on coalitions.
The rise of the AfD, which secured 20.8% of the vote, is perhaps the most striking outcome of this election. Although their support is still strongest in the former East Germany, where they garnered 29.7% of the vote, the AfD is beginning to make inroads into the West, achieving 13% of the vote in regions that were once firmly supportive of the CDU/CSU. This growing influence of the AfD highlights the increasing polarization of German politics and society, driven in part by economic insecurity, immigration concerns and the cultural tensions surrounding globalization.
In addition to the rise of the AfD, the election results also revealed the diminished strength of the SPD, the Greens and the Free Democratic Party (FDP). These parties, which had formed the previous traffic light coalition government, struggled to present a unified front. The fractious nature of this coalition led to inefficiencies in governance and left the electorate dissatisfied. The lack of progress on key issues such as inflation, immigration and economic reform contributed to the overall sense of disillusionment with the current political establishment.
The roots of AfD support: economic struggles and immigration concerns
The AfD’s strong performance can be attributed to a combination of factors, with two key issues standing out: economic discontent and concerns over immigration. Germany’s economy has struggled in recent years, with no GDP growth for several consecutive years. The country has faced multiple crises, from the effects of the Russia–Ukraine war to challenges stemming from global inflation. These economic difficulties have taken a toll on the German population, particularly in the former East, where unemployment rates remain higher and economic opportunities more limited.
Moreover, immigration has become a deeply divisive issue in German society. With a growing percentage of the population born outside of Germany, many citizens feel a sense of cultural insecurity and fear that the nation’s identity is being eroded. The AfD has capitalized on these fears, advocating for tighter immigration controls and a reassertion of German values. Their message has resonated particularly in the East, where the legacy of reunification remains a source of tension.
While Germany does require immigration to address its demographic challenges and labor shortages, the rapid pace of immigration has created a perception of cultural and economic strain. This issue has been exacerbated by the ongoing debates over asylum policies and the EU’s handling of migration. The AfD’s success can thus be seen as a reaction to the perceived failure of the political establishment to address these concerns effectively.
The CDU’s shift toward the far-right
In response to the AfD’s growing influence, the CDU, under the leadership of Friedrich Merz, has begun to shift its stance toward the far-right. Merz, a former lawyer with ties to major international firms, including BlackRock, has sought to consolidate the center-right vote by adopting some of the AfD’s positions, particularly on issues like immigration. His proposals for stricter asylum laws and the tightening of border controls echo the policies championed by the AfD and reflect the growing pressure on the CDU to adopt a tougher stance on migration.
Merz’s strategy, however, raises questions about the future direction of the CDU and its relationship with the AfD. While some analysts argue that the CDU is attempting to outflank the AfD on the right, others warn that this could further erode the party’s centrist identity and deepen the political polarization in Germany. The shift to the right is already being felt in the party’s rhetoric, with Merz calling for deregulation of the economy and stronger defense policies in line with the rising nationalist sentiment in Europe.
The impact of Germany’s political instability on Europe
Germany’s political instability and economic challenges have broader implications for the future of Europe. As the heart of the European Union, Germany’s struggles to maintain political cohesion and economic stability could have far-reaching consequences for the entire continent. A fractured Germany is unlikely to provide the leadership needed to navigate the complex geopolitical challenges facing Europe, from the ongoing conflict in Ukraine to the growing threat posed by Russia.
The lack of a strong, unified German government also undermines Europe’s ability to respond effectively to global challenges. With the United States increasingly focused on domestic issues and shifting its attention away from Europe, the continent may find itself exposed to geopolitical risks. In the absence of a coherent European strategy, populist leaders like Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin could exploit Europe’s weaknesses, further undermining the region’s influence on the global stage.
Germany’s failure to address its internal divisions could result in a Europe that is fragmented, weakened and increasingly susceptible to external pressures. As the continent grapples with an aging population, economic stagnation and rising political extremism, the prospect of a more cohesive EU seems increasingly unlikely.
A long road ahead
Germany’s political future is uncertain, with deep divisions in society and a lack of consensus on key issues. The rise of the AfD and the CDU’s shift toward the far-right reflect the growing dissatisfaction with the political establishment and the challenges facing Germany in the 21st century. As the country grapples with economic stagnation, immigration concerns and a fractured political system, the path forward will require difficult compromises and painful reforms. Without a strong and unified government, Germany risks losing its leadership role in Europe, leaving the continent vulnerable to external threats and internal disarray. The coming years will be critical in determining whether Germany can overcome its political paralysis and reclaim its position as a stable and effective force in Europe and the world.
[Lee Thompson-Kolar edited this piece.]
The views expressed in this article/video are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.
” post-content-short=” Germany’s recent election results have brought to the forefront the deepening fractures within the nation’s politics and society. The election showcased a significant shift in the political landscape, with the rise of the Alternative for Germany (AfD), a far-right party that has gained…” post_summery=”Germany’s recent election results highlight deepening political fractures, with the rise of the far-right Alternate for Deutschland and the weakening of the center-left Social Democratic Party. Economic struggles and immigration concerns have fueled AfD’s support, especially in former East Germany. This instability could undermine Germany’s leadership in Europe, leaving the continent vulnerable.” post-date=”Mar 06, 2025″ post-title=”FO° Exclusive: Old Ghosts Come Roaring Back in New Germany” slug-data=”fo-exclusive-old-ghosts-come-roaring-back-in-new-germany”>
FO° Exclusive: Old Ghosts Come Roaring Back in New Germany
The geopolitical landscape has been significantly shaped by US President Donald Trump’s transactional approach to international relations. His administration’s policies regarding Panama, Canada, Mexico and the broader Gulf of Mexico region, as well as his handling of crises in places like Gaza, provide a distinct lens through which to view his mindset.
The framework under which he operates is one that embraces power politics, a belief that the strongest force holds sway and deals are transactional — each party gives something up in exchange for tangible benefits. This is the essence of his philosophy, one that redefines diplomacy as a zero-sum game. This ideology was dramatically evident in his recent AI-generated video, which paints an idyllic, fantastical version of Gaza’s future — one in which violence and despair are replaced with beachside leisure, belly dancers and the inevitable presence of billionaires like Elon Musk. This is all set to the backdrop of a new world order with Trump as its architect.
The absurdity of the video is apparent, but its most striking element is the way it is embraced by those around Trump. Instead of distancing himself from such a fantastical portrayal, he has leaned into it. The video, which was meant to showcase a utopia, reveals a mindset in which Trump sees the world as a place where countries, particularly those in the developing world, are reduced to mere settings for the grandeur of global elites. This worldview, troubling as it may be, garners support from certain quarters.
Many have reacted to this video. Commentors praise Trump’s vision for a world where these “pesky” developing nations are reduced to backdrops. Their comments focus on economic growth and the notion that such areas like Gaza should simply be incorporated into a commercial system that benefits those in power. It reflects a dangerous, imperialistic outlook that distorts how we should view global cooperation and power dynamics.
However, this vision is not one that is universally accepted, even among those who support Trump. While the video highlights his transactional style — offering deals, even at the cost of human suffering — it also reveals the continued support of those on the far-right and isolationist factions of the population. This underscores how Trump’s appeal lies in his ability to portray himself as a figure who can solve problems with direct, albeit harsh, solutions.
The real threat lies not in his policies alone, but in the fact that his worldview is growing popular. For countries like Ukraine, this presents a terrifying prospect: The reality of international law and collective defense systems is increasingly under attack.
Russia, Ukraine and the limits of military power
Trump’s approach to Russia, particularly in relation to Ukraine, further underscores his transactional nature. He has consistently hinted at providing Russian President Vladimir Putin with an exit from the Ukraine conflict, claiming that his pragmatic approach could bring about peace.
However, Trump’s focus on Russia’s military power misses the real threat: Russian intelligence. It is not the Russian military that should be feared most, but rather the country’s ongoing, sophisticated espionage efforts aimed at destabilizing democracies. These operations are often low-cost but high-reward, changing the trajectory of a nation through subversive means. Whether it’s influencing public opinion, assassinating political figures or shaping electoral outcomes, Russia’s intelligence services have been successful in destabilizing countries and shifting their allegiances.
In Ukraine, Russia’s intelligence services have capitalized on divisions, turning the situation into a proxy war of influence. Meanwhile, Trump continues to downplay the conventional military threat posed by Russia. He focuses instead on superficial geopolitical concerns, like Ukraine’s access to rare-earth minerals, which he cites as a key point of leverage in his negotiations.
Ukraine is caught in the middle. Its sovereignty is threatened by not just Russian military aggression, but the geopolitical manipulations of the United States, which seeks to extract concessions from the country. The idea of a “transactional” peace is, at its core, about securing economic resources and political influence, rather than seeking a lasting solution to the conflict.
NATO and the decline of multilateralism
Another crucial aspect of Trump’s geopolitical approach is his treatment of NATO, which he has openly criticized. He has repeatedly said that the US should not be responsible for defending Europe unless European nations increase their defense spending. While this stance has garnered support from certain segments of the American population, it has left Europe in a position to navigate the complexities of security and defense without reliable American support.
The fragility of NATO is becoming evident. Trump refused to commit to Article 5 of the NATO treaty, which states that an attack on one NATO member is an attack on all. Now countries like Germany question the alliance’s future.
This shift in US policy could have dramatic repercussions for Europe, particularly as internal divisions grow. Countries like Germany and France, historically the anchors of European unity, are struggling to maintain cohesion in the face of external threats. With Trump’s isolationist rhetoric and the growing instability within the European Union, the idea of a unified European defense system seems increasingly distant. The concept of NATO, originally designed to counter the Soviet threat, now risks irrelevance as Trump’s insistence on transactional deals further erodes its foundations.
The future of global diplomacy and economic fallout
Looking beyond Europe, Trump’s transactional approach to global diplomacy has far-reaching consequences. For instance, if China–Taiwan tensions further escalate, Taiwan could be left to navigate its fate without American intervention. Trump’s reluctance to engage in foreign conflicts or intervene in disputes unless it serves American economic interests represents a broader trend of disengagement from traditional global leadership roles. This shift is particularly concerning for smaller nations that have relied on American support for their security and sovereignty.
The Global South is similarly vulnerable in this new era of transactional diplomacy. Countries in this region, often caught between the competing interests of global powers, are left with few options other than to accept deals on the terms of stronger nations. As the world moves toward a more fragmented, bilateral approach to diplomacy, smaller countries are finding it harder to assert their interests or secure meaningful alliances. The return of de facto gunboat diplomacy, in which stronger powers impose their will on weaker nations, signals a regression to a more imperialistic world order, one in which global cooperation and multilateral institutions are sidelined.
The world in flux
The global order, as we have known it, is in a state of flux. The erosion of multilateralism, the rise of transactional politics and the growing dominance of strongman figures like Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping signal a dramatic shift in international relations.
For nations like the US, this might seem advantageous in the short term. After all, bilateral deals can offer immediate benefits. However, the long-term consequences for global stability are profound. With Europe increasingly on its own, Ukraine stuck between competing powers and the world’s smaller nations left vulnerable, the future of international diplomacy seems uncertain at best.
For investors, this geopolitical uncertainty signals a need for caution. With protectionist policies and nationalist sentiments gaining traction, global markets may experience volatility. Domestic producers may benefit from these shifts, but the broader implications for global trade and investment are yet to be fully realized. As the global power structure continues to evolve, those who navigate this new world with foresight will be best positioned to weather the coming storm.
[Lee Thompson-Kolar edited this piece.]
The views expressed in this article/video are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.
” post-content-short=” The geopolitical landscape has been significantly shaped by US President Donald Trump’s transactional approach to international relations. His administration’s policies regarding Panama, Canada, Mexico and the broader Gulf of Mexico region, as well as his handling of crises in places like…” post_summery=”US President Donald Trump’s transactional approach to international politics focuses on power and economic interests while undermining multilateral diplomacy, as seen in his handling of Gaza and Ukraine. His dismissal of NATO weakens alliances, leaving Europe vulnerable. This shift towards bilateral deals and unilateral action erodes global stability, empowering stronger nations at the expense of weaker ones.” post-date=”Mar 04, 2025″ post-title=”FO° Exclusive: The New US–Russia–Ukraine–Europe Soap Opera” slug-data=”fo-exclusive-the-new-us-russia-ukraine-europe-soap-opera”>
FO° Exclusive: The New US–Russia–Ukraine–Europe Soap Opera
[On December 31, 2024, we predicted seven developments for 2025 and boldly went where only fools, angels and astrologers dare to go. So, what can we expect in 2025? To borrow words from the military, a more volatile, uncertain, complex and ambiguous (VUCA) world. What follows is the entire seven-part discussion. If you would like to read this piece as a clickable magazine, please click below.]
A Turbulent Donald Trump Second Presidency
US President Donald Trump won the election by promising more secure borders and higher tariffs. Now that he is in office, he will clamp down on immigration. Trump and his team believe in protectionism and isolationism. The underlying idea is to bring back manufacturing jobs to the US. So, expect higher tariffs. Lower immigration is likely to lead to economic harm. Tighter labor markets, higher costs for businesses and increased inflation are likely to follow.
As an issue, immigration has created a divide within Trump’s camp. The trigger was his selection of Sriram Krishnan as senior adviser for AI in his administration. Krishnan is a Tamil Brahmin (Tam Brahm) who was born in India. He did his undergrad at SRM Institute of Science and Technology (SRMIST) and is a general partner of American venture capital firm Andreessen Horowitz. This high-achieving Tam Brahm heads the firm’s London office and is pals with both former British Prime Minister Boris Johnson and Tesla and X CEO Elon Musk.
Krishnan’s appointment led to a backlash from the Make America Great Again (MAGA) base. Laura Loomer, a MAGA political activist and Internet personality, took issue with it. Vivek Ramaswamy and Musk, the two co-chairs of the newly proposed Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE) rode out to Krishnan’s defense. So did former PayPal executive David Sacks, whom Trump has tapped to be White House AI and cryptocurrency tsar. The war of words played out on X, the new bastion of free speech.
The MAGA crowd argues that the tech industry imports Indian workers because they are cheap. These Indians put downward pressure on American wages. Trump’s finance and tech bros, on the other hand, argue that there are not enough Americans to do tech jobs and thus the tech industry needs to bring in foreign workers. This controversy will continue to divide Trump’s camp in the months ahead.
Trump’s tariffs will accelerate the creation of two contending economic systems. Such a situation existed during the Cold War, but since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the global economy has become more integrated than ever. However, the American and Chinese economies have now grown increasingly separate from each other. This trend will accelerate.
Importantly, US global leadership will weaken. Trump will pursue unilateralist, isolationist and contentious policies. So, we will see increased fraying of international norms and weakening of US alliances in Europe, the Middle East and Asia.
The New Science and Technology Race Is Heating Up
In just the next decade — even the next five years — AI will be performing most tasks better than humans. It will also be more efficient. The shocking question our societies must answer now appears to be, “Who will be the master, AI or humans?” Even the profoundly cautious National Intelligence Council warns that AI may pose “existential threats … that could damage life on a global scale” and that “require the development of resilient strategies to survive.”
For the first time in ten thousand years of civilization, humanity faces an entity that will disrupt us, may control us and could even threaten our existence. Even if AI does not take over humanity, its impact on global employment, for both white- and blue-collar workers, could well disrupt societies and traditional ways of life.
In a poll of AI experts, 18% were excited at near-term prospects, 42% were equally excited and concerned and 37% were more concerned than excited about the changes in the “humans-plus-tech” evolution they expect to see by 2035. Numerous studies estimate that AI will eliminate the need for anywhere from seven to 48% of all jobs within 15 years. Kai-Fu Lee, one of the world’s leading experts on the subject, estimates that AI will eliminate the need for about 38% of all jobs by the early 2030s.
AI will also concentrate wealth in the few corporations and countries that have the financial and technical resources to develop and exploit this technology. Large AI firms in the US like Meta, Google and Microsoft will emerge as winners. So will Chinese companies like Tencent, Alibaba and Baidu.
Experts note, too, that wealth distribution will become even more unequal, with the top 1% of the population reaping most of the profits. Much of the rest of humanity will be in danger of losing its livelihoods. The US and China together are likely to capture 70% of the over $15 trillion that AI is estimated to add to the global economy by 2030.
In addition to an AI race, a new space race is also underway. Both the US and China are racing to go to Mars. The former expects to get there by 2027–2028, while the latter is planning for 2028. Space is becoming increasingly militarized as well. Surveillance satellites, missile defense and anti-satellite technologies are increasingly important.
Governments and private players will invest an estimated $1 trillion in the space sector. SpaceX is developing a fully reusable, two-stage super heavy-lift launch vehicle called Starship. At 122 meters (equivalent to a 35-story building), Starship can currently carry 90 metric tons and will soon double that. SpaceX has launched Starship six times and plans 100–400 launches annually within one to three years.
A third technological race is on in the renewable energy industry. The majority of solar panels and batteries currently come from China. Electric vehicles (EVs) in China cost a third less than in Europe and the US. China subsidizes EVs handsomely. Furthermore, the Chinese EV industry has technological and production advantages over its competitors.
Global EV sales are projected to grow by 30% in 2025 and reach 15.1 million. In 2024, 11.6 million EVs were sold. They comprise 13.2% of total vehicle sales. This market share is estimated to grow year-on-year despite the Trump administration’s lack of enthusiasm for EVs.
Demand for electricity is rising significantly. Increasingly, renewables are supplying this electricity. In 2025, renewables will surpass coal to become the largest source of electricity for the first time in history.
The Turbulent Middle East Will Cool Down a Bit
Israel has emerged as the big winner in the latest Middle Eastern conflict. The Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) have weakened Hamas. In Lebanon, the IDF decapitated Hezbollah and destroyed the Shia militant group’s assets. In Syria, Sunni rebels have seized Damascus, and Baathist dictator Bashar al-Assad has fled to Moscow. During the upheaval in Syria, the IDF seized all of the Golan Heights. It also destroyed the country’s entire air force, almost all of its navy and most of its other military assets.
Previously, Syria was a key Iranian ally and fought many wars against Israel. The Assad family belonged to the country’s Alawite minority, which follows a form of Shia Islam. Now that Assad is gone, Iran stands weakened and cut off by land from its allies in Lebanon. So, the threat to Israel is greatly diminished. Turkey is back in the fray, though, and its influence has risen.
The Ottoman sultan was the caliph of all Sunni Muslims until the empire ended in the aftermath of World War I. Now, the fabled Umayyad Mosque in Damascus is back in Sunni hands. In the long run, a Salafist Syria might be a bigger threat to Israel than an Alawite one. By the time Assad fell, his regime had a very narrow social base, commanding only the loyalty of the Alawite elite. The majority of the Syrian population had turned against the Assad regime, which explains its rapid fall.
Now, Ahmed Hussein al-Sharaa is in charge. He is better known by his nom de guerre Abu Mohammad al-Jolani. Backed by Turkey and some Gulf countries, Jolani has engineered an image makeover and is projecting himself as a moderate. Yet it is important to note that he was an associate of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi and a formidable al-Qaeda operative. The US State Department long had a bounty of $10 million on his head. Already, his men are telling women to cover their heads. If Jolani manages to consolidate power and create a majoritarian state backed by other Sunni powers, that might cause Israel a greater headache than its erstwhile Shia foes.
Note that the 1916 Sykes–Picot order is dead. The nation state experiment in the Middle East has failed. Tribalism and sectarianism are ascendant. Keeping Syria or Iraq or any of the states in the region united and functional will become harder.
In the meantime, the Kurds and Palestinians remain the losers of history. No great or regional power really backs them. In the case of Palestinians, every power in the region gives them lip service, but none of these Muslim states is willing to fight for them.
In 2025, conflict in the Middle East will diminish because it has clear winners. Israel now has the upper hand against its enemies, especially Iran. For the time being, the great powers are standing by and avoiding involvement in the region.
The Russia–Ukraine War Could End
Russia and Ukraine have been at war since February 24, 2022. Casualties have mounted, and economies are under strain. Russia has been slowly but relentlessly gaining Ukrainian territory in a battle of attrition. Western support for Ukraine has been wavering. Neither France nor Germany has a budget for 2025 partly because of political disagreements over Ukraine.
US President Donald Trump’s reelection changes the equation as well. He will not support Ukraine as strongly as his predecessor Joe Biden did. So, there will be pressure on Ukraine to sue for peace.
Former CIA officer Glenn Carle and Fair Observer Editor-in-Chief Atul Singh disagree on their reading of Russia. The former sees the Russian economy as under strain. Russian foreign exchange reserves are decreasing and inflationary pressures are increasing. The country has overinvested in the military and other sectors are suffering. The ruble is tumbling. Carle estimates that Russia cannot prosecute the war forever.
Singh takes a different view. He points out that, while prices are rising, so are wages. Ironically, Western sanctions have benefited Russia by preventing capital flight. Money is no longer flowing out to buy yachts in Monaco or football clubs in London. Now, the capital stays home, creating a domestic multiplier effect. Sanctions have also forced Russia to reindustrialize. Besides, GDP figures can be deceptive. Western countries with higher GDP have a smaller manufacturing base than Russia’s. Also, sanctions have not entirely worked because developing country purchases have replaced European demand for Russian fossil fuels.
Given Russia’s size and resources, it can take greater pain than Ukraine. Ukraine’s economy has cratered, shrinking by as much as 30% according to some estimates. Ukrainian men have fled the country at higher rates than their Russian counterparts. Ukraine is simply running out of cash and men.
Unsurprisingly, Europe is losing its nerve. The German far-left and far-right both want the war to end and blame it — along with American protectionism — for deindustrializing their country. Traditionally, Germany has been a high-tech manufacturing powerhouse. Now, it is in crisis. So is France and so are many other European countries. Given these trends, Singh believes that some sort of peace or ceasefire deal should occur by the end of the year.
Will the Global Economy Muddle Along, or Is There Trouble Ahead?
Former CIA officer Glenn Carle and Fair Observer Editor-in-Chief Atul Singh disagree on the global economy. Carle thinks the global economy will muddle through, while Singh thinks there is trouble ahead.
Carle takes confidence from official growth figures. The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) estimates global growth will be 3.3% in 2025. The US economy is projected to grow at 2.5%, the EU about 1%, China 4.8% and India 6%. These figures are relatively healthy and the global economy should be able to weather the shock of tariffs imposed by US President Donald Trump.
Singh sees record global debt — $323 billion as of December 3, 2024 — as well as protectionism and currency wars as big risks. Sovereign debt will continue to rise, increasing default risk. Both the German and French governments fell because political leaders could not agree upon a budget. Europeans will not accept cuts to their welfare states in order to save the money for Ukraine.
In Asia, China’s real estate bubble has burst. Rising labor costs weakened its export-led strategy, which faltered under the Covid-19 pandemic. Since 1978, China has industrialized at the cost not only of the West but also emerging economies like India and Brazil. It is betting on a new wave of industrialization in critical technologies like solar panels and batteries. State support for Chinese companies is common and well known. This is tempting many countries worldwide to raise tariffs, provoking retaliation and exacerbating inflation.
Donald Trump wants to weaken the dollar, yet simultaneously retain its status as the world’s reserve currency. He is inspired by former US President Richard Nixon’s abandonment of the gold standard in 1973 after the Vietnam War. Despite this abandonment, the dollar continued to be the global reserve currency. According to our Republican sources, there is no serious threat to the dollar given current economic crises in both China and the EU. Therefore, they are confident that the US dollar will continue to be the global reserve currency even after depreciation.
Economists at top investment banks believe that the Trump administration may also use tariffs as a tool to support depreciation, pointing to the 1985 Plaza Accord. In those Cold War days, allies with a trade surplus — France, West Germany, Japan and the UK — agreed with the US to depreciate the dollar. Our sources in the incoming Trump administration indirectly indicate that some of their colleagues are determined to bring back manufacturing to the US and see depreciation as a key policy measure.
Other countries are anticipating Trump tariffs and dollar depreciation. The Swiss National Bank, the European Central Bank and the Bank of Canada have already cut interest rates, weakening their currencies. Others are planning to follow suit. However, if all major trading countries try to weaken their currencies simultaneously, none may gain from more competitive exports, but all could experience heightened exchange rate volatility.
![""]("https://www.fairobserver.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/Screenshot-33.png")
Singh believes that the chances of a black swan event have increased because the structural economic and political problems are not going away. So, fasten your seatbelts and expect turbulence ahead.
Unstable Africa Drives Refugees North
In 2024, militant Islamist violence in Africa reached a record high. Fatalities have nearly tripled since 2020 to approximately 11,000. This violence has displaced over 45 million people, a 14% increase over the 2023 figure. Last year marked the 13th consecutive year in which this figure has risen.
Russia has now emerged as a major player in Africa, displacing France in many countries. Moscow has conducted multiple disinformation campaigns and sent mercenaries to many conflict zones, such as Mali, Niger, Libya and Sudan.
The implosion of Sudan is the biggest crisis in Africa today. It has exacerbated the tensions in an already fragile region, worsening conflicts in neighboring states and increasing political instability. The internal conflicts in Libya, Chad, the Central African Republic, South Sudan and Ethiopia are now further complicated by Sudan’s instability.
Foreign powers, most notably the United Arab Emirates, Russia, Iran and Egypt, are inflaming Sudan’s conflict. They have deployed drones, munitions and mercenaries. They also patronize the smuggling of resources. This scramble for influence risks Sudan fragmenting into a collection of client states, sidelining civilian voices and popular sovereignty.
Over 11.5 million Sudanese have been internally displaced, and more 2.3 million have fled the country since the civil war began in April 2023. Food shortages are estimated to be killing hundreds of people daily. An estimated three million people are facing acute food insecurity.
Experts point out that droughts and floods are a key reason for increased conflict. Climate change means that places lack rain for longer periods or get too much rain in too short a time. This means the land is less productive, even as populations rise. This explosive combination has led people to fight over water, pastures and land.
In 2024, an estimated 163 million Africans suffered from acute food insecurity, over 10% of the continent’s population. This figure is nearly triple that of five years ago. Many of these Africans are crossing the Mediterranean Sea to get to Europe.
Lee Kuan Yew, the late Singaporean statesman, once warned that if Europe did not export prosperity south, Africa would export people north. That is exactly what is happening.
Europe Faces a Tough Year Ahead
France and Germany are the two beating hearts of Europe. Both of them ended 2024 without a budget. Both countries face new elections in 2025.
France went through a tumultuous year. Fair Observer Chief Strategy Officer Peter Isackson and Fair Observer Editor-in-Chief Atul Singh explain the crisis in the French Fifth Republic in the piece embedded below. Traditional parties have imploded and new blocs have emerged. Marine Le Pen’s far-right Rassemblement national (RN) is on the ascendant. Although it won only 126 seats out of 577 in the French parliament, it received the most votes.
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The left-wing Nouveau front populaire (NFP) won 193 seats while President Emmanuel Macron’s Ensemble won 159. The two parties oppose RN’s social and political far-right stance, but NFP and RN are closer on economic policy than either is to Ensemble. In 2024, the three parties could not agree upon a budget. Michel Barnier’s government fell, making him the shortest-serving prime minister of the Fifth Republic.
Germany’s traffic-light coalition — so-called because red, yellow and green are colors of the Social Democratic Party (SDP), the Free Democratic Party (FDP) and the Greens, respectively — fell because the parties could not agree upon a budget. Chancellor Olaf Scholz’s government has proven to be indecisive and ineffective. The three parties could rarely agree on anything even as the German economy contracted for two consecutive years.
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The far-right Allianz für Deutschland (AfD) is on the rise, sending shivers down the spine of a country where the specter of Adolf Hitler and the Nazi party remain strong. Yet the ineffectiveness of traditional political parties, a sinking economy and fears about immigration are fueling AfD’s rise. Repeated acts of terror by some Muslim immigrants have added to the fear.
In France, Germany and other EU countries, the clash of cultures between secular Europeans and religious immigrants is only too real. The fact that the latter are often poor and congregate around mosques makes them more Islamist than their countrymen back home. Note that President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan gets a much higher percentage of votes in France, Germany and the Netherlands than he does in Turkey.
As problems mount, the French Fifth Republic is on the verge of collapse while Germany still suffers from a postwar crisis of confidence. The operative question is simple: Who will lead Europe?
In 2006, former CIA officer Glenn Carle told a group of German officials, “If Germany does not lead Europe, Europe will not be led.” These officials were horrified at having to assume the responsibilities they had long avoided so as not to be tarred as the new Nazis. Only Germany can lead Europe, and it may eventually be AfD that leads. What happens then?
Throughout Europe, the far-right is on the rise. Slovakia, Hungary, Italy and the Netherlands are some examples. Economic strain, fears of immigration and concerns about social cohesion are at play. None of these concerns are going away in 2025.
[Anton Schauble and Lee Thompson-Kolar edited this piece.]
The views expressed in this article/video are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.
” post-content-short=” [On December 31, 2024, we predicted seven developments for 2025 and boldly went where only fools, angels and astrologers dare to go. So, what can we expect in 2025? To borrow words from the military, a more volatile, uncertain, complex and ambiguous (VUCA) world. What follows is the entire…” post_summery=”Trump’s tariffs, AI’s rapid growth and the Russia-Ukraine war are reshaping economies and global power. Conflicts in the Middle East, instability in Africa and political turmoil in Europe are driving migration and uncertainty. The world in 2025 is heading toward greater division, economic strain and a fight for technological, political and economic dominance.” post-date=”Mar 01, 2025″ post-title=”FO° Exclusive: A More Volatile, Uncertain, Complex and Ambiguous World in 2025″ slug-data=”fo-exclusive-a-more-volatile-uncertain-complex-and-ambiguous-world-in-2025″>
FO° Exclusive: A More Volatile, Uncertain, Complex and Ambiguous World in 2025
Fair Observer Communications and Outreach Officer Roberta Campani spoke with Giorgio Musso about Sudan’s ongoing crisis and what it means for the region. Musso, a researcher and lecturer at the University of Roma Tre, explains how the conflict grew out of long-standing political and military rivalries, the impact on civilians and the challenges of bringing stability to the country.
Giorgio Musso lays out Sudan’s situation in clear terms. The country, one of Africa’s largest, has endured decades of conflict, shifting power struggles and outside interference. Colonial rule shaped its early history and the fight for independence led to long, brutal wars. Oil and gold made Sudan an economic prize, drawing the attention of foreign powers. Ethnic divisions and regional disputes fueled internal conflicts, with Darfur becoming a flashpoint for violence.
The split from South Sudan in 2011 changed the country’s trajectory but left unresolved issues. South Sudan took most of the oil fields, while Sudan kept the pipelines and export infrastructure. Border tensions flared and armed groups seized opportunities to expand their control. In Khartoum, military factions maneuvered for power. Foreign governments engaged in diplomacy but often prioritized their own interests over stability.
The current war began in April 2023 as a battle between two military leaders. General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan heads the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF). General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, known as Hemedti, commands the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), a powerful paramilitary group. They were once allies, but disagreements over military integration and control of resources led to open fighting. Gunfire and shelling tore through Khartoum. Violence spread across the country, hitting Darfur especially hard.
Millions of civilians were caught in the middle. Cities were reduced to battlegrounds. Hospitals ran out of supplies. Food, water and medicine became scarce. Aid workers struggled to reach those in need. More than five million people were displaced and over twelve million faced hunger. Regional governments scrambled to deal with a growing refugee crisis. Ceasefire attempts repeatedly collapsed as both factions fought for control of key territory. Tribal groups joined the conflict, deepening the chaos.
The war also drew in outside forces. Russia’s Wagner Group maintained ties to Sudan’s gold trade. Gulf states had economic interests at stake. China, the US and other powers watched closely, each calculating its next move. Meanwhile, Sudan’s civilian movements, which once pushed for democracy, were sidelined. Activists called for an end to military rule, but both generals ignored them. Some local councils tried to fill the governance vacuum, but lawlessness spread.
International organizations stepped in with mediation efforts. The African Union and IGAD held peace talks, but neither Burhan nor Hemedti showed real willingness to compromise. Humanitarian groups raised alarms over atrocities, particularly in Darfur, where ethnic violence had resurfaced. The US labeled RSF actions in the region as genocide. Despite widespread condemnation, the fighting continued.
Musso argues that Sudan’s path forward depends on real negotiations and civilian leadership. Previous peace agreements ended past wars, but only when power-sharing and resource control were addressed. Sudan needs a government that represents its people, not just military factions. Regional organizations can help facilitate talks. International actors must support stability rather than back rival factions. Most importantly, Sudan’s civilians need a voice in shaping their future. Without that, the cycle of war will continue.
The views expressed in this article/video are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.
” post-content-short=” Fair Observer Communications and Outreach Officer Roberta Campani spoke with Giorgio Musso about Sudan’s ongoing crisis and what it means for the region. Musso, a researcher and lecturer at the University of Roma Tre, explains how the conflict grew out of long-standing political and military…” post_summery=”Sudan’s military leaders, General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan and General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, have turned against each other in a fight for power. Their forces have devastated cities, displaced millions and deepened the country’s crisis. Sudan needs a civilian government to break the cycle of war and bring lasting stability.” post-date=”Feb 28, 2025″ post-title=”FO° Talks: Sudan, a Regional Intractable Conflict” slug-data=”fo-talks-sudan-a-regional-intractable-conflict”>
FO° Talks: Sudan, a Regional Intractable Conflict
Martin Lonergan is a man of diverse experiences, whose career has spanned trading, business, extensive travel and political candidacy. Having trekked from Florida to Washington, DC, on foot in 2021 — an unforgettable moment that led to his meeting Atul Singh — Lonergan’s life has been anything but conventional. He has run for parliament as a candidate for the Reform UK Party in the United Kingdom, written books and embraced a politically active role in an era of significant change. In this interview, he provides insight into his political journey, his views on the current state of UK politics and the future of the Reform UK Party.
A return to politics
Lonergan’s engagement in politics came after years of disillusionment. He hadn’t voted for nearly two decades, as he was disheartened by the political landscape, particularly by the actions of leaders like UK Prime Minister Tony Blair. Lonergan’s frustrations with Blair’s leadership, particularly over the Iraq War and broken promises, led him to disengage from voting entirely. However, when the Reform UK Party approached him with an opportunity to run for parliament, he felt compelled to act. His candidacy for Walthamstow — a traditionally Labour seat — was born out of a desire to make a difference rather than complain from the sidelines.
Despite the Labour incumbent’s strong victory, Lonergan’s performance was notable. He placed second, surpassing both the Tories and the Liberal Democrats, signaling a clear message that many voters were unhappy with the existing political choices. The increasing unpopularity of the Labour Party, combined with the growing disenchantment among Tory voters, signals a potential shift in UK politics — a shift that could see Reform UK gaining more traction in the future.
Disillusionment with Labour and the Tories
Lonergan’s political leanings have always been center-right, shaped largely by his experiences growing up during UK Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher’s era. He has long supported a free-market economy and individual liberty, beliefs that diverge sharply from the Labour Party’s emphasis on big government and nationalization. Reflecting on his disillusionment with Tony Blair’s tenure, he specifically criticizes Blair’s role in the Iraq War and the consequent deceit that led to widespread skepticism among voters.
Regarding Labour’s current leadership under Prime Minister Keir Starmer, Lonergan suggests that the party has now drifted closer to the center and lost its distinctive identity. With both major parties — Labour and the Tories — pursuing similar policies, especially on issues like immigration and spending, it’s become increasingly difficult for voters to differentiate between them.
By contrast, Reform UK offers a clear alternative. It stands firmly for free markets, small government and individual liberty. This makes the party a credible challenger to the traditional political establishment.
The economy and the budget
One of the key issues on the table for any potential government is the UK economy. Recent employment regulations, such as increased national insurance contributions, have made it more difficult for businesses to hire and retain employees. A more flexible labor market — one where hiring and firing are less constrained by bureaucracy — would alleviate many of the current staffing shortages plaguing various industries.
The reckless government spending under the Tory administration has left a significant hole in the public finances. Chancellor Rachel Reeves’s budget has failed to address the fundamental issues of job creation and business growth. To stimulate economic growth and job creation, the UK must establish a more favorable environment for businesses by reducing taxes and simplifying regulations.
Immigration and the UK’s social fabric
While the UK needs a balanced approach to immigration — particularly welcoming refugees in need — the current system is too lenient towards economic migrants. The country has seen an influx of young men from conflict regions who are not necessarily in immediate danger, and merely seek to exploit the benefits system.
The UK requires a more discerning approach, one that prioritizes vulnerable groups such as women and children, while also allowing skilled workers to enter the country to contribute to the economy. This would prevent the social fabric from being strained while ensuring that the UK has access to a sufficient workforce.
The NHS and bureaucracy
Lonergan is especially concerned about the state of the National Health Service (NHS). Though this system is still a cornerstone of British society, it is no longer fit for purpose in its current form. The system contains quite a few inefficiencies, particularly in middle management and non-medical staff roles that contribute little to direct patient care. Reducing this bureaucracy and focusing resources on frontline services would improve the NHS’s ability to deliver care effectively.
Furthermore, employment laws must shift to allow employers more freedom in managing staff. The country needs a system where businesses can make hiring and firing decisions based on merit, which would help address the issues of underperformance and job shortages.
Foreign policy and international relations
The UK’s foreign policy, especially its involvement in the Ukraine war, is highly disagreeable. NATO’s expansion provoked Russia to war, and the West should focus on finding a negotiated solution rather than continuing to escalate the conflict.
Furthermore, Western narratives often paint issues like the Syria and Iran situations in a one-dimensional light. Lonergan advocates for a more pragmatic approach that recognizes the complexities of these regions and focuses on diplomacy rather than military intervention.
The UK should engage with Iran, particularly regarding energy. It could provide Europe with a stable source of energy, reducing the continent’s reliance on Russia.
Reforming Britain
Looking to the future, Lonergan outlines three key priorities that he believes are crucial to “Make Britain Great Again.” First, the government needs a more controlled immigration policy that balances the needs of the economy with the social challenges of integrating large numbers of newcomers. Second, the state needs a reduction in power, with fewer regulations and lower taxes — this would foster a more dynamic and entrepreneurial society. Third, the NHS needs a reform — one that cuts waste, improves efficiency and ensures that resources are better directed towards patient care.
Lonergan believes that the UK needs a radical shift in its approach to politics, economics and foreign policy. By focusing on issues that truly matter to the British people, he is confident that the country can regain its former glory.
[Lee Thompson-Kolar edited this piece.]
The views expressed in this article/video are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.
” post-content-short=” Martin Lonergan is a man of diverse experiences, whose career has spanned trading, business, extensive travel and political candidacy. Having trekked from Florida to Washington, DC, on foot in 2021 — an unforgettable moment that led to his meeting Atul Singh — Lonergan’s life has been…” post_summery=”Martin Lonergan of the Reform UK party wants to “Make Britain Great Again.” He advocates for a center-right, free-market approach to the country’s governance. In this interview with Atul Singh, he expresses his thoughts on the UK’s current immigration policy, economy, foreign policy and more.” post-date=”Feb 19, 2025″ post-title=”FO° Talks: A Reform UK Perspective on British Politics” slug-data=”fo-talks-a-reform-uk-perspective-on-british-politics”>
FO° Talks: A Reform UK Perspective on British Politics
A recent breakthrough from DeepSeek, a new Chinese artificial intelligence startup, has sparked global interest. Not only has the company released a language learning model (LLM) that rivals OpenAI’s GPT-4o, it claims to have developed it in just two months using a minimal investment of $5.6 million.
This audacious claim has caused controversy in the tech world. Industry leaders like Elon Musk question the truth behind the Chinese company’s claim. Critics argue that DeepSeek’s expenditures and resources, including the number of chips used, are much higher than it states.
DeepSeek’s R1 model rattles US tech giants
Even discounting tall claims, DeepSeek’s rapid development and minimal investment highlight a potential shift in the AI landscape. Even if the published numbers are exaggerated, the release of an open-source cheap AI tool severely undermines the business models of Silicon Valley’s giants. Those companies rely on massive amounts of computing power and electricity consumption. The former needs a lot of high-quality chips and the latter requires a massive amount of power generation. If DeepSeek can achieve similar results with far fewer resources, i.e. lower costs, this would cause a major disruption.
This shift has already affected market confidence. On January 27, tech giant Nvidia lost $600 billion — a significant 17% — in market value. Simultaneously, the Nasdaq Composite, the index that tracks the top United States tech firms, saw a 3% drop.
Marc Andreessen, the inventor of the internet browser and a bright venture capitalist, endorsed DeepSeek’s innovation. He referred to the company’s model, R1, as AI’s “Sputnik moment.” This comment truly illuminates the importance of DeepSeek’s success, and serves as a wake-up call for the US. Just as the Soviet Union’s launch of the Sputnik 1 satellite spurred the US to action in the Space Race of the 1950s and 1960s, this new AI model signals that the US has to take on China in the new AI race.
Notably, China has made significant progress despite US efforts to restrict the country’s access to advanced chips and chip-manufacturing technology. When Joe Biden was president, he consistently used trade policies to preserve US leadership in AI and AI-related computer chips, Yet DeepSeek has overcome the odds.
The Chinese startup has garnered attention for its impressive results. According to the Artificial Intelligence Quality Index, R1 is already outperforming several established AI models, including Google’s Gemini 2.0 Flash, Anthropic’s Claude 3.5 Sonnet, Meta’s Llama 3.3-70B and OpenAI’s aforementioned GPT-4o. Based on these results, R1 could be an industry changer.
The potential boons for developers and users in the AI ecosystem are notable. As DeepSeek’s model is open-source, app developers and users stand to benefit from its accessibility and transparency. By contrast, closed-source models, like those from major US firms, limit innovation and could prove less adaptable over time. This shift could prompt Silicon Valley to reconsider its approach to AI development. In recent years, Big Tech has become more bureaucratic and less innovative. American tech giants have become monopolistic and oligopolistic, losing their hunger, nimbleness and creativity.
Silicon Valley’s death of innovation
The current AI landscape is like an inverted pyramid. At the base are LLMs like DeepSeek’s R1. Above the LLMs are app builders, and atop apps are users. The proliferation of LLMs — particularly those that are open-source — will foster innovation across the board. By contrast, Silicon Valley’s larger players are increasingly focused on maintaining their dominant positions, often stifling the spirit of innovation that once defined the San Francisco Bay Area.
A tech industry veteran once said that Silicon Valley was home to risk-takers and innovators, like the Wild West cowboys tinkering in garages. Nowadays, the adventurous cowboys who still remain have been pushed to the sidelines. Instead, founders now prepare fancy presentations to woo venture capitalists or Big Tech for investments. Once startups become big, they exit not through an initial public offering but by sale to a larger company.
When startup founders come under the thumb of Big Tech bureaucracy, this stifles their creative spirit. In turn, this stifles technological growth and dampens the innovative spirit. Big tech is now more interested in maximizing quarterly profits than advancing the frontiers of technology creatively. The dominance of big Silicon Valley’s dominance has led to bloated, inefficient business models that consume excessive resources, both in terms of computing power and energy.
Many tech veterans now believe that Big Tech should be broken up. They feel it is un-American and uncompetitive, and partly responsible for the cost-intensive and power-intensive models used in the industry today. Conversely, China’s nimble, open-source approach might offer a more sustainable and flexible model for AI development. How ironic is it that a company from a communist, authoritarian regime has threatened to upend the monopolistic status quo in a democratic, market-driven society?
Technological innovation comes from the fringes
Then again, smaller, more flexible entities tend to drive innovation. Historically, significant cultural and technological movements have emerged from fringe groups. Jazz, for example, was invented by African-Americans, a marginalized group that at that time was excluded from mainstream US culture.
Similarly, technological innovation often arises from outside the established norms. Larger organizations, while successful, can get bogged down by bureaucracy. This inhibits their ability to stay agile and forward-thinking. We can see this dynamic playing out in the tech industry right now, as small companies like DeepSeek are challenging the dominance of big players like Google and Meta.
One thing that has provided US supremacy and could potentially maintain it is the country’s unique combination of financial resources and flexibility. The massive investment capital in the US combined with its risk-taking appetite and diverse competing centers of research — both universities and other research institutions — give it a massive advantage against anyone else.
A stable, regulatory legal framework for the US economy adds to that magic potion.
China has worked to create its own AI champions. Now its small, fringe startup has found incredible success but there is no guarantee of future success. The US has many advantages and could easily win the AI race. To make sure that the US wins this race, it might be prudent to trust-bust — break up big companies into smaller entities, which Teddy Roosevelt pioneered in 1902 — the obscenely colossal Big Tech.
[Lee Thompson-Kolar edited this piece.]
The views expressed in this article/video are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.
” post-content-short=” A recent breakthrough from DeepSeek, a new Chinese artificial intelligence startup, has sparked global interest. Not only has the company released a language learning model (LLM) that rivals OpenAI’s GPT-4o, it claims to have developed it in just two months using a minimal investment of $5.6…” post_summery=”Chinese AI startup DeepSeek has commanded global attention by developing a competitive language learning model. Supposedly, it has done so only in two months and only with a small investment. Regardless of that claim’s legitimacy, DeepSeek’s success is groundbreaking for the industry. Can monopolistic Big Tech firms in the US, with tons of red tape, declining culture of innovation and capital-intensive business model, keep up?” post-date=”Feb 14, 2025″ post-title=”FO° Exclusive: Chinese AI Startup DeepSeek Sparks Global Frenzy” slug-data=”fo-exclusive-chinese-ai-startup-deepseek-sparks-global-frenzy”>
FO° Exclusive: Chinese AI Startup DeepSeek Sparks Global Frenzy
Just days after entering office, US President Donald Trump swiftly revoked 78 of his predecessor Joe Biden’s executive actions. These include executive orders, which carry the greatest weight, along with lesser memoranda and proclamations. While executive orders carry the force of law and are difficult to overturn, memoranda and proclamations are harder to track and enforce.
By January 28, Trump signed 37 executive orders, with titles like “Unleashing American Energy” and “Putting America First in International Environmental Agreements,” effectively pulling the US out of the Paris Climate Accord. These actions signal a return to policies like “drill, baby, drill,” inspired by Republican vice presidential candidate Sarah Palin. In 2008, she campaigned on a platform promoting petroleum and natural gas exploitation. They also mark a return to policies that reassert unilateral American sovereignty at the cost of international collaboration.
Over the decades, key judicial decisions have empowered conservatives. Chief Justice John Roberts has strengthened and rationalized the conservative view, which has altered American democratic institutions. One can argue that the Supreme Court’s ruling in the case of Bush v. Gore (2000) essentially handed George W. Bush an election victory, ringing in neoconservative rule.
Additionally, Trump’s current agenda echoes Republican Grover Norquist’s 1980s campaign to shrink the federal government by half. Norquist champions the unitary executive theory, in which the president must have untrammeled power, avoiding the logjam that checks and balances cause today. Unlike the 18th century, the US is now a superpower, and presidents must have the authority to act speedily and effectively in the national interest.
We can trace Norquist’s ideas to philosophers like John Hobbes, who advocated for strong executive authority to maintain order in society. This Hobbesian philosophy is manifesting again in Trump’s presidency at a time when bureaucratic inefficiencies and regulatory capture have eroded public trust in institutions.
A shift toward a unitary executive
The concept of a unitary executive goes back to before Norquist. Per this theory, the president has the power to make decisions and enforce them without interference from the legislative or judicial branches of government, and has become a driving force in US governance. This idea is credited to German legal thinker Carl Schmitt, Adolf Hitler’s personal lawyer who argued for centralizing power.
Neoconservatives have embraced the unitary executive. They believe the federal government has become intrusive and inefficient, and no longer acts as the Founding Fathers intended. They reject decentralization and champion a streamlined government. Trump’s aggressive use of executive power fits within this larger framework.
Trump is changing the very nature of American democracy. Even if his specific goals fail — many won’t — his actions have significantly altered the political and societal landscape. Trump has reshaped the discourse, expectations and structure of the US government, shifting it toward a more authoritarian model. Public support for a strong, decisive leader bolsters this move. Polls show that over 40% of the American population does not support democratic processes, and greatly favors strong leadership.
Over the last centuries, during periods of democratic paralysis, decisive leaders have often risen to combat challenges. Wartime and economic crises are two examples. The US could be experiencing one of those cyclical phases now, in which Trump steps in and shakes things up. He may face backlash for his policies, leading the country back to a more democratic way of governance. Many overdue reforms could finally come to fruition as well, like addressing gerrymandering, campaign finance and reconsidering the extremely short two-year terms in the House of Representatives.
Trump’s policies often clash with established norms, particularly on immigration and birthright citizenship. Some see this as a threat to the country’s cultural identity. These policies could change the US’s interpretation of citizenship. They will also change the essence of America.
The strong do what they can
A crucial aspect of Trump’s agenda is a conservative push for a smaller, more autocratic government that prioritizes simplicity and reduced interference in citizens’ lives. However, the policies that follow often lead to unintended contradictory consequences. For instance, tariffs increase the value of the dollar, and curbs in immigration create labor shortages. Politically, though, they work, creating a dynamic where dissatisfaction is directed at the government, which reinforces support for conservative figures as potential saviors.
Trump’s push for greater executive power is a constitutional crisis in the making. If his administration enforces policies using illegal methods, such as military action at the border, it could lead to a breakdown of legal systems. Violent clashes could break out with other branches of government over legal authority, triggering a constitutional crisis.
In terms of foreign affairs, Trump’s unilateral approach reflects a shift toward US isolationism and mercantilism. His policies suggest a return to a more imperial, 19th-century model of international relations, marked by power-driven deals and disregard for legal or ethical obligations. Out goes the rules-based order, in comes the sphere-of-influence style of international relations where power and the perception of power alone is key.
In the words of the ancient Greek historian Thucydides, “The strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must.” Trump’s philosophy, and especially his desire to acquire Greenland, Canada and Panama, mirrors Thucydides’s thesis.
[Lee Thompson-Kolar edited this piece.]
The views expressed in this article/video are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.
” post-content-short=” Just days after entering office, US President Donald Trump swiftly revoked 78 of his predecessor Joe Biden’s executive actions. These include executive orders, which carry the greatest weight, along with lesser memoranda and proclamations. While executive orders carry the force of law and are…” post_summery=”Donald Trump revoked 78 of Joe Biden’s executive orders and issued 37 executive orders along with memoranda and proclamations, which have lesser weight, by January 28. His actions mark a shift towards a unitary executive model, where the president has the power to make decisions without interference from other governmental branches. Whether or not he succeeds in his goals, Trump has already changed how America functions.” post-date=”Feb 10, 2025″ post-title=”FO° Exclusive: Donald Trump Launches an Explosive Imperial Presidency” slug-data=”fo-exclusive-donald-trump-launches-an-explosive-imperial-presidency”>
FO° Exclusive: Donald Trump Launches an Explosive Imperial Presidency
Founder, CEO and Editor-in-Chief Atul Singh speaks with Douglas Hauer-Gilad about US immigration policy under a second term for US President Donald Trump. The discussion focuses on Trump’s policy objectives, the feasibility of them and their impact on immigrants and the legal system. Douglas’s expertise provides an informed perspective on what lies ahead.
Douglas is a lawyer who dedicates his career to immigration cases. He is also a rabbinical student in New York and a doctoral candidate in Talmud and Rabbinics. He teaches law at Boston University and is active in human rights work around the world. He currently helps Israeli families affected by the October 7 attacks. He brings a deep understanding of immigration law and its real-world effects.
Atul asks Douglas about Trump’s approach to border security and immigration enforcement. Trump emphasizes securing the border and protecting American jobs. His policies include stricter deportation measures, particularly targeting immigrants with criminal backgrounds. However, mass deportations require resources and international cooperation, which makes them difficult to implement.
US Customs and Border Protection have too much power
One key issue is the power of US Customs and Border Protection (CBP). Under a second Trump administration, CBP receives more authority to override civil rights protections. This means fewer rights for immigrants, including restrictions on their ability to appeal deportation. Trump also intends to close the US–Mexico border entirely. CBP already has minimal oversight compared to the FBI. With more freedom, the agency can act with even less accountability and become more aggressive in enforcing immigration laws.
The conversation also explores the role of tech billionaires in shaping immigration policy. Elon Musk expresses opinions on immigration but does not control government bureaucracy. It remains to be seen whether figures like Musk influence policy or if the system continues without significant changes.
Deportations are difficult
Another major topic is the idea of a large-scale deportation program. Trump previously spoke about removing millions of undocumented immigrants. Douglas discusses whether such a plan is realistic and what legal and logistical challenges it faces.
Finally, the discussion touches on the possibility of another ban on Muslim immigration. Trump previously enacted restrictions on travelers from several Muslim-majority countries. Douglas provides insights into whether such a policy returns and what its legal consequences are.
[Lee Thompson-Kolar edited this piece.]
The views expressed in this article/video are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.
” post-content-short=” Founder, CEO and Editor-in-Chief Atul Singh speaks with Douglas Hauer-Gilad about US immigration policy under a second term for US President Donald Trump. The discussion focuses on Trump’s policy objectives, the feasibility of them and their impact on immigrants and the legal system. Douglas’s…” post_summery=”US President Donald Trump’s new administration intends to crack down heavily on immigration. He is granting more power to US Customs and Border Protection and wants to institute stricter deportation policies. But these efforts require resources and international cooperation — can Trump realistically execute these goals?” post-date=”Feb 09, 2025″ post-title=”FO° Talks: US Immigration Policy Under Donald Trump 2.0″ slug-data=”fo-talks-us-immigration-policy-under-donald-trump-2-0″>
FO° Talks: US Immigration Policy Under Donald Trump 2.0
[On December 31, 2024, we predicted seven developments for 2025 and boldly went where only fools, angels and astrologers dare to go. So, what can we expect in 2025? To borrow words from the military, a more volatile, uncertain, complex and ambiguous (VUCA) world. This is Part 7 of a seven-part series. You can read Part 1, Part 2, Part 3, Part 4, Part 5 and Part 6 here.]
France and Germany are the two beating hearts of Europe. Both of them ended 2024 without a budget. Both countries face new elections in 2025.
France’s tumultuous 2024
France went through a tumultuous year. Fair Observer Chief Strategy Officer Peter Isackson and Fair Observer Editor-in-Chief Atul Singh explain the crisis in the French Fifth Republic in the piece embedded below. Traditional parties have imploded and new blocs have emerged. Marine Le Pen’s far-right Rassemblement national (RN) is on the ascendant. Although it won only 126 seats out of 577 in the French parliament, it received the most votes.
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The left-wing Nouveau front populaire (NFP) won 193 seats while President Emmanuel Macron’s Ensemble won 159. The two parties oppose RN’s social and political far-right stance, but NFP and RN are closer on economic policy than either is to Ensemble. In 2024, the three parties could not agree upon a budget. Michel Barnier’s government fell, making him the shortest-serving prime minister of the Fifth Republic.
An ineffective government and rising AfD worry Germans
Germany’s traffic-light coalition — so-called because red, yellow and green are colors of the Social Democratic Party (SDP), the Free Democratic Party (FDP) and the Greens, respectively — fell because the parties could not agree upon a budget. Chancellor Olaf Scholz’s government has proven to be indecisive and ineffective. The three parties could rarely agree on anything even as the German economy contracted for two consecutive years.
Related Reading
The far-right Allianz für Deutschland (AfD) is on the rise, sending shivers down the spine of a country where the specter of Adolf Hitler and the Nazi party remain strong. Yet the ineffectiveness of traditional political parties, a sinking economy and fears about immigration are fueling AfD’s rise. Repeated acts of terror by some Muslim immigrants have added to the fear.
Who will lead Europe?
In France, Germany and other EU countries, the clash of cultures between secular Europeans and religious immigrants is only too real. The fact that the latter are often poor and congregate around mosques makes them more Islamist than their countrymen back home. Note that President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan gets a much higher percentage of votes in France, Germany and the Netherlands than he does in Turkey.
As problems mount, the French Fifth Republic is on the verge of collapse while Germany still suffers from a postwar crisis of confidence. The operative question is simple: Who will lead Europe?
In 2006, former CIA officer Glenn Carle told a group of German officials, “If Germany does not lead Europe, Europe will not be led.” These officials were horrified at having to assume the responsibilities they had long avoided so as not to be tarred as the new Nazis. Only Germany can lead Europe, and it may eventually be AfD that leads. What happens then?
Throughout Europe, the far-right is on the rise. Slovakia, Hungary, Italy and the Netherlands are some examples. Economic strain, fears of immigration and concerns about social cohesion are at play. None of these concerns are going away in 2025.
[Anton Schauble and Lee Thompson-Kolar edited this piece.]
The views expressed in this article/video are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.
” post-content-short=” [On December 31, 2024, we predicted seven developments for 2025 and boldly went where only fools, angels and astrologers dare to go. So, what can we expect in 2025? To borrow words from the military, a more volatile, uncertain, complex and ambiguous (VUCA) world. This is Part 7 of a seven-part…” post_summery=”Both the French and German governments collapsed in 2024 after political parties were unable to agree on budgets. Europe is without leadership at a time when its economy is under strain and concerns over immigration are increasing. Far-right parties will continue to rise in 2025.” post-date=”Feb 08, 2025″ post-title=”FO° Exclusive: Europe Faces a Tough Year Ahead” slug-data=”fo-exclusive-europe-faces-a-tough-year-ahead”>
FO° Exclusive: Europe Faces a Tough Year Ahead
[On December 31, 2024, we predicted seven developments for 2025 and boldly went where only fools, angels and astrologers dare to go. So, what can we expect in 2025? To borrow words from the military, a more volatile, uncertain, complex and ambiguous (VUCA) world. This is Part 6 of a seven-part series. You can read Part 1, Part 2, Part 3, Part 4 and Part 5 here.]
In 2024, militant Islamist violence in Africa reached a record high. Fatalities have nearly tripled since 2020 to approximately 11,000. This violence has displaced over 45 million people, a 14% increase over the 2023 figure. Last year marked the 13th consecutive year in which this figure has risen.
Russia has now emerged as a major player in Africa, displacing France in many countries. Moscow has conducted multiple disinformation campaigns and sent mercenaries to many conflict zones, such as Mali, Niger, Libya and Sudan.
Sudan’s conflict is Africa’s biggest crisis
The implosion of Sudan is the biggest crisis in Africa today. It has exacerbated the tensions in an already fragile region, worsening conflicts in neighboring states and increasing political instability. The internal conflicts in Libya, Chad, the Central African Republic, South Sudan and Ethiopia are now further complicated by Sudan’s instability.
Foreign powers, most notably the United Arab Emirates, Russia, Iran and Egypt, are inflaming Sudan’s conflict. They have deployed drones, munitions and mercenaries. They also patronize the smuggling of resources. This scramble for influence risks Sudan fragmenting into a collection of client states, sidelining civilian voices and popular sovereignty.
Climate change has increased African food insecurity
Over 11.5 million Sudanese have been internally displaced, and more 2.3 million have fled the country since the civil war began in April 2023. Food shortages are estimated to be killing hundreds of people daily. An estimated three million people are facing acute food insecurity.
Experts point out that droughts and floods are a key reason for increased conflict. Climate change means that places lack rain for longer periods or get too much rain in too short a time. This means the land is less productive, even as populations rise. This explosive combination has led people to fight over water, pastures and land.
In 2024, an estimated 163 million Africans suffered from acute food insecurity, over 10% of the continent’s population. This figure is nearly triple that of five years ago. Many of these Africans are crossing the Mediterranean Sea to get to Europe.
Lee Kuan Yew, the late Singaporean statesman, once warned that if Europe did not export prosperity south, Africa would export people north. That is exactly what is happening.
[Anton Schauble and Lee Thompson-Kolar edited this piece.]
The views expressed in this article/video are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.
” post-content-short=” [On December 31, 2024, we predicted seven developments for 2025 and boldly went where only fools, angels and astrologers dare to go. So, what can we expect in 2025? To borrow words from the military, a more volatile, uncertain, complex and ambiguous (VUCA) world. This is Part 6 of a seven-part…” post_summery=”In 2024, an estimated 163 million Africans suffered from acute food insecurity, over 10% of the continent’s population. This figure is nearly triple that of five years ago. Many of these Africans are crossing the Mediterranean Sea to get to Europe.” post-date=”Feb 06, 2025″ post-title=”FO° Exclusive: Unstable Africa Drives Refugees North” slug-data=”fo-exclusive-unstable-africa-drives-refugees-north”>
FO° Exclusive: Unstable Africa Drives Refugees North
[On December 31, 2024, we predicted seven developments for 2025 and boldly went where only fools, angels and astrologers dare to go. So, what can we expect in 2025? To borrow words from the military, a more volatile, uncertain, complex and ambiguous (VUCA) world. This is Part 5 of a seven-part series. You can read Part 1, Part 2, Part 3 and Part 4 here.]
Former CIA officer Glenn Carle and Fair Observer Editor-in-Chief Atul Singh disagree on the global economy. Carle thinks the global economy will muddle through, while Singh thinks there is trouble ahead.
Global growth is promising but debt is rising
Carle takes confidence from official growth figures. The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) estimates global growth will be 3.3% in 2025. The US economy is projected to grow at 2.5%, the EU about 1%, China 4.8% and India 6%. These figures are relatively healthy and the global economy should be able to weather the shock of tariffs imposed by US President Donald Trump.
Singh sees record global debt — $323 billion as of December 3, 2024 — as well as protectionism and currency wars as big risks. Sovereign debt will continue to rise, increasing default risk. Both the German and French governments fell because political leaders could not agree upon a budget. Europeans will not accept cuts to their welfare states in order to save the money for Ukraine.
The dollar: a depreciating global reserve currency?
In Asia, China’s real estate bubble has burst. Rising labor costs weakened its export-led strategy, which faltered under the Covid-19 pandemic. Since 1978, China has industrialized at the cost not only of the West but also emerging economies like India and Brazil. It is betting on a new wave of industrialization in critical technologies like solar panels and batteries. State support for Chinese companies is common and well known. This is tempting many countries worldwide to raise tariffs, provoking retaliation and exacerbating inflation.
Donald Trump wants to weaken the dollar, yet simultaneously retain its status as the world’s reserve currency. He is inspired by former US President Richard Nixon’s abandonment of the gold standard in 1973 after the Vietnam War. Despite this abandonment, the dollar continued to be the global reserve currency. According to our Republican sources, there is no serious threat to the dollar given current economic crises in both China and the EU. Therefore, they are confident that the US dollar will continue to be the global reserve currency even after depreciation.
Trump’s tariffs and weakening currencies may cause turbulence
Economists at top investment banks believe that the Trump administration may also use tariffs as a tool to support depreciation, pointing to the 1985 Plaza Accord. In those Cold War days, allies with a trade surplus — France, West Germany, Japan and the UK — agreed with the US to depreciate the dollar. Our sources in the incoming Trump administration indirectly indicate that some of their colleagues are determined to bring back manufacturing to the US and see depreciation as a key policy measure.
Other countries are anticipating Trump tariffs and dollar depreciation. The Swiss National Bank, the European Central Bank and the Bank of Canada have already cut interest rates, weakening their currencies. Others are planning to follow suit. However, if all major trading countries try to weaken their currencies simultaneously, none may gain from more competitive exports, but all could experience heightened exchange rate volatility.
![""]("https://www.fairobserver.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/02/Screenshot-6.png")
Change in currency value vs US dollar, January 3, 2023 – December 16, 2024. Via FOI.
Singh believes that the chances of a black swan event have increased because the structural economic and political problems are not going away. So, fasten your seatbelts and expect turbulence ahead.
[Anton Schauble and Lee Thompson-Kolar edited this piece.]
The views expressed in this article/video are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.
” post-content-short=” [On December 31, 2024, we predicted seven developments for 2025 and boldly went where only fools, angels and astrologers dare to go. So, what can we expect in 2025? To borrow words from the military, a more volatile, uncertain, complex and ambiguous (VUCA) world. This is Part 5 of a seven-part…” post_summery=”Glenn Carle and Atul Singh disagree on the global economy. Carle believes it will muddle through with healthy growth, while Singh warns of risks from global debt, protectionism and currency wars. Tariffs, currency depreciation and China’s economic struggles could lead to volatility and potential crises in 2025.” post-date=”Feb 04, 2025″ post-title=”FO° Exclusive: Will the Global Economy Muddle Along, or Is There Trouble Ahead?” slug-data=”fo-exclusive-will-the-global-economy-muddle-along-or-is-there-trouble-ahead”>
