Atul Singh: Welcome to the fifth edition of 2025’s FO° Exclusive. Last month, we covered Donald Trump’s new economic revolution via tariffs and more, the Pakistan–India clash and Mark Carney’s victory in Canada. This month, we have a new pope. US President Donald Trump has a new $400 million Qatari jet. He has been to the Middle East, which he has enjoyed very much. The Russians continue to strike Ukrainians and Vladimir Putin has called the Americans emotional. India and Pakistan have stopped fighting for now. Syria is on the edge of civil war, if we are to believe US Secretary of State Marco Rubio, and Colombia has joined China’s Belt and Road Initiative. We could go on and on. Needless to say, there are lots of issues to cover. There is no dearth of issues we can dwell upon.
However, in May 2025, we will cover two — two, not three — issues. They are: US Budget and US–China Tariff Deal Unleash New Economic Uncertainty, and Hunger Now Strikes Gaza and Big Crisis Brews in Israel. So, let’s get to number one: US Budget and US–China Tariff Deal Unleash New Economic Uncertainty.
So we have a lot to get through. And the gist of it is that for all the promises of balancing the budget and trimming government finances, the House of Representatives under their great leader, US President Donald Trump, has passed a budget that will spend even more. So deficits will go up, debt will go up.
Glenn Carle: I’d like to jump in here. Great art, I would argue — and I’m not a conservative who argues for the unities of time and space — must combine farce with tragedy so as to leaven the sadness. And the budget bill, we’ll call it, seems to be a spectacularly wonderful piece of art then. So why don’t you start with what is fundamentally — one should only look at it as a farcical enterprise, because otherwise we would all simply commit suicide.
Atul Singh: We don’t want you to commit suicide, Glenn. You have a long, long way to go, many books to write and many Hollywood thrillers to be made about your various stories. But let’s start.
The House of Representatives passed a budget bill for fiscal year 2025 by a single vote. Members of Congress debated the bill through two successive nights, and only after a marathon push, this bill passed in a 215 to 214 vote.
Contents and consequences of the Trump budget
Atul Singh: And this is extremely telling because it’s by a knife’s edge, a razor’s edge, and clearly the Congress — or rather the House of Representatives — is deeply divided. The bill is 1,100 pages long. I’m sure, Glenn, you’ve read every page. If not you, I’m sure some others have. I see we have Christopher Roper Schell in the audience, and I’m sure he’s read every page since he spent 11 years on Capitol Hill — so a hundred pages for every year.
Anyway, importantly, what does this 1,100-page extravaganza do? It extends corporate and individual tax cuts passed in 2017. Remember, this happened during Trump’s first term in office, so he’s very committed to extending these tax cuts. This bill also cancels many of former President Joe Biden’s green energy incentives. Now, I know, Glenn, you will be saddened by that. It tightens eligibility for health and food programs for the poor. The bill also funds Trump’s crackdown on immigration, adding tens of thousands of border guards and creates the capacity to deport up to one million people each year. The bill also loosens regulations on firearm silencers — because, you know, that’s extremely important. Not just to own a gun, but to have a silencer, (laughs) so that you can operate it with safety after night, without any sound to give you away.
Glenn Carle: That’s right, you don’t want to bother the neighbors!
Atul Singh: Yes, sound pollution is a terrible thing, ladies and gentlemen. Indian regulators and legislators should take note. They should learn something from the US.
Now, this is a sweeping tax and spending bill that increases US debt by trillions of dollars. Note: the US debt has already reached 124% of the GDP. The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimates that the bill will increase the US government’s deficit by $3.4 trillion by 2034. Note that the US government spent $1 out of $8 on interest payments. According to the CBO, this is more than the defense budget. Over the next ten years, the CBO estimates that the US will spend $1 out of $6 on interest payments because of an aging population. As we know, anywhere in the world, aging populations push up any government’s health and pension costs. The US is no exception. So maybe we need to bring back smoking, Glenn, smoking and drinking. All this clean living is a bad idea.
Glenn Carle: That’s right. That’s right.
Political rhetoric and regressive realities
Atul Singh: Now remember that this budget has led to mixed emotions. The Speaker of the House actually says the House has passed generational, truly nation-shaping legislation. This is Mike Johnson. Maybe he’s right. Who knows?
US President Donald Trump has called the bill, “One Big Beautiful Bill Act.” I don’t see how it is an act, because it has to go through the Senate — but let’s go with the President, because he is the most powerful man in the world, and the wisest, of course. And his billionaire ally, Elon Musk, is disappointed. Musk says the bill can either be big or beautiful but not both. So, well, now there seems to be a chasm between two BFFs — best friends forever.
Note that all Democrats and two Republicans voted against the bill. A third Republican voted “present,” which means he or she voted neither for nor against the bill. Another Republican missed the vote because he had fallen asleep. Very convenient. It will not show up on his record.
Now, after all this division within the House of Representatives, Moody has downgraded US credit rating from Aaa to Aa1, citing a decline in fiscal metrics. For the first time, the US does not hold a top-notch score from any of the three big credit rating agencies.
Markets are worried about growing US debt. And note, the CBO estimate, which I mentioned that the US would spend $1 out of $6 on interest payments, does not take into account Trump’s new budget. The House of Representatives’s new budget worsens an already bad fiscal situation. So obviously, markets are worried. Yields on 30-year government bonds have jumped to over 5%, the highest in 18 months. Markets are volatile and they have dipped somewhat — not dramatically, but still. If you look at them across a six-month timespan, they have dipped.
More importantly, the dollar has depreciated. This has major implications when it comes to the cost of imports and could add to inflationary pressures. So, on the whole, the US budget, which has just gone through the House of Representatives, now has to get through the Senate. And if it does, it adds to the fiscal pressures on the US.
Now look, any reform will require cutting a bit of spending and raising taxes, and that causes pain. And this is a challenge with all democracies. All democracies find it easy to kick the can down the road. They find it very difficult to cut spending or to raise taxes because that causes pain.
Glenn Carle: Well, that’s the thing. I mean, it’s easy to give, but it is very difficult to withhold or to take or to tighten one’s belt, or make others tighten their belts. I do agree with the Speaker of the House that it may be, if not the most significant, one of the more significant pieces of legislation in… well, that’s Trump who said this: if not in the history of the country, certainly it is very important. But I think for the really opposite reasons than Trump claims, although I don’t know that he actually believes himself.
So with all of these detailed things, what really is going on? It’s the same old story, really. And stereotypes are always based on some truth, and the relevant stereotype or thumbnail sketch of the respective parties’ positions and what’s happening — is that this is perhaps the most regressive budgetary tax legislation in history. It takes — the various proposals will probably remove ten to 12 million of the poorest citizens in the United States from any sort of medical insurance whatsoever so that those saved funds can essentially be granted to the top 1% of Americans based on wealth, which means that those who have $11 million net assets or more will receive all of the funds through tax cuts that have, up until this bill, funded medical insurance for the 12 million poorest Americans.
The middle class will suffer a bit — probably $1,200 per year, or $1,200 to $1,600 per year, I think it is more in cost. So you’re going to get to that part actually next — that’s on tariffs — so I’m speaking a little bit there. But it’s not catastrophic for the middle class, but it is a phenomenal gift to the wealthiest 1%.
What’s happening — this is the standard difference between Republican philosophy and policy and Democratic, broadly speaking. But all thought is generalization and all generalization, of course, will ignore any number of specific details that contradict the broader statement.
The Democrats, as we all know, think the government must be activist so as to create more equality. Ideally, equality of opportunity — not always of outcome — for society as a whole, and that one cannot pull oneself up by one’s bootstraps all the time, but sometimes one needs assistance to start the process.
Whereas the Republicans believe — and we’re having a distilled version of pure conservative Republican ideology in the Trump administration, whose policies really are shaped by the right wing of the Republican Party — believe that the only function government should have is border control — we’re seeing that in spades in the Trump administration — a strong national defense, and that’s it. That’s it. So that, literally, people are free to do whatever they want — which means if they can’t figure things out, they can die under a bridge.
I’m paraphrasing once again one of my favorite quotes, which is from Anatole France in the 19th century and his arguments in France over liberal economic policies versus the socialist ones. That’s truly what is happening here, in a way that has not happened in policy terms since the 1880s, 1890s — since before the birth of the modern welfare state or social democracy, the role of governments to address some social concerns, be it the health of its citizens or stability of the banking system and so on.
Atul Singh: Though to be fair, Glenn, the House of Representatives have not really cut down Medicaid, Medicare, Social Security — the big ticket items — so they have not gone to—
Glenn Carle: Medicaid will.
Atul Singh: Okay. But not Medicare yet. And Social Security, they haven’t touched it much.
Glenn Carle: No, it’s coming.
Atul Singh: So they haven’t gone back to the pre-Bismarck era.
Glenn Carle: It’s coming. No, well, I didn’t say they’ve eliminated everything yet. But the trend and the objective is to reduce the size of the federal government. We saw this through Doge — whatever one thinks of Elon Musk, he actually was acting simply as an agent of the philosophy that has shaped the policy recommendations of the Heritage Foundation, American Enterprise Institute and the Project 2025 and its authors, which is to reduce, in absolute terms, the size and role of the federal government of the United States — to decentralize anything, to leave everything to local authorities or to do nothing.
And we have seen a proposed increase in the defense budget, a substantial increase in the border control budget — because we’re going to get rid of all these people who don’t look like me and are not here legally, or even maybe if they are here legally. And it is a nearly revolutionary shift in thrust and intent of the role of the federal government. Certainly one we’ve not seen since in the United States since the Supreme Court prior to 1933, and policies by the Democratic Party — the parties are switching the theology — up until about the presidency of Theodore Roosevelt 125 years ago.
So it is shockingly powerful and coherent. I personally find it appalling. One might support these views — I know a lot of people who are friends, actually, who do — but that’s the intent.
Now, on the budget deficit. Theoretically, this is supposed to — the Republicans have baked their bread and buttered it on claims that they want to be the party of fiscal responsibility. As Atul pointed out, this is the most irresponsible single budget in American history.
You know, when Social Security was begun in 1933, the retirement age was set at 65. And in an act of great humanitarian compassion, the life expectancy — so that meant that one could not receive the pension until age 65 — but the life expectancy in 1933 was 65. So one might be slightly cynical about how generous it was. But a fortunate circumstance was that there were something like 16 workers per beneficiary at the time. And as we all know, that has declined continually as the American population and all populations have aged. And now there are, I think, two workers per beneficiary. And that is unsustainable.
However, to fix all of this problem with Social Security and the federal budget deficit actually could be done without catastrophic harm or disruption. I believe that Paul Krugman has calculated — and his first name slips my mind, I just had a conversation with him, actually — one of President Bush’s chief economists is Mr. Mankiw — both of them have—
Atul Singh: Greg Mankiw.
Glenn Carle: Mankiw, yeah, have said — thank you — a change in revenues and expenditures adding up to 2.1% — that’s the figure that I retain — of GNP. So a rise in revenues, decline in expenditures equal to 2.1% of GNP would address the United States’s structural budget deficit.
That could be done progressively, without huge disruption. You freeze Social Security cost-of-living increases, say — I’m just making this up off the top of my head — and you increase taxes by 1% or something to that effect. These are not quite marginal changes, but they are not revolutionary changes. And yet, as Atul pointed out—
Atul Singh: It could increase retirement age as well. There are many, many tweaks you could do.
Glenn Carle: Which has been happening and probably should continue to. And if one does that — because now the life expectancy is not 65 — it’s 79, I think, for males—
Atul Singh: More parties, more beer.
Glenn Carle: Then we wouldn’t have to have all of the tooth-pulling and true pain, disruption that is coming from this bill, if ever it is passed, which is very problematic.
Tariff truce or temporary fix?
Atul Singh: So what we see is that the bill still has to go through the Senate. The bill will still have to then come in as legislation, and we see that the uncertainty that characterizes America is only on the rise. And indeed, that’ll have global consequences.
And talking about uncertainty, we have to talk about the US–China trade deal. And this happened a lot earlier than a lot of people expected. It happened after negotiations in Geneva. The US, of course, will decrease the extra tariffs on Chinese goods to 30%. China will remove non-tariff barriers on American goods and decrease extra tariffs to 10%. The total US tariffs on Chinese goods would remain about 40%, while Chinese tariffs on American goods would be 25%.
So this is detail-schmetail, in a way, but the key question is: Why did both these countries agree to a truce? Well, when it comes to US President Donald Trump, he clearly does not want empty supermarket shelves, inflation or recession. Most market analysts predicted a guaranteed US recession with 145% tariffs on Chinese goods. This was more pain than Americans were willing to bear.
Our sources in the Trump administration inform us that Bessenomics is winning against Navaronomics. Now, this is very interesting. In our conversations with many people in the Trump administration, they are saying that the administration is falling into two camps.
Bessenomics refers to Treasury Secretary Scott Bessant’s economic vision. So this is a more transactional take on traditional Republican economics. Bessant wants China to sign more purchase agreements, as it did during Trump’s first term — buy more commodities such as soybeans, maybe American beef, pork, manufactured goods such as Boeing planes. And so, his idea is: China has not played fair, and this is what Republicans believe in. And there’s more than an element of truth — China has not played fair when it comes to trade. It has backed national champions. It has tariff and, more significantly, non-tariff barriers. So let’s use tariffs as a transactional tool, as leverage to gain greater market access into China. That reduces the deficit, and that is in American interest because it creates American jobs, because a key focus for the administration is to bring back American jobs. So for Bessant, this is just a means to an end.
Navaronomics refers to the economic vision of Peter Navarro, the senior counselor for trade and manufacturing to Trump. Now, he aims for a total reordering of global trade through punitive tariffs. He is much more of a true believer. He believes in truth with a capital T. He’s much more of an ideologue. He’s a bit like the neoconservatives of Iran. And so, he’s authored the 2006 book, The Coming China Wars, and the 2011 book, Death by China. He believes that Chinese illegal export subsidies and currency manipulation make it impossible for American companies to compete. The solution is an isolationist and protectionist economic policy that unleashes a full-scale trade war on China.
And we hear — and this is not just us, this is a number of other publications have also alluded to this — that Bessant, not Navarro, has pushed for a US–China trade truce.
So that is the incentive on the US side. What is the incentive for Xi Jinping? Well, we’ve talked a lot about China, and we were China bears long before others were. And both Glenn and I remember going and meeting the Indian Foreign Ministry, and the Foreign Ministry folks there had belief in China’s miraculous ability to defy the economic laws of gravity. We always believed that the Chinese economic miracle would face a slowdown. It’s not that China will go back to smoking opium as in the 19th century, but we certainly see the increased unemployment — particularly youth unemployment — the decreased growth; the real estate sector in the doldrums, which we pointed out repeatedly; the high debts on bank books; the aging population; the fact that households have a majority of their wealth locked up in real estate — because you don’t have such developed capital markets, people are not owning portfolios of Apple, Google, Walmart and God-knows-what shares.
Glenn Carle: And in one of the great ironies of modern history, certainly one of the last two, I think it is, maybe three, remaining “communist” states have a terribly underdeveloped social security system. The Chinese people don’t have the pension system and care that Western democracies provide for their populations, which is in part why their savings are so high, and why the property bubble explosion is more than just bad economically, but catastrophic even socially.
Atul Singh: And our sources in Beijing and Tokyo regularly explain how the Chinese economy is experiencing a profound crisis. Why the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) fears unrest, and some even believe that the economic pain could lead to a real threat to the stability of the regime. And that is why Xi Jinping, who withdrew his zero-Covid policy very quietly with the white flag of surrender.
Therefore, Xi Jinping definitely doesn’t want to be bullied, he definitely does not want to lose face in his negotiations with the US. But also, this Xi-led CCP does not want the economic pain to get so overbearing that it starts impacting the stability of the regime. So it was in their interest to conduct a truce.
Now, both sides claim victory. Both sides say that the other is more vulnerable to tariffs. The jury is still out on what is truly the case. But the important thing is that this is just a truce. The trade war is not over yet. This is something to really bear in mind.
The US will retain tariffs on electric vehicles. The US will continue to stop China gaining cutting-edge technologies, whether it is semiconductors or jet engines. The US has already sanctioned more than 20 companies, including Hong Kong-based entities, for shipping Iranian crude oil. And of course, the Chinese are objecting to the US–UK trade deal, which lowers American levies on British car and steel imports provided that the UK works to promptly meet US requirements on supply chain security and ownership of production facilities.
Why is this important? Because the Chinese own a lot of these facilities in the UK, and the Chinese see this as a violation of the basic principle that trade agreements between countries should not target other nations. And they see this as a clear example of mala fide US intentions. So, on the whole, we believe this deal achieves a suboptimal equilibrium, and it could easily be undone.
Undermining superpowers from within
Glenn Carle: I think we should think of China and the United States as being two people in a rowboat in the ocean, who don’t get along whatsoever and want to go in opposite directions. But unless they both row, the boat will be swamped. So they’re stuck. China cannot do without the US market and cannot — without huge disruption to itself — withdraw or sell off, exit from the $700 billion, I think it is, in US bonds that it has. And the US can’t, without tremendous political problems for the administration and huge economic pain and recession, pay for the imported goods with the higher tariff rates or produce equivalent products itself in a way that would avoid causing economic harm.
[Atul shares the Geopolitical Risk Monitor on his screen]
Glenn Carle: Oh, goodness, are we sharing a screen?
Atul Singh: Yes, I’m sharing a screen showing the Chinese GDP growth declining. This is our Geopolitical Risk Monitor. You can see that there are strong incentives for China, as Glenn said, as there are for the US, to somehow not completely end up in a bish-bash-bosh and sink the boat, which is the global economy.
Glenn Carle: Something that’s shocking — at least shocking from the American perspective, perhaps a little less shocking from the Chinese perspective, but nonetheless shocking — is that both countries and both leaders, Xi and Trump, are taking actions that long-term undermine the strengths of their respective economies and societies.
Atul has spoken about the budget issue — that’s what we’ve talked about so far in the United States — and it’s very important. But it’s one element of a broader series of changes being proposed or executed through executive actions to a host of American practices and systems that really have been the generator of American exceptionalism and economic wealth, and therefore, political strength and influence. In the United States’s case, are Americans intrinsically superior economically? Obviously not; see others.
But what America has done better than anyone else — and it’s not only because America is a continent with great natural resources, which are fundamental attributes and parts of the explanation — but there’s this web of approaches and systems that has been unique in the world. We still have a vast array of strongly supported research institutions and universities, such as Harvard or Bell Labs, which do cutting-edge research. And they can do so because they have access to huge amounts of capital, which has been funneled significantly by the federal government, working within a society where the rule of law is on the whole objective and applied equally and openly; where capital flows are ample, liquid and relatively unregulated; where the workforce is highly trained and literally the best and the brightest from around the world have been aggressively encouraged to come, compete, succeed — and those who fail cause no problems, because the successes vastly outweigh the failures.
All of those attributes of American success are being eroded and undermined now. The budget is one component of this. And all of this is almost the American government committing suicide. It’s the Trump administration actively, consciously pursuing many of these policies. We can talk about the reasons why they think it should be done, but they’re undermining the roots of American exceptionalism.
At the same time, Xi Jinping, I think pretty clearly, is doing the same thing to China. China is the great success story in human history of the last 40 years, with its growth and the wealth and the opportunities it’s providing to ever more of its citizens, and its increasing influence and power worldwide. I would argue China has been, and could continue to be, achieving essentially all of the goals that it seeks without taking the steps that Xi has felt obliged to do, for fear of, as Atul touched upon clearly several times just now, losing control and seeing the Chinese party challenged or overthrown through social unrest and grievance and demand and so on. His response has been the classic one of an authoritarian, totalitarian — to double down on tightening control.
So that now you have, in every level of every corporation in China, every business, a representative of the political commissar, essentially — a Communist Party official who interferes with the rational decision-making of a bank, car company or farm, and undermines, long-term, the roots of the Chinese miracle, if you want to call it that, which has been decentralizing decision-making and providing opportunity for people to pursue their own interests.
So it is a remarkable thing we’re seeing. And the budget issues, which are critical, are just one component of this larger, terrible story that we’re living.
Atul Singh: Two quick points and we’ll move on. Peter Isackson makes the point that he is more inclined to follow Louis-Vincent Gave of Gavekal Research’s analysis of China rather than our doomsday scenario. Well, Louis has a point. But Louis is rather rosy on China. Yes, China has bet big on electric cars, solar panels and even AI. But fundamentally, we think that the structural problems in the Chinese economy are not going away. Xi is fundamentally amongst—
Glenn Carle: If I had to choose between the economic policies addressing fundamental issues of China today or those of the United States, I would choose China. Certainly, I agree with Peter on that.
Atul Singh: Okay, well, so maybe I’m a little biased. I think the Chinese economy, with its centralization and Xi being a Maoist, has a lot of risks that are underappreciated — particularly in the West. The top-down structure often has problems that are swept under the carpet, until one day they are no longer hidden.
Of course, the US has multiple problems, and we’ve touched upon them — in particular, the polarization, the division, the inability to make sane political and economic decisions, and now a very skittish market, which is seeing rising bond yields and a depreciating dollar. So, a lot of uncertainty in the world.
And those of you who are running companies and want to talk to us, we’re happy to talk to you. Give us a shout. We’ll take this forward.
Glenn Carle: I have for years now made the unamusing pseudo-witticism that with the Brexit vote, England basically committed suicide and declared itself an inconsequential island someplace in the mists of the North Atlantic. But Brexit, compared to what the United States is doing to itself, is a rational step. I do not want to understate the gravity of the harm — economically, socially, politically — of the policies that are working their way through the law-making process in the United States. And Atul talked about the budgetary one.
But let’s go to the next section of the world where things are going completely screwy.
[Lee Thompson-Kolar edited this piece.]
The views expressed in this article/video are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.
” post-content-short=” Atul Singh: Welcome to the fifth edition of 2025’s FO° Exclusive. Last month, we covered Donald Trump’s new economic revolution via tariffs and more, the Pakistan–India clash and Mark Carney’s victory in Canada. This month, we have a new pope. US President Donald Trump has a new $400…” post_summery=”The US House of Representatives has passed a divisive budget that increases spending, deepens deficits and provokes market anxiety. Simultaneously, a fragile US–China trade truce reflects mounting internal pressures on both governments. While US President Donald Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping claim victory, their policies threaten the structural foundations of their economies and global stability.” post-date=”Jun 02, 2025″ post-title=”FO° Exclusive: US Budget and US–China Tariff Deal Unleash New Economic Uncertainty” slug-data=”fo-exclusive-us-budget-and-us-china-tariff-deal-unleash-new-economic-uncertainty”>FO° Exclusive: US Budget and US–China Tariff Deal Unleash New Economic Uncertainty
[This is the third part of a four-part series. To read more, see Parts 1 and 2 here.]
Josef Olmert: Hello. Good to see you again, to talk again to my followers, my watchers, my readers. So today, we are in our third episode in the four-episode series that I have about the US–Israel relations, and this is an episode that will lead us to the current situation, with particular emphasis on the situation under President Donald Trump.
But I just want to remind us that I said last time that this episode would be more about delving more deeply into the forces, particularly in the US, which shaped these special relations that we have described already in the first two episodes, what I call the interesting relationships at the beginning, and then the special relationships. So when we talk about the relationship with the US, we have to say that in the 1950s, after the recognition of Israel by Harry Truman, the establishment of diplomatic relations, basically the 1950s were dominated by the Republican Party under President Dwight D. Eisenhower. And one has to say that at that time, the Eisenhower administration could not really be considered to be too pro-Israel, or even pro-Israel altogether. In some ways it was; in many other ways, it wasn’t. John Foster Dulles, the architect of American foreign policy at that time, was definitely not a friend of Israel.
And when the US looked at the situation in the Middle East and looked at it from the perspective of the Cold War, the idea that really dominated American foreign policy in the 1950s was much more like an alliance with pro-West Arab countries. What they tried to establish — the Baghdad Alliance — failed, but they tried to do it. And then came the Eisenhower Doctrine of 1957, following the pressure on Israel to withdraw from Sinai in the Sinai War, which was basically, again, anti-communist, but was not based on any alliance between the US and Israel.
American Jewish support and cultural solidarity
Josef Olmert: So one has to say that even though the Israelis already in 1958 were very helpful to the West by allowing British airplanes to fly to Jordan over Israeli territory in order to help what seemed at that time to be a danger to the existence of the regime of the Hashemite King Hussein in Jordan. It was the result of what happened in the Middle East after the Syrian–Egyptian alliance — the unity — and what seemed to be the Soviet penetration to the very core of the Middle East through the leadership and charisma of Nasser, this anti-Western, anti-American, anti-Israel Arab leader.
But in the US itself, already in the 1950s we see the creation of the coalition that would be very helpful to better relations between the US and Israel. That was composed of various elements. And in the first place, it was the American Jewish community. The American Jewish community already in 1948–49, during the War of Independence and even before the beginning of it, showed a great deal of support to Israel. There were many, many American volunteers who came to fight on behalf of Israel, including pilots that were the beginning of the great Israeli Air Force, one should say. There was this famous Colonel Mickey Marcus, or Michael Stone, that was recruited by the Zionists in the US and by Israel to become a commander in the Israeli army. And then it was his tragic death by mistake in an accident that happened. He became the hero of a later movie called Cast a Giant Shadow. The star of this movie was Kirk Douglas himself, a great supporter of Israel — he just died a few years ago when he was over 100 years old.
But we saw the main components of this coalition, alongside the American Jewish community. In the 1950s, they established a famous organization known as AIPAC, the American Israel Public Affairs Committee, where basically the alienated were connected more with the Democratic Party rather than with the Republican Party. To give you an example which is not always known, the American labor movement, the AFL–CIO, under the great leadership of George Meany, was tremendously supportive of Israel. Meany said that the AFL–CIO are the greatest supporters of Israel in the world, no less than that. So of course he was supportive of the Democratic Party.
But also in the minority communities in the US, there was more support for Israel at that time. And if we go from the ‘50s to the ‘60s and even a bit later on, we see that at least two very significant key figures that were really fighting, struggling for human rights, civil rights in the US, and equality are very pro-Israel. One of them was Martin Luther King, no other, who said that anti-Zionism is anti-Semitism and was supportive of Israel. He got a lot of support from the Jewish community. We remember the rabbi Asher Meza marching alongside him and other prominent Jewish leaders. Take even Cesar Chavez, the great Mexican American leader of the migrant farm workers, who was also very pro-Zionist. He was attacked for this by leftists who couldn’t agree with the fact that he was pro-Israel.
Take even in the field of culture, the cultural world, a guy like Harry Belafonte, the famous singer and activist. They were so pro-Israel, singing “Hava Nagila,” “Re’eh Na,” “Ma Tovu,” “Ma Na’im” and so on. Sammy Davis Jr. and others.
Evangelicals and the republican realignment
Josef Olmert: So you could see the beginning of the creation of this pro-Israel coalition that would become more significant in the 1970s, when you started to see a change also in the Republican Party. And part of this change had to do with the move among evangelical Christians towards the adoption of their doctrines that would lead them to become very pro-Israel. Take, for example, the famous leader Billy Graham, who visited Israel in 1960.
Later on, when we heard the recordings of President Richard Nixon during the Watergate crisis, we heard some unpleasant comments made by Billy Graham about Jews to the ears of the president at that time — which I’ll come back to a little bit later on — to the evangelicals. Which, yes, it was not good. But in the overall context of creation of a pro-Israel coalition, people like Billy Graham at that time, and other people later on, played a very significant role.
So we see a change also in the Republican Party, and this change became very, very significant — particularly in the 1980s during the presidency of Ronald Reagan, who was instinctively pro-Israel. Not from an evangelical Christian perspective, but from the perspective of, “Here it is: It’s a world conflict between the good guys and the bad guys. Israelis are on the side of the good guys. They’re our friends. They are against the Soviet Union, so Soviets are against them.”
So the Republican Party was changing in all kinds of respects, and Ronald Reagan symbolized it. Less so his successor, Bush the father, as opposed to Bush the son later on. So we see a situation whereby, as of the 1970s, in Congress, for example, the support to Israel is becoming the feature, of what would be the main pillar, perhaps, of the pro-Israel sentiment in the US and the basis for the special relationship: the bipartisan support. Bipartisanship was very significant, and it had to remain like that. We shall see what happens as we get closer to our situation. Part of it we’ll say today, part of it we’ll leave to the last episode.
But the fact of the matter is that even when you could see the shaping up of this coalition, composed of people in both parties — in Congress, in great support of Israel — you also had, at the same time, the elements that in recent years would become much more influential than what they used to be at that time. Not so much in the Jewish community — the anti-Zionist elements within the Jewish community were mainly focused around the Reform movement in the old days. Later on, what was called the American Council for Judaism and other such organizations in the 1950s, ‘60s — particularly after the Six Days War — and during the campaign conducted by so many important American Jewish organizations, basically the American Jewish community, in support of Soviet Jewry and the campaign to let our people go from the Soviet Union.
So the Jewish community in the 1960s, ‘70s was really moving very strongly towards the side of support for Israel. Not necessarily organizations like the American Jewish Committee or the American Jewish Congress or even the ADL would say, “We are Zionist organizations,” but they definitely were very, very pro-Israel. So their way of showing pro-Israel was by support for every legislation that would be pro-Israel in Congress — the support for financial and military aid to Israel, and all kinds of other aspects of the relationship.
But you could see elements that were already at that time starting to create this nucleus, or the roots, of what would be anti-Israelism later on. Isolationism in the Republican Party, fiscal conservatives of one kind or another, nativist politicians. Much later on — more recently — you could hear people like Ron Paul, for example, or even before him, Pat Buchanan, as examples of the fact that even in the Republican Party, as it was moving more and more towards a more pro-Israel approach, you still had these elements of strong isolationism and even, I would say, nativist politics that were anti-Israel.
Democratic drift and the decline of bipartisanship
Josef Olmert: You could also see changes starting to develop within the Democratic Party by the rise of the left wing in the party. That would include, as of the 1970s, ‘80s and onwards, elements that otherwise were previously very pro-Israel. One example of it is what happened to the people around Martin Luther King Jr. He was pro-Zionist, he was pro-Jewish, he was pro-Israel. And some of the closest people to him later on would develop overt anti-Israel positions and even on occasions anti-Semitism, such as the famous or infamous ugly comments by Jesse Jackson about “Hymietown” New York. And even people like John Lewis, the legend Lewis, that changed the tune about Israel.
And the same would happen also among other minority communities, or in the Hispanic community, and so on and so forth. So you could see that while in Congress there still was very strong support for Israel based on bipartisanship, you could also see and hear the forces that would be against it, that on occasion seemed to be very marginal, but because of changes in American society later on, would become much stronger.
From the Israeli perspective, it was obvious that Israel needs to maintain bipartisan support. It was obvious. That was a main pillar of the approach. That was the strength of it: the bipartisan support. And it had to be kept.
There were occasions in which the late Menachem Begin, for example, strongly reprimanded the junior democratic senator visiting Israel by the name of Joseph Biden Jr. He also reprimanded the republican Charles Percy. And after, during the Reagan administration, there were some diplomatic problems between the two countries, when Begin knew how to criticize strongly, let alone maybe even attack, policies of the Reagan administration. So it was clear that while the Israelis were trying to maintain their policy of bipartisanship in terms of American support to Israel, when Israeli leaders needed to criticize democrats and republicans, they would have done it, but always within the context of maintaining the basic framework of bipartisan support for Israel.
And that’s something that we have to bear in mind. When you look at this support to Israel and you look at republican senators, for example, from places without any Jews — in Wyoming and Montana, there are very few Jews — saying whatever they say about supporting Israel, it puts in perspective all these comments — I would say antisemitic motivated attacks — on AIPAC being bribing all those politicians. I myself heard on occasions politicians from both parties saying, “They say that I’m in the pocket of the Jews in my state.” “I was looking for Jews in my state — I hardly found any!” So obviously, there was always this sense that the support to Israel was not without its critics and attacks on it. AIPAC became the symbol of this support to Israel and was therefore the target of a lot of criticism that was motivated also by antisemitic motives, like “the Jews maintain only one loyalty, first loyalty is to Israel,” “the first steps of those who support Israel as opposed to supporting the US.”
Now, let’s face it: The alliance with the US was based on two key pillars. One of them was the sense of common values, common political heritage. Israel is the only democracy in the Middle East. Israel is like us, it’s like the US. It’s a liberal democracy. We have problems with this or that Israeli policy, but altogether, it is a country that we can associate with. It is on the right side of history. Then the other side of it was the strategic, political, military, common interest between the two countries that were not without their problems on occasion, particularly when there were Likud governments that tended to be more towards the right wing — but not only.
After all, it was a Likud government that made peace with Egypt when the president was Jimmy Carter. And other Likud governments did accept American requests/pressures on other occasions. For example, during the first Gulf War, when Yitzhak Shamir, the very hawkish Israeli prime minister, agreed with President George H.W. Bush that even if there would be Iraqi missiles fired on Israel — and Israel knew there would be — if it wasn’t chemical warheads, there wouldn’t be an Israeli response, so as not to turn this war into an Arab–Israeli war, something that Saddam Hussein wanted.
That was a big service from Israel to the US. Not every country would like to see 42 Scud missiles falling on its centers of population and not reacting because they succumb to the interest of a bigger ally — in that case, the US. Just wanted to say, Shamir at that time — trust me, I know — was under heavy pressure from his defense minister, the great, late Moshe Sharett — who said, “Israel has to react. We cannot lose our power of deterrence.” And Shamir said, “No.” The overall interest of maintaining the alliance with the US was more important.
Yes, Israel had 12 requests from the US at the time. Eleven of them were fulfilled. One was not. Let’s move on beyond that.
The growing divide: American Jews and Israeli politics
Josef Olmert: So the point really is that the coalition that existed in the US that was supportive of Israel — that was enhanced and strengthened by the ongoing, gradual but consistent mobilization of the Christian evangelical community in support of Israel, alongside the other traditional forces of support — really laid the groundwork for what was really considered to be almost like an automatic alliance. You knew that the US would veto any anti-Israel resolution in the UN, in the Security Council. You knew that Israel would always vote with the US when it came to important situations for the US. You knew that Israel would always consult, or at least try to consult, with America about particular big, big national security decisions.
What happened — and we see it already in the late 1980s, 1990s and onwards — is that there are starting to be changes. In the Jewish community — yes, even today, the Reform movement is members of the World Zionist Organizations, and they are Zionists in their way. But when you look at the Reform movement of the ‘60s, ‘70s — how it moved from its traditional kind of problematic notions about Zionism, about the Jewish state or Jewish nationalism, to the new crop of rabbis that would become more significant in the 1990s, in the beginning of the 21st century onwards — you see a difference. You see a difference even in the conservative movement. It always was the mainstream of support for Israel.
You could see differences that would affect the academic community in the Jewish community. You could see it in universities. I saw it personally. I experienced it in my own situation when I came to talk in universities and in spending sabbaticals. What happened was a combination of various factors. I will just mention two — not necessarily the most important ones; there are many others — but it’s a topic that has to be discussed in a separate way. It’s such a big topic: the American Jewish community and Israel.
One of them is the growing strength of a new ideology that was propagated by many in the Reform Movement — and also, but less, in the conservative movement — the tikkun olam ideology. It is the “repairing of the world” as the number one Jewish mitzvah, the Jewish challenge. Something that I personally am very much opposed to. I consider it to be an attempt to justify, without saying it, a kind of running away, perhaps even stamping on the part of others, from the sense of: “We are Jews, therefore we support Israel, because this is the state of the Jewish people, and we feel we’re part of the Jewish people.” The element of tikkun olam has become very significant — taking one element in Judaism, making it so significant. It’s a very significant development in the Jewish community. One has to accept it.
Now, the other element is the decreasing support among certain age groups, particularly youngsters. Now here I should say, first of all, it’s true. One can see it, particularly if you are in the academic world and you come across students. But the explanation to that is not different from what other ethnic groups in America feel about their own country — the mother country, so to speak — when you talk about the third or fourth generation in these communities. And the Jews are not, in a way, much different than others.
As you get more and more away from the memories and legacies of their own country or the mother country, you develop different attitudes toward it. And I noticed that among people in my classes as a professor — of Irish Americans, Italian Americans, Lebanese Americans and so on and so forth. But the fact of the matter is that you could see the beginning of erosion in Jewish support for Israel — again, a minority among the Jews, but one that has become more vocal.
At the same time, the evangelical movement became very significant in the Republican Party. People like Jerry Falwell in the Moral Majority; Pat Robertson; John Hagee, the Pentecostal — a great supporter of Israel in San Antonio, Texas — and others. And what happened was that when these elements in the Republican Party became more and more important and significant in affecting republican approaches and policies — yep, that’s something that we have to say. Take states in the South, where, for example, in South Carolina, in every primary that you have, people define themselves as republicans or democrats, evangelicals and so on. It’s a republican state, and 75%–80% of republicans in South Carolina say they are evangelicals. So you can imagine the level of support for Israel in a state like that.
But the growing support of these evangelicals encouraged something that would lead to what I would consider to be a great, if not even huge, problem for Israel. The fact that these trends in the American Jewish community were coinciding with what seemed to be the growing dominance of right-wing parties in Israeli politics, the Likud party in particular. It’s something that also affected the operation of AIPAC, which became more and more associated with pro-republicanism, if in a way. More and more Israeli governments, led by the right wing — particularly under Netanyahu, as of 1996–1999, but much more so after 2009 — became more and more associated with an AIPAC that seemed to be more republican. And it could be justified, in fact, because the Republican Party became more pro-Israel. So those who are pro-Israel are becoming, in a way, more pro-republican. But the majority of the Jewish community in America did not go along with it.
And the problem there was — there were many problems behind it, but one that I would like to mention and emphasize is: Many American Jews, by the claim for supporting liberal democracy and all that comes with it, found it difficult, if not impossible, to support wholeheartedly, strongly a state like Israel that is dominated by right-wing and religious parties. And governments that are supported by parties like this that are, in Israel itself, mostly supported by the Mizrahi community — the Jews from Arab and Muslim countries. That has become a cultural problem that would lead to political consequences.
The idea that Israel, as it is developing — in the 1970s, much more so in the 1980s and even more so in the 1990s onwards — is not the Israel that we would like it to be. And that, of course, opens the Pandora’s box of all this situation of the relationship between Israel as the center of the Jewish world and Jewish communities abroad. What are the limits of the ability and the willingness of Jews outside of Israel to support Israel when they don’t like what’s happening in Israel? That’s a big question. I have to mention it. It’s not something that could be kind of brushed under the carpet, you know, because it is an unpleasant topic to discuss.
And the fact that things like this happened as I described created a growing crisis between Israel and the Democratic Party in particular, and the constituent groups of the Democratic Party that traditionally used to be so pro-Israel — among minority communities, among the labor movement, for example — it’s nothing like it used to be. Things changed.
MAGA, Woke politics and the Trump situation
Josef Olmert: I will end now by saying: It is very easy to pinpoint blame on a particular politician — in that case, Benjamin Netanyahu, the Prime Minister of Israel for 15 years, 16 years almost, after 2009, and before that, three years, 1996–1999. The problem is that when situations are developing the way I describe them, the responsibility of the Israeli leadership at the time should have been to minimize the problems, to try to balance them off, rather than exacerbate them by going with the stream and adopting what seemed to be a very pro-republican approach. And something therefore that would deepen, extend and widen the gaps between Israel and Jews abroad.
But as I said, movements within American Jewry were not disconnected from the overall changes in American society, demographic and others. But I will just end with a teaser to the last episode: I can say that in the last 15 or 20 years, or maybe less, two mass popular movements emerged in the American political scene: MAGA on the one hand and the woke movement on the other hand. The two of them, for different reasons, are not conducive to the alliance between the US and Israel.
And we are going to see in the last episode how their impact and influence deepened very much the trends that I started to relate to, or that related to, toward the end of this episode. So I leave you with that, and we shall meet again for the final episode: How it is under Donald Trump, with the background of the Biden administration, and so on and so forth, within the context of the current wars in the Middle East involving Israel. And I say “wars” because it’s not just the war in Gaza. Thank you.
[Lee Thompson-Kolar edited this piece.]
The views expressed in this article/video are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.
” post-content-short=” Josef Olmert: Hello. Good to see you again, to talk again to my followers, my watchers, my readers. So today, we are in our third episode in the four-episode series that I have about the US–Israel relations,…” post_summery=”In the third episode of this four-part series, Professor Josef Olmert explores the evolution of US domestic support for Israel, tracing bipartisan backing rooted in Jewish, labor, minority and evangelical communities. He details growing polarization, with Israel’s alignment to Republican politics and right-wing Israeli leadership alienating American Jewry and the Democratic base. These shifts foreshadow deeper rifts in today’s political climate.” post-date=”May 31, 2025″ post-title=”FO° Talks: US–Israeli Relations Explained, Part 3: Shifting Coalitions” slug-data=”fo-talks-us-israeli-relations-explained-part-3-shifting-coalitions”>
FO° Talks: US–Israeli Relations Explained, Part 3: Shifting Coalitions
[This is the second part of a four-part series. To read more, see Part 1 here.]
Josef Olmert: Hi, hello to all my watchers and followers and readers. This is episode number two in my series on US–Israel relations. And a little correction to what I said in the beginning of the first episode: There will be four episodes, not three. And as you recall, we ended the first episode with reference to a turning point — a historic turning point in the relations between the two countries and in the history of Israel altogether in the Middle East — which is the War of 1967, also known as the June War or the Six-Day War.
We’ll come to that momentarily. But allow me first to kind of repeat, for the sake of those who might have missed part of the first episode, the main points that we made in the first episode about the beginning of American–Israeli relations. And this related to what happened in the Second World War with President FDR, and then the momentous decisions taken by President Harry Truman of recognizing the State of Israel immediately upon its establishment, and beforehand, the support for the UN resolution about the partition of Palestine, if you will. The first resolution about the two-state solution was rejected by the Arabs. And that’s in reference to what people say today about the two-state solution.
And then we talked about the early years of the relationships, with the bumps, ups and downs. And a very big down was the way Eisenhower treated Israel in 1956 in the Suez War. In the 1950s, the main supporter of Israel in terms of supplying arms and also diplomatic support was France, which is interesting — mostly when it was under the French Socialist Party at that time, as opposed to the French Socialists of today. The French Socialists of the 1950s — Guy Mollet, for example, and others — were very, very pro-Israel for all kinds of reasons, and also supplied Israel lavishly with arms.
All this started to change with the rise of General de Gaulle to power in what is called the Fifth Republic as of May of 1958, and came to an abrupt end in the War of ‘67 that we shall refer to soon.
The Cold War heats up in the Middle East
Josef Olmert: But in the case of the US, the beginning of some military relations started with President JFK, who supplied Israel air defense systems, the Hawk missiles, with all kinds of strings attached, you know. But still, it was not until 1967 that things changed in a very dramatic way between the two countries.
Now, the War of 1967 is a huge topic that I’m not going to get into in this particular series, but I have to mention a few points about it which will give the background to what will happen later on between the US and Israel. This was a war that had to do with the Cold War, which raged all over the world at that time. And in the early 1960s, the West won in some areas. The West lost in other areas. The Soviets won in some areas, if you will. Algeria became independent. You can argue a defeat to the Western world, even though General de Gaulle was the one who granted it to the Algerians. The Cuban Revolution and the failure of the Americans to bring down the Castro regime, as we all know. The beginnings of the war in Vietnam, the Vietnam War, this time with American involvement, as opposed to the 1950s when it was French involvement.
The Soviets also lost. They lost, for example, in Indonesia in 1965. Huge country with all that happened there. So, we talk about ups and downs. And there are other examples on both sides.
In the Middle East, we have to deal with changes that took place in Syria and Egypt and the way the Soviet Union treated them. As of the February 23, 1966, Syria is ruled by what’s called the Neo-Ba’ath, which is basically the more radical, militant Ba’ath party of mainly the minorities, and especially Alawis, with names like Hafez al-Assad already as defense minister and commander of the air force, and others. And Egypt is ruled by Abdel Nasser, who lost points because of his failed intervention in the Yemeni Civil War as of 1962.
It wasn’t a failure because the supporters of Nasser lost in this war. It was a failure because Nasser lost in the Arab world because of the use of chemical weapons by the Egyptian army against other Arabs as opposed to the totally peaceful border between Egypt and Israel. So many people in the Arab world said, “You kill Arabs, but Israelis are enjoying total peace along your border.”
So, Nasser was under pressure. The Syrians were very radical, militant, under domestic pressure and trying to cause troubles along the border with Israel over the issue of the Jordan River waters and border incidents as of late 1966. And that’s the point here. The Soviet Union put pressure on both Egypt and Syria to get closer. They signed a defense pact. And that’s something that as of now, so many years later, hasn’t been totally clarified. Even when you look at the Soviet archives that were opened after the collapse of the Soviet Union, there were those in the Kremlin who put pressure on Egypt and Syria to cause troubles with Israel as part of the overall configuration of the Cold War.
May 1967 and Israel’s intelligence failure
Josef Olmert: And here it is: the peaceful border between Israel and Egypt. No problems. The problematic border with Syria. And all of a sudden, as of May 15, 1967, the Egyptian army, in violation of the arrangements after the war of 1956, started to cross from Egypt through the Suez Canal to the Sinai Desert and amass on the borders of Israel.
The Israelis were surprised by it. By the way, an interesting point: Israeli intelligence failed in this instance to read in advance what would happen, which was not the first such failure. In 1960, there was another such failure when Egyptian troops all of a sudden started to amass around the border with Israel without Israelis having any sense of it in advance. That was a crisis that dissipated without any problems. Just to be mentioned only in the context of understanding how intelligence works, and in particular, when we talk about Israel, it’s referring also to what would happen a few years later in the Yom Kippur War. We’ll come to that in 1973. It’s an important point here.
So, the Egyptian army started to amass along the border with Israel. Nasser started to make threatening speeches, calling specifically for a war against Israel — hysteria all over the Arab world. He specifically says he will forbid the movement of Israeli ships from the Straits of Tiran via the Suez Canal — again, in violation of every international law — which in itself is what they call casus belli, a cause for war.
The Israelis are completely surprised and confused. Prime Minister Levi Eshkol at that time — a very nice man and the successor of Ben-Gurion, lacking any charisma — invited the Soviet ambassador to Israel at that time. His name was Chubakhin, and he says to him, “I’ll take you with me right now, without any prior notice, to the Israeli troops on the border with Syria for you to see that there are no Israeli concentrations along the border with Syria. There’s no need for all that.” And Chubakhin said to him, “I don’t care about the facts. We tell you not to provoke troubles with Syria. Period.”
So, you see the connection to the overall bigger picture. The Israelis decided to sound out their Western allies — the partners of the war of ‘56: France and Britain. And then the US. Foreign Minister Abba Eban — not lacking knowledge of foreign languages; he spoke great English, great French; he understood what was said to him. The French and British basically didn’t care. “Okay, do something diplomatic about it.” And then he went to US President LBJ. What exactly he heard from LBJ in this meeting is not so clear. Did he get the specific green light from the Americans to go to war, a preemptive strike against the troops around the borders of Israel? We’ll come to that in a second. Or was it the sense of, “Well, do whatever you have to do. We are out of it, but do whatever you have to do,” — any of this?
At any rate, when he came back to Israel, the sense in Israel was that the US this time would not act like Eisenhower acted in 1956. Call it a mild green light to go to the preemptive strike.
Total victory and strategic realignment
Josef Olmert: In the meantime, King Hussein of Jordan, as we know, joined the Arab coalition under Nasser and put his army under the command of the Egyptians. The Syrian army was along the borders in the north, Jordan in the east, Egypt in the south. It was a violation of international law, the blockade on the Suez Canal and shipping for Israel. The stupid UN Secretary-General at that time, the Burmese U Thant, removed the peace units of the UN from the border because Nasser demanded it from him — again, in total violation of the arrangements of 1956.
Israel had no choice but to go to the war of self-defense under a national unity government with what was, at that time, the Herut–Liberal party, together, that would later become Likud under Menachem Begin. And we know what happened in this war: total victory for Israel and no American pressure, as opposed to ‘56, to stop the war.
Israel was allowed at the time to finish the job completely. Israeli troops on the other side of the Suez Canal; overlooking the Egyptian army on the Egyptian side of the Suez Canal; taking over the West Bank as a result of defending against Jordanian aggression, including the holy city of Jerusalem; liberating the holy city of Jerusalem for the Jewish people and taking over the Golan Heights in the north from the Syrians.
In the context of world politics, this was taken to be a victory for an American ally against the Soviets. And what it did also was, it was the first time, probably, that you were not just getting from Israel, if you are the US, some precious intelligence stuff. Like, say, the Israeli intelligence is the one that told the Americans about the famous Khrushchev speech in the Communist Party Conference in 1956 about Stalin, or other such changes. Israel proved itself to be a credible, potential, possible ally, being a strong military power.
This is the beginning of the relationship with the US to become, later on, the special alliance between the two countries. At the time when France imposed an embargo on Israel, the British washed their hands off. America became now the number one ally of Israel. And that’s the historic turning point.
Let me make a point to start with: This alliance was very, very helpful to Israel. We’ll come to some examples. It was also very helpful to the US. I’ll also give these examples. It was an alliance in many respects. It was clear who was the big brother — the US — and who was the smaller brother — Israel. It was clear.
However, what I want to emphasize here is another important point, because it will also have implications to what would happen much later on, all the way to the days that we are talking about now. Israel developed a dependence on the US, which was much more than just the money-getting, which was important, and the arms-getting, which was extremely important. Everything was: the UN diplomatic support, indeed, was very important — and other international organizations.
The dependence became part of the collective DNA of policymakers in Israel about what Israel could or couldn’t do, should or shouldn’t do. It almost became like a psychological burden. And it became an impediment on many occasions to the Israeli freedom of action on issues which were extremely important to Israel.
Dependence on a superpower is a problem. And I know lots of people say that “the Israelis lobbied the US” — and we’ll come to all that — “so influential.” “America depended on Israel.” “America was really the one that listened to Israel.” In reality, almost every time — not always, but almost every time — after ‘67, when an Israeli government, whether it was still the Labor governments until ‘77 or the Likud governments mostly after ‘77, when they had to make a big, big decision, they referred it first to the US. “What do you think?”
I leave it as an open issue here, I’ll just mention it. Some would say it was a great idea. The great Ben-Gurion went to the war of ‘56 only after he had this alliance with France and Britain. However, in ‘48, he established the state without consulting first with the US or getting their approval.
In 1967 — as I said before, you can argue whether Israel got the green light or not — but Israel went to war with its own independent sovereign decision. Here is an example of what this psychological dependence created. Take the war of ‘73, the Yom Kippur War. It’s still an open issue: How could it happen that Israel was so surprised?
You already heard before an example of how Israel was surprised on other occasions. So let’s leave this one aside. A lot of it had to do with the fact that the US said to Israel, “The Arab armies are a mess, but it’s not going to be a war.” And the Israeli decision was: “There is not going to be a war.” Even when, in the last 24 hours ahead of the beginning of the war, it was already clear there was going to be a war, and the Israelis knew that, they still decided not to preempt because they wanted to make sure that there would be American diplomatic support once the war starts. And that’s a controversial decision. A big decision, a crucial, historic decision. And that refers to what I said about the dependence on the US.
The fact of the matter is, the US, under the policy mostly dictated at that time by Kissinger, we know what was already happening domestically in the US: the Watergate scandal and all that, which weakened President Nixon as a president. But Kissinger was the architect, spokesperson and executor of American foreign policy. He was part of those who put pressure on Israel not to finalize the war by totally defeating the Egyptian army, when the Third Egyptian Army was already besieged by the Israelis.
Maybe a great, positive decision, because it could have helped later on President Sadat to come to the idea of making peace with Israel. Because he could argue that the war of ‘73 was a partial or full victory for Egypt, not a total defeat as it could have been if the Israelis were allowed to continue the siege over the Egyptian Army — the Third Army, as they called it — and totally destroy it, as was so easy for them to do at the time when the war was stopped.
The costs of dependence
Josef Olmert: But there are other examples on either side of the spectrum here: how the Israelis made big decisions without consulting with the US, how they did it only because of consulting with the US. But altogether, it became almost like a dictum in Israeli foreign policy and security policy: “Can we or can we not do it because of what America will say or do?”
And that’s how I leave it here. That’s a factor. To say it was wrong or it was right is wrong because it depends on so many other examples, and it depends on the specific situation that we talked about.
So, this alliance as of ‘67 had so many components. The financial support to Israel was fantastically significant, even though as of 2006 — and many people don’t know it — the civilian aid stopped. It’s only military aid. And of the money that Israel gets as military aid, 75% of it goes back to shopping in the US, which means that the net aid to Israel is only 25% of the $3 or $4 billion a year. But still, it’s important. And I’m not saying what I’m saying now in order to belittle it; I’m just putting it in context. Absolute support — almost — in international organizations, including the veto power on anti-Israel decisions in the UN Security Council — that was very significant.
Support for Israel in times of domestic issues. For example, the big financial economic crisis of the early 1980s with the hyperinflation in Israel at that time as a result of the economic policies of the Begin government, and his late finance minister, Yoram Aridor. The so-called dollarization plan and all that. These had a lot of American support.
It was clear that America considered Israel to be a great ally even though it still had Arab allies. Saudi Arabia continues to be, as of the Camp David Accords of 1979. Egypt is becoming part of the triangle of the main allies of the US in the Middle East: Egypt on one end, Saudi Arabia and Israel in the middle. There was a lot of support.
I can go on and on and on. And two elements which were very, very significant in this support were the bipartisan support, which most Israeli governments cared very carefully to maintain — the support of both parties. That was very significant. We’ll see more of it in the next episode. And the rise of the American Jewish community as a major block of support to Israel, which was not as strong in the 1940s or even the 1950s, but became much stronger in the late 1960s and early 1970s, with regard to the struggle for Soviet Jewry, and supporting Congress on the level of the different states in the US.
Israel was helpful to the US on various occasions. Take, for example, the crisis in Jordan, 1970 — Black September, when the Syrian army invaded Jordan and Israel forced them out. Something that was in Israeli interest, but significantly in American interest. Israel in that case was doing something that was in the service of the entire Western world. Not for nothing — Joe Biden of all people said on one occasion that Israel is like another aircraft carrier for the US. That’s an interesting statement that he made before he was president.
We have to remember that Israel helped the US with regard to the situation in Iran before the revolution by providing intelligence that was precious but was ignored by the US. Israel helped the US before the Saddam invasion of Kuwait in 1990. I can tell you something that very few people are aware of: A high-level Israeli delegation, in the middle of July, flew especially urgently to the US to caution them about what could happen. And the US said, “We don’t know.” They should have known. So, they sent the unfortunate ambassador, April Glaspie, in Baghdad, to talk with Saddam Hussein on July 28. And we know what happened there. Saddam Hussein promptly said, “Nothing would happen.” That was July 28, 1994. Four days later, on August 2, the invasion started.
Israel agreed not to retaliate to Saddam sending 42 missiles to Israel during the Gulf War of ‘91. It’s part of the alliance with the US. Because the US did not want it to be an Arab–Israeli war if Israel was to react, as opposed to a war of the US with an Arab coalition — including even Syria — against Saddam Hussein.
And we can go on and on like this. The balance sheet is, in this alliance, Israel benefited enormously. There’s no question about it. What the alliance did to the overall decision-making process in Israel is also something that we should have mentioned — and I did — and we have to bear it in mind. In a way, it made Israeli policymakers somewhat complacent in making some crucial decisions — realizing, and on some occasions mistakenly, that the alliance with the US would do the job for Israel.
There are two approaches here, in general terms, from an Israeli perspective, about how to handle all this. Should we trust only ourselves, always and absolutely so? Is it even possible? Or should we measurably trust a great ally? And what’s in between these two approaches?
Cracks in the alliance
Josef Olmert: Our next episode will be about the emerging of forces within the alliance, both in the US and in Israel, that — I’ll already say now — were to weaken it in a gradual but systematic way that was not always recognized, definitely not in Israel as such. And that will lead us to the fourth episode, which will be the current situation with Donald Trump.
See you next time.
[Lee Thompson-Kolar edited this piece.]
The views expressed in this article/video are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.
” post-content-short=” Josef Olmert: Hi, hello to all my watchers and followers and readers. This is episode number two in my series on US–Israel relations. And a little correction to what I said in the beginning of the first episode:…” post_summery=”The second episode of this four-part series traces the evolution of US–Israeli relations through the pivotal events of the 1967 Six-Day War and the Cold War. Professor Josef Olmert highlights how military cooperation and diplomatic support from the United States gradually developed into deep strategic dependence. Though beneficial, this dependence constrained Israel’s autonomy in key military and policy decisions.” post-date=”May 29, 2025″ post-title=”FO° Talks: US–Israeli Relations Explained, Part 2: Consequences of the Six-Day War” slug-data=”fo-talks-us-israeli-relations-explained-part-2-consequences-of-the-six-day-war”>
FO° Talks: US–Israeli Relations Explained, Part 2: Consequences of the Six-Day War
Josef Olmert: Hello. Hi again to my loyal viewers and readers, and followers. I’m starting a new series, a short one of three episodes, about the Israeli–US relations. A topic which is big, big on the agenda of many people in Israel, in the Middle East, in the US, a topic that has become very relevant as a result of recent developments, including what may seem to be, and apparently is, a change in the tone — at least in the tenor — of the Trump administration with regard to Israel and to some Middle East issues.
And my historical background conversation in this particular episode is not going too far back. It is going to the Second World War, and what would follow later on: the establishment of the State of Israel and the beginning of the relationship between the two countries. And it will include elements that may not be an historic revelation, but when put all in one context, may be surprising to quite a few of the watchers and readers, because it may put in some perspective some of the well-established notions about the relationship between the two countries that have always been dubbed, at least in the last few decades, as the special relationship, the unbreakable alliance, the God-knows-what type of definition given to this relationship by both friends of these relationships and enemies of it.
So let’s go to the Second World War and start with a general comment, which is that once the US entered the war — finally, after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, which is basically the end of American isolationism — with all its might, with all its power, that America had to develop foreign policy which hardly existed until then about the Middle East. Which was really at that time, until the Second World War, not an important part to the US, but for the beginning of some commercial economic relations having to do with oil, of course. And oil is important, as we shall see.
Harold Hoskins, the Holocaust and Zionist response
Josef Olmert: So President Roosevelt went to develop an American strategy as to how to deal with current issues during the Second World War and future implications of them. He did something which may have been the precedent for other American presidents: He sent a special envoy to the Middle East. His name was Harold Hoskins. He was a former military person, lieutenant colonel — and he had an interesting background. He belonged to a family that had to do with the American University in Beirut, a famous academic institution, the role of which in American–Arab relations has not always been recognized properly.
The university was established in 1866 and became a hotbed for two groups of people. On the one hand, Americans who came to the Middle East — mostly Protestant missionaries, interestingly enough, from New England — who came to the Middle East following the terrible, bloody civil war in Lebanon between 1840 and 1861 that ended with the huge massacre of Christians in 1861. And the other group that it attracted were those Americans who were influenced by the existence of this college, were interested in the Arab world, in the Middle East, and would become, later on, ambassadors of goodwill for the Middle East — being basically dominated by Arabs, by those who use the Arabic language, and mostly by Muslims, not even Christians.
So Hoskins, therefore, did not come from a background that one could say was pro-Jewish or pro-Zionist. On the contrary — he came from a totally different background, the opposite one. And he visited the Middle East in 1942, 1943 and then presented his report to the president, which basically was saying to the president, “Hey, look, you cannot really support the Jewish idea about establishing a state. There’s the Arab world, you know.” And one can argue he accepted the basic tenets of what one would call the pro-Arab lobby in the US at that time — and maybe for many years later — that the US should go with the majority of people in the Middle East, not with the minority: the Jews.
Now, at that time, when Hoskins was in the Middle East and then presented his recommendations to the president, there was the Holocaust in Europe, and two developments emerged that would be the counterbalance to this report of Hoskins. One of them was the dramatic, dramatic revelations by this Gentile, German Tzadik — the righteous among the Gentiles — Edward Schulte, who came one day to the young representative of the World Jewish Congress in Geneva, Gerhart Riegner, a young Jewish person at the age of 30, and told him, “Do you need to know the truth? They are going to kill all your people in Europe. Urgently message this truth to your superiors so that the Western countries will do what they have to do.”
I’m not going to get into all that — just to give it as a background with all the controversies that emerged later on about the reaction of the Roosevelt administration, or the lack thereof, the slowness of the reaction. But it was one element that was introduced to the discussion about the Middle East at that time and the future, which had to do with the fate of the Jews in Europe and what could be a solution to their plight.
But at the same time, also, the Zionist movement reacted. And the famous Biltmore Plan that was announced in the Biltmore Hotel of New York at that time — a great place, not anymore — a conference that took place between May 6 and May 11, 1942, in which finally, finally, the leadership or the majority of the official Zionist movement accepted the idea that the future should be a Jewish commonwealth — that’s the word they used — in what they called Palestine. Accepted finally what the revisionist side of the Zionist movement, under the leadership of the great Ze’ev Jabotinsky, had said for many years earlier — that the final, ultimate goal of Zionism is to do exactly that: national liberation movement of the Jewish people, and the national homeland of the Jewish people, the land of Israel — or Palestine, as they called it — should be a state.
So Roosevelt knew that there were pressures from both sides, and at the end of the day, he did not make a big speech in which he repeated the recommendations of Hoskins. He even established, later on, the Refugee Board to save Jews in Europe — which did, by the way, good work. Raoul Wallenberg, the great man, was an agent of this group.
Roosevelt’s oil deal
Josef Olmert: But then the next chapter, if you will. In between, there were all kinds of negotiations with the British that also had their committees about what would be the future of the Middle East and Palestine. There was this historic meeting on February 14, 1945 in the Suez Canal aboard the ship of the American Navy between the president and the king of Saudi Arabia, King Ibn Saud — a historic meeting that established, by the way, the real, ongoing, historic special relationship between the US and a country in the Middle East, which was the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. End of 1945: This is the most permanent, consistent, solid alliance between the US and any country in the Middle East, which may have been shaken — we’ll come to that later on in the series — during the 21st century, but has been and still is the one alliance that can be considered the uninterrupted historic alliance of the US with its new role as the superpower and the Middle East country.
There are all kinds of historians that will tell you, “This was this result of that meeting, and this was that result of that meeting.” But since I’m the one who talks here, I will say to you: This was the deal of oil for protection. The US will defend Saudi Arabia, Saudi Arabia will give oil to the US. That’s it. That was the deal.
And then the president came back, was almost a dead person — he would die a little bit later on April 12, 1945. But before then, on March 1, 1945, he gave his big speech to Congress in which he said the famous statement that in five minutes of talk with King Ibn Saud, he learned more about the Middle East than what he had known before. Which was, in a way, a reflection of, apparently, his inner thoughts, but also a slap in the face to a lot of people in the Jewish community, people like Rabbi Stephen Wise and others who believed that Roosevelt was the greatest ever supporter of the Jewish people. He said something that to this very day is used by many people, particularly on the right side of Jewish and Zionist politics, to indicate that FDR was not exactly the great friend of the Jews he was portrayed to be.
Truman’s recognition and Israel’s fight for survival
Josef Olmert: And then came Harry Truman. What did he know about the Middle East? Nada, nothing. What did he know about foreign policy? Nada, nothing. But he was a great person, great president. And he knew to make decisions. And he had to make decisions about the question of Palestine on two accounts: First of all, what to do with the Zionist demand to allow refugees from Europe to go to their historic homeland as their final refuge after what happened. The British said no, the Americans put pressure to allow hundreds of thousands to come. But then the most important decision had to be done: Should America support or not the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine? And he made the resolution that America should support the Partition Plan, as proposed by the UN Inquiry that was approved by the General Assembly in the historic decision on November 29, 1947. Which was accepted by the Zionist majority as an official position, and was rejected by all the Arabs, the Palestinian Arabs and the Arab states.
The question was: Was it really the final decision of Truman? Would he go along with it and support this Jewish state once it’s being declared? As the Zionists said, it would be declared the last day of the British mandate over Palestine, which was supposed to be May 15, 1948. They were supposed to declare it on May 14 because it was Friday as opposed to Saturday, which was May 15, the Sabbath.
And Truman was under terrible pressures. In January 1948, he retracted his initial position. He talked about international trusteeship for Palestine for a while. And there were pressures on him from both sides, including his old Jewish friend and business partner, Eddy Jacobson, on the one hand, as opposed to the Arabs and as opposed to some of the closest people to him. Chief among them: Secretary of State George Marshall, the great winner of the Second World War, secretary of state, the architect of the Marshall Plan — who was terribly opposed to the establishment of a Jewish state and to an American recognition of it. And he said to the president, “I will not vote for you if that’s your position.” The famous Clark Clifford, the well-known Democratic adviser, told the story. Other people told the story; there’s no question about it.
Truman made his decision: He gave the US recognition to the State of Israel 11 minutes after the declaration made by David Ben-Gurion in Tel Aviv on May 14, 1948. But that did not mean a carte blanche for the Zionists, for the Jews, in what ensued afterwards: the War of Independence that started with the invasion of five Arab armies on May 15 to the newly-established state, in order to basically exterminate the Jews, as was predicted by the Secretary-General of the Arab League, Azzam Pasha. He said in October 1947, “This will be a war of extermination.” This was what the Arabs planned for the Jews: the Nakba of the Jews, the destruction of the Jewish state, the extermination of the Jews three years after the Holocaust ended in the Second World War, the deportation of the Jews, whatever.
And America imported an embargo on arms to Israel. The ones who gave the arms to Israel at that time for their own reasons — we shall not get into it in this episode — arms that allowed the Israelis to win the war were the Soviets, the Soviet Union — the so-called, famous Czechoslovak arms deal. At that time already, Czechoslovakia was under communist control. Interesting, interesting.
Cold War choices and the Suez Crisis
Josef Olmert: But America recognized Israel, there were diplomatic relations. And then came another turning point: It was the Korean War of 1950. It really divided the world and also divided the ruling coalition in Israel at that time. Not always are people aware of that, because David Ben-Gurion, the leader of the Mapai party, had partners in the government that were to the left of Mapai — Marxists and Zionists, but very pro-Soviet. And they put pressure on Israel to at least be neutral in the Korean War, or even support the Soviet Union.
And Ben-Gurion made his historic decision: no way. He gave a famous speech in the Knesset, which also included an attack Joseph Stalin personally, and made the choice: We go with the West. Still having relations with the Soviet Union for a few more years to come that were problematic — including also the Soviet attempt toward the end of the days of Stalin to try the Jewish doctors with the so-called plot to poison the Soviet leadership, which was apparently a preparation for a final solution for the Jews in the Soviet Union.
Later on — just to put things in some perspective, and not everybody would like to hear what I’m going to say now — the famous Henry Kissinger said (he then apologized for that when it was published many, many years later) in closed sessions when he was in the Nixon administration, that the US would not have done anything if the Soviets were to put Jews in concentration camps and get rid of them. Yes, he said it. He then apologized for it. Many, many years later, it was revealed when documents were published that that’s what he said.
The next episode of the relationships is the Suez War of 1956, when Israel, France and Britain collaborated in the attack on Nasser of Egypt after all his aggressive acts against Israel that were perpetrated, by the way, from the Gaza Strip — Gaza that the Egyptians refused to give to the Palestinians as an independent or even autonomous state.
President Dwight D. Eisenhower was not a partner to all that. And even though we are already in the Cold War, the idea that two partners of the US in NATO, France and Britain, would collaborate with Israel in a war that was not coordinated with the US — a few days before the American presidential elections in 1956 — and while the Soviets were engaged in their situation in Hungary, that was against the sense of Eisenhower, that he was no more just the commander-in-chief of the Allied forces in Europe, as he was in the Second World War. He was now the head of the free world. And he collaborated with the Soviet Union at the height of the Cold War to force the British and the French to stop their support for Israel and withdraw from the Suez Canal. And the Israeli army was forced, after months, to withdraw from Sinai.
And a period of 11 years of peace and quiet along the border lasted until 1967. In January 1957, Eisenhower published the Eisenhower Doctrine, which was an attempt to counterbalance all this by basically saying, “It wasn’t because we liked Nasser what we did, but from now on, we say to Nasser: no more.” And that’s something more to do with the US and some other Arab countries — or the Middle East in general — that I will not get into.
Looking ahead to 1967
Josef Olmert: But 11 years were opened until 1967, which would be, in a way, a historic turning point in the relationships between the US and Israel. And that will be the gist of my second episode. The next episode will be 1967, the Six Days War, as a historic turning point — the beginning of what one might call the special relationship between Israel and the US.
I’ll see you then. Thank you.
[Lee Thompson-Kolar edited this piece.]
The views expressed in this article/video are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.
” post-content-short=” Josef Olmert: Hello. Hi again to my loyal viewers and readers, and followers. I’m starting a new series, a short one of three episodes, about the Israeli–US relations. A topic which is big, big on the agenda of many people in Israel, in the Middle East, in the US, a topic that has become very…” post_summery=”Professor Josef Olmert explores the historic roots of US–Israel relations, beginning with World War II and continuing through the Suez Crisis of 1956. He highlights early American ambivalence toward Zionism, the impact of the Holocaust and Cold War geopolitics. The first episode of this three-part series sets the stage for 1967, when ties between the two nations deepened significantly.” post-date=”May 27, 2025″ post-title=”FO° Talks: US–Israeli Relations Explained, Part 1: Post-World War II” slug-data=”fo-talks-us-israeli-relations-explained-part-1-post-world-war-ii”>
FO° Talks: US–Israeli Relations Explained, Part 1: Post-World War II
Gary Grappo: Good day, and welcome to FO° Talks. Joining me today is the CEO and founder of Fair Observer, Atul Singh, and our discussion today is going to be addressing India as a Rising Global Power. I’m pleased to get into this conversation. But before we get into the subject of global power in India, I think it’s only appropriate, Atul, that maybe we start out with a discussion of the recent crisis between India and Pakistan and what that means. So thank you for joining us, and, Atul, your thoughts on this brewing crisis and what it means?
Atul Singh: Well, Gary, one of the things that we have to look at when we look at places like Israel and Palestine and India and Pakistan is the nature of history and the nature of competing narratives. Now, as far as India is concerned, this was a cold-blooded Islamist terror attack. Twenty-six people are dead, killed after being asked about their religion.
Gary Grappo: This is up in Kashmir in the Indian—
Atul Singh: This is up near Pahalgam, a terrorist spot, yes. And this is part of a pattern. Islam has used terror as an instrument of state policy. Its leaders have admitted to using terror as an instrument of state policy, and they have sought strategic depth against India, in particular since the loss of Bangladesh in 1971. Remember, there was a 1971 India–Pakistan war. Pakistan came up short, and after it came up short, Bangladesh was formed. Pakistan has pursued a strategy of bleeding India through a thousand cuts. It was General Zia-ul-Haq, the Islamist president, who took over in a military coup and hung Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, who initiated it. Lest we forget, it was Bhutto who declared the Ahmadis to be non-Muslims in 1974 and said they would eat grass for a thousand years but get a nuclear bomb. So Bhutto was no saint, but Zia was worse. In fact, it was Bhutto’s intransigence that led to Bangladesh. He was racist; he thought the Bangladeshis were dark-skinned for Muslims. So we can go into a whole eddy, but the bottom line is that Pakistan was founded on the idea that all Muslims of the Indian subcontinent are a separate nation. It was founded on the nostalgia of the Delhi Sultanate, which was a garrison state, as Ishtiaq Ahmed — a noted historian or political scientist at the University of Stockholm, professor emeritus, originally of Pakistani origin — has talked about. He’s talked about a garrison state in the context of post-1947 history, and for Pakistan to inflict damage in India, they have fanned many insurgencies. In fact, in the early days, it was Punjab. There was disaffection there. And then after 1989, it was Kashmir. Now, as far as India is concerned, since 2014, India has been ruled by the Bharatiya Janata Party — it’s a Hindu right party. And the Bharatiya Janata Party has thumped its chest and, literally, the prime minister has said he’s got a 56-inch chest and claimed to be the great masters of national security. And they have trumpeted that tourism has replaced terrorism. So this is not egg in their face, but blood in their face. And so they’ve lost a lot of face because they had put in a lot of investment, they had built infrastructure, they had liaised with the Gulf countries such as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates to get investment in Kashmir. Indian tourists have started going to Kashmir in large numbers, and so for this to happen will have a chilling effect on tourism. So there’ll be less money flowing into Kashmir, so there’ll be more unemployment, and that Pakistan will hope to exploit. They’ve killed tourists, and now kill tourism.
Strategic fallout and historic patterns
Atul Singh: And what has happened on top of that is that they’ve been weighed, measured and found wanting. And mind you, since 2023, Pakistan has been following a policy of targeting Indian army and Indian security personnel in Poonch and Rajouri. That’s in Jammu, the other region, because Jammu and Kashmir are, as you know, twin regions.
Gary Grappo: Right. It’s probably useful to note that Kashmir has long been known as a popular tourist destination, dating back even to the early middle part of the British colonial period. Obviously, during that time, it was quite exotic, but Westerners in particular have looked to Kashmir with aspirations of sometime visiting this place that is somewhat reminiscent of Shangri-La, (Atul laughs) with high elevations, the spectacular mountains, gorgeous lakes, lovely weather. It seems to have it all. And so it’s not unusual that the government of India would put that kind of investment into developing the tourism infrastructure in order to drum up not only foreign tourism but, as you mentioned, Indian tourism.
Atul Singh: Massive domestic tourism. Especially, it was pent-up demand — because for decades, people wanted to go but couldn’t. And now the government said, “Everything’s hunky-dory, you can go,” and everyone went. And tourism in Kashmir was not just British times, Gary. It goes back to Jahangir, who came to the throne in 1605 and would wander off to Kashmir to escape the heat of the North Indian plains. And of course, he was a Mughal emperor who liked his booze, and he’s the one who allowed the British East India Company in. So I don’t want to get lost in history, but he’s the father of the chap who built the Taj Mahal.
Gary Grappo: Aha.
Atul Singh: So Akbar, the only great Mughal emperor, apart from his grandfather who conquered India. So Kashmir has long been regarded as this magical Shangri-La place. And during the attack, what transpired is: There was complacency. It was a complete failure of intelligence — we’ll get to that in a bit — on the Indian side. There weren’t security personnel there in the meadow. There should have been; it was a very popular tourist place. And the response time of the security personnel to get to the spot of massacre was quite high. So once again, a terrorist attack happens in India — remember Mumbai, 2008 — and once again, Indian intelligence and Indian security forces are found wanting.
Gary Grappo: This sounds eerily reminiscent of the Hamas attack on the Israelis on October 7.
Atul Singh: Exactly. Yes, it is eerily similar. The scale was smaller, but they have gone far deeper inland. Hamas, they just crossed the border. Here, if you look at where the attack happened, that’s quite a long way away from the Line of Control. So it is a pretty impressive logistical achievement of the Pakistani army to conduct this attack.
ISI, Asim Munir and Pakistan’s terror networks
Atul Singh: Now, what are the incentives? I always—
Gary Grappo: Just a cautionary note: You said, “Pakistani army.”
Atul Singh: Yeah.
Gary Grappo: But it was a terrorist organization.
Atul Singh: Yes, it was, it was. But the reports that we are getting from people in intelligence and also contacts outside India is that, most likely, the Pakistani army was behind this attack. The balance of probabilities — this is including our British friends — and the reason for it is threefold. Number one, we have to talk about the new Chief of Army Staff, Syed Asim Munir Ahmad Shah. As you know, Pakistan has always had “Allah, Army, America.” And of course, Syed Asim Munir is not like his predecessor, Bajwa. You’ll be surprised to learn, Gary, that he went to a traditional Islamic seminary. He went to the Markazi Madarsa Darul Tajweed, and his father was an imam. So this is not your Scotch-drinking Pakistani patrician landlord general, whose top interests are Scotch, Scotch and Scotch. (Laughs) This is more of a General Zia-ul-Haq kind of figure, alright?
Gary Grappo: Yeah.
Atul Singh: And his family is originally from Jalandhar, which is Indian Punjab. And guess what? He was Director General of Inter-Services Intelligence. Surprise, surprise! (Laughs)
Gary Grappo: Which has a rather extensive history of collaboration with extremist Islamic groups, not least of which was the Taliban during the American period in Afghanistan, much to the never-ending fury of the Americans.
Atul Singh: Exactly. So General Asim Munir — and he’s the chap who had the shortest stint as DG, Director General of ISI, apparently because he exposed the corruption of Imran Khan’s wife, Bushra Bibi. Well, hey ho, there we go; that is what it is. He gave a speech recently which was very telling, very Islamist, very targeting of India. I’ll dig it out and send it. In fact, I’ll try to share it with our viewers in analysis. So, the nature of Asim Munir is important, because he believes that Pakistan needs strategic depth and strength against India, and they cannot let Kashmir normalize, because otherwise it’ll slip out of Pakistani hands. Number two is the Pakistani army’s unpopularity. We know that they have locked up Imran Khan, their most popular leader since Ali Bhutto. Of course, Imran’s blamed America, as usual. Everything is America’s fault. Gary, as you know, you’re omniscient and omnipotent. You are the gods, the great Olympians of today’s times — those of you in the State Department and CIA.
Gary Grappo: The world’s favorite whipping boy.
Atul Singh: Exactly. I meet people at the State Department. I sometimes think, “If only they were as people imagine them to be, they really could do a lot of damage.” (Laughs) But as you know, people are people. And the unpopularity of the Pakistani army is owed to the fact that the country is in an economic crisis, a disproportionate share of resources end up with the Pakistani army. And it’s not just the budget — they have prime land, they have golf courses, they have extraordinary benefits, and their top generals tend to be corrupt and amass massive fortunes. Rumor has it that they’ve sold all their shells to Ukraine. So should there be war with India, they’ll run out of artillery shells. So the Pakistani military is not quite the US military, Gary — and it’s certainly not the British military, especially of colonial or imperial times. So the Pakistani army needed a distraction. And remember that recently they’ve suffered in Balochistan. They’ve had demonstrations by large crowds against them for the first time in their history, houses of generals have been sacked. All of this has happened. How do you unify a country? And look at the kafir — India, run by evil idol worshippers who are running an apartheid regime against our fellow Muslims who rightfully belong to Pakistan, i.e., Kashmir. Good narrative, gets everyone worked up. The only thing holding Pakistan together, as we know, is hatred for India, because it is the “Pure Land,” Pakistan. So they needed something to do to boost their popularity again. And indeed, India’s actions have boosted unity in Pakistan and the popularity of the Pakistani army. Insofar as the attack goes, it has served a certain end.
India’s institutional weakness and complacency
Gary Grappo: There has been a claim on the Pakistani side that this is a response to Indian-inspired attacks by separatist groups in Balochistan and Pakistan. How do you assess those claims?
Atul Singh: Well, look — India may have given some money to these groups, but I doubt Indian intelligence is that competent. Because, again, remember that people end up in Indian intelligence — especially India’s R&AW — when they don’t get what they want. The top choice of everybody in India is the Indian Administrative Service. We have one civil services exam. There’s no separate entry, really, for any of the civil services. So you write one civil services exam. So the chap who hates numbers ends up as the taxman in the Indian Revenue Service. The chap who can barely do pull-ups ends up in the Indian Police Service and can hardly run. And the chap who cannot speak ends up in the Indian Foreign Service. (Laughs) So, to put it politely, it is a Kafkaesque nightmare — to use language that my British friends would use, and that includes the Scots and the Welsh — it’s a clusterfuck, you know. And also on top of that, what happens is that people get in at 28, 29. It’s too late to mold them. People go to R&AW initially from the lower civil services — which is not so much of a problem, but the fact that they are going in because they didn’t get any of the top choices, where you have more opportunities for graft — i.e., corruption — and for power. And then the top positions are held by the IPS, the Indian Police Service. And the only IPS officers who join R&AW, which is the Research and Analysis Wing, or even the Intelligence Bureau, are those who are unhappy. I repeat: those who are unhappy with the cadre they are allotted, meaning they’re allotted Tamil Nadu, and they are from Delhi and they are hating the southern heat. Or they’re from Delhi and they’re allotted Nagaland — my previous state cadre — because you’re allotted a state cadre and you want to come to Delhi for your children’s education. So if you don’t like your cadre, your state, or you don’t like your chief minister, or for some reason you fall out with the local state political bosses, then you flee to a central deputation. So the reality is that unlike the Inter-Services Intelligence, which is the crème de la crème of Pakistan, the R&AW is the slough of the Indian system. So their competence is, shall we say, not dramatically high. So Pakistan blames R&AW after it blames the CIA. And just as the CIA doesn’t have Pakistan as a top priority, so does the R&AW not have Pakistan as a top priority. Their top priority is probably stealing money, which is the top priority of Indian bureaucrats when they cannot… And then, of course, it is getting a posting to the US or UK so that their children can go to top universities like Harvard or Oxford on taxpayer money. So no one even learns Balochi in the R&AW. We have such a crisis. You’ll have the odd man who’s extremely determined and is very motivated, and maybe that’s five to 10%, but generally it’s a dysfunctional organization. So to blame a completely dysfunctional organization for all the evils in Pakistan is slightly tall. I would suspect that the Iranians have had more of a hand in stirring the pot. And they certainly do have an intelligence service that is effective. They are motivated. You have talked about the IRGC as well — very motivated is the Iranian intelligence, just as the Turkish intelligence has memory of an empire. We know that the Turks have a great role to play in Syria, and the Iranians have a great role to play in Syria and their near neighborhood. So I would rather, if I had to just do a logical, cool-headed analysis — and I don’t have inside information here — I’d say, hmm, probably it is the Iranians. Yes, the Indians may have given some money, but the operational ability of Indian intelligence to do much is highly doubtful. So I made the first two points: One, it is Asim Munir, then two, it is the Pakistani army. And number three — and I think this is important — is that Pakistan now wants to go back to using the terror groups again, because it faces a new threat, and that threat is Afghanistan. The Taliban has not accepted the Durand Line. The ISI feels that they are in an extraordinary squeeze, with an aggressive Taliban on its border, with a local Taliban conducting insurgency, with an India that is becoming economically mightier, with Kashmir—
Gary Grappo: Significantly mightier.
Atul Singh: Sorry?
Gary Grappo: Significantly mightier. As I said at the outset, India is now rising to one of the top economies in the world and Pakistan is nowhere near that level. So clearly, they must look on what is happening in India today, particularly with the foreign investment that is now pouring into the country, with great envy and with little, little hope of attracting comparable investment in Pakistan.
Atul Singh: Yeah. So just a wrinkle there: Because Narendra Modi has adopted a policy of Sanatan socialism — I call it Sanatan because the local word for Hinduism is “Sanatana Dharma.” Actually, there was a huge outflow of foreign institutional investors from India last year. The stock market fell, and foreign direct investment was practically zero. So yes, over the last few years, investment has come in, but India will have to correct its path. And should the free trade agreement with the US and the UK transpire — and that will require India to bring in some market-friendly reforms — India will be back in business. But you’re right in over a decade or two-decade or even three-decade span, but not the latest, Gary. There are problems in the Indian economy. And we’ll do a separate issue, separate discussion on that. Very happy to, because that, for me, is the big worry for India: its economics. To go back to James Carville, it’s the economy, stupid. And we have a big population. But still, despite that, we have high growth. Yes, we have local industry. Now we are making a lot of our own missiles, we have a nuclear program that is decent, we are making artillery shells. India will inevitably improve. It’ll never be China. It’ll never be the workshop of the world. But it’ll be significantly better than Pakistan.
Gary Grappo: In their flock with the United States, they are looking at joint production of military aircraft similar to what America has done previously in places like Egypt and in Turkey, including advanced fighter aircraft, radar systems and so forth. And now, with the move of Western technology firms out of China, India is very much in the scope of these companies as a place that is much more friendly, although it obviously faces some challenges, particularly in dealing with the Byzantine bureaucracy of India.
Atul Singh: Exactly.
Gary Grappo: And it has a very capable workforce, very trainable workforce, and so it’s looked at as a place where Western firms, despite some obvious challenges, can do business and be very successful.
Atul Singh: Yes. And certain states of India, in the West and the South in particular, are very market-friendly — the coastal states. So we’ll get to that later. But the third point that I was making was that you have a hostile Taliban in the West — the very Frankenstein’s monster that Dr. Frankenstein created; Dr. Frankenstein being, of course, the ISI — has turned against Pakistan. And you have an India which is strengthening. And the Taliban and India, curiously, are talking to each other. So if you are Pakistan, it is in your imperative to rally people around the Islamic flag. And that attack does that beautifully, because it does upset a lot of the Hindus. Because remember, in the Hindu mind, there is this extraordinary sense of shame and this extraordinary thin-skinned feeling of impotence — because 1192-on, India was first ruled by the Turks, then the Pashtuns, then the Mughals. And of course, Nader Shah from Iran invaded India and slaughtered thousands. I believe it was 1739 — give or take one or two years, 1739 if my memory serves right. And then Ahmed Shah Abdali, a Pashtun, smashed the Marathas in 1761 and allowed the British to take over because they destroyed the most powerful local Hindu power. So in the Hindu mind, there’s this extraordinary sense that we’ve always been beaten. Farsi was the official language of India. We had to pay jizya, we always got defeated, our women always got abducted. We are weak. And now we must turn the clock, and we must be strong. And the Hindu Right takes inspiration from Israel, where the Israelis wanted to create a new type of Jewish man — and indeed, woman — stronger, tougher, aggressive, willing to respond, militarily innovative, with intelligence that was top-notch. And India has never achieved it, because India has many different countries rolled into one. The Tamils have their own script, and the southern Indian languages come from the Dravidian school. The northern languages are Indo-European. Hindi has more in common with German than with Tamil. So India is, in many ways, an ethnic and linguistic zoo. You go to Nagaland, where I served, and it’s basically 99%, if not 100%, American Baptists, and it has prohibition. And then Goa — I was born there — that’s Catholic. And you go to Kerala, and that’s Syrian Christians. And then you go to Lucknow, and the culture is Shia. But then you go to Delhi, and you go to Deoband. And Deoband is Sunni — it’s a theological seminary — and the Taliban follow the Deobandi school. By the time I finish explaining India to your colleagues in the State Department, their heads are spinning, because there are layers after layers after layers. And in such a diverse country, which is fundamentally a colonial state where we’ve inherited everything from the British, and the British created two sets of institutions: one at home in London, and they’re extraordinary; and one for the colonies, and they were to be run on the cheap. So the Indian Administrative Service and the Indian Police Service — they’re relics of the empire. They never created this at home; they created this in India. And the Pakistanis have it, and the Bangladeshis have it. The Pakistanis have the PAS, the Bangladeshis have the BAS. And the reality is that the Indian state is fundamentally a flailing state, to use the words of a political scientist; I think he was American. And the reason is: One day you’ll be running agriculture, the next day you may be running culture, the third day you may be running finance. The economist does not head the Reserve Bank of India, an IAS officer does. So at the top, the IAS is the general management, the elite management, the equivalent of the McKinseys. And they run everything from the Surveyor General of India, which should be a military position because you’re looking at maps, to the Director General of Civil Aviation, which you should probably know something about civil aviation. But the chap going to head it is coming from the agriculture ministry.
Gary Grappo: Perfectly logical!
Atul Singh: Yeah, perfectly logical! The Archaeological Survey of India is, of course, headed by an IAS officer, too — and that’s a punishment posting. But they don’t let go of any of the fiefdoms, because the principle that you can have a specialist in charge, a domain expert in charge, is a particularly despicable one. It’ll challenge the top caste that rules India, which is the IAS — the modern caste system. So India is not a professional state. And therefore, neither is Pakistan, nor is Bangladesh. And so, therefore, you have this inability to respond to crises, because people look up, they don’t take decisions at the grassroots: the top-man culture. And under Modi, the Prime Minister’s Office is all-powerful. It has expanded to a historic high. And it’s an open secret in India that if you don’t want to take a decision — an IAS officer wants to screw you over — they send the file to the PMO, the Prime Minister’s Office. It will never come back. So for years now, everybody in intelligence has been telling me that human intelligence in Kashmir has collapsed. And especially the young officers: “Sir, we rely too much on technical intelligence. Sir, things are really bad. No one is talking about it.” There’s a l’affaire du meta in the Indian media, because we are supposed to tell the story that everything is wonderful in Kashmir. We’ve hosted G20 in Kashmir. There are rivers of milk and honey flowing in Kashmir. And the reality is that in Kashmir, number one, the intelligence, especially human intelligence, had collapsed. The Intelligence Bureau was doing a shitty job. The R&AW, many of its agents were, in fact, double agents who were helping get Indian Army officers killed. They didn’t have a clue. The military intelligence as well had — they were marginally, probably arguably, a little bit better, but they don’t have the resources. But they weren’t doing great either. And every paramilitary or every central police organization has its own intelligence… well, yeah, they were complacent. The lieutenant governor is reputed to be incompetent. India has changed Article 370, in which Jammu, Kashmir and Ladakh — three different regions — were one state. Now Ladakh is Union Territory, separate. Jammu and Kashmir is one Union Territory, separate. And the lieutenant governor came from Uttar Pradesh. He is a BJP man — a Bharatiya Janata Party man — but he does not have a good reputation within the BJP as someone competent. And he comes from my state, UP — Uttar Pradesh. So, from what I know from my family and my contacts, he wasn’t terribly competent, he likes sycophants and he’s in charge of law and order. And fundamentally, they merged the cadre. Jammu and Kashmir was a separate cadre. Once it became a National Union Territory, there was a general cadre, and you had officers who had served in Delhi suddenly popping up in Jammu and Kashmir. Officers who’d served in Goa, suddenly in Jammu and Kashmir or Ladakh. And they didn’t understand local conditions. So there was a weakening of the state machinery. So all in all, there was institutional decline and complacency over many years, and the government ignored it — just as there were weaknesses on October 7, remember, in Israel. It happened because a lot of reservists were not on duty. Israelis had become complacent. They had automated everything. They never thought that Hamas would be able to manage such a concerted attack. So just as there were many failures there because of complacency and incompetence, the Indian side displayed both as well. And at some point, there has to be a reckoning.
Geopolitical leverage: water and naval power
And this then, you know, takes away the scab of this inferiority complex that Indians have had — that we are militarily inferior, we have been beaten and we never respond in a muscular way. We never did in Mumbai. Before that, in Kandahar, we just went and released extremists who went on to found jihadi organizations that killed thousands. We never crossed the Line of Control in Kargil in the 1999 border conflict. We could have surrounded the hills and starved them, but we didn’t even dare to do that. We sent young men to die. So there’s a lot of this angst and heartburn. And in a way, Modi is now a prisoner of the popular outreach and this sensibility of having been on the losing side of history, culturally and civilizationally.
Gary Grappo: That, Atul, from the perspective of an outsider presents a very dangerous alignment of conditions, because it would appear almost inevitable, based on what you have said, that not only is there going to be an armed response on the part of the Indians, but a pretty forceful one to reassert an image of strength — which they have to project internally, but also externally to the Pakistanis and to the rest of the world — because they do have aspirations of being a global power. And being victimized by this extremist group demonstrates a certain vulnerability, particularly when it has its origins in Pakistan. So what do you anticipate will be the response of India, and what happens after that?
Atul Singh: Well, the most significant thing to remember is that the current government has weakened the military tremendously. And it has weakened the military by bringing in a new policy called Agnipath, the Agnipath scheme, which is that you recruit everyone in the Army, Navy and Air Force for four years, and only a quarter will be retained — supposedly the best. Now, why is it a problem? You may say it’ll create a meritocracy. It is a problem because every other government service offers a permanent job. And because of India’s socialist history and still-feudal society, people crave government jobs. You’ve been in such societies, Gary, so you understand this much better than people who’ve grown up just in America and have just seen American capitalism. And so what this has signaled to the army is that, “We are bottom priority. We don’t matter. We are just armed guards.” And so morale is rock bottom in the Indian military. Right now, in a village, the top priorities go to the local police, then to the central police organizations. And if you don’t get in, then you come to the military, which is frightening. And also the training period is just six months. So what happens is that often people commanders will wait four years to see if someone can be sent for an advanced gunnery course or technical course. Because if you send a soldier away and invest in that person, and that person is not retained; it’s a waste of investment. Luckily, the scheme is new. And so there are lots of old, time-tested and battle-hardened soldiers around. But morale is low and there’s a shortage of officers, too, because ultimately, civil services have all the power and all the glamour, and they can steal money hand over fist. So in Indian society, except for very idealistic people or people who really care about the military, or who just think they won’t get into the civil services, no one really wants to be a military officer. And that is a challenge many militaries are facing — the shortage of officers — not just India. So is the Indian military ready to fight? Well, we don’t know. Maybe, maybe not. India has not increased its investment in the military as it should have, especially given the threat of China on one side, Pakistan on the other and now Bangladesh, which has turned Islamist. And Myanmar, which is up in flames. Every border is active. I don’t think most American viewers and listeners appreciate it. India lives in a very rough neighborhood, right? So now, let’s then get to the other response: the Indus Waters Treaty, 1960. It survived the 1965 war, it survived the 1971 war, it survived the 1999 Kargil border conflict. It has survived all sorts of insurgencies. It survived the Mumbai attacks, which were spectacularly brutal, in 2008. It has survived all these tensions. But now, earlier threatened, the government has said, “We are suspending participation.”
Gary Grappo: And just for our viewers, explain why this agreement, this understanding is so critical to both countries.
Atul Singh: It gives the use of the upper three rivers — I could go through the names of the rivers, but we’ll keep it very simple. The Indus has five tributaries. Punjab literally is the land of five rivers. Some of them begin in China, and they flow into Pakistan. And Pakistan lives off the water of these rivers. The British built canals, and that canal system ensures that Pakistani agriculture produces enough grain to feed a lot of its people. Pakistan’s population has grown fivefold since 1960. And so the waters are very crucial for Pakistan. There’s always been a fear that India could build a dam and start using the water, because India’s population has grown threefold and Kashmir’s population has grown dramatically, too. They need more water. And a lot of people on the Indian side think that this treaty is overly generous to Pakistan and it releases far too much water to Pakistan. It’s like feeding milk to a snake. That’s an Indian metaphor — that snake drinks that milk and then bites you all the time. And so they say, “You know what? Just stop the milk.” And there has been this thinking, but no one has acted on this. And I think India now is at that stage where it says, “Okay, you keep hurting us. What can we do to hurt you?” It’s like, “Maybe we can build a dam in the future. We suspend the water treaty. We can increase and decrease the flow of water — increase it when you have floods, decrease it when you have droughts, build dams, choke you out. And then what? Then let’s see if you conduct terror. Because if you won’t stop, we have to do something.” That is the thinking of the Indian side.
Gary Grappo: That climbs a very dangerous ladder of escalation, because when you threaten the livelihood of a nation, which is what you’re describing in the case of Pakistan and its need for water to sustain so much of its population and its agricultural sector, then—
Atul Singh: It is a feudal society living off agriculture.
Gary Grappo: Yeah. So then you’re talking about casus belli.
Atul Singh: Yes, and so Pakistan says, “Then we’ll treat this as an act of war.” And the reality is that India thinks, “You know what? You’re inflicting war on us anytime at a time and place of your choosing. So we have to do something now.” Ironically, the suspension of this treaty is really popular in Kashmir, because they’ll get more water from the Indus. (Laughs)
Gary Grappo: It’s not ironic at all. It makes perfect sense.
Atul Singh: Yeah, from Chenab, from Jhelum. So yes, it is a ladder of escalation. It will take a lot of time to really make a difference — to build the dams, to build the pipes, divert water. They can pipe it out, actually. That’s the cheapest way. But the reality is that India is embarking on this because it is militarily less expensive and less risky for the government. Yes, it could also use its navy, which is far superior, to blockade Pakistan. And that is a scenario, too. That’s scenario two. Scenario one: Choke off the water. Scenario two: Use your navy to block off energy imports and just block off their exports. Just do something higher-impact, lower-casualty. That is the new thinking in India. And number three, which is the Israeli suggestion — and you will laugh at this — the Israelis say, “Why don’t you start conducting selective elimination of the top leadership of the Pakistani military?” Which is what they do in Iran. (Both laugh)
Gary Grappo: They have the intelligence and precision to carry it out in the fashion Israelis have.
Atul Singh: Exactly, exactly! So maybe we’ll say, “Why don’t you do it for us, and we’ll give you the money?” (Both laugh) So Israel keeps marveling at the fact how, “If Asim Munir is a problem, you can kill his child.” This is literally what an Israeli friend suggested. “You can take a pistol — you have to inflict damage, after all, and establish deterrence.” You can see the Israelis think a little bit quicker than the Indians. (Gary laughs) And the reality is that all of these three might be on the cards, but India is not in a position to conduct targeted assassinations. We do not have the capabilities. The state is flailing; the structure of the state, that needs reform. We can’t do that. The Navy — possibly, yes, definitely. And the first two retaliations under the Narendra Modi government were by the Army and Air Force. In Balakot, for instance, when the last attack happened. And maybe it’s the Navy’s turn. That could happen. And I’m sure that the Pakistanis have their own scenarios to inflict pain. And they need the war more than us.
China, drones and the manufacturing squeeze
Atul Singh: And there’s another dangerous scenario: Remember that China does not like the stock of manufacturing going from China to India. You wouldn’t if you were China, Gary. You would come up with your own response. It’s a chessboard with many players moving pieces, and even the chessboard itself changes. (Gary laughs) So let’s say you’re an ambitious People’s Liberation Army general. Let’s say you go to Xi Jinping and say, “You know what? The Indians are bothering the Pakistanis. We can give them 10% of our drone production” — not even other stuff. China is the factory of the world. The Chinese can arm Pakistanis. If the Chinese put troops on the Line of Actual Control — LAC — they put troops because both borders are contested with Pakistan and with China. So let’s say they put troops on the Line of Actual Control — boom. Alright, India will have to put troops there. And let’s say they supply Pakistan with drones, not even artillery. Let’s assume it’s just drones. That’ll be a huge problem for Indians, because India cannot match the production — 70% of the drones, apparently, according to some reports, are produced by China. China produces an extraordinary number of drones. And if they arm Pakistan, they could trap India within the subcontinent, because they don’t want India to emerge as a power in Asia. Just as the US fears the rise of China, China fears the rise of India. So Graham Allison’s Thucydides Trap applies in the global context to the US and China, and in the Asian context to China and India. And that would be a nightmare, because the Pakistanis could conduct strikes. And Islamic radicalization within India has created a number of what you call sleeper cells. And remember, there are radical Muslims from Kerala, the most educated state of India, who ended up in the Islamic State — volunteered and went to the Middle East and fought. Remember — I think it was just a few years ago — there was an entire Love Jihad gang busted. The chap is in jail now. And the whole idea was that Muslim men, who tend to spend more time in the gym in India — you look at all the film stars: Shah Rukh Khan, Aamir Khan, Saif Ali Khan — they’re all basically of Pashtun origin. They’re all short, they are two feet tall. They are not like the tall Pashtuns of Afghanistan or northwest Pakistan. They don’t look like Imran Khan. But they have Pashtun origins. But they all tend to marry Hindu women, because the middle-class Hindu boys are too busy cracking competitive exams. They are geeky, they are weedy. And Muslim women are kept under wraps — they don’t come out, in the Indian social setting in particular. But the Hindu women are professionals — they are doctors, they are nurses, they are out and about. And the taxi drivers, the mechanics, the motorcycle riders, the gym boys with their tight T-shirts and big muscles often tend to be Muslims. Often they end up seducing and then marrying these women. And then, once women are involved, they will say, “Yeah, if you convert, it’s just nominal.” But before you know it, they convert. And I heard a tape of this person who’s now in jail talking about, “Oh, you’re converting — you’re just targeting girls of lower caste. I need you to convert girls of Brahmins and the other upper caste.” Because remember, the Indian social system, being such that if you marry outside your caste — in urban areas, that’s happening a lot — but even that is frowned upon, at least in rural areas. So one community doesn’t want you to marry out, and the other community — and I was told this by a very dear friend of mine — that the maulvi gives you a prize if you marry out and you get someone to convert. So that is also going on. That’s not huge, but that touches upon the insecurity of a lot of the Hindu middle class — that we are girly boys, we are vegetarian surrender monkeys, and the Pashtuns are more manly, taller, handsome, fairer than us — and they get our girls. Of course, it goes back to Alauddin Khilji. And Khilji is a derivative of “Zalkhai,” which I was told means “the abductor of women.” And he literally went around abducting or kidnapping all the beautiful local Rajput princesses for his harem. So this goes back 800 years ago. So again, there are layers within layers and memories.
Gary Grappo: The historical roots of the animosities between the two religious groups, Hindu and Muslim, and the two countries—
Atul Singh: Not just two! The Sikhs have an even worse experience of Islam, because their gurus were killed. So Islam has, shall we say, a rocky past, a rocky relationship with other communities everywhere, but especially in the subcontinent. But then amongst Muslims, there’s this feeling that, “The BJP has pushed us out. We don’t matter. They don’t have a single Muslim Member of Parliament. We are excluded politically, and we have to hit back.” So there is this strong animus. And so the ISI has built a number of small cells which it could activate, and in fact, this is what the Mossad keep talking about. They say, “You could have a five-front war. You could have Pakistan. You could have China. You could have attacks on your coasts, which the Bombay and Mumbai attacks proved are very vulnerable. You could have an insurgency.” Let’s say you have 200 million Muslims. Let’s say 1% of them are radicalized — that’s just two million. And let’s say 1% of that 1% actually can do stuff — that’s 20,000. But 20,000 is still a big number.
Gary Grappo: Very big number.
Atul Singh: So if they blow up power plants, if they derail your rail tracks, if they poison your towns’ water supply, you’ll be stretched. You’ll be at breaking point. And we are not even talking about Bangladesh, which has turned against India recently, after Sheikh Hasina has left. It’s now far more radical than it was, the current government doesn’t really have control. Nepal, which has fallen into the communist arc of influence; Bhutan, where the king and I were at Oxford together — a very good chap — but he’s having to gingerly navigate both India and China; Maldives, which has turned more radical Islamic — that is not far from us; Sri Lanka, which, yes, also in the recent past allowed the Chinese to build a port at Hambantota. And so India is scared of the “String of Pearls” that may be used to choke it. The Chinese are scared of the Indians fighting for Anglo-Saxon masters, as they did. Remember the sack of Beijing and Lord Elgin II. Lord Elgin I brought back the Elgin Marbles from the then-Ottoman Empire, and they are in the British Museum proudly — as the British will tell you, they’ve preserved them well. And Lord Elgin II, the son — a Scotsman indeed — went off to Beijing with his Indian troops and sacked the Summer Palace. And the Chinese have not forgotten that. (Laughs) So the Chinese are scared that the Indians may yet again fight for Anglo-Saxon masters.
Gary Grappo: Well, they’re not quite Anglo-Saxon, but it’s not too far-fetched when India now looks at this new relationship — the so-called Quad — that includes the United States and India, Australia and Japan.
Atul Singh: But the US is seen as an Anglo-Saxon power, although—
Gary Grappo: Of course. And I’m sure Austria is as well. And so that leaves Japan, which now has a very cozy relationship with so-called Anglo-Saxon nations, particularly the United States and Australia. And now there’s India, that’s in the mix again.
Atul Singh: It grates on Chinese sensibilities. Please finish your point.
Gary Grappo: Well, the point is that this is a very new development in South Asia. I say “new” in terms of the longer stretch of history, where you have four disparate countries coming together, not yet in a military pact, although three of the four do have a military pact—United States, Japan and Australia. And the Indians, increasingly warming to a quasi-soft, technology-oriented military relationship with the United States, appreciating the superior technology that they’re going to get from the US and the rest of the West, which they’re not going to get — certainly from Russia, which can hardly afford to export even bullets these days, and of course, nothing from China. And so this is a critical relationship, but it hasn’t moved into the traditional Western alliance that the United States has with Japan, with Australia, with its NATO allies. Although, I think deep within the heart of many Americans — and now I’m thinking of the traditional — this administration is hard to predict — would probably love to see that kind of a security relationship with India.
Atul Singh: Yeah, absolutely. And that makes China insecure. So when the Chinese are acting — and remember, India is in a bind with China, as is the US — because India imports a lot of stuff from China.
Gary Grappo: Absolutely.
Atul Singh: It’s economically dependent on China. So, so many of the things India makes, from solar panels to electric cars, the ingredients are all coming from China. So India is in a bind. China is a frenemy in some ways. But China then is propping up Pakistan. The CPEC — China–Pakistan Economic Corridor — and the port in Gwadar. The idea for China is to tie India down in South Asia so that India doesn’t get too big for its boots. So we are in a very tricky geopolitical cocktail, where everyone feels the squeeze in a different way. And I’ve already explained the squeeze Pakistan is feeling. So you’ve got a lot of cats on a hot tin roof. It remains to be seen what transpires. (Laughs)
Gary Grappo: And summer’s not even here yet!
Atul Singh: Exactly, exactly.
US mediation in the face of nuclear danger
Gary Grappo: Well, to close out this subject of this recent rise in tensions when it looks like military action is imminent, is there a role, and is there a mediator? Like, is there a role that a mediator can play in lowering tensions, at least at the moment — the most proximate cause of tensions — to avoid something truly no one would want to contemplate? And if so, who might that be? If you look at the major powers, it ain’t going to be China. The Europeans probably don’t have the heft — they certainly have the interest in seeing this conflict moderated — so who’s that going to be? And can a mediator be helpful here?
Atul Singh: So, two things. India is traditionally averse to mediation between India and Pakistan because of the history. Because it was banned by the United Nations when it took the matter in 1948 to the United Nations instead of finishing the military operations, which it could and would have won at that stage. They could have taken all of Kashmir. They didn’t. And Pakistan changed the demography of Kashmir. And in Kashmir, what happened is that Pakistan-inspired Islamist jihadi terror groups changed the demography of Kashmir, and, in fact — I forgot to say this — they have been changing even the demography of Poonch and Rajouri, the border districts, over the last two, three years in a very concerted way. They target Hindu and Sikh minorities, then they flee. Over a period of time, the district becomes completely Muslim. So ironically, the Indians didn’t do that, and they felt they were always blamed, despite the fact that they had acted in a far more equitable manner than the Pakistanis in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir. So Indians lost complete faith in Europe. They saw Europe and, of course, the US, partly because of Cold War alliances, as too beholden to Pakistan.
Gary Grappo: Yeah.
Atul Singh: And the narrative in Europe, even the use of language — that “militant groups” attack — that upsets the Indians. Because, come on, it’s an Islamist terrorist attack. People have been asked whether they are Muslim or not, and if they cannot recite the Kalma — or Kalima, as you would call it in traditional Arabic — they are shot. And in fact, a Christian said, “I’m a Christian. Don’t kill me. I’m not Hindu. I’m not Sikh. I’m not Buddhist.” And they said, “Well, look at what you’re doing in Palestine,” and they shot him anyway. So the reality is, Europe has absolutely no political perches in India at all. If the Europeans say, “We’ll mediate,” the Indians will say, “You can go fuck yourself,” — not in as many words. But there’s a real animosity to European mediation. With the US now changing its policy — and I have a friend who’s Republican, who says that India is the new frontline state against Islamism and communism. And he thinks that the US — obviously, he’s Texan, he’s a Republican — should get India to act robustly. And that is one end of the spectrum. The Pentagon and others, they want closer security ties, you said, with India to counter China. So with that, there are perches. And the US has the ability to mediate, but it’ll have to be a bit deft, and it will have to offer a sweet trade deal to have leverage in India, because India needs a trade deal. And now, with the tariffs, India could hurt very badly. So the US has the ability to mediate, but it would have to be deft and make sure that it understands Indian sensibilities.
Gary Grappo: And how would Pakistanis see an American mediation effort?
Atul Singh: I think the Pakistanis need the International Monetary Fund. You have a lot of leverage against the Pakistanis. (Laughs)
Gary Grappo: Oh yeah — 25% of the vote. (Atul laughs) If they want that next IMF bailout, yeah, they’re going to have to have the Americans.
Atul Singh: Yeah. And remember, all their kit is American. You can just stop upgrading kit and stop sending them spares. So you have a lot of influence. Asim Munir may still offer namaz — or prayer, salah — five times a day, and might remember his imam father preaching jihad against the infidels, and may still resent America and, of course, the Indians. But at the end of the day, he’s become chief. He knows the realities of his army. He’s not going to stand up to the Americans. And the Chinese cannot bail Pakistan out. Ultimately, it is the IMF. So the US has a lot of leverage in Pakistan and can use it. And the US has some leverage against India. And the US, despite all the decline, despite everything, is the only player that can mediate. But it has to be deft about it and not trample sensibilities.
Gary Grappo: And this is where the current US administration would be challenged. You really have to have an appreciation for the nature of this conflict. Yes, there was a devastating terrorist attack by jihadists, with which Americans, of course, can sympathize greatly. But the level of tensions are far, far deeper, and the complexities you’ve just outlined over the course of this discussion are virtually infinite. And that’s where I think this deftness is really critical in understanding that this is just not another conflict; this is something very different. And kid gloves are going to be necessary if you’re going to be able to successfully ratchet down tensions here and avoid an ugly military confrontation.
Atul Singh: Yeah. And one more thing we have to remember is that the reality is that neither side wants all-out war.
Gary Grappo: Correct.
Atul Singh: And so they want — what’s the term — an off-ramp. They want a ramp they can take and something that’ll save face for both parties.
Gary Grappo: Absolutely.
Atul Singh: Do you think Narendra Modi wants war? Absolutely not. After the Agnipath scheme, a war may be tricky. And Asim Munir knows he runs a bankrupt country.
Gary Grappo: Yeah. And it’s important to remind all of our viewers that we are talking about two nuclear-armed states.
Atul Singh: Yep.
Gary Grappo: And there is no individual on either side who wants to see this escalate to a point where one side may feel pressured, so threatened, to resort to the use of a nuclear weapon. And both sides understand that very, very clearly. This is—
Atul Singh: On that note, maybe I will differ a little bit. Because I think Pakistan’s nuclear threshold is really low.
Gary Grappo: Oh, yeah. Their thresholds are different.
Atul Singh: And India has a no-nuclear-first-strike doctrine. So India is not going to use nuclear weapons first. But Pakistan keeps threatening to, because that’s what gives it leverage. And fanatics in Pakistan — the graduates of the madrasas who have now infiltrated the army — the top man has gone to a madrasa, right?
Gary Grappo: Yep.
Atul Singh: So they, unfortunately, are talking a lot about using tactical nukes. So it’s not that both sides don’t want to use it. One side, increasingly, is open to using nukes, at least tactical nukes — and that is something to throw in the calculus. Because the old assumption, when you had the Scotch-drinking generals running Pakistan — let’s say Pervez Musharraf, right? The chap liked tennis. His top priority was Scotch, Scotch and Scotch, and then tennis came a distant second, okay? He certainly didn’t want nuclear weapons. Yeah, he wanted an advantage, he took the Kargil heights and yada ya. But I think what you said held absolutely true then. Now, we are not so sure that there aren’t people who are willing, and who make this assumption that, “Yeah, we have nothing to lose,” because Pakistan has gotten poorer, it’s gotten more desperate. Its population has increased, it is an extremely fractious society. The most popular leader, Imran Khan, has been locked up. The Pakistani military now has put the Sharif family and the Bhutto family in charge, both of whom are extraordinarily corrupt. The Sharif family is notorious for making tons of money. They are businessmen. The Bhuttos, the less said, the better. Bilawal Bhutto was known at Oxford for sex, drugs and rock and roll. There are tabloid reports of orgies that he used to conduct back in the day — that may or may not be true, who knows? But the point is that he speaks Urdu with an English accent; he’s completely not credible. So what the military has done to Pakistan is that because the democratic escape valve isn’t there for the tension to get out, because the state has not provided things like schools, hospitals, basic services, the population has swung and turned to the mullahs and the madrasas. And there’s a millenarian element in Pakistan. And Pakistan could very easily, in five, ten, 20 years — if it doesn’t implode — go the Iran way. So the calculus doesn’t hold that neither side wants nuclear weapons. I think if it’s an American diplomat, if it is an American politician, if it is anybody in Europe who’s thinking about these issues, or elsewhere in the world — even if it’s someone Chinese listening to our conversation — they have to bear in mind that the risks here are really high. And remember, because India is nationalist now, India will respond. In an earlier era, India would have restrained. And I think in India, their preferred response is as little war as possible. Because remember, Modi is Gujarati and his home minister is Gujarati: Amit Shah. They don’t come from military backgrounds, they don’t come from military families. No one in their family has ever served in the military, as far as I know. They are not geared for military conflict. But they understand water because they come from an arid region. So their favored method would be: stop the water.
Gary Grappo: Good point. Well, I think we’ve come up on our time here before we got into the great power discussion. And we’ll save that for a part two. But thank you so much for giving us these insights, sharing these insights. Confrontation between these two very, very large, heavily armed countries has great import — not only within the region, but globally.
Atul Singh: Thank you, sir. Thank you for the conversation.
[Lee Thompson-Kolar edited this piece.]
The views expressed in this article/video are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.
” post-content-short=” Gary Grappo: Good day, and welcome to FO° Talks. Joining me today is the CEO and founder of Fair Observer, Atul Singh, and our discussion today is going to be addressing India as a Rising Global Power. I’m pleased to get into this conversation. But before we get into the subject of global power…” post_summery=”India faces renewed tensions with Pakistan following a deadly terror attack in Kashmir, which exposed intelligence failures and sparked talk of retaliation. Fair Observer Editor-in-Chief Atul Singh outlines Pakistan’s internal instability, the growing influence of Islamist actors, and China’s strategic interests. With nuclear risks looming, US mediation is the only path to deescalation.” post-date=”May 21, 2025″ post-title=”FO° Talks: Islamist Terrorist Attack Triggers New India–Pakistan Tensions on Restream” slug-data=”fo-talks-islamist-terrorist-attack-triggers-new-india-pakistan-tensions-on-restream”>
FO° Talks: Islamist Terrorist Attack Triggers New India–Pakistan Tensions on Restream
Atul Singh: Welcome to FO° Talks. With me is one of the legends of the Indian Air Force, Air Commodore Ashutosh Lal. He did his schooling from Lucknow, a place where I did my university and where my father went to medical college. So he’s here because he was an air attaché in Ukraine. He speaks Russian, he’s flown Russian helicopters, he’s been to Ukraine regularly. So today, you will get an Indian Ringside View of the Russia–Ukraine Conflict. Welcome, Ashutosh.
Ashutosh Lal: Thank you very much. Thanks, thank you so much.
Atul Singh: Alright, Ashutosh, you’ve been to Ukraine over a number of years. Walk us through how you saw — and I don’t mean as a story, because, of course, you’re a pilot, not a historian. But still, you’ve had your brush with history — how you saw the conflict (a) emerging and (b) developing.
Ashutosh Lal: Right. Just to debunk, I am knowledgeable, actually.
Atul Singh: Well, you were an instructor. All your formal students swear by you!
Ashutosh Lal: Many of us have been, and we all have our stories here and there. But trust me, I’m a very ordinary person who — God was kind — that I had a tryst with the Indian Air Force for a pretty long time. And God was kind to give me all the opportunities to fly the airplanes, to do whatever I was supposed to do. In that, there was a responsibility given to me to go to Ukraine as air attaché in the year of our Lord 2011, and I came back much later in 2014 after a little bit of extension.
Atul Singh: So you were there three years.
Ashutosh Lal: Yeah. So from that point of view—
Atul Singh: That is when Crimea occurs.
Ashutosh Lal: I saw the first conflict, if you may call it so: the genesis of the entire fault line as to how it developed, what exactly happened, how Crimea was taken away…
Atul Singh: Or how Russians took Crimea. (Laughs)
Ashutosh Lal: But let’s say how Ukrainians gave it up. For that matter, that’s also another way to look at it. But like I said, how green men, little green men, who sprung up and they took away everything. So I saw it from all up front, close. It was very clear to me as to how it was going to affect us, and since then on, I’ve been visiting, revisiting and trying to keep myself updated — not because I’m not a historian by profession, but the trigger which happened in me because of my boss over there. I must give credit to him for many understandings — our ambassador, Shri Rajiv Chandra, who was extremely kind to us and who taught us, who shaped us, mentored us. And under his tutelage, if I may say, we went on to do whatever work we could do with him. So I must duly construct, or he came in at the point when I landed up in Ukraine in 2011. Believe you me, Atul, it was perhaps one of the most beautiful countries in the world. To be very honest, I had traveled a fair amount of the world before that, so I could draw a comparison and say that there was a great amount of vibrance and there was a great amount of joy and happiness. There was a great amount of respect for Indian culture, and there was a great amount of likeness between our two cultures. Later on in the chat, we can point out a few for that matter. But the point here is that that was the phase: UEFA Euro 2012, which was co-hosted by Poland and Ukraine in 2012. I remember I saw that, and I was there. The first match was Sweden–Ukraine, both playing blue/yellow jerseys. And Ukraine was magnanimous to ask Sweden to choose their color so that Ukraine could choose their colors. Andriy Shevchenko, the legendary football player — I believe he’s turned pro golfer now—
Atul Singh: Oh, has he?
Ashutosh Lal: Yeah, yeah.
Atul Singh: Okay.
Ashutosh Lal: He scored the first goal. It was a sight to be seen on the Maidan, which is the Independence Square, which turned later into dark and ugly pictures when the conflict broke through. See, I thought that was the apex of Ukraine, what I saw at that time as to how Ukraine was prospering. And it appeared to us very clearly that Ukraine is heading toward the European or EU way. Now, this was the belief which all my colleagues in the embassy, including my boss, had, that this is what’s going to happen. However, I was not convinced, because whatever little I dug up — and I lived on the streets over there, I spoke the language of the streets. (Chuckles) I was working the streets, so to speak. It was a very different time altogether. But in that particular—
Atul Singh: You weren’t just staying in your diplomatic bubble and kettle. (Laughs)
Ashutosh Lal: The whole idea was to get a feel of the place. And because of my link with Russian machinery — half of which, I did not know, was built in Ukraine — it was totally Ukrainian in its pedigree. So when that happened to me, and I realized how my life was saved by many of these Ukrainian workmen working in the different zavod — the plants — I used to visit over there, that drew me to the entire thing to try and understand what exactly was happening on the ground. So in that, my belief was — I think I’m quite sure about it — that Ukraine, under the influence of who and who — we can talk about it — did not envisage this outcome, which it eventually turned out to be. And they thought that they could dissect themselves from the larger ecosystem of East Europe. I’m not talking in terms of the Russian Federation. I’m talking about that larger ecosystem of East Europe. They wanted to dissect themselves and get attached. Please, when I’m saying that, those of you interested should look up where the west of Ukraine, the cities of Lviv and Ivano-Frankivsk — which part of Europe they kept changing hands with, whose background — Khmelnytskyi, might as well look him up: the ruler and the horse rider who came winning and marauding. You need to see that, as to what they were doing: carrying the symbol of power, something like a gada, which they carry in their hand. So you need to see that, and how Ukraine went from one to the other side needs to be seen. Notwithstanding that, post-Second World War, post- that era when everything was developing, post-Germany, when the Wall fell, unification happened, perestroika — how things were moving forward. This particular aspiration of Ukraine to come to the West or the European side, and this game plan of the West to try and snatch Ukraine out of the close, tight embrace of the East European ecosystem — I think that was the conflict which led to what happened.
Historical claims and regional politics
Atul Singh: So if you go back to 300 years ago — and Vladimir Putin’s op-ed talks a lot about it — there is a sense that Ukraine is the ancestral kingdom of Rus. Ukraine was attacked and taken over by the Polish–Lithuanian empires, and therefore, it is inevitable that Ukraine should remain in the sphere of influence of Russia. That is the Moscow view of the world. At the same time, if you take the Polish view of the world, they say, “Well, Western Ukraine in particular is a land contiguous to ours, and therefore has a lot more in common with us. And therefore, it should come more to the West and give us a greater buffer against Russia.” And if you go back to Soviet times, what people forget is that the brunt of collectivization — and there are books and books and books one can read — was borne by the Ukrainian peasantry. The kulaks were mainly Ukrainians. And in fact, Joseph Stalin killed three and a half million of them. And I have friends who are historians, and I have friends who are in MI6 and the British Foreign Office, and they often joke that had the British invaded Ukraine, they wouldn’t have treated them with the racism Nazis did. They would have set up an independent Ukrainian state. They would have played divide and rule, as they did around the world — they were rather good at it — and they wouldn’t have killed three million Ukrainians like the Nazis. So the reason I’m giving this historical color — and of course, those of you who want to dig up more can read a piece that retired CIA officer Glenn Carle and I wrote just before the war begins in 2022. We wrote it on Christmas Eve, December 2021 — and the point is, it is a tortured land with a tortured past, with contending narratives of history and different geopolitical interests. Over to you: What did you see transpiring at that stage?
Ashutosh Lal: So business? What Atul said is what I’m going to stay totally off.
Atul Singh: Okay, fine. (Laughs)
Ashutosh Lal: Academics and everything else you’ve heard about him, for that matter, you can go back and read. So this is where the ringside aspect comes in. And where did I pick up this issue and this feeling that Ukraine would not be able to be pulled out from the embers of East Europe, or whatever the big brother was. I picked it up from Romania. Let me narrate.
Atul Singh: Excellent.
Ashutosh Lal: So there was this seminar happening over there — a conference, perhaps — which was discussing—
Atul Singh: In the capital?
Ashutosh Lal: Romania, Bucharest.
Atul Singh: Bucharest?
Ashutosh Lal: Yeah.
Atul Singh: Okay.
Ashutosh Lal: Romania was also under my watch. I was there. So I was required to be there because a senior official from India was traveling over there, and he had to do a presentation on Prithvi missiles. There was a test done on an anti-ballistic missile of the three-stage model. So he had come to present a paper on that. And I was with him, and I was part of that seminar. And as always, my ears were out on the ground to try and figure out what’s happening. Why? Because the interesting part was in the front row, or perhaps just behind the front row, there was a row of ushankas — an ushanka is the P-cap which Russians wear — there was a row of ushankas. A senior, perhaps a general, on the right-hand side and a lieutenant down the line, age-wise, stacked up over there — and the presentation was going on. Please remember: Romania houses the active component of the missile defense, right? And that was a time when Deveselu base was being reactivated, because the earlier launch base which had been developed for Afghanistan was being denied, and they had no choice but to come back to this. And Deveselu was this Aegis Ashore site; radars were in Turkey. You know the whole idea. So in that context, to a speaker, I asked a question. I said, “Sir, the talks are on. Ukraine is likely to follow the EU very shortly. The handshake will take place very soon. And if you look at the European conundrum, you’ll realize that wherever in the East either the US has gone forward and NATO has caterpillared, or NATO has gone forward, the EU has caterpillared. So it’s just a foregone conclusion that today it is the EU, tomorrow it will be NATO, and Ukraine will turn into a NATO state. By which would I understand that these missiles here in Romania, or this site here in Romania, may shift to Donbas, Donetsk, Luhansk.” Those were my exact words. You know what the response was? Before anybody else on the stage could respond, the general with the ushanka passed an elbow down the line, and the elbow traveled all the way. Up sprang a young lieutenant, and in chaste English, he just spoke to the audience. He said, “Whatever the gentleman is talking about is in the realm of fiction. It can never happen.” And he sat.
Atul Singh: That is totally understandable.
Maidan and the fall of Yanukovych
Ashutosh Lal: Understandable. So that’s what my point is. That is the time that, from a ringside view, being on the ground, I understood and realized the fact that it is the dynamics of neighbors. Being on the ground in the streets and working over there, I knew that the economic ties of East Ukraine with Russia were very close.
Atul Singh: They had been for centuries.
Ashutosh Lal: There was travel, there were relationships — husband, wife, families, blah, blah, blah — whatever you call it. So it was absolutely unthinkable that you could draw a line there. And here was the West. The likes of — you know who — Victoria Nuland.
Atul Singh: I mean, our Chief Strategy Officer, Peter Isackson, despises her. (Laughs)
Ashutosh Lal: So that phone call is there on the net if you want to listen.
Atul Singh: (Laughs) I’ve heard it, yeah, yeah.
Ashutosh Lal: But the fact remains that here they were trying to call this out. When this happened — and I analyzed this comment, I dug deeper into it. Then comes out the next ringside exposé or understanding of mine. Dnipropetrovsk is a town where you have the usual — I may be getting on mixed up names here and there. Sometimes it happens.
Atul Singh: We won’t hold you to it. More important was the point rather than the detail.
Ashutosh Lal: I understand. But now, this base agency of Ukraine. Exceptionally brilliant products they had. In my scouting for trying to see that, imagine: You could have a Su-27 which carries a missile rocket under the belly, goes to the highest possible altitude in a particular direction and vector, launches that missile and that missile puts a LEO satellite into orbit. So it was the easiest possible way to give you coverage over a battleground if you want to put a LEO, which is persistent but finishes off sometime. A Low Earth Orbit satellite, right? So they had some wonderful systems, like the floating dock for the Zenit rocket, which launches a satellite into orbit. That means you didn’t have to have a Sriharikota. You could drag that platform on the ocean with the help of tugs to the appropriate place to have the rocket launching your satellite in the most economical manner. So that’s a wonderful, brilliant system. But also, the credit was that they were the father of all SS-series missiles of Russia. From SS-18 to SS-21, everything was being found there. It was their patent. And if you look at the books at that time, which I did, you realize that these missiles were approaching the end of life, and they would need extension. So just imagine: If this part of Ukraine was taken out of Russia’s influence, that factory would not have been available. They would not have been able to life-extend the intercontinental basing of Russia. And in one masterstroke, the West would have utilized a large part of the arsenal on which Russia primes. Not much has been spoken about it. But like I said, the ringside views are this—
Atul Singh: It adds a great degree of detail, granular detail.
Ashutosh Lal: It’s very clear and very straightforward, that I came back to my boss. I told him, and we had a discussion, and he said, “No, I do not deal. You see what’s happening.”
Atul Singh: But, you know, the Indian Foreign Services often aren’t the truest foreign service! (Both laugh) I’ve had to deal with them for too many years!
Ashutosh Lal: Of course, that is what I’ve heard. Then what happened was the last 24 hours, when the Maidan turned and everything else started. Yanukovych had to take off in his helicopter. It was the second time it was happening in that part. In fact, in Romania also, there had been a dictator who was trying to get in a helicopter from a rooftop, who was pulled back.
Atul Singh: Nicolae Ceaușescu.
Ashutosh Lal: Absolutely.
Atul Singh: Yeah, a friend of mine, his father fled Ceaușescu, nearly died! (Laughs)
Ashutosh Lal: So I’ll stay to my point — that Yanukovych fled, and inside Ukraine, everything changed. And suddenly all that happened and the independent districts sprung.
Escalation and evacuations
Ashutosh Lal: To link it up to Euro 2012, the way I saw the development happening over there — the airports were built up, the hotels were built up, the infrastructure was done up — absolutely prime and very beautiful. All that was destroyed in the last seven to eight months in front of me. That’s how the tide turned.
Atul Singh: What you’re saying is that it was overreach on the part of the US? Political overreach?
Ashutosh Lal: I would put it differently. One has to understand: That geographical neighborhood is a real fact of life.
Atul Singh: Of course. I mean, look, the US did not allow missiles in Cuba. There was the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis.
Ashutosh Lal: I was about to say the same thing. In fact, the cross-reference was made to my reply there. I said, “Look, you also have the same issue in Cuba.” The same issue was there? Quite possible there could be an issue happening in that particular conference when I was discussing with people. But be that as it may, it tells us very clearly, and in our own context. And we also have a very turbulent neighborhood that keeps shifting from one side to the other. So the neighborhood is a fact, and the neighborhood is required to be managed by the people who are involved directly. It cannot be managed remotely by someone sitting very far away. Because, for all these reasons, as it is very clear now, they would always have their vested interest deployed inside.
Atul Singh: That’s history, the law of history.
Ashutosh Lal: So, if that was so, it could have been seen, it should have been seen. It should be seen by us in managing our neighborhood issues — how we want to swing from one to the other side — because the neighborhood is something. There is another issue which I would just like to mention over here: Amongst the leadership of Ukraine I saw from that point in time, there was Tymoshenko.
Atul Singh: The braided lady who was put in jail by Yanukovych?
Ashutosh Lal: Yes, she was in jail when I reached her. And if you read that history as to who was on which side, there’s plenty of interesting things over there. But she was in jail when I reached there. People were doing dharna protests to try and get her out from detention at that point in time. But the fact remains that from there—
Atul Singh: Just for members of the global audience: You go, sit down and protest, and stop the streets, really.
Ashutosh Lal: Basically. Atul, thank you for that connection. But I’m just saying that from there, what I saw — the leaders, how they were fanning out to be — when I come to Mr. Zelenskyy, I often wonder: Could he have done something differently, so as not to ruin that beautiful country of Ukraine, which I call моя друга батьківщина — “my second homeland?” I just want to remind your viewers that if you’ve ever had any bit of sunflower oil, you have a little bit of Ukraine in you. And I’ve got my tooth also sorted out over there—a root canal. So I have it in my tooth as well! (Laughs) So the point is that being that affectionate to that land, and having seen the potential — imagine a country which is largely under snow for four to six months, yet is the largest grower of grain in Europe. So there is an immense amount of potential—
Atul Singh: Sunflowers, wheat, so many other agricultural products.
Ashutosh Lal: And I will come to the region a little later, when the conflict has already broken out. Because right now we’re talking about what could have happened. So, I’m talking with Zelenskyy. Could he have done something differently? Did the other side — Americans, mostly — realize that here is a person who is used — like what we are doing with a mic and a camera — and if he has a narrative, he will read that and he will enact that. Was that the thing in the initial phase, where he kept enacting what he was being told to say, and then took the entire conflict south? Now he was in a different mode; he changed clothes, and wore different things and came to the front end, trying to do what was required to be done? Was it too late by then? That question has to be asked. So how the neighborhood is to be managed and how the national interests — which are always a sacrosanct thing, not the friends and foes — that needs to be seen very clearly. This is my gathering of lessons from the ringside.
Atul Singh: Okay, so — 2014: You’re there, and the conflict really erupts. Because Russia simply cannot give away Crimea. After all, Potemkin, the great lover of Catherine the Great, conquered it for her, and that was Russian access to warm water. There’s no way the Russians were ever going to give Crimea away to Ukraine. And in 1954, it was none other than Nikita Khrushchev who gifted it to Ukraine. So in Russian minds, it was theirs. And then, of course, the conflict erupts in Donbas and Luhansk. The little green men you’ve already mentioned, walk us through that period. So what did you see?
Ashutosh Lal: Thank you very much. Trust me, in Crimea — right up to Alupka or Atakoy, where I traveled — I thought it was the most amazing place, and that Russian and Ukrainian existence was practically inseparable. Truly international. A couple of times, I was there on Victory Day — I was there at Crimea to see the wonderful parade, the Black Sea Fleet and whatnot. Yalta — you know what happened in the Second World War. The Yalta Conference is still a very important landmark, as you know.
Atul Singh: The contours of the post-war world.
Ashutosh Lal: So how did I come into this entire thing? And how did I get that inside view of this conflict brewing, apart from what was happening in Kyiv? Kyiv, of course, we knew. You remember those snipers on the Maidan and the people who came and occupied over there in the thick of winter. Somewhere, I have a picture in which I’m standing on Maidan with everything burnt out. I mean, I was yelled at — “Get back into the embassy!” — because I was out there in Maidan trying to see what exactly was happening, because of my own curiosity. And when the snipers were taking shots, everything was happening over there. So that was in Kyiv, but I got involved because there were our students who were studying in different cities. So the first place we got an SOS call from was Crimea. Our ambassador got a call from the parents of our children in Crimea — in Ukraine — now under Russian control. “What’s happening?” So the ambassador came and said, “Boys, we have this issue at hand.” So I said, “Let me go. I’ll go and be with them. I’ll comfort them and I’ll take care of what was required, and then I’ll come back to you.” He was apprehensive, of course, because we’d not changed sides yet, and there was the issue of passports and blah, blah, blah. I said, “Don’t worry, sir, because I’ve been working the streets. I will be able to go through that way.” I was given the go-ahead. I went across, and I stayed in Crimea at the same hotel where the group from BBC and World Service was staying, mind you. And they were staying in the same hotel, carrying out such coverage of the entire situation while the city was rather peaceful. Leninsky Square was where the main protest was happening. That is where the hands had changed and everybody went to dinner in the restaurants. Later that night, I asked those two, “Why are you raising this red flag?” But then there are dynamics, too. The point is that when I was there and I spoke to the students — this was the city of Simferopol, the capital of Crimea — I gathered them all together and then briefed them. “Now this is how we will do. This is what we will do.” But luckily, we did not have to evacuate them from there. The transition was rather peaceful. I went and saw their parliament building, as they call it, and there were these little green men standing there with balaclavas. And that’s about all. Because there, the narrative had been set, and that wonderfully intertwined Russian–Ukrainian presence had changed. Ukrainian soldiers and officers had joined the Russian Armed Forces. Then all of that happened and it just changed. Remember, that was the first change of nationality of a sizable portion of land after the Second World War in that area, and that would happen without firing a single bullet. So obviously, I can understand the West was feeling pretty let down that they let this happen. They didn’t have their ear to the ground, which was a failure on their part, and a lot happened. But in that, I understood that now the Russian mechanism — their so-called hybrid warfare, which we can speak about in a different interview altogether — was already deployed. It was happening. Crimea, of course, has a problem of freshwater shortage and access to the mainland, which they have now secured through this conflict. As you are aware, all of that has been secured. So it was very clear to us that—
Atul Singh: They have a landbridge now.
Ashutosh Lal: In fact, talking about bridges, we had a small problem at hand. While in Ukraine, I was handling Project 832 — modernization. It was a very big project of, what, 105 airplanes, but one got crashed, so 104 were left. The plot was: Five airplanes would come, get overhauled in this plant — which is contiguous to Zhuliany Airport, the smaller airport in Kyiv — and then they fly out to India and practice. We had to do 35 airplanes. The second-last batch was at my hand, and I was about to come back when this war happened. And the air route to Ankara — the first thought was to route over Crimea — and now we could not go over Crimea. So I had no choice but to take the airplanes all the way west to Bucharest, and then from Bucharest head to Istanbul because you could not make it to Ankara. You know, the whole planning had to be changed. So be that as it may, the fact remained that I realized that Crimea was gone for good, and that gave us an indication as to what was going to happen in the East. Because that mechanism of hybrid warfare had started to deploy over there, and it was very clear that if they didn’t get their acts together, then that would happen. This is where the West woke up in a significant manner, and they deployed a good number of boots on the ground under different guises. That gap was simple, but it was what we call “standard and recommended practices” — exercises between two forces. The radio phraseology to be used commonly, so that they can be used in some peacekeeping somewhere. How do you use radio? How do we use basic tactics that can be synchronized? So under that guard, the trainers who were there from the West — and NATO especially — became the custodians of now keeping their watch. And that had started. This is where the conflict started to happen, which basically brewed in the eastern part: Kharkiv, Donetsk, Dnipropetrovsk, Zaporizhzhia, even down till Kherson later, you know. This is a tragic chapter. Sir, that’s where I thought, it’s very important to understand — just 30 seconds more — because this, again, happened in Lugansk. The city of Lugansk had a big medical college. By the way, I hope you’re aware that the cost of East European MBBS is sizably less than what is available here in India.
Atul Singh: That’s what I’ve been told.
Ashutosh Lal: That is the reason why many of our students go over there, which I suppose is a good thing. Of course, they have to come back and take an MCI exam before they can start practicing over here. But I found very bright young people over there from all parts of the country who were there. So I was sent to Lugansk again under a similar situation, where this thing was happening, and now it was live. Because the gunshots were being fired outside and everything was happening, I had to hire a train and move about 800, 900 students in the train, over buses, put them in the train, and the train came to Kyiv where the ambassador and all our setup was waiting for them to be received. I had to go there because of my connections with the plants over there, and I used the help from the people on the ground. And that is what I used to do. Whatever I could do, we managed it. But it again allowed me — and that was Holi at that point of time. I spent Holi with those boys and girls over there in that place. When I put them in a hall — I had gone along with my sister — I addressed them and I told them, I made groups. I made leaders. I said, “When this happens, this is how the message will go, this is what you will do.” So I built that quasi-operation, and I built them out in that place. This is where I again realized that now it is not coming back. The situation is such that it will not come back, it will not go to foster — it’s going to get worse from here, it’s only going to get more destructive from here, now both sides will suffer, whichever.
Atul Singh: So the train had been set in motion.
Ashutosh Lal: Yes, and it was an irreversible train to my mind. And which unfortunately—
Atul Singh: That’s up for debate, sure.
Ashutosh Lal: After you make your point, then I will come back to what happened in the second conflict, because I was there again.
Russian hybrid warfare and the 2022 invasion
Atul Singh: Okay, so you mentioned hybrid warfare. Okay, what’s the Russian model of hybrid warfare, and how did the West respond?
Ashutosh Lal: Atul, hybrid warfare would be another episode.
Atul Singh: We’ll have to get you back! (Laughs)
Ashutosh Lal: So let’s keep that aside.
Atul Singh: Give us an outline, give us a teaser.
Ashutosh Lal: A good point, yeah. So the hybrid warfare spoken about by many authors and a lot of literature available over there, is Russia’s war actually hybrid warfare? And some mechanics leave us asking the question. But leave the mechanics aside; look at the results. The result was, like I mentioned to you, that they managed to change the nationality of a large piece of land — a crucial warm sea port where the Black Sea Fleet was based — without firing a single bullet. Do I see any more moving? So this is what was the trajectory of the warfare, which was running out. Of course, the West jumped in, and the contest heated up, so to speak. People lost lives, and so much destruction took place subsequently. But that is the potential of hybrid war, because it’s a very important issue for our own armed forces. And it includes everything — lawfare, I don’t know what all — because the entire set of academia, the entire set of institutions of army, judiciary, administration, diplomacy, foreign services, economy, everything comes into it. So that is an amalgamation which is an ultimate binder of the national policy.
Atul Singh: Okay, well, you mentioned the second phase of the conflict: February 24, 2022. Alright, Russian troops move in, and you were there again.
Ashutosh Lal: Yep.
Atul Singh: So what transpires then for the Russian tanks to start rolling in?
Ashutosh Lal: Right. So, I was back in 2014. I came back to my job normally here. Whatever happened, I had a wonderful time in the Air Force. Early January 2020, I left the Air Force and I was trying to become a civil helicopter pilot, which I am right now. I was flying till very recently for a company in Mumbai, taking passengers from the point of dispersal to their ships and rigs and getting them back. But in that, my interest in trying to understand during this conflict — and this is a very, very important key point — the way I saw through the conflict, I am completely mesmerized by the Ukrainian ingenuity. That’s not only on the battlefield. People will tell you how males exited Ukraine, how their own population deserted, they don’t have boots on the ground, some people have gone away or whatever. But in that also, how common Ukrainians — leave politicians aside — held on to their nationality, held on to their spirit, held on to their ingenuity on the battlefield, off the battlefield, in the domain of military tech. For those of your viewers who are perhaps not very much aware, Ukrainian military tech is huge. It may surprise you that 40% of the Indian Navy’s frontline ships are powered by Zorya’s engine, which is made in Ukraine. It’s absolutely important for us that we have them with us. And mind you, unlike the airplanes, the ships are different. You have to first choose the engine, because Indian transmission has to be quiet, and then you build the ship around it, so then can’t change it. So you have to identify the engine provider first before you arrive at your ship. That is the kind of planning process. So Zorya powers more than 40% of the Indian Navy; it’s very important for us. Antonov — anything to do with Antonov — A-12 and A-22, what we flew in our Air Force, and the An-124 is what the US survives on.
Atul Singh: Which most people don’t know.
Ashutosh Lal: Antonov is thoroughbred — inside to out, including engines and everything else — Ukrainian. It’s got nothing to do with the honor of Russian women. So Ukraine MIC, or Military Industrial Complex, was itself huge at that point, alright. But in the war, how it transformed itself is a story that someday the world should document.
Atul Singh: I’m sure people are documenting it already.
Ashutosh Lal: I’m sure. But you look at it from my perspective as to how this tech… To give an example, in Kharkiv, I found out that some small company was making a very peculiar ammunition which could be mounted on the pylon of a low-flying airplane. It just dispenses very small transmitters over a swath of ground: GPS jammers. They would all transmit, they would noise-jam the GPS, and they would die down as the battery dies down. So in a period of time when you want to operate over there, you can deny GPS in assault. Selective non-availability of GPS you could achieve at that point of time. Their expertise in radio listening and eavesdropping is very well known. There was an incident which happened in an unknown army, and there was a unit which had some equipment from there — I’m sure your listeners know about it. So it was being brought from there. So you could do that. There were many things. They made passive radars. That means it’s just a receiver, not transmitting anything else. Poland has a solution, but this equipment of Ukraine was such that, using the normal transmission from the radio nav-ways of Europe, they were able to mimic and understand. Without opening up any transmitter, they can get comfortable with the surroundings. Wonderful technology. Of course, needs to be matured, needs to be tied up, needs to be inducted into the systems — that is where our ingenuity could have come. LWS-6 Żubr, perhaps the largest hovercraft, skims over any rocky stretch and the sea, carries tanks and has an amazing technology in which it can sidestep and turn around in a very small place, which is also there on the Zorya engines. Crazy, absolutely. So they were at that level already. From there, those boys and girls, those men and women — what unmanned aerial systems have done to this war — very soon people will be coming out. And I know for sure that people who built it then, during the conflict, tested it during the conflict, and used it to destroy very expensive equipment. Otherwise, a large country like Russia would not have—
Atul Singh: Tanks, for instance.
Ashutosh Lal: So specifics will take time. So I’m just trying to tell you indicators as to where you should research and try and transfer.
Atul Singh: I mean, we should get into specifics, because a lot of our viewers wouldn’t have the time. Some would, some would spend hours, but others wouldn’t.
Ashutosh Lal: Like I said, these very inexpensive unmanned aerial systems, which affected very large equipment on the ground, how they intercepted, they went into Kursk. Of course, there’s a lot of Western help that was available. But still, when they realized that the fighter planes were not coming through — Su-27 deploying — they applied the Internet to keep the conflict on, to keep the pressure. Now, I come back to February of 2022. That is when the tanks rolled across from Kharkiv and from the East. So my friend called me for something or other — I would go down there. I said, “Okay, I’ll come. But are you sure Mr. Putin is all lined up? That said, you’re not gonna come down? No, no, everything is okay, just — apparently — come, come.” I landed at Kharkiv, I took a car, and I was driving to his approach.
Atul Singh: You were not yet a civilian helicopter pilot?
Ashutosh Lal: No, I was.
Atul Singh: You were already?
Ashutosh Lal: I was. So in our academy, we had breaks. When you fly for six weeks, you have three weeks off. So I left the military for 15 days because I had the qualification. Of course, Covid also hit at that point of time, but that’s another story. The point here is that when I reached the provision, I had a good time with my friend, chatted and met old contacts and everybody else. And I was looking for the local beer, Natsu. Fifteen-seventeen is really old, even in beer. So we went to the bar and had that, came back, slept it off — only to be woken up by the phone ringing consistently, because Mr. Putin had dropped across. Now, this is the time to speak about the operation which Russia launched to quickly end this conflict on their own terms, and the fight back with the help of the people who are deployed on ground from the West, and Ukrainian beauty. I’m talking about a very audacious attempt by helicopters of Russian armed forces to carry out what, in typical terms in the Air Force, we call SHBO — Special Heli-Borne Operations — taking troops in the helicopters all the way from their secured bases, where? To a small airport outside Kyiv — home to Antonov. So when I was there in Bucha, I got stuck badly. And I take the car, and as I start driving back towards Kyiv, these helicopters are flying over. Su-25s, Su-27s flying over, and there was chaos, and there were roadblocks, but I was somehow managing and coming. Because the idea was to come close to Kyiv, because all the flights were canceled. I did not have a flight to come back home. I had to have a plan in my mind to get back, because remember, I had to come back to my job. (Atul laughs) And I don’t have any visa toward either place.
Atul Singh: You couldn’t have flown into Poland!
Ashutosh Lal: Minor issues actually fucked me! (Laughs)
Atul Singh: Minor issues! (Both laugh) You could’ve swum through the Black Sea, swum through the Suez Canal…
Ashutosh Lal: The Bosphorus was calling me, be that it may.
Atul Singh: You’re a fit man!
Ashutosh Lal: So the point I was trying to make was that when this was happening, I realized that this was something, it’s a very important moment in a helicopter pilot’s life. Unfortunately, I could not be part of that formation or that fight, but I was there to witness it from close quarters and to follow up later about—with the help of my other friends who were there — to follow their help, as to what exactly happened. So the long and short is that this train of helicopters — the Mils — “Mi version.” For them, everything is “Mi version,” Mils. Mi-17 is an export version — which, we’ll call it null patterns — for them — everything is “Mi version.” So Mi-8s are carrying these troops. Mi-35s, my own helicopter, which I live in and die by—
Atul Singh: You like it, clearly.
Ashutosh Lal: There is no match to it. That’s another story.
Atul Singh: We’ll cover it in another video! (Laughs)
Ashutosh Lal: So Ka-50s were escorting them. Great machine, for that matter. So they were escorting, and there was this battle. There are many videos. Missiles flying across, flares flying across, hits taking place — and animations available as to how they turned over here, there, and then took a hit and took a hit. It was crazy. So they reached this airport outside, and initial gains were being made. Because that night, I was in Kyiv, and I was staying on a highrise, where everybody else was inside the bunker. I was left in that flat alone, horizon, and I could hear the noises. So it is then when the system kicked on, and the reaction to make sure that the runway is not made available for a follow-on fixed-wing transport aircraft to land over there, with a fleet of Ilyushins or Antonovs or whatever the Russians had. Because this normally happens; it’s called the link-up. Initially, the SHBO force goes, secures the airport. Now the link-up happens on the fixed wing runway. So they made sure that this doesn’t happen. And although they had taken ground on that airport, the Ukrainians with the help of—
Atul Singh: With the help of other foreign troops.
Ashutosh Lal: Yes, because there were instructors over there. And it is my understanding, which I’m very clear about, that they quickly stopped this entire plan. And then they said, “This is the counter.”
Atul Singh: Reports are that this was mainly Americans and British instructors. There must have been others because of NATO.
Ashutosh Lal: Yeah, NATO and the West always have a very good mix of things.
Atul Singh: Interoperability, as they say.
Ashutosh Lal: No, so the point I was trying to make was that this is where this fight started to turn dirty, and the link-up could not happen. And that became very messy. That was another very important turning point from the point of view of Russia. Russia had lost the initial momentum, because obviously—remember, the attacker always has the initiative. He chooses where to come in from. The defender has to jockey and adjust itself. So Russia had the initiative. It had the first move, and they came and they tried something out, which was very audacious —over that distance, over that range. Of course, we are at Sagar Chak. Reminds us of ‘71. But those distances were much smaller when it happened from one of—
Atul Singh: Just very quickly: Sagat Singh — we’ve had an episode on him. He was the great hero of the 1971 war. We’ve had his son interview with us, actually. So General Sagat Singh Rathore is a legend of the Indian military. And of course, he used helicopters and yada ya. You can read about him, learn more about him. But that was a much smaller distance.
Ashutosh Lal: So that’s a much more manageable distance, much less air defense—
Atul Singh: Dense.
Ashutosh Lal: Density against the — and it was all dark and night, and it was small hops against Maghna rivers and tributaries. Here, this was a large distance given out that you have entered now, and you could be tracked. See, the peculiar thing about helicopters — which we are all very aware of — is that once you spot a helicopter, visually or by radar or by the beam, you can put a pin on that location. And now, what is our speed? Two hundred forty kilometers an hour at the max, right? Four kilometers per minute. So you can start expanding it. So in that time, we cannot exit. We cannot just go away. We have to be there only. So if a faster-moving platform comes in, he will find us in that using a known area. So I’m just saying, that is the kind of—
Atul Singh: They’re sitting ducks, basically, once that happens. (Laughs)
Ashutosh Lal: I would not accept at first, but be that as it may, it brings you—
Atul Singh: Flying ducks.
Ashutosh Lal: It brings in new challenges. So we had this interesting contest, which is what I saw, and that’s what happened. So that—
Atul Singh: It was massive casualties, wasn’t it?
Ashutosh Lal: That was one turning point. I’ll be very specific: There was one turning point where Russia lost. And then onwards, the entire conflict turned into a different manner. It became a war of attrition, not much of a war was taking place. And several issues — what kind of soldiers are coming in, what’s happening — given the ingenuity of the Ukrainian people, soldiers and people on the ground, the tech support on the ground, what they started doing… that’s another success story.
Turning points and military operations
Atul Singh: The use of drones.
Ashutosh Lal: Yes. If I’m not wrong, the last attack from Russia on the right front has come about two days, three days prior. That has happened now. You see what happened in Kursk? They went inside that deep and held it to that long, unless that Russian operation happened. And, you know, now they’ve been obstructed.
Atul Singh: They came through a pipeline.
Ashutosh Lal: Yeah, I mentioned to you that they came through a pipeline — Russian special forces. Please note, gentlemen, that they came through a pipeline. They came through a pipeline, and there were casualties, but they emerged on the other side. If this tussle happened—
Atul Singh: Just an extraordinary operation. On both sides, the troops have proven to be pretty innovative. I mean, the Russians have come up with glide bombs, the Russians have come up with innovations themselves.
Ashutosh Lal: Yeah, that is there, because in the first war, I saw how the helicopters were shot by machine guns. Planes were destroyed. You know how all that was done? Because I remember, in the first time when I was there — 2014 — and we were trying to work out, can we have a runway secure enough to land an airplane from India and pull the boys and girls out from there? So I was scouting for that, and I reached this airport, and I hitched a ride with the milkman to try and see what the runway is. But that was the place where the night before, an Il-76 was shot. And Il-76 was landing on the runway, and it was shot by a shoulder-fired missile on the idling Indian pilot who was landing, and the entire airplane was strewn up on the runway.
Atul Singh: Wow.
Ashutosh Lal: So it was very obvious and clear to me that no matter what you do in this part — of course, it was too close to the conflict — it can happen. Mind you, by then the other issue would also happen. You lost a civil airplane.
Atul Singh: Yes, indeed.
Ashutosh Lal: Tail color, red and blue.
Atul Singh: Yeah, yeah.
Ashutosh Lal: Being mixed up with an Il-96, and Mr. Putin is coming back and Mr. Modi was coming back as well behind him. We had to intervene and get his route altered away from the conflict. So all that was also happening. The times are very specific. That is when it was decided that it is best to go on the ground and try and pull them out by the train. We fixed up in Kyiv. We went there, we managed that — seven, eight coaches — and pulled everybody out. And that was our—
Geopolitical lessons and India’s opportunity
Atul Singh: So what now? What now? You’ve laid out a wonderful ringside view. And now, of course, we have a new president in the White House, and we have talk of a truce. In fact, some sort of truce, apparently. And it seems that now Zelenskyy will have to read from a new script.
Ashutosh Lal: So Atul, I’ll— (laughs) …Yeah, that’s one interesting way to put it across, actually. But let me just say this: Let me look at the idealistic view as to how this can resolve, actually. Okay, then we can say the best possible action, and then we can see how it can—
Atul Singh: The scenarios.
Ashutosh Lal: Yeah, that. Like I said, the neighborhood requires restoration. And a very important point which comes in — which links me up to this famous mythology of India, of Mahabharat — Kaurav, Pandav. When this issue was being discussed about EU being signed for Ukraine—
Atul Singh: Ukraine is a part of the EU.
Ashutosh Lal: Yes, yes. So you’re aware that even Russia, as a federation, also has a—
Atul Singh: Of course, yeah.
Ashutosh Lal: —Something like an EU of their own. It’s called the Customs Union. So Russia offered that, “Okay, you want to be with the EU? No problems, go with them, no issues. But do not exit the Customs Union. Keep us included.” Because they wanted to have that tie, which was carrying on. They said, “Okay, doesn’t matter.” They had adjusted that much. So it reminds me of that — Kaurav, Pandav, who said, “Five villages. You give us just five villages — five Pandavs, five villages — not even of the…” What should I tell your viewers?
Atul Singh: Not even tipping the needle. (Laughs) So you seem to be holding Victoria Nuland and the hawks in Washington, D.C., responsible for this. The neoconservatives, in a way.
Ashutosh Lal: Look, Atul, history is fraught with examples when people who were not in that area, and they were sitting somewhere else in a much part of the world.
Atul Singh: That’s the history of the last 500 years. We are sitting in front of a map of the world. So you look at the map in the world — Latin America, Portuguese and Spanish all the way to Mexico. India — the British and the French East India companies had a bish, bash, bosh.
Ashutosh Lal: That is why I was talking about the idealistic solution. Why? Because I am not counting out that such new Newlands and Pyatts are still sitting in that setup. There are rare elements in Ukraine which are to be taken out. So there are people who are trying to anchor everything else to do what is required to be done. So I will leave that out right now, because that’s a dynamic switch — which is a different issue, but whatever. But I’m saying, ideally, the earnestness of maintaining a neighborhood needs to be considered.
Atul Singh: So what you’re saying is Russia and Ukraine have to learn to live together.
Ashutosh Lal: There is no choice.
Atul Singh: Got it.
Ashutosh Lal: There is no choice. Now, the flavor changes on the East. And what this bitterness will do over the years and how it can be managed is a different ballgame. Mind you, the people in the west of Ukraine — and very dear friends of mine, very interesting. I was traveling with my friend, and his son, a basketballer of 16, 17, 18 years, of which I spoke to in Russian, and he refused to speak to me for the whole duration. Talking Russian.
Atul Singh: I’ll only speak in Ukrainian. So that divide has cast a different line.
Ashutosh Lal: Yeah. So all those divisions have come in already.
Atul Singh: The division is even there in the Church now.
Ashutosh Lal: Many things have happened. Church has changed. The oldest Orthodox monastery was in Ukraine. That was the Vatican of Orthodox Christianity in the east of Europe, which is Lavra the cave. It was the cave monastery — it was by the side of Dnipro. Now, I’ve taken our former chief there when he came down to visit. He was a Catholic himself, but he was kind enough to go there and accept that honor. So that changed. The old calendar went out. Stary Novy God has gone out. So many things have changed for them. So I’m saying those scars would remain. So how they manage this neighborhood — but I have a firm belief that only people who are there involved, they should have the biggest say. And if they have it right, then probably they can work out a constructive or a positive—
Atul Singh: So that’s the idealistic view. So what happens now?
Ashutosh Lal: This idealistic view, Atul, simply said, is not going to happen. We do not have one Angela Merkel, one European leader who was able to speak to both sides.
Atul Singh: Yeah, Angela Merkel. She was from East Germany, she spoke Russian.
Ashutosh Lal: This conflict went down the drain because she was not in the office, to my belief. Perhaps, if there was somebody who could speak on both sides and can do that. I thought our prime minister went on the train all the way. He also had that latitude to do that.
Atul Singh: But we don’t have the heft yet.
Ashutosh: Yeah. Be that it may, I mean, we’ll have to try whichever way you look at it right now. So my belief is this idyllic, idealistic solution is not going to be fructifying. It is going to get meddled and dirtied by many such power factions. What’s happening across the Atlantic — the government changing and everything else happening — they have their own issues. The people who were before them, they had their own issues. So they will drive it this way. But this ideation will not happen.
Atul Singh: Got it.
Ashutosh Lal: Poland is emerging as a very strong pull in this entire game.
Atul Singh: Of course. They already said they’ll go nuclear.
Ashutosh Lal: So please understand, this idealization is not going to happen. Now, how badly it gets muddled, how much time it takes, and what all is taken out of there — and what is taken out of Ukraine is my last point, which you will have to give me two minutes.
Atul Singh: Yeah, sure, take all the time you want. Actually, go ahead. Take the two minutes now.
Ashutosh Lal: Okay. So let’s put this conflict aside. I just want to tell you that what I look at — from our country’s interest.
Atul Singh: From India’s interests.
Ashutosh Lal: And I’m a military man. I was a military man in my head, in mind. I’m still one. So I would talk about that.
Atul Singh: I would love to see you as air chief marshal. (Laughs)
Ashutosh Lal: Aw, thank you. I never had that caliber. I could not have been there. But let me still make a point here. So now we are not talking about Russia–Ukraine. I’m talking about national interest. When the regions in which you have some penetration are at conflict, and those regions have a technical, or economical, or a geographical or a mineral-wise edge over you — world over, history over — that is the time for the national interest to be kicked in and try and to get things to cut that delta and get your own system up. Right? You should not have had an issue to ask Indians from somewhere else to build your own ships. By now, we should have become quite omniversal, so to speak. Self-reliant, for your audience. So this is where I thought our eastern neighbor played a very good card.
Atul Singh: China.
Ashutosh Lal: In my only tenure over there — ’11 to ‘14 — what I kept seeing is what they were at. Singularly, very focused, very sharp, very quick. And they were able to execute things and take it. Technologies, expertise… So the story of Liaoning is the most interesting impact. And your viewers might have read it. I’ll just narrate it very shortly.
Atul Singh: No, please, go on ahead. Not all of them have, so it’s an education.
Ashutosh Lal: So what happens is that when you hear the story, it will tell you what was the level they were operating at. Well, surprise to some of you that our Vikramaditya and their Liaoning are actually brothers. They both were born in a city called Mykolaiv, which is—
Atul Singh: Just tell them what both these vessels do.
Ashutosh Lal: Okay, I’m sorry. My apologies. So Vikramaditya is our aircraft carrier. Liaoning is the Chinese aircraft carrier, which is floating in the South China Sea, and it has led the development of their subsequent aircraft carrier. Vikramaditya has come to us from Russia. It has come from the city of St. Petersburg, where it was a Russian aircraft carrier earlier. It has been now refitted to take our aircraft on board — MiG-29s — and that’s what is now flying its last service. So I’m saying — Vikramaditya and Liaoning, yeah — are both brothers. They were the same model, displacement, design of aircraft carriers, born in a dockyard which is in the city of Mykolaiv. Ukrainians will call it Mykolaiv, Russians will say Nikolayev. So in the city of Nikolayev they were born. Vikramaditya went to Russia and was in St. Petersburg, where we contracted it from. And finally our team went there and refitted for a long period. So the story of Liaoning is that Liaoning was a lining, just like a shell. The news came that there was a company in Macau which wanted to buy this Liaoning and make a floating casino out of it in Macau.
Atul Singh: By the way, Liaoning is the northern state, right next to North Korea. (Laughs) So they claimed it was going to Macau.
Ashutosh Lal: The claim was it will go to Macau as a floating casino. Immediately west, everybody’s ears went up. “No, it’s not them, it’s something deeper, actually.” Now Liaoning was bought by this company. It was being dragged through the Bosphorus Strait. And the environmentalists put up a big fight and said, “No more. You can’t take it through Bosphorus.” They tried to stall, delay what was required. But of course, deep pockets, focus, everything else — it went. Now, God intervened. In the Sea of Greece, there was a massive storm. And this hull got decoupled from the tug. They almost lost it.
Atul Singh: Wow.
Ashutosh Lal: But then the storm subsided. And again, it was caught on. And by the time this combination was turning around Cape and heading towards our part of the world, that company in Macau merged with Liaoning, as you say. My pronunciation is wrong.
Atul Singh: I’ve traveled a bit around China. That’s the only reason. (Laughs)
Ashutosh Lal: So please help me with that.
Atul Singh: I also had a Chinese girlfriend. That also helps! (Laughs)
Ashutosh Lal: So that company got merged with that shipyard over there: Dalian. And in this period, there were hordes of experts from the city of Mykolaiv, which were relocated over there. And now, when this hull reached over there, the work started. By the time we were refitting and trying to get our ship back, and after huge overruns of time and cost and whatnot, Liaoning was out roving the sea, the trials in the South China Sea. And the rest is known to your viewers focused not only on the military part, but on the food security part. It was surprising that China leased an area of land as more or as much as Belgium in size. Built a deep-sea port right next to it. Now obviously, the south doesn’t have snow, so it can grow the year long. So year-round, they would grow grains over there and ship it. Call it food security. When you are having a region under pressure, under conflict, and they’re looking for help and what they have not. The people who are involved in diplomacy, they are looking after their own national interest. And that is why geopolitics is a blood sport. So that is what I was understanding that this should have happened. There were many such places and some such cases where we could have really scored well, because we have a very good emotional connection.
Atul Singh: Yeah. I mean, they watch Raj Kapoor. (Laughs)
Ashutosh Lal: No, sir. Raj Kapoor is history. Only babushka will respond to you about Raj Kapoor. By the way, do you know who is the most famous actor in that part of the world? You’d be surprised: Mithun Chakraborty.
Atul Singh: Oh, okay. Yes, I would have—
Ashutosh Lal: If the song plays, “Jimmy Jimmy,” there is not a single Ukrainian woman or girl who will not dance in that hall. That is a fact. I’ve witnessed the funeral of a young girl who went to her grave wearing a saree and holding a Mithun portrait in hand. And we had to get a letter from him, the ambassador, to speak to him. I told him, “No, sir, you must speak to him.” And he has to write back. And he wrote back; the letter was given to the father as a closure on that. So that is the kind of emotional connection. Family is one important cultural connection within us. The religion is another important—
Atul Singh: Religion? In what way?
Ashutosh Lal: The allegiance to our religion. You know, here also, we are — whichever way we tell — we are spiritual people, deep inside. And, there also, whatever happens, you would find them born from the Church, and they would be God-fearing before the food and everything else. You will see that. So they’re—
Atul Singh: Religiosity.
Ashutosh Lal: Absolutely. So there are these two strong pillars. And third is friendship, which I am a living example. So that’s how I realized that we are so much in common, and we could have leveraged much more. But I think we must have done it. I’m sure people who are responsible — they are doing it right now.
Atul Singh: Well, one can live in hope. I can tell you they are not doing so in Washington, DC, where I live. (Ashutosh laughs) Anyway, Ashutosh, lovely to have you. We’ll continue this discussion. We’ll have you for other episodes, and we have a lot to discuss.
Ashutosh Lal: Yeah, all in all, I want to just say from my side, a big thank you to you and your viewers. I hope I’ve been able to do justice to the ringside view. (Both laugh) And thank you very much.
Atul Singh: Thank you.
[Lee Thompson-Kolar, Aaditya Sengupta Dhar and Anton Schauble edited this piece.]
The views expressed in this article/video are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.
” post-content-short=” Atul Singh: Welcome to FO° Talks. With me is one of the legends of the Indian Air Force, Air Commodore Ashutosh Lal. He did his schooling from Lucknow, a place where I did my university and where my father went to medical college. So he’s here because he was an air attaché in Ukraine. He…” post_summery=”Air Commodore Ashutosh Lal offers a detailed view of the Russia–Ukraine war, drawing from his experiences as India’s air attache in Ukraine during the 2014 Crimea crisis. He explores the geopolitical miscalculations of the West, the enduring regional ties and the technical and cultural significance of Ukraine for India. Ashutosh emphasizes the necessity of managing neighborhood relations locally.” post-date=”May 20, 2025″ post-title=”FO° Talks: An Indian Ringside View of the Russia–Ukraine Conflict” slug-data=”fo-talks-an-indian-ringside-view-of-the-russia-ukraine-conflict”>
FO° Talks: An Indian Ringside View of the Russia–Ukraine Conflict
Atul Singh: Welcome to FO° Talks. With me is Anna Hryniv, a Ukrainian journalist and communications specialist. She’s living as a refugee in the US, and she visits the National Press Club in Washington, DC, off and on. And therefore, we decided it would be great to have a chat with someone who is from Ukraine, knows Ukraine well, is actively engaged with the Ukrainian cause and will offer a Ukrainian point of view on what’s going on. So, welcome, Anna.
Anna Hryniv: Thank you. Thank you for having me.
Atul Singh: Anna, we are hearing a lot about Ukraine. We’ve been reading that the US has been negotiating with Ukraine. In fact, there was a time negotiations were occurring in Saudi Arabia. We heard Russian President Vladimir Putin calling for direct talks with Ukraine. Now Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy says he’s ready to meet Putin personally in Istanbul. What is going on? What do people in Ukraine think about the negotiations?
Anna Hryniv: Yeah, thank you for this question — it’s a great, great question. And before this interview, I spoke with my friend at the front line as I decided that their opinion is the best answer for this question, because they know what is going on. And I asked what they think about negotiation, about Russian opinion, about everything. And I even put it on my paper about what they taught me about it. So they tell me that it doesn’t matter what will be after this negotiation. They’re pretty sure Russia will come back just in the months, or in the year, or in two. So they are prepared for another war, because it just doesn’t work for Russia and it just doesn’t work for Putin.
Atul Singh: I see. So why doesn’t it work? What does Russia really want? What’s the view of your friend?
Anna Hryniv: Yeah, it’s a great question, and we ask this question a lot of times over a lot of years, actually, hundreds of years — what Russia wants from Ukraine. But they don’t want Ukraine to change something, to change their policy, or to change the president. They want Ukraine to be part of the Russian world, and it’s never happened. That’s why this war is so long, and that’s why it’s gonna be so long if we’re gonna think that it’s so easy to negotiate with Russia. And the other reason, the other thing I want to explain that my friend told me is that it’s pretty hard for Ukraine to be part of this war, but nobody wants peace more than Ukraine now. Nobody.
Ukraine’s Western dream vs. Russia’s empire
Atul Singh: Hmm. So tell me something and tell me if what I’m hearing is true. I hear from a number of American friends that when they speak to Ukrainians, they say that Ukraine wants to be part of the Western world. It wants to be part of the EU, it wants to be part of NATO, it wants to be part of the freer economies of the West. And they see the West as historically expanding east. After all, Poland was part of the Communist Bloc, but Poland now is a very dynamic economy, and a very important member of the EU and a very important member of NATO. So the American view is Ukrainians want pretty much what the Poles want, and what the Russians want is to retain Ukraine as part of the Russian world, of their sphere of influence, because they see Ukraine as home to the kingdom of Rus. They also see Ukraine as part of the former Soviet Union, and they have their fleet in Crimea. Do you think these two views are hitting each other, are colliding? Is that what’s at stake?
Anna Hryniv: So yeah, you’re absolutely right about the Ukrainians wanting to be part of the West part of the world. And from what I see, Ukraine is a pretty Western country now. It’s a part of the world’s democracy. Ukraine changed. It’s a young country, but it’s changed. It’s modern, it’s brave, on the one side. On the other side, what are Ukrainians fighting for? It’s not only about wanting to be part of the European Union, or for the West part, or the US part. It’s not about this. It’s about: You cannot just change borders by force. That’s the main idea. Because it started with Ukraine, but it could be any other country, and it’s really a bad future to understand that any other country can change the borders of any other country just by force. That’s what we are fighting for.
Atul Singh: I see. But the truth is that over history, most borders have changed thanks to force. Germany has its current borders because they lost in World War II. Austria, the same. And you could say the same about so many countries. I mean, India has its borders today because the British left us with those borders. So I agree with the principle, but reality and history are different, right, Anna?
Anna Hryniv: It’s a great point. But we can tell about a lot of things that were like that: women’s rights, human rights, different countries. And we cannot always say it was like that every time. No, we live in a modern and different world when you cannot just change the border if you want. You cannot just do a deportation of 20,000 kids from your country just because you want to do it. You cannot just murder a whole city as in Mariupol just because you want to do it, because someone did it before. It’s not how it works. We have some rules and world order, and we should respect it.
Ideals collide with the new world order
Atul Singh: Yeah, but here’s the thing: A lot of people are saying that world order has taken a beating. We are now living in a new order, particularly now when you look at what’s happening in the Middle East, look at what’s happening in Gaza, look at what’s happening in South Sudan. India and Pakistan just had a major fight, and that was to change borders in some ways, especially on the part of Pakistan. So we are again back to a more violent era. And the classic example, perhaps, is Syria, where Turkey and Israel — Turkey, which used to have the Ottoman Empire — now is the dominant player in Syria, and Israel has taken some of southern Syria’s territory. So yes, you are saying we cannot do that — that’s a great principle — but we are living in a different world. Does that worry you?
Anna Hryniv: So, I have a question for you as a journalist: Do you think it’s okay to change the border by force?
Atul Singh: I don’t think it is alright. But at the same time, what I’m saying is, this is the world we live in. So what can we do about it? Does that worry you? It worries me.
Anna Hryniv: It’s a great point, and yeah, what can we do about it? We can have an impact. We can save our country, help our countries, if we understand it’s right. This is what all my friends say. Actually, all my friends are from a media background; they are journalists, they are camera operators, they are producers, and they are all now at the front line in Ukraine. And this is the answer for your question: What can you do? Because they are right there. This is their home country, and they cannot—
Atul Singh: So they are fighting for what they believe is right, they are fighting for their territory and sovereignty?
Anna Hryniv: They are fighting for their home. It’s just right. And it’s the same with the Ukrainian community here in the US. What can we do with all our right principles? Not just principles, but do a lot of protests, meetings, rallies and different events, action summits. So just be proactive.
The fight for global support
Atul Singh: Excellent. Now, that brings me on to my next question. You’re obviously very active. You’re working very hard for the Ukrainian cause. So what do you and your friends, and what do other Ukrainians think about the international support Ukraine is receiving? Do you feel that the US and the EU have your back?
Anna Hryniv: Yeah, thank you for this question, and I’ll refer to my friend. I asked him, what does Ukraine need? If somebody asked me, “Okay, guys, we are helping you, we support you. What do you need?” And they answer: “So what does Ukraine want for this question? To be armed, to be able to push Russia back.”
Atul Singh: From whom? From the US and EU mainly, correct?
Anna Hryniv: Yeah, just because it’s really important. Because if Ukraine loses, it’s not just only a Ukraine loss. It’s a loss for the whole democratic world. Just because every country can be Ukraine next. So if we’re not helping Ukraine, we can forget about the peaceful world that was before 2022. So about the community here in the US: From one side, I want to say thank you to all the people who were really supporting us, because I’m — it’s not correct to say refugee, but we’ll say refugee, because the US is protecting Ukrainians. But I really appreciate all the support to Ukrainian people, because you can feel the support when you move from Ukraine, as a human — it’s my personal side — and from the community. So I had a chance to meet people from different states with different political sides, and all of them tell me that they have some supporting project that they help with to move Ukrainians from Ukraine. Then they help host Ukrainians here in the US. They send money to the Ukrainian army. So in every state, with every different idea, political things, every American person I met tells me, “I support Ukraine.” And it was a pretty big surprise for me. So yeah, I think this helps.
Atul Singh: So you think the Americans have your back?
Anna Hryniv: Yeah, I think so, because we can feel it. It’s a bit different from the first year of the war, but I think it’s—
Atul Singh: What’s a bit different? Is there now a little bit of donor fatigue? Is there now a little more uncertainty?
Anna Hryniv: Yeah. I can explain. It’s not as chaotic as it was before, because when this shocking war started, everyone started to say, “How can I help? Where can I send money? Who can live in my apartment?” Now, I feel it’s not that huge, but it’s more focused. So we still feel this help. Of course, we want more, but I mean, anyone trying to protect their countries and home wants more, but we appreciate this help.
Atul Singh: So, question for you, different question. There was a White House meeting which was very controversial. And that White House meeting between the Ukrainian president and the American president and the American vice president didn’t go down very well. Did that affect the morale of Ukrainian-Americans? Did that affect the morale of Americans supporting Ukraine? How did that play out?
Anna Hryniv: Yeah, I can say, from my personal view. So that day, I received, like, hundreds of messages with support from my Ukrainian friends, from my American friends. So, I mean, yeah, we had a lot of questions from this meeting, but from what I see, I received a lot of messages that say, “We support you, we still support you. It’s really important for us to help Ukraine.” It’s not easy to be very diplomatic and be nice when your country is under attack every day. It’s just not that easy when you see hundreds of people killed by Russia. It just doesn’t work like that. I understand this whole world of diplomacy and rules, but it’s not that easy, especially after you spend a week or two in Ukraine. You understand why Ukrainians are acting like that or this really quickly.
Ukraine Action Summit
Atul Singh: I see. So, let’s now talk about the Ukraine Action Summit. You were involved in it. Explain to us: What is it, when did it happen, why is it important, what kind of people attend the summit? Is it mostly Ukrainian Americans, or is it also people from other backgrounds?
Anna Hryniv: Yes, it’s a great question. I really loved this event. So, it was the sixth Ukrainian Action Summit, and the idea of this summit is to bring all people who want from all the states to go to their representatives and talk about Ukraine. Super easy, but really productive. And from what I see working with different communication activities, this is the best way to support Ukrainian ideas. So not only do some protests and rallies, but go to your representative and tell him about Ukraine. Tell him to support some decision about Ukraine. Tell him to support some, I don’t know, laws with refugees, some support of arming Ukraine. Representatives are the key to Ukrainian support. So we decided to do that project with the Coalition for Ukraine, and we brought together 600 Americans. Part of them were American with Ukrainian roots, part of them not — just, like, no connection with Ukraine. They just feel they want to support Ukraine. So it was a really, really productive and great meeting.
Atul Singh: I see. And does this lead to more support on Capitol Hill, more support from the American media, more support from American civil society? Is that the long game?
Anna Hryniv: Yes, exactly. This was the idea. It’s not only about this event. It’s not enough to do just one Action Summit. That’s why it’s not the first and not the second. We understand we’re gonna do more. But it really changed minds. It really helps. And I used to work with members of the Parliament, so I know how it works. It’s impossible to know everything about what’s going on in your county, for example. You listen to people that live there. So it’s the best idea to just be connected with your representative. And if they hear about Ukraine 100 times per day, maybe they’re gonna change their mind.
Atul Singh: I see, I see. Good old electoral politics, eh? (Chuckles) So, let’s talk about Ukrainian refugees in the US. You are a refugee yourself of sorts — you are in New York. What has been your experience in New York and in the US so far?
Anna Hryniv: Yeah, thank you so much. It’s like my third year in the US. Time flies. But it was hard to leave my home.
Atul Singh: Yeah, and by the way, just so that viewers know, you’re from Odessa — that ordinarily beautiful city.
Anna Hryniv: Right, thank you for that.
Atul Singh: If anyone has seen Battleship Potemkin, an early movie, they can see the steps of Odessa. Anna Hryniv is from Odessa, and she told me there are 30 media channels and 300 social media channels in Odessa itself?
Anna Hryniv: Yeah, you’re right, it’s only about the city’s.
Atul Singh: Exactly. So quite a culturally rich city on the Black Sea.
Anna Hryniv: Oh, yeah. Right.
Atul Singh: So, carry on. Tell us, how do you find life here as compared to such an idyllic place?
Anna Hryniv: Yeah, you’re absolutely right. Odessa is beautiful. I hope that everyone who will read or see this interview, you can visit Odessa. I promise I can’t show the city to all Americans who want to see this city. It’s pretty diverse and beautiful. It’s really, really, like, a mix of everything. So yeah, it was pretty hard to leave this city and leave Ukraine. And it wasn’t our choice — it wasn’t the choice of Ukrainians, because we were really happy in our country. I know there are a lot of stereotypes and thoughts about life in Eastern Europe, but from my side, Ukraine is a pretty modern, super cool country that’s beautiful. So it wasn’t our choice to leave. But from another side, I am really grateful to all American people for how easy it was for me to become a part of New York or the country, because everyone who spoke with me when I only moved asked me, “How can I help you? What advice can I give you? Maybe I can help you with this connection. Maybe I can help you with everything.” So it was really easy, if I can say that (laughs) in this story, to become a part of the new country for me.
Atul Singh: I see. And I mean, America is the land of immigrants, and there’s more than an element of truth there. So the experience has been very positive. Now let’s talk about the activities of other people who’ve come from Ukraine — your community. What are the activities you’ve engaged in for the past three years, and what are you planning now?
Anna Hryniv: Yeah, thank you for this question. From what I see, the Ukrainian community here, especially in New York, it’s pretty big and diverse. It’s proactive. It’s different because there’s parts of communities that have been here for, like, years and years, and there’s—
Atul Singh: Some have been there a hundred years or even more.
Anna Hryniv: Exactly. We have the Ukrainian Village. It’s a part of Manhattan. It’s like East Village. It’s a really famous place there. So we have this part of the community, and we have different new Ukrainians that only moved. It’s interesting to see how they connected with each other, because it’s two different worlds. But still—
Atul Singh: Is the older community more religious?
Anna Hryniv: I can tell this, maybe, but not super conservative, I’ll say, yeah. But it’s still different, every generation is different. But this generation grew up here in the US. This generation grew up in modern, different Ukraine. There were different rules with different everything. So yeah, it was pretty interesting to see how this generation and community connected just because we have one goal and one idea. And I can say it connected really well. We did, like, hundreds of events, from something with art to something with protests and rallies and a lot of things. What we do, we do now in DC, just because I see it works better. Just because, from what I see and what I talked about before, it’s not enough now just to be seen on the streets or just speak with journalists. You need to push your opinion to officials, because they can change something in the White House and Congress. So that’s why we moved a little bit of our activities to DC and focused on that part. This is one part of your question, and the other part — what we are preparing for — it’s really important things. And I want to show some statistics, some numbers. So, like, 669 kids were killed by Russia—
Atul Singh: When?
Anna Hryniv: From February [2022], from starting this war.
Atul Singh: Over three years?
Anna Hryniv: Over three years. And 20,000 were deported to Russia. Two thousand were injured by Russia. Millions have to leave their countries. So now we’re preparing them an event. It’s going to be the first of June. It’s called Children Praying for Children. We’re going to do a big, big event in every state, including DC as well, to bring these numbers, to talk about this and to pray for Ukrainian kids.
Fading attention and enduring resolve
Atul Singh: I see. So all very good, and good luck with your future activities. I have a difficult question for you now, and it may be difficult personally for you. We have a lot of conflicts going around the world. We know about Israel–Gaza, that is attracting a lot of media attention. You move to the south, you have the Houthis in Yemen. You move to Africa, there’s South Sudan. Lots of people have been displaced, a lot have died. You move east, you get to Iran. Iran–US tensions are high, there are negotiations going on. You move further east, you’ve had Pakistan and India, two nuclear powers, almost go to war. They’ve just had a ceasefire, but things are tense. So with all of this going on, and with so many different tragedies, with so many children in so many countries dying, do you think that global attention for the Russia–Ukraine war is going down? And if so, how do you feel about this? What do you plan to do about this? And what are, in your view, the likely consequences?
Anna Hryniv: Yeah, it’s a great question. Thank you for that. You’re absolutely right. And as a media person — you’re from the media, you have a huge media background — we understand that this is how it works in psychology. So it’s okay to focus on something else, but—
Atul Singh: I’m also a historian by training, so I’m not your typical media person.
Anna Hryniv: Yeah, so you understand how—
Atul Singh: I’m just saying that there are huge trends, long-term trends, and so sadly, sometimes because of that, human nature gets overwhelmed. So it’s a difficult question.
Anna Hryniv: You’re right. It’s human nature. And from what I understand, working as a volunteer, helping with all these Ukrainian fields and projects — it’s okay to understand that people cannot be focused on Ukraine 100% of their time. It’s okay to understand this information and then work with that, not trying to be rude and say, “Oh no, you need to read about Ukraine every day. You need to know about Ukraine. You have to know, you have to.” It’s not how it works. It’s war going on in my home, so—
Atul Singh: It matters to you, of course.
Anna Hryniv: Yeah, it’s necessary for me to talk about it. It’s necessary for me to do some action with this. I understand it’s going to be like this. It’s hurtful, it’s hard, because that’s my own city, Odessa, is under attack every day. And when we say it’s under attack with drones, we don’t mean small drones; it’s the big machines. So my own family had lost in this war. It’s just super heartbreaking. But on another side, I understand this is how it works, and we should know how to deal with this. And that’s why we’re creating every day something new — some events, some topics, something to do with this. Just because this is the only way we can change it and help, of course, our army to fight back.
Atul Singh: Got it. So you recognize that global attention has indeed gone down, but you’re trying to stay current, stay relevant, and fight for your cause, correct?
Anna Hryniv: Absolutely. Absolutely.
Atul Singh: Great. Anna Hryniv, thank you for your time. It’s been a real pleasure. We’ll have you back. It’s great to have a Ukrainian perspective on the war. All the very best with your work, and we’ll see you soon.
Anna Hryniv: Thank you very much.
[Lee Thompson-Kolar edited this piece.]
The views expressed in this article/video are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.
” post-content-short=” Atul Singh: Welcome to FO° Talks. With me is Anna Hryniv, a Ukrainian journalist and communications specialist. She’s living as a refugee in the US, and she visits the National Press Club in Washington, DC, off and on. And therefore, we decided it would be great to have a chat with someone who…” post_summery=”Fair Observer Editor-in-Chief Atul Singh speaks with Ukrainian journalist Anna Hryniv about Ukraine’s ongoing conflict with Russia and the moral and geopolitical challenges of defending its sovereignty. A refugee of the war, Anna shares personal insights from the front lines and Ukrainian diaspora in the US. She highlights shifting global attention and the importance of sustained support.” post-date=”May 17, 2025″ post-title=”FO° Talks: A Ukrainian Refugee Reflects on the Russia–Ukraine War” slug-data=”fo-talks-a-ukrainian-refugee-reflects-on-the-russia-ukraine-war”>
FO° Talks: A Ukrainian Refugee Reflects on the Russia–Ukraine War
Atul Singh: Welcome to FO° Talks. With me is John Feffer — a friend, an author, a spokesman and a nature lover. He’s written many articles for Fair Observer. He has a great understanding of international affairs, and he’s indeed a citizen of the world. Today, we will speak to John about Why US Soft Power Is Now Declining Dramatically. Now, welcome, John, and let’s get cracking.
John Feffer: Sounds good. Thanks for having me.
Atul Singh: Great to have you, John. John, before we crack on, please explain to our viewers and our listeners — I’m sure most of them know about soft power already — but lay out: What do you mean by soft power?
John Feffer: So generally, the contrast is between hard power or military power — the use of military force to achieve objectives — and soft power. Soft power being non-military, could be political, could be economic. It’s often grouped together with cultural efforts to promote a country’s cultural offerings. But there is also the same objective. The objective is to get other countries to do what you want them to do. With the United States, the idea was, well, if we introduce these kinds of soft power mechanisms, such as sending US jazz bands around the world or providing consultancies on how to build democratic institutions, that countries would gradually converge towards US values and ultimately do the kinds of policies that the US wants other countries to do — make it easier for the United States to negotiate with these countries to achieve trade deals, ultimately, perhaps military deals as well. But soft power was a key tool in the toolbox in the arts of persuasion, the arts of what might be called hegemony. In other words, the effort to get countries to do what you want to do not by forcing them to do so, but by convincing them that it is in their own interest to do so, to such a degree that they may not even think that they’re doing what, say, the United States wants them to do. They just think that they’re doing what they want to do. That’s the ultimate victory of soft power. For the United States, of course, this was birthed in the competition with the Soviet Union during the Cold War. The Soviet Union, of course, had its Communist International. It was promoting its version of soft power — in other words, the works of Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, perhaps also the works of Stalin — sending those books around, sending movies around that embodied communist ideals, the Bolshoi Ballet, Shostakovich music. So the Soviets had their version of soft power as well. But of course, the United States was a wealthier country and had things that a lot of people around the world wanted to see or hear, i.e., jazz, Hollywood movies, even food products that the United States produced, like Spam. So this was our effort to win hearts and minds around the world in our competition with the Soviet Union. Of course, it still existed post-Soviet Union, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, but we could argue that perhaps soft power no longer had the singular focus that it had during the Cold War. The goals, the ambitions somewhat constrained when they were no longer within the context of US–Soviet competition.
Atul Singh: Brilliant, John. My old lecturer at Oxford — now quite famous — Niall Ferguson, called it “blue jeans and rock and roll.” And I call it the Harvard and Hollywood Effect. (Laughs) Of course, Joseph Nye — whom I’ve met and who has very kindly been a donor to Fair Observer, too — came up with this idea of soft power a while ago, and you explained it very well. And America’s great ability to have that attractiveness in terms of its economy, its technology, its entertainment industry, its educational institutions and its values held sway. And one could go back to the Atlantic Charter under Franklin Delano Roosevelt. We could go back earlier to Woodrow Wilson and his Fourteen Points and the League of Nations idea. And the US has had this earnest, moral, “city on the hill” element to it. But — and there’s always been a but — Vietnam dented it. Before that, the 1953 coup in Tehran — MI6-inspired, largely conducted by the CIA — dented it. And in recent years, the Iraq War really dented it. Torture dented it. The flouting of the UN and international treaties dented it. And we have seen soft power a bit damaged. And yet, thousands of students have still come to Harvard and Stanford and MIT. I’m sitting in Silicon Valley, and I was at Stanford yesterday, and it’s still full of foreigners. And so the attraction still persists.
Erosion of US soft power
Atul Singh: So what is this talk about decline, and particularly dramatic decline, that we are seeing in some quarters and that we’ve got together to discuss today?
John Feffer: Well, you’re right that the moral leadership that the United States purported to show to the rest of the world has been damaged — damaged not only by events like the Iraq War but damaged by historical revelations of US involvement in a variety of immoral activities. But increasingly, you saw soft power be separated from the US government itself in the minds of many people. In other words, they could consume Hollywood movies, many of which were critical of US government actions, and imagine that they are consuming an American product without necessarily consuming an American government operation, shall we say; that they could buy blue jeans and not be complicit, say, in US government wars around the world; that they could go and study in US institutions, and that they would be studying at Harvard — they wouldn’t necessarily be studying at the center of CIA recruiting in the United States. (Laughs) So there was plausible deniability, shall we say, in the consumption of the products of soft power and their connection to the US government itself. But increasingly — and this begins before the Trump administration — the US government begins to question the validity of or the value of its soft power operations. Again, in part because it’s no longer advanced in the service of a specific effort or campaign to win hearts and minds — hearts and minds, in this case, against the Soviet Union. For a period of time, obviously in the wars on terrorism, this substituted for the goal of American soft power. We have to somehow convince people around the world that terrorism — or the objectives of al-Qaeda and Boko Haram and other groups around the world — that those are morally bankrupt or instrumentally not competent or whatever, and that US values still should hold sway in this sphere. But it’s really with Donald Trump coming to power in his first administration, and then even more unsettlingly in his second administration, that the assault on soft power begins in earnest. And the attacks are across the board: Soft power and institutions like USAID — the Agency for International Development — that they’re corrupt themselves or that they encourage corruption in other countries by basically shoveling money into the pockets of corrupt leaders; that they’re ineffectual; that they don’t produce either the results that they themselves say that they’re trying to produce, i.e., lifting people out of poverty when, in fact, it seems that no country has been lifted out of poverty by the efforts at least of these humanitarian or development programs; that these institutions simply support failings of well-paid NGO people in the United States or in the UN or in a variety of different organizations. So the critiques are across the board, and Trump comes in and says, “Well, let’s just get rid of them! Let’s not even discuss whether this program or that program is useful or not. Let’s just get rid of USAID,” without realizing — this is par for the course for Donald Trump — that USAID is not just supporting the efforts of finding a better approach to fighting AIDS in Africa or addressing famine around the world or helping people out after a humanitarian disaster. But USAID was a cornerstone of helping the US itself. USAID used to boast on its website that 80% of USAID dollars were spent inside the United States. In other words, a lot of the food aid that went out was, of course, purchased from US farmers. A lot of economic development went into the pockets of US consultants or US businesses. It was a projection, not just of US moral leadership in the world — i.e., “We believe in the importance of humanitarianism” — but it was a bottom-line-oriented effort to help out US businesses. So Trump really wasn’t thinking through that and thus has undermined a lot of US business activity around the world. Not only that, but he has undermined the cornerstone of the research and development complex here in the United States. So much of the money that has been dedicated to scientific research and the like in US universities and research centers has come from the federal government, and Trump has come in and slashed at that as well. And this, of course, has eroded the US educational position around the world. But again, as I said, it was eroding before Trump took office. According to a recent survey, out of the top ten research institutions around the world, only one of them is American. Only Harvard makes the top ten, and the rest, basically, are Chinese. So what Trump is doing is attacking an already weakened edifice of research and development, educational achievement. And so when we’re talking about the erosion of American soft power, you could say that Trump is dealing it a death blow, but he certainly was not the first one to wield an axe against this particular complex.
Tariffs and global backlash
Atul Singh: So, question for you: You just said 80% of the money was being spent in the US, which means that actually the money being spent overseas was not that high. But more importantly, it was creating this loop, which — okay, you want to send food aid, but you purchase it from US farmers. You save people from famine, you also help US farmers. There’s a multiplier effect. And of course, you increase goodwill, so you show that the US is more than missiles and drones, bombs and bullets. It’s also about winning hearts and minds. So basically, is the wheel now off? Is it now largely the US coercive power which will rely more on strong-arm military or economic leverage — tariffs being a classic example? And I can tell you that — and I’m sure you have friends in Europe and Asia, of course you do, you speak many languages, including Russian — many of my friends in the diplomatic circuit, in the business circuit, in the political circuit in countries like Japan and Switzerland, Germany and France and the special ally, UK, are apoplectic at this new indiscriminate levy of tariffs on friend and foe alike. How do you explain this? What will transpire? What will happen because of this?
John Feffer: Yeah, well, there are two aspects of US soft power we haven’t really talked about. One is managerial competence. In addition to the exporting of democracy and the exporting of blue jeans, there was also the exporting of technical expertise. And the United States was a center for that — developing new scientific methods, like during the Green Revolution, for instance, promoting golden rice and sending the scientists around the world to India.
Atul Singh: India benefited greatly from US help in the Green Revolution. There’s a tremendous input. Norman Borlaug, if I remember the name correctly, played a great role.
John Feffer: Yes, but it wasn’t just scientists. It was also folks who specialized in representative democracy. And if a country was emerging from 40, 50 years of martial law, or 500 years of colonialism, then the United States could be expected to send competent managers in the political realm to show folks how to draft a constitution, how to put together checks and balances. Well, obviously managerial competence is not a strong point for the Trump administration. And it has no interest in showing people how to replicate the model that it is currently destroying — i.e., representative democracy and checks and balances in the United States. So that’s off the table right now. The second key element of soft power was participation in global institutions and the establishment of global norms. And here we get closer to your question about tariffs. Because, of course, the United States was instrumental in the establishment, first and foremost, of the United Nations and various international institutions and agreements around such things as human rights and conduct during wartime. And with the United States now withdrawing from the UN Human Rights Council under the Trump administration, that kind of participation in the establishment of those kinds of norms is off the table. But it wasn’t just in the political realm — of course, it was in the economic realm as well, with the United States being instrumental in the establishment of the Bretton Woods institutions — the IMF, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and so forth — and the creation of the rules and regulations, if you will, the traffic laws governing the global economy. And that held sway, arguably, until — well, relatively recently. You could even say it held sway until Liberation Day, when Donald Trump instituted these across-the-board tariffs, which was a throwback far before World War II, to a time when, for instance, in the lead-up to World War I or the lead-up to World War II, there were efforts by various countries to protect their economies from globalization. What was globalization at that time? Globalization 1.0 — and grow their economies within tariff barriers. Now, that strategy didn’t disappear. It was employed by other countries during this ascendant period of a globalized economy. South Korea, for instance, uses tariff walls in order to build up its steel industry and then its shipbuilding industry. But it does so within the context of globalization. In other words, South Korea is doing this in order to participate as a stronger actor in the global economy. North Korea is the opposite example. It closes off its economy, uses, effectively, tariff walls — (laughs) along with all sorts of other walls — but not in order to join the global economy; in order to create an autarkic, or what they call Juche, system of self-reliance. So you have those two models just on the Korean Peninsula of approaches to the global economy. What’s unusual, though, is for a dominant country like the United States to use tariff walls, because ordinarily it’s a smaller country that’s going to say, “Well, we can’t compete against these major economies unless we protect our infant industries — help them grow, help them develop — so that one day they can grow up and compete.” Well, the United States has had a fully mature economy for decades and decades. So one might ask, why does the United States exactly need tariff walls to protect what are no longer infant industries? These are completely mature car-making industries or machine-building. And of course, globalization has had a problematic impact on the US economy as well, and the erosion of manufacturing. We’ve compensated with services and financial economic approaches, but a lot of people have suffered. A lot of blue-collar workers have been left behind in this transformation, and these are the folks who voted for Donald Trump, imagining that the United States could return to its position as a manufacturing center of the world and that tariffs would allow that to happen. A little hard to imagine how that’s going to happen, because unfortunately, the United States is indulging in very erratic and unpredictable economic activity at the moment. Trump says, I’m going to impose these tariffs, and then the next day says, well, I’m going to carve out these exceptions, or I’m going to make an exception for an entire country because they’ve been nice to me and kissed my ring. But what that means is that a country outside the United States, as well as businesspeople inside the United States, are trying to make predictions about where they’re going to invest money. They’re not likely going to invest a lot of money in, say, a manufacturing plant in the United States if Trump is going to change his policies the very next day and you’re suddenly left with a stranded asset — an enormous factory that’s designed to produce component parts for a US-made, US-manufactured auto. Previously, those component parts came from Canada, Mexico, China. And you’ve built this plant because you’ve been following Donald Trump’s recommendation to revitalize American manufacturing. And then — boom — he makes a decision: “Ah, well, we’ll let those components come in from Canada or Mexico.” And you’re basically out of luck with this big investment you’ve just made in this manufacturing plant. So it’s very, very difficult to expect the tariff walls will produce in the United States the same kind of results that they produced in South Korea during its major growth phase, because in South Korea they were accompanied by an industrial policy that provided predictability in economic planning. And here in the United States, the tariff walls have not just not been associated with industrial policy, but the Trump administration has been actively cutting out the legs from whatever industrial policy the Biden administration was beginning to establish during its four years in office.
Fairness, decolonization and geopolitical fallout
Atul Singh: That was a very insightful analysis of the Trump tariff effect. But here’s an argument that I hear a lot from people in the administration: that, look, the dollar is overvalued because too many foreigners want to keep assets in the dollar. We are the reserve currency of the world. It is the world’s currency. But our problem — reversing the statement of Nixon’s man who said, “The dollar is our currency and your problem” — they say that manufacturing has hollowed out because other countries have cheated in the global trading system. South Korea, for instance — South Korea keeps tariffs, supports its industry, and then, once its industry has advantages including government subsidies, and once it has been protected under the infant industry argument through tariff and non-tariff barriers, then South Korea basically eats the global shipbuilding industry for breakfast, lunch and dinner. And so you don’t have shipyards anymore in the US, or for that matter in the UK, in Glasgow or elsewhere. So this is not fair, and tariffs are a way to even the playing field. And the Trump administration wants to use tariffs and a devalued dollar to bring back manufacturing jobs in the Rust Belt. And they say something needed to be done, and we are the only people who are willing to act. And the others simply were not. The others were happy to sell the American working class down the river for the interests of American consumers and American shareholders. So what do you say to that, John?
John Feffer: Yeah. Well, there are two arguments. One, the Trump administration could care less about blue-collar workers — except when it comes to election time and they need their votes. But the record of the first Trump administration demonstrated that they enacted policies that tilted the playing field even more in favor of the wealthy. And there was no return of manufacturing jobs or better salaries for blue-collar workers during the Trump administration. Number two — Trump administration number two — it’s unlikely that we’ll see any substantive changes in American policy that will benefit the working class. An industrial policy — if these tariffs were associated with an industrial policy, well, maybe we would see that. But there is no industrial policy. We saw something of the like under the Biden administration — an industrial policy to emphasize and protect US green energy production and jobs and manufacturing. So an industrial policy plus tariffs, selectively, against the major players, primarily China. So of course, the Biden administration maintained significant trade barriers, though nothing like the 145% that the Trump administration has levied against China. So that’s one argument. Second argument is that the Trump administration is, in fact, not interested in leveling the playing field. It wants to go back to a time when the United States was king of the hill — when it could say that US business interests and US manufacturing interests trump all the interests of everyone else in the world. Yeah, the United States helped create the global economy. It also structurally ensured that that global economy would benefit the United States — at least initially, until, say, the 1980s or 1990s, when globalization became turbocharged. So the United States, of course, has dominant control over — not control necessarily, but more control than other countries — in institutions like the World Bank and the IMF. So much so that China has said, “Well, forget it. We’re going to create our own parallel institutions, because we’re sick and tired of trying to have a fair distribution of votes within these institutions.” In fact, you could say that South Korea, China, all these other countries were cheating in order to build up their infant industries. And that’s absolutely correct. Another way of putting it is that they deliberately got prices wrong. This is the argument from Alice Amsden — that they looked around at the global economy, and in 1960, South Korea was basically GDP of Ghana per capita. And they said, “Well, there’s really no way out of this unless we stopped listening to the consultants” — who come largely from the United States, on delegations sent by USAID and other organizations. “If we stop listening to them” — and their advice was, you should go with your comparative advantage. What is your comparative advantage, South Korea, at this point? Wigs — which was a major export for South Korea in the early 1960s — and later rice, raw materials, in other words. But if South Korea was ever going to rise higher in the development index, it was going to have to produce finished goods. And in order to do that, it had to basically deny the advice coming from outside economists and basically establish these tariff walls and encourage their own industries in this protected space. You could argue that what South Korea did was not just for South Korea’s benefit, but was really a signal to the rest of the world that this is how development can take place. That “It’s not going to happen out of the largesse of the United States and other great economic powers. It’s not going to come from receiving rice shipments from USAID. It’s not going to come from feeding hungry people with food grown in the United States. It’s going to come from our own efforts to create a manufacturing sector, to have our own industrial policy.” So the question of fairness? Well, you could argue that these efforts by South Korea and other countries really met the test of fairness. If we establish fairness as “every country has a chance to develop and achieve the kinds of sustainable advances that the United States has achieved over the years,” that’s fair. The United States trying to get back to its position of “first among equals,” so to speak, in the global economy? No, that’s fundamentally unfair. And the United States has to get used to this distribution of economic power around the world in the same way that colonial countries in Europe had to get used to the distribution of political power during decolonization. This is a form of decolonization in the economic sphere, if you will. And the Trump administration absolutely does not want to see that happen.
Collapse of trust and the future of US power
Atul Singh: So let’s go back to soft power. You now have a US president who says he’ll take over Greenland, who says Canada should be the 51st state. Says Panama, of course, should be controlled by the US. And actually, it is now, and they’ve managed to put pressure on Panama, which had joined the Belt and Road Initiative, and they now have pressured Hutchison Whampoa to sell its ports — which is a Hong Kong company run by Li Ka-shing — and the US has also talked about Europe raising its defense funding not just to 2% of the GDP, but to 5% of the GDP. The speech by JD Vance in the Munich Security Conference, shall we say, didn’t go down swimmingly well (laughs). It might be fair to say that. And his performance vis-à-vis Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy wasn’t construed all that beautifully by any of the allies. And so what are the consequences of this newfound aggression against neighbors and allies?
John Feffer: Yeah, it is shocking to a lot of people, because the expectation was that many of the cornerstones of the American national security enterprise would remain intact. And in fact, the only one that really has remained intact is the desire to spend more on the military — and that Trump is boasting of his trillion-dollar Pentagon budget — and the desire to send and sell those arms overseas, in part as a way to offset the costs of domestic production for our war machine. Everything else has been under question — US involvement in NATO, its respect for sovereignty. Here’s a guy who insists upon sovereignty in the US context: the United States must defend its borders. But he has little concern for the sovereignty of other countries. And sovereignty being, of course, a cornerstone of the global system. The United Nations is a system of nations that will all respect each other’s sovereignty. And they have arguments about where sovereignty begins and ends — how far from the border, the coastline? How do we deal with contested territory — an island here or sliver of territory there? But that’s all handled within a UN system. When Russia invades Ukraine — boom — that’s beyond the pale. That should not exist within the UN system. When Israel commits war crimes on a daily basis in Gaza, that too should not exist within the UN system. Of course, these are not isolated examples. We’ve had plenty of examples of atrocities and the violation of sovereignty in the past. But what’s different today is that you have many major leaders not saying very much in protest to these violations. So you have a country like India, which you might expect to be very firm in its defense of the principle of sovereignty — at least in the abstract — has, of course, said some negative things about Russia’s invasion, but hasn’t really effectively observed sanctions, and indeed has taken advantage of trade with Russia to get cheaper energy imports. The United States now too, led by someone who cares little about the violation of sovereignty — and so, no surprise then that he doesn’t really care about Canada’s sovereignty and doesn’t care that Greenland wants a measure of independence from Denmark — he wants to absorb it into the United States. I think that this is an inflection point. I suppose it’s a common phrase used these days — an inflection point in the international system. Either we head back into a period of anarchy, essentially, in which countries have thrown out the principle of sovereignty, and there’s no longer an international system that establishes again the traffic laws about where one stops and where one goes in the international system. Or people realize before it’s too late, “Hmm, anarchy is not such a great arrangement for the international system,” and we’ll see the resumption of, say, pre-1815 Europe before the Concert of Europe. Or we’ll see World War I, World War II, when the international system also suffered a breakdown. And short of that catastrophe happening again, one might hope that countries will come to their senses and say, “Okay, yeah, we have to make certain compromises in terms of our own sovereignty in order to live in a community of nations with other countries.”
Atul Singh: And where do you think we are headed on current trends? Do you think the pendulum can swing back, or do you think the loss of US soft power now is perhaps permanent? And also, a follow-up question: Does Donald Trump represent — and because I’m sitting in Silicon Valley, I’ll use the Silicon Valley lingo — a feature or a bug?
John Feffer: Yeah. Well, definitely he was a bug in his first administration. And the Biden team did everything it could to resume the status quo. It absorbed some of the changes that Trump had made — of course, they kept the sanctions against China, for instance, or the tariffs against China and some of the export controls. But in general, they tried to reassure the international community that the United States is back. In other words, it is going to play a cooperative role. I’m not so sure that a subsequent administration — if voters turn Trump out of office and put someone else in from a different party — I’m not so sure that it will be possible to persuade the international community that the United States is back again. I think there’s just a fear that the United States can’t be depended upon by anybody, frankly. Even if you’re a far-right leader, the United States can’t be depended upon. You might have a personal relationship with Trump, but obviously, if he decides he doesn’t like you anymore, as he decided with a number of leaders, then all bets are off. So that means that countries are going to look either to their own resources — Europe, of course, spending more on their military; Canada, beginning to look for other places to export their products to; Mexico, the same — and a lot of countries, especially in the Global South, are going to look to China. And China has — if you look at some of the speeches that Xi Jinping made during his recent trip to Southeast Asia — what did he emphasize? He emphasized stability, security, predictability — everything that the United States is not. These countries are going to say, “Hey, why should we hitch our wagon to a country like the United States that is so volatile, that it changes completely every four years, when we could hitch our wagon to China, which fundamentally hasn’t changed?” Of course, China has changed — its economy has changed rather dramatically — but at least for the last ten or 15 years, China has consistently promoted its Belt and Road Initiative and various infrastructure deals with countries. So my guess is that, at least in terms of the US role in any stable international community, people are just not going to look to the United States any longer for leadership. The role of the United States as a research hub — a hub of soft power, if you will — I think that that era also is over. Hollywood is now but one of many film industries, including Bollywood, including the film industry in Nigeria, the European film industry, the Mexican film industry. Yes, Hollywood obviously still has a lot of cachet, a lot of power, a lot of money. But I think it is now operating in a multipolar world. The same, obviously, for educational institutions. When it comes to scientists, they’re looking at — and I have friends who are in universities around here in western Massachusetts who are on tenterhooks because their grant focus for scientific research either has been canceled or they don’t know what the status of them are. They don’t know what the future is. They don’t know if their graduate students will be able to continue their research. Everything is up in the air. And a lot of scientists, at least I hear, are asking this fundamental question: Should I stay in the United States if I cannot expect in the next several years to have my research funded? And I’m getting these offers from institutions in Europe and around the world that promise me not just funding for a year, but funding for the entire life cycle of my research project. So let’s put it this way: When it comes to soft power, the United States, over the last ten years especially, has seen a significant decline. And the Trump administration, thinking that it’s restoring the greatness of America, has in fact done the opposite by destroying the very foundations of what made American hegemony so powerful, especially its soft power elements. Military power — that’s all that’s going to be left to the United States. It will increasingly resemble Russia — a country that is militarily powerful because it has nuclear weapons and has invested a lot of money in its military. Russia, of course, 6% of its GDP recently, the United States aspiring to increase it to 5% here—
Atul Singh: With a much bigger denominator, John.
John Feffer: Yes, absolutely.
Atul Singh: Really big denominator. The American military is extraordinary. The American Navy basically is much more powerful than the British Navy ever was. It’s a colossus.
John Feffer: Absolutely. And this commitment to military power, but also old-fashioned fossil fuel power, which is, again, something it would share with Russia. And abandoning the efforts to go beyond the fossil fuel era. So the United States under Trump, yes, it’s going back to the 1950s. And the world is not going to go back to the 1950s with it.
Atul Singh: I see. Again, do you think it’s irredeemable, or do you think the political climate can change, will change, and the pendulum will swing?
John Feffer: The political climate will change, there’s no question about it — unless Trump short-circuits the democratic process and runs “for a third term” or declares martial law and takes over all institutions of society, which is — alas — not a completely unknown possibility. But yes, I think it’s very likely that, if democracy continues to exist here in the United States, there will be a pendulum shift. But I don’t think that is sufficient to restore US soft power. The boulder is rolling down the hill. We, the next party, could set up brigades to arrest the motion of that boulder downhill, but it’s going to be tough. Again, this is a powerful country, so it’s not going to be overnight. We’re not going to see the United States turn into Easter Island, or the Mayan civilization, from one day to the next.
Atul Singh: Or even Great Britain.
John Feffer: Or even Great Britain, yes. But we could become a nation of shopkeepers (laughs) within a generation, within 20 to 25 years — a well-armed nation of shopkeepers, to be sure — but still, not the power that we were previously, i.e., a power that was projecting — was holding together in many ways — the international community. Not through its actual moral leadership — because, as you say, there are lots of reasons why the US was immoral in its leadership around the world — but at least in theory, the United States was acting in this fashion. And now the mask is off, and there’s no pretense that the United States has any moral leadership left in it.
Atul Singh: On that somber note, John Feffer, thank you so much for your time, and we’ll have you back very shortly for a number of other discussions.
John Feffer: I look forward to it, thank you.
[Lee Thompson-Kolar edited this piece.]
The views expressed in this article/video are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.
” post-content-short=” Atul Singh: Welcome to FO° Talks. With me is John Feffer — a friend, an author, a spokesman and a nature lover. He’s written many articles for Fair Observer. He has a great understanding of international affairs, and he’s indeed a citizen of the world. Today, we will speak to John about Why…” post_summery=”The United States’s soft power is rapidly declining as US President Donald Trump’s policies exacerbate its collapse. Fair Observer Editor-in-Chief Atul Singh and John Feffer, the director of Foreign Policy in Focus, examine the erosion of global trust, the dismantling of soft power institutions like USAID and the shift to coercive economic and military tactics. America’s moral leadership may be irreversibly damaged.” post-date=”May 12, 2025″ post-title=”FO° Talks: Why US Soft Power Is Now Declining Dramatically” slug-data=”fo-talks-why-us-soft-power-is-now-declining-dramatically”>
FO° Talks: Why US Soft Power Is Now Declining Dramatically
Atul Singh: Welcome to FO° Talks. With me is Ashank Desai, who’s an entrepreneur par excellence. Today, we will discuss the fascinating story of India’s NASSCOM. Welcome, Ashank.
Ashank Desai: Thanks, Atul. Thanks to be here with you, as always.
Atul Singh: Excellent, excellent. So let’s talk about what NASSCOM is. The full form of NASSCOM is the National Association of Software and Services Companies. NASSCOM is the acronym. It was born in 1988, a little more than 19 months before the Berlin Wall fell on November 9, 1989. And we know what happened then: Two years later, the Soviet Union collapsed. In contrast, NASSCOM went on a rocket ride — up, up and away. And Ashank Desai was one of its founders. He is a past chairman, he had a ringside view. In fact, he was one of the people who made this rocket. So today, we are with an entrepreneur who’s created a fantastic software company, or many software companies. He has created public policy schools and institutions, both in IIT Bombay and in IIM Ahmedabad, his two alma maters, and he’s someone who’s part of the team who made NASSCOM such a big deal. Welcome, Ashank, again. Let’s get cracking with the story of the Indian IT industry. Even before NASSCOM began, what was going on?
Ashank Desai: So NASSCOM started at those interesting times, as you said — the Berlin Wall, Russia and maybe just later, there was the whole liberalization of the Indian economy, too.
Atul Singh: It happens the same year the Soviet Union collapsed, actually. There was a balance of payments crisis, and this happens earlier in the year in 1991. Those of us who are young enough remember those days. By the end of the year, the Soviet Union is no more. And in 1991, the Narasimha Rao government has, with Manmohan Singh as Finance Minister, taken away some of the License-Permit-Quota Raj. And of course, the Indian economy finally grows, and no longer can people say that we grow by the Hindu rate of growth. Actually, it was the socialist rate of growth, not the Hindu rate of growth. But over to you, Ashank. Heady time, and you were a part of it! You are one of the people who helped grow India. So let’s hear from you: What was going on before NASSCOM?
Ashank Desai: Yeah. So I always say that I have lived a dream — a dream of IT industry, a dream of seeing the IT industry at less than $50 million becoming $250 billion, which is like, as you would guess, 5,000 times growth in a generation in dollar terms. I think it may be another 2x if you put it in rupee terms. But the point I’m making is, the dream that I lived is what I will describe. And NASSCOM is part of that story. So go back to the 1970s and late ’70s, early ’80s. The whole IT industry, as we call it now, is full of large hardware players. The hardware players are making large mainframes, minicomputers, and they used to develop what is called now software and software services, but they bundled it with hardware. And then there was some interesting thing that happened in the US, where IBM was told in some legal battle that they have to separately charge for hardware and software, and not as a combined one. And that opened up the software industry, actually—
Atul Singh: And that led to the rise of Microsoft and Bill Gates. (Laughs)
Ashank Desai: Yeah. Later — and Bill Gates and many other things that all we know. So some of us started in late ’70s and early ’80s software companies. And Mastek is one of those companies. With my colleagues, four of us were the founders. But it was such a small company and such a small industry that we were struggling to grow. We were struggling to show profits. And by ’86, you will be surprised that our whole revenue was just 50 lakhs. Or, if I go by the present dollar rate, it may be less than $10,000. And we were rated as one of the top five or six companies in India. Such was the size. (Atul laughs) The point I’m making is, we were all struggling. And there was this feeling that we need to look at global markets, not be constrained by Indian market, because there was a feeling that because of Indian entrepreneurship, because of Indian talent — which is very good in maths and science — because of English language and because of our cost advantage, India has an opportunity to look at the global software services market. And then, at that point of time, suddenly, all of us were feeling a great feeling of looking at a much larger vision. Yet we were constrained by a lot of things that were happening in India in terms of issues of movement of people, movement of money, financing, our cost of marketing and sales in US and other countries. You will be surprised that when I first wanted to go abroad, I wanted a foreign exchange. And then I had to apply and wait and all those things. And then somebody asked me from RBI, “Why do you want foreign exchange?” He said, “You are not doing any exports. You are not earning anything.” I said, “Sir, to earn, only I have to go there.” So those were the times. (Atul laughs) So we said, we need to come together and attack this whole problem of a) the internal controls; b) the image of India and marketing issues that we had. Everybody thought, “India and software? Come on. You only have snakes and elephants moving on the roads.” That was the image. So we needed to change so many things, and we could not have done it unless we came together. So this dialogue about coming together as one association started happening sometime in ’83, ’84, ’85 — that period, you know? There were talks in Mumbai, where I am based. There were talks going on in Bangalore, which was also upcoming at that time. Then there were people going abroad, and some of them were talking in some Indian delegations that used to go there to promote software. So there was some discussion there among Indian leaders, so there are various stories there. But the whole thing got kind of converged into a big movement sometime in 1987. So some of us came together. And one Mr. Harish Mehta — who is also one of the founders, took—
Atul Singh: He’s written a book, if I remember correctly. He’s written a book on the founding of NASSCOM. And he’s a friend of yours, as I understand.
Ashank Desai: Yeah, he’s a good friend of mine for many decades, and he has written a very interesting book, which is doing well. So, then he invited all of us. He said, “Why don’t we start working on this whole issue?” However, there was a problem there. The problem was, there was already an association of hardware companies called MAIT. And, as I told you, software was given almost free by hardware companies — now we can do it the other way. But at that time, hardware was the main business. So they were a large association, and we were a small part of that association. So he said, “Look, guys, this is not going to work. We are not about domestic market. We don’t want to sell anything much in domestic — we want global vision. And you have your own market in India. You want to sell hardware, please do it. You can’t support us.” But they didn’t agree. We had a chairman that time called Mehra, and he tried to come and convince us and so on and so forth. So many things happened. But we decided to move ahead, and we met in Delhi sometime in ’87. And that was an inflection point where 30, 40, 50 of our software companies all met together. Mastek was there, Infosys was there. And then there were other software companies who were also present there. There was a TCS, which was, of course, largest for me even then. So all of us were there, and we stated, “We must do a separate association.” The chairman of MAIT came that time; he convinced us. He still said, “Don’t do it. We can go together.” But we were clear. And that was the foundation. So that meeting then was the foundation point of NASSCOM. I was there. Harish Mehta was there. Then there were other colleagues — particularly two founder members who were later felicitated by the Prime Minister — four of us as founders of NASSCOM.
Atul Singh: Who were the other two?
Ashank Desai: Yeah, one was Mr. K.V. Ramani, who was running a software company called Future Software. And one Mr. Saurabh Srivastava, who was, of course, in Tata Burroughs at that time — or maybe it was Tata Unisys that time, I don’t know exactly — but he was working in one of the startup software companies. And there was, of course, people like Nandan Nilekani who were also very keen to take part. He was there. And I think Mr. Narayana Murthy was also there in that meeting. I am not 100% sure, but he, of course, helped us greatly later. So all of us were there. And some of us said, “Now we should write a constitution.” And we were wondering how to write a constitution. We were not experts, so we looked at many other associations. And we — six, seven, eight of us — were signatories. I was one of those privileged ones whose name comes first, because there was nobody above me in terms of alphabetical order! (Both laugh) So anyway, we created a constitution with values, with the idea that we will do something very, very professional. We had decided terms of chairmanship. We had decided how we will get elections. We had decided what are the things that we should put boundaries on in our association, and so on and so forth. We thought about it, because we were all first-generation entrepreneurs — mostly. Most of us — as you know, Infosys, Mastek — these are all early founders of the IT industry. And then we had, of course, people from larger companies like TCS and Tata Burroughs, and so on. So we wrote that constitution. But we did not have any idea of doing elections. So we wanted somebody who could lead that for the few years before elections happen. And we invited one Mr. Prem Shivdasani, who was actually a CEO and well-respected person in the hardware industry at that time, and he had retired and started something of his own. But real elections happened, and then Harish Mehta became our first chairman. So that is the story of the beginning of NASSCOM.
Atul Singh: So it is a story wherein a few people feel a need, come together and you break away from an early association that involves hardware. So it’s almost like the breaking away — although not so dramatic — of any church from the big Catholic Church. You became the Protestants and therefore succeeded, I suppose. But walk me through the conception stage. Who was the person who first conceived of NASSCOM? Because we now know how it began, but was it you? How did you get the idea that it had to be services, not just software, because it could very easily just mean National Association of Software? So tell us a little bit more about the early founding, the process of founding NASSCOM.
Ashank Desai: Yeah, as I said, this founding was a kind of process where many people got involved. And then that Delhi event we had, where many people came, and some of them decided to move this ahead. And as I said, four of us who were later felicitated were the main people who spent a lot of time doing groundwork. But having said that, I would not tell you that we were the only four people. As I said, there were people from the IT industry, like Mr. Nandan Nilekani of Infosys. Then there were people from TCS and other persons who were all involved. So I don’t think it is one person who could say, “I was the founder of NASSCOM.” It was a team effort. At the same time, there were some people who took more interest and spent their time, money and efforts moving forward. And that’s where this constitution and name came from. That name came out of this group discussion of eight, nine, ten of us who had signed that constitution.
Overcoming competition and building trust
Atul Singh: So that brings me on to another question, which is that Indians are famously fractious. You look at any battle — Battle of Panipat: First, the Marathas piss off everybody else, including the Jats, who walk off and don’t fight with them. And then, of course, all the different Maratha sardars have their own rivalries. And that is the story of Indian history. So how did the famously fractious Indians come together and literally create a team of rivals?
Ashank Desai: Absolutely, you have some brilliant question there. And that’s really the foundation of NASSCOM. We were all competing, we were very small, we were going to the US and UK and competing against the same customers. But there was a streak of professionalism, a streak of ethics, honesty, larger vision — those were the values of this first generation of entrepreneurs, like me and many others. And that is the reason we felt that we could trust each other when we worked together to make the industry larger. So the word, “co-opetition,” was later coined by some American author and so on. This was that. This was like competing outside the office of NASSCOM — but when we come inside, we don’t push our companies, we don’t talk about our companies. We just see how we can make [things] happen. And that was one of the reasons — apart from a few others, which we’ll talk about — that made NASSCOM successful. You see, there are many associations today that get split. They start and then say, “Oh, no, no, my interests are not being served,” or “I want my company to get something,” and so on and so forth. And India — as you know — that crab story, that people try to pull everyone down, and all those things like that…
Atul Singh: It’s all so true, because you go to the Indian embassy and the defense attaché will tell you that, “We are the Shudra, and the Indian Foreign Service officer is the Brahmin, and I’m a nobody.” And then you meet the RAW guy, and he’ll say, “Oh, I am the Shudra, and I never get to do anything important, and I don’t get to do my work.” And then the IFS person will tell you that, “These defense guys and RAW guys, they know nothing. We know everything.” So this is not just within castes. It is between services, it’s between companies. It’s a feature of our culture. You’re right — that crab metaphor is so true. But you overcame it. So that’s super rare.
Ashank Desai: In fact, even today, people come and ask some of us to speak on how this NASSCOM happened. Because they see in our associations, we have not been able to bring this kind of alignment, this kind of cooperation, and, you know, ego-busting policies. So that’s one of the things that happened. We were lucky, in a way, you can say. But I think we were about a new generation — that post-liberalization entrepreneurs.
Atul Singh: Post-1991.
Ashank Desai: Yeah. We were looking at the world with different lenses. We were not past. We had abandoned the past. And that is what is the story of NASSCOM — that we abandoned the past and did many things that an association should not be doing, in a way, or industry should not be doing.
Atul Singh: So you had a fresh vision for the future — let’s put it that way. So that’s one thing that helped you succeed. What were the other things? You alluded to them — outline them for us.
Ashank Desai: So, out of that association of not competing when we are in NASSCOM, we created a next level of great bond and trust among some of us early founder members, you know, that I described. And we even today meet — now, it is almost 37 years, as you know. We still meet today, along with our families, talk about ourselves, industry and past, and many other things, and see that we still work together. So it was not only about industry and a formal relationship — it went beyond that. So that’s one point. Even today, if you look at NASSCOM — there are many new people who have come after us, you know, it has become all young people who have come — they have become chairmen. But we, every year, go out along with family and past chairmen and existing council, along with family — enjoy, sing, dance and discuss also everything — and come back saying, “Oh, we are all together.” So that is one culture — the team culture — propagated further on. That’s one. Number two is about what I would call professionalism, or what I would call an attitude of a liberal economy paradigm, if I may call it. It is about free markets. It is about merit — as the real arbiter of ultimately what happens. It is about seeing that we do not try to cut corners. So this liberal attitude and professionalism is the second part which was there. Because if that was not there, we would have resisted many changes that we wanted to do. Our government wanted to help us. We all said, “We need to trust each other, and we should find government as a partner.” So this liberal professional attitude meant that we don’t suspect government. We help government to perform better to help us. And that’s where my motivation to start a public policy school is out of that. I have seen how industry can influence government and professional government bureaucrats to make changes happen. If you educate them, if you tell them policy options and if you have the right people there, you can make a difference. So we closely worked with the government out of that attitude of liberalization. The third one was, of course, realizing that we need to change the Indian way of doing business. We have to be focused on highest quality, highest governance of our companies and our customers. We realized [our customers] were not necessarily from India. They were from all over the world — large corporations. They looked at professional partners. Because imagine doing software at a distance — you need to trust people. And we did many things to make that trust happen. So that is another part. And last, and not the least, was, we were innovative in terms of finding out as a group. And hence, NASSCOM innovated many things. We, in industry, innovated many things. But this is not a story of industry — this is a story of NASSCOM. So I will say that NASSCOM also was innovative.
Atul Singh: Understood. So you are describing features that are almost universally applicable. I could apply these features to Buddhism. You know, the reasons for success: culture, teamwork, liberal attitude, openness, professionalism. And in a way, you could say this goes back right to the Nagar-set tradition of ancient India, or, for that matter, the cities of Europe that succeeded, wherein the notables — Les Notables — got together and had a long-term vision for the future. And that is fascinating because it cuts across time, it cuts across space. But as we know, every story has challenges. And what I want you to inform everybody about is those early challenges. Because people forget today how it was a radically different time. India was a socialist country, Indira Gandhi had nationalized all the banks. There were capital controls — you couldn’t leave the country without, actually, permission from someone to carry a very limited amount of dollars. You had to pay duties even to import computers to do your work. So the story has many, many, many layers, like an onion. And I’m not saying peel all of them, because then we’ll be here ‘til tomorrow — but give us some color as to how hard it was, and how much you had to fight the odds to create what you have today.
Ashank Desai: Okay, great. Again, a great question, because that is what made the future of NASSCOM and the IT industry. And that’s what NASSCOM made happen. People in this generation may not realize the value of that, because they are living in a different world. We were living in a different world. It used to have 100% duty on software import, Atul. So if you want to present, we are talking about 100% duties—
Atul Singh: (Laughs) Akin to Donald Trump’s Back to the Future!
Ashank Desai: But the point was, it was unaffordable for the Indian industry to import any software, best of the software. Number two: It was very difficult to buy hardware in India, because IBM was told to go out, as you know, during an earlier regime. And multinationals were not best of the companies who were applauded by government. So we had—
Atul Singh: No, look, the Janata Party government. Why just mention Indira Gandhi? The Janata Party government kicked even Coca-Cola out. It was the same place. Everyone was protectionist. The Janata Party was protectionist, the Congress was protectionist. And of course, we had the Communists. How can we forget them?
Ashank Desai: Of course. So hardware was very difficult to be imported. So we needed to change. Otherwise, how are we going to do best-of-class software unless we have best-of-class hardware in the country? Yeah, they were not there. They had to get it from outside. Third, we were so constrained in terms of foreign exchange, and we were trying to solve that problem, in a way, by building industry. But as I said, I was asked by some official, “Why are you going out? What foreign exchange, when you are not building foreign exchange?” But we had to start somewhere. So we had to liberalize this whole movement of people and movement of supporting exports — so liberalizing some of the exchange there. Then the challenge was, of course, much larger in terms of our image and our reach to the foreign world. Because of these issues — that we were small, we had constraints of moving around, we had a constraint of money — we could not promote ourselves to be the major players. Everybody had a bad image about India. So we had to act. Another challenge which NASSCOM had to address — and then, as times moved ahead, everyone said, “Yeah, you are doing good software, we understand you are very bright people. But where is the quality of your software? You still have to improve your quality. You are not at the level that we are,” — American students. So that was another challenge. I’ll tell about how we solved each one of them. I’ll come to it very quickly. I’m first describing, telling, yeah. And the last one was about the cost of doing. They said, “Fine, you can’t come to the US and do software for us, because that is going to be as costly. Because then you have to pay for your coming there. I have to pay you allowances. Where is the advantage of cost? Show me a big advantage of cost.” So the challenge was, we were not geared because telecommunication was not there. You know, I remember there was one line — 64 KB, Atul — going between Texas Instruments, Bangalore, to America. And we said, “Wow, we now have a telecommunication connection.” Now, I don’t know how many gigabyte connections we have, I’ve lost count. But 64 KB was the largest ever telecom line between America and India. So there was a problem of telecommunications.
Atul Singh: Ashank, Ashank, let me stop you. Ranvir Trehan, who worked on the ARPANET — he is a mentor and a dear friend, and he’s in his 80s — and he said you cannot imagine when, during the early days, how limited data would go around. It’s a totally different universe, not just a world. I mean, the era of optical fibers and whatnot has completely transformed telecommunications.
Ashank Desai: Yeah. So all these problems meant that all this dream of being a large software exporter from India, earning foreign exchange, was just a pipe dream at one level. The last one was, of course, talent. We used to still wonder — I remember one meeting of NASSCOM, we were saying, “We have some 100 project managers in the country. What software export are we talking about anyway?” So let me tell you how we addressed these challenges. That’s where the government comes in — that’s where our association comes in — as one industry and not competing with our own interest. The first thing we did was we said: 0% duty on software. I told you — 100%. We said: 0% duty. I want all the software in India to come with no duty. Other industry guys said, “You guys are crazy. You guys don’t know how to run business. You need protection in the country. We are just growing. We have just liberalized. What nonsense you are talking?” We said, “No. We want best of the software and hardware to come into the country. We will build on that.” And so, flood software in, flood software out. That was our message to the government. And fortunately, Mr. Manmohan Singh was Finance Minister at that time. So he heard us, and he kind of agreed reluctantly. He said, “See, guys, if these guys — young guys, so-called professionals — want to do something, anyway, they won’t do much harm to us. We are a very small industry.” So I think he agreed. And we had a good bureaucrat at that time. I must tell you that story — that we were lucky to have bureaucrats in the Department of Electronics and government who saw that opportunity, and they were also entrepreneurial. And one name comes to mind — Mr. N. Vittal. His name should be written also in a big way in the history of the IT industry. In fact, he was also felicitated by the Prime Minister, along with us; we were felicitated as founders, and he was also one of the supporters. So we worked with him very closely. Then we went and told him, “Sir—”
Atul Singh: And what was his name?
Ashank Desai: N for Norway, N. Vittal — V-I-T-T-A-L. He was a part of Gujarat government bureaucracy. And like all Gujaratis, he was very entrepreneurial. We just lost him, unfortunately, just a few months back. (Atul laughs) Yeah, yeah.
Atul Singh: Oh dear.
Ashank Desai: He said, “Okay, I will support you.” He said, “What all you want?” We also said we had very great difficulty doing software export in Export Processing Zones — they were what is called an SEZ. There was so much bureaucracy, so much control. We said, “Software should not be done in one place. Software can be done anywhere.” I can sit at home and build software — which I am doing now, thanks to Covid. But even at that time, we were telling them: Software has to have a free development facility. And then we came up with an idea of the Software Technology Park — STP. That innovation happened because NASSCOM said, “We don’t want SEZs alone. Allow us to build software anywhere. So that customs officials, hardware import, putting them behind big walls, is not required. We can just get a connection.” And so that is the second thing we asked for from the government. And we said — Vittal also agreed — but he went and told the government, “These guys want many things. They will do $400 million export in the next two years.” He just promised the government and the Prime Minister and the Finance Minister. And we heard about it in the press. We went, “Sir, you want all the facilities, right? You better deliver.”
Atul Singh: (Laughs) He was a good Gujarati! He was like, “You are drunk.” He was a good Gujarati! (Laughs)
Ashank Desai: So he said, “I have committed already that you will do $400 million.” We were just a $100 million industry, you know? So we said, “Sir, this is difficult.” But the point I’m making is, we did very close to that number in any case, because we grew very fast. So he was asking and giving us something. At the same time, he was demanding. This was good. Then we went and told him, “Sir, we can’t do telecommunication software in India unless we have a big telecom pipe.” And all the telecom in India was public utilities, as you know. There was VSNL, there was MTNL, there is now BSNL. Now, they were not geared to provide us the kind of fast movement, fast expansion. We used to say, “We want vision and bandwidth — both together.” And that forced the government to privatize the telecom.
Policy interventions and quality improvement
I must tell you this, Atul: In the history of India, when I started Mastek, it used to take 12 years to get a telephone connection in Mumbai.
Atul Singh: Wow.
Ashank Desai: You know that handset you ring, rotating?
Atul Singh: It moved around.
Ashank Desai: You must have seen it.
Atul Singh: Yeah, yeah, I grew up seeing it at my grandfather’s place. It would be a black telephone, and you dialed it… and if it was in color, that was a fancy set! (Laughs)
Ashank Desai: In fact, in Mastek, we did not have any phone the first five years. Can you believe we were doing business by making calls from telephone booths? That was the way we were doing business. Then we had some hired—
Atul Singh: They used to be called STD, ISD booths. I remember them.
Ashank Desai: So the point I am making is, we said we must liberalize and have the private sector coming in. And now you get your mobile phone in ten seconds, right? You just go and order it. This revolution happened not by the telecom industry. We asked for it — the IT industry.
Atul Singh: Wow.
Ashank Desai: So we are actually the initiator of this telecom revolution that happened in India. We did it for us, our industry, obviously — but the whole country benefited out of it, because the telecom industry was very small. They were not big. And fortunately, Mr. Vittal also went and became Telecom Secretary. He agreed. So that is the third challenge that I solved. I told you about import duty. I told you about difficulty in doing software in software zones. We changed the telecom policy. Now comes the next point: We wanted a large number of talent, and we were not having computer science graduates as we have now. Now almost 40% or 50% of engineering graduates are computer science. In fact, it is the other way now — that we are not producing other engineers, which is not good.
Atul Singh: But I still hear complaints from people in industry that you have to train these people yourself. Because what happens is they come out of university knowing very little practical stuff, and then it takes you a year, sometimes, or 18 months to train them to work for you.
Ashank Desai: Yes, of course that is the case, because we are growing faster than the education system can produce the quality people. So that’s a separate discussion. So we came up with what is called MCA — Management of Computer Applications — as a new degree. And we pushed it through the government, and we told the government also, “Please liberalize education.” You know, India used to produce only 100,000 engineers, or less than that, in the 1990s. That was just not even enough for us.
Atul Singh: Wow.
Ashank Desai: We said, “Unless you allow large universities to come themselves, these IITs and regional engineering colleges can’t produce the number of engineers that we need.” And we forced the government also to liberalize education. In a way, our pressure for talent helped liberalization in education, too. And today, we produce almost 1.5 million engineers. We are the largest engineer producers in the world today, probably number one or number two. Now that revolution happened again because we wanted people. We were growing so fast, and we were not getting people. So that is both policy intervention—
Atul Singh: So, two revolutions because of you — knock-on effects. Number one was the pressure to improve telecoms, and number two, the pressure to liberalize education and produce enough computer science graduates, really — or computer science people — to work in the industry.
Ashank Desai: AI and what will happen to the whole world. But one thing everyone says: India has the largest AI talent. “Let us go to India. They know how to make things happen.” How is it happening? That’s happening because we are all here to produce raw talent. And we are geared to train them when they come into our companies. So all that supply chain, as you would call it, of people has been professionalized and scaled up. So that is another challenge, which we got solved through this. The next one, the image issue. You know, there was a World Bank study at that time who came and said, “Oh, you guys are a software industry? We should work on something to produce a global report on what kind of software you should do.” So we again went to the government and told the government, “Please support us. We want this report to be done. Because if it is from the World Bank, everybody will take notice, and they will think of India as a good place.” Okay, so that is another thing that we did. Again, government supported us. But that report was 30 years ago. What it says now looks very, very small — but that’s okay. That was a foundation that created image, and we used to tout that report in America. “You know what the World Bank is saying?” So they’d say, “Oh, okay, looks like you guys are good.” So that is another thing. The last one, of course, was something that NASSCOM itself. That was the focus on quality. In ’95–’96, there is what is called a CMM — Capability Maturity Model — for evaluating the software development process. And it has a Level 1 to Level 5. It is a Carnegie Mellon University model. And we were considered not a very high-quality country. And then there was what is called ISO 9001 — it was a global standard for the process of software. We, as NASSCOM, pushed very hard. We brought experts from all over the world, forced people to train. And Atul, by 1999–2000, 80 to 90% of CMM Level 5 companies were in India. So we were number one in the software process. And by the way, I must tell you one story here, which is my company-specific. You see, that Carnegie Mellon model has a model for software development and also for people development. And they have what is called CMM for software development and PCMM for people development. And we had applied for it, and we were assessed by people from outside India — they came from America. And when they announced it, they invited top management along with employees. And they said, “I have to make one announcement which will make you very proud.” So we said, “Maybe we have got that PCMM.” He said, “No, not only that you’ve got PCMM — you are the first private sector PCMM company in the world.” He said, “There are only two companies who have got this PCMM. One is a Navy or military establishment in the US. And then there is another one, which is, again, a government. You are the first private sector.” So—
Atul Singh: That was a huge achievement. Huge achievement!
Ashank Desai: Yeah, in 1999 or ’97, I think. I don’t remember. The point I’m making is, there was a whole revolution of focus on quality and people. Now, all that happened because of NASSCOM. And that’s the way we handled the challenges. I hope my long answer answered your question — how we addressed the challenges: working together, working with the government, working with people outside India and then promoting the industry. It’s a lovely story. It is a dream, as I said, that we lived.
Inflection points and innovations
Atul Singh: So tell us about the inflection points. We know about the challenges, but surely there must have been inflection points when you made a huge quantum leap. The Greeks have a fantastic conception of time — Chronos, which is chronological time, and Kairos, wherein you can bend the arc of time. Like, you look at, alright, you work very hard over time, but then there comes the Olympics, and if you put in your best, you win Olympic gold or an Olympic medal. So what were the inflection points for NASSCOM and the industry?
Ashank Desai: Yeah, so two, three things happened. The first one was this inflection point about being rated high globally in quality. So that was one important inflection point — because people have said now, “Wow, we are now relying on India.” The second inflection point which happened, in parallel, was developing software offshore. Remember, software was not done far away from the cabin of the CIO in America or the UK. They wanted to see programmers outside their doors. And the process was: You tell them what to do, then change it. You see, the software development process is very complicated and muddy. And a lot of surprises happen. You must have heard some stories of software going completely failure. And all those things have happened, hut that is because the process is still—
Atul Singh: I’ve heard a few stories. Yes, one or two even from you.
Ashank Desai: You know, they say that you tell them to develop a jhoola, or a swing — but by the time you tell them what to do, they convert it into their own world. Then they convert it to their architecture, and what you get is a noose to hang somebody. That’s the kind of story. Anyway, so the point is, we perfected this whole model by 1995, ‘96, ‘97. We perfected this art of doing software 5,000 miles away. Because the Internet was now happening, and we could develop software at a distance. (Clears throat)
Atul Singh: Yes, please, crack on.
Ashank Desai: And that was an innovation and one of the inflection points. Because remember, when Covid came, we could not use our offices. We sent all the people home, and they were working at home and still producing the same software — because we knew how to do it at a distance. You see, it was not a challenge for us. So the whole world depended on India to deliver software when Covid was there, and offices were closed, people could not travel. No problem — we can do it anywhere. So this anywhere software development was a second inflection point. It happened in the late ‘90s, around that time, because some of these changes that NASSCOM made happen. The third inflection point was, of course, Y2K — for the industry again — where NASSCOM, of course, took a role of propagating it globally and so on. That is another point where suddenly the doors were open for Indian industry to work with large corporates, Fortune 500 companies. Then another one was, this whole industry was only built on software development, as we call it. But there was a next round of innovations, and markets opened up for Indian industry — what we called Business Process Management. People started saying, “Okay, you can do software — then you can do our call centers. You can run our finance department. You can run our HR departments.” So this whole flood started coming, and a new industry got developed. And NASSCOM was geared to support that industry.
Atul Singh: Got it. So there was a massive multiplier effect, is what you’re saying. It didn’t just lead to software coming in, but lots of other stuff coming in as a result.
Ashank Desai: So those were some of the inflection points which happened in the IT industry. But NASSCOM was an observer and supporter. And we, as a group, were kind of… See, because in every industry, every time a new market happens, there are new challenges. You see, when this BPM industry happened, they had their own challenges. Who was solving them? NASSCOM. Okay. The next inflection point, which has now happened over the last seven, eight years is large American and British and global corporates starting what are called GCCs — Global Capability Centers. And they are in Bangalore, they are in Mumbai, they are in Hyderabad and Delhi, and so on. Now, that is another flood which is coming now, a new inflection. Now, to support these people, there are a lot of issues they still face. So we are there to support, okay? Then there is another inflection point—
Atul Singh: Just tell our viewers and listeners a little bit about Global Capability Centers, because they are the new thing. And a lot of people have questions about what you call the GCC. This is not the Gulf Cooperation Council — for those of you who listen to Fair Observer and watch Fair Observer and read Fair Observer for geopolitics — this is a different GCC.
Ashank Desai: So that story goes sometime back, again, when NASSCOM played a stellar role. You see, ‘80s, ‘90s, even early 2000s — most of the software was done by Indian companies for the developed world. But we said, “We are not about only Indian companies. We are about multinational software services companies coming to India.” Okay? We didn’t see them as competition. Today, in associations, they say, “Oh, they are from outside. They will come and finish us.” NASSCOM again took that view that we are together. We are not competing, but we are partners.
Atul Singh: Going back to what you called earlier the open, liberal, professional culture of NASSCOM, right from day one.
Ashank Desai: Yeah. So we supported these Microsofts, SAPs, Accentures who all came to India, because now they realized they better be in India. So that was the beginning. They were not called GCCs at that time, but that was the software companies coming to India. But now what is happening is—
Atul Singh: I’m also told GE came in a big way in the early days. Is that true?
Ashank Desai: Okay, yes, GE also was another inflection point, in a way. You had asked for some inflection point. Jack Welch came sometime in, I think, the late ‘90s, if I’m right. And he said, “Oh, wow, India is such a great country with software development. I will start my own center, and I will give business to a lot of Indian companies.” And there are many Indian companies that benefited. And then they started their own joint venture called DP, BP or BPM Business, called Genpact. Anyway, so they also were one of the people, but they were very early. Others didn’t take notice of that too much. Mostly, the software was done by Indian companies and multinational software companies, services companies. So many people came in those early days. But now what is happening is our customers and our large corporations, whether they are making cars — they want to do research using IT and design cars in India. There is a chemical industry, people who come and invent new chemicals. They want to develop their whole business to run sitting in India. Then there is an aerospace company who comes here and designs parts. So they are now not only doing software, which they are doing also, but they are also running some of their R&D operations sitting in India. And most of it, as you know, R&D is driven by IT. So to that extent, they need IT people. And they also need domain experts, as we call them. They need automobile experts, they need chemical engineers, they need aerospace engineers and so on and so forth. So the GCC is a culmination of almost doing technology for the developed world sitting in India. And that’s why they call Global Capability Center, GCC. And now we have 1,700–1,800 of them in India. And every quarter, I think we add some 30, 40, 50 of them. It is growing very fast.
Atul Singh: Come again? Give an idea of the numbers. How many of them today?
Ashank Desai: I would say 1,700.
Atul Singh: Wow! 1,700, and growing at the rate of what? 10%, 20%?
Ashank Desai: Yeah, yeah. If you say 50 per year… One is that the existing 1,700 are becoming larger. On top of it, new people are coming. So today, we are growing much faster — maybe 20% or 25%. And they account for almost one-third of our IT output today. And one-third of people are employed by them. See, we have around 5.5 million. They have almost 1.8 million people today. You come to HSBC as a bank, or Citibank, or Boeing or whoever. They all have centers here.
NASSCOM’s evolution and future challenges
Atul Singh: So quite a few changes. And so we are looking at NASSCOM today — that is radically different from the organization that began in 1988. Actually, on March 1, 1988. So tell us: How is NASSCOM similar to what it was in 1988 — yes, the culture of professionalism, a sense of team, family etc.? And how is NASSCOM different? Because surely the organization must have grown. You probably have professional management, you have different interest groups. So tell us about both the similarities and the differences.
Ashank Desai: Okay. Can I go back slightly for one story that I must tell you?
Atul Singh: Please, it’s your show.
Ashank Desai: Because that story is, again, part of NASSCOM history, and this “people working together and not worrying about their own competition” issue. In the early years of NASSCOM, another challenge that I didn’t describe to you was the financial condition of NASSCOM. And we could not spend a lot of money — we were all small companies, having a hundred people, 50 people. Now we have five million as an industry. So there was a challenge to running NASSCOM. I remember — Infosys’s Mr. Narayana Murthy, who was the second elected chairman, said, “I will do courses for NASSCOM for all others in the industry. And whatever earning money I get, I will give it to NASSCOM. See the kind of large-heartedness you saw there.” There was another story. NASSCOM was to be recognized — we had to become associated with larger bodies. So there was a body which is still there, called ASOCIO. ASOCIO is the Asia-Oceanian Computing Industry Organization, which is an association of 20 countries. And these 20 countries include Australia to Japan, and now from India to the Philippines — all of them. Now, we were not members there — or we were kind of not known — NASSCOM, in ‘91. So we said, “We should become a member of that, because Japan and Australia will recognize us, and Korea and Singapore will recognize us.” So the chairman at that time said, “We don’t have money to go there. Who will go?” And there was a big event in Melbourne at that time. So I said, “Harish, I will go. I will spend my own money. I will spend my company’s money and my own time to promote NASSCOM.” So I went there. And I realized there was some other small association that had become their member. We said, “They are not the association and NASSCOM is the association.” And I enrolled NASSCOM in ASOCIO, which was a great liberator — because then the Asia-Pacific market opened up to us in 1991 or 1992.
Atul Singh: Ashank, that is really early. You guys were really outward-looking. And you weren’t just looking at the US — you were looking both East and West. That’s pretty impressive.
Ashank Desai: Yeah. That was our vision, as well as, as I said, some sacrifices all members met.
Atul Singh: And necessity, in a way; you were wise enough to recognize what was the need of the hour and do what you needed to do.
Ashank Desai: Yeah. Anyway — so coming back to your question now, this story of the team and all had to be told with this kind of backdrop. So you were asking me: How do we look forward, right? What’s your question?
Atul Singh: There was a time when you were a small industry. NASSCOM began on March 1, 1988. NASSCOM must have been a very different beast. And today, it’s a huge industry. You employ one million people. You have Global Capability Centers coming in. You have many more interest groups. So how has NASSCOM changed? And how is it similar? What are the similarities between the NASSCOM of 1988 and the NASSCOM of 2025?
Ashank Desai: Great question. Any organization — if it has to grow — it has to make changes happen. At the same time, its core has to be kept intact. There are some things that need to not be changed. They become the foundation. And there are some things which need to change. So. what is that which has not changed still? That same camaraderie of people who are competing and networking together is still there today. Even today, we all meet. Even today, we have that relationship — trusting each other. And NASSCOM is facilitating it. So that’s one. Number two is this whole professional liberal aspect of whatever we see in the world still remains. When GCCs came, some people came and complained. They said, “Oh, they are competing with Indian companies in NASSCOM.” We said, “No, it doesn’t matter. We are about India. We are not about Indian entrepreneurs alone. We are about India.” So those attitudes and values have not changed. However, what has changed greatly is the whole nature of the industry has changed. Now — export, of course, is big. And we need to do many new things to address that market. There is AI. There is this whole issue of new services that are coming out of cybersecurity, coming out of the whole issue of GCCs running their operations here. All of them are new services. And we should be ready to support those new services, which is different from what was earlier. And AI particularly is bringing a lot of challenges in terms of the number of people that we need, the quality that we need and so on. So that’s a big challenge for our exports.
Atul Singh: So let me stop you just for a second, because I’m hearing from people like you, people who know the industry, people who understand big challenges, both technological and business. And one of my friends said that earlier, you needed a number of coders, and then you checked, and then, of course, you came up with the product. And he said, “Now, the low-level code — AI can do. And now you actually need the senior developer, or the architect, to look at it, correct it, make sense of it, and then produce the final product or service.” But the challenge is, that senior developer or senior manager had a lot of experience-made errors. Now, because of AI, juniors are not getting that experience — you don’t even need them. And the people who are at the top with the experience are becoming more and more valuable. And we’re getting into this challenge: Where will we get the senior developers or the senior architects with the vision to create a product and service for the future? Because very few people are getting their hands dirty, and dirt under their fingernails. This is what I’m hearing, and what I’m hearing is that the paradigm is changing very dramatically. And we’ll have to be very nimble and flexible to adapt. Would that argument — or would that analysis or insight — resonate with you? Are there legs to it?
Ashank Desai: Absolutely. Absolutely, Atul. The changes have been there in the IT industry for all 40 years. It’s not that change has been happening. If you remember, I used to do punch cards when I was studying at IIT to run my program.
Atul Singh: Yes, you told me. It’s there in our podcast. (Laughs)
Ashank Desai: Yeah. And it used to take me one and a half days to remove a bug in the program. Now you can do it in ten microseconds. And that’s why they have to be more productive, I tell them. But anyway, this time, the changes have happened at a much faster rate. And the industry and NASSCOM together have to make that change themselves. So the industry has to see that they train people in these new technologies, which all of us are doing. Today, most of my budget for R&D is going into training people in new AI, cybersecurity, building new applications and so on and so forth. So industry is investing greatly and going out and telling customers that we can do these new applications — which otherwise we have not done. Many firms are building platforms which are going to be global platforms. Many are doing micro or mini LLMs also, by the way. Some of them will succeed, some may have challenges. But the point I’m saying is, there is this whole change in terms of priority in Indian IT industry. That’s one. Number two, we are going and telling the government — that’s where NASSCOM again comes in — “Sir, now is an opportunity for India again, one more time. We are doing $250 billion. We can do $500 billion in the next six, seven years, provided we build infrastructure in the country to do AI and other research.” And today, our government is again very supportive to us. And they have already rolled out some RFPs for building large data centers. They will be run by private people — but they will be well-funded by the government. Government is investing money. Government is also investing money in using AI for the domestic market. There is a lot of work happening and many other excellent centers have been done in various IITs. So how is that happening? Because the government now wants NASSCOM and the IT industry to participate to use AI in the country. So now there is a new change that is happening in NASSCOM. That change you were talking about is about getting focus on making things happen in the Indian national domestic market. We were more focused on exports. But now we are equally focused on the Indian market and changing India’s face. As you know, UPI that happens today. You can transfer money — even my housemaid, even my vegetable vendor doesn’t want to do any cash. He says, “Sir, transfer the money.” Now how did that happen? That has all happened because Indian IT leaders — like, you know, many others… like, we have not the others thanks to that UIDAI, which was formed ten, 15 years ago. Mr. Nandan Nilekani took charge and so on. So some of these things are also happening today. So that investment is happening in Indian usage of IT, investment is happening in Indian IT infrastructure. And that will shape the future of tomorrow’s IT industry and tomorrow’s NASSCOM.
Protectionism and upcoming strategies
Atul Singh: Alright. So lots of changes, lots of developments. Let’s talk about Donald Trump, alright? Because we have to. It’s a new era. Protectionism is back in the air. And you just mentioned how, in your DNA, NASSCOM opposes protectionism. You are open to competition. You’re open to collaboration. You see that as a challenge. And we are now living in a world where Donald Trump has unleashed tariffs on nearly all trading partners. British Prime Minister Sir Keir Starmer — and you do a lot of business in the UK, so you know Britain really well — so Keir Starmer has declared, “The world as we know it is gone.” So what lies in store for NASSCOM in this brave new world?
Ashank Desai: Okay, that’s a good question. With so many things happening — change every day — to hazard a guess of what will happen is a really tricky question. You could be proved completely wrong or completely right, not necessarily because of your intelligence, but because somebody else has done something.
Atul Singh: Yeah, but as an organization, you still have to plan and make a guess. It’s like sailing. The weather is rough, the waves are choppy, the winds are strong, but you still have to make a decision, Ashank.
Ashank Desai: Of course. Now, there are two sides to that whole thing. One is about the kind of work that the Indian IT industry does. It is something that does not fall into the goods area. To answer very specifically what is happening, it is about services. And fortunately, services trade has always been without any duties — both ways. India imports so many services — financial services, legal services, intellectual property, so on and so forth, and many other things. And we, of course, do IT services and many other things. And both of them are intangible goods and not physical goods. So they cannot be located, where they can be clear the tariffs can be put on them. They are not coming to some seashore or airport. So a) it is difficult, b) anyway, it is a duty-free kind of trade which is happening globally. So as such, we are very hopeful that the IT industry or services industry will have a lesser direct impact. So that’s point one. Having said that, we have to be aware that some of these trade and tariff shifts will impact our physical goods industry, and many others. And it will also impact our customers in those countries. Today, there is a fear of recession in the US and UK. Why? The stock market is falling. Why? Because there is a fear that this policy will trigger a problem for our customers. So NASSCOM and the IT industry have to see that they offer services that help them to control some of this cost. And that’s why we are very well geared, doing a lot of work offshore, doing a lot of projects which will help them to produce services at a lower cost or in an innovative way. So we actually can be, in a way, the positive side of this — that we can be one of the potential partners for some of them to help them address this crisis — is the way I look at it. So on one hand, yes, there will be a negative impact, of course, because of our customers facing recessions. But I feel that it will also open up opportunities for new applications and doing a lot of work in India.
Atul Singh: On the whole, you’re very, very, very positive about what is going on. By the way, I apologize — announcements have begun in India’s national capital in Delhi. There’s some political rally or something, and someone’s grabbed a mic, a loudspeaker, and is checking the mic. So apologies for the background noise, Ashank. But we are coming to the close of our interview anyway. So my final thoughts are: You’re a senior statesman, you are one of the titans of industry. If you could advise current technology leaders in India and NASSCOM, what is the three-point advice you would give? Since you work so much in the UK, let’s end on a three-point Oxford/Cambridge debating formula. (Laughs)
Ashank Desai: Yeah, that always works. I use them also in my speeches. Okay, the three points are very simple. Number one: Build the future by building talent and the educational system.
Atul Singh: So education, number one. So you’re sounding like Tony Blair: “Education, education, education!” (Laughs)
Ashank Desai: Second, I think we need to build tomorrow’s organization for making change happen faster than we are doing today.
Atul Singh: Embrace change.
Ashank Desai: Change has to be embraced much faster. That is second. The third thing is: The problems are getting so complex that I don’t think any one party or any one entity can solve them. It is a partnership across countries, across associations, across sectors. Working together in a win-win formula is much more needed now than earlier.
Atul Singh: So collaboration.
Ashank Desai: Collaboration, embrace win-win attitude. Don’t think of only yourself. Thinking of what we can do together is more required now than ever. So those are the three points.
Atul Singh: Brilliant. Ashank Desai, always a pleasure to have you. Thank you so, so much for your time.
Ashank Desai: Thanks, Atul. The great job that you are doing, too — it has always been a pleasure.
[Lee Thompson-Kolar edited this piece.]
The views expressed in this article/video are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.
” post-content-short=” Atul Singh: Welcome to FO° Talks. With me is Ashank Desai, who’s an entrepreneur par excellence. Today, we will discuss the fascinating story of India’s NASSCOM. Welcome, Ashank. Ashank Desai: Thanks, Atul. Thanks to be here with you, as always. Atul Singh: Excellent, excellent. So…” post_summery=”NASSCOM Founder Ashank Desai recounts his company’s creation and evolution, and describes how his small entrepreneur group overcame regulatory, infrastructure and cultural hurdles in socialist India to build a globally respected IT industry. Quality standardization, offshore development and India’s telecom and education revolutions were pivotal in its story. Today, NASSCOM adapts to AI, global capability centers and shifting geopolitics.” post-date=”May 11, 2025″ post-title=”FO° Talks: The Story of the Indian IT Industry” slug-data=”fo-talks-the-story-of-the-indian-it-industry”>
FO° Talks: The Story of the Indian IT Industry
Glenn Carle: I think we have to give at least two minutes to Canada, a country very dear to my heart.
Atul Singh: Yes, exactly. Let’s talk about Mark Carney Leading Liberals to a Fourth Consecutive Victory. That is huge. So let me paint what’s happened very quickly. Liberals won 169 out of 343 seats, they got 44% of the vote. The Conservatives won 144 seats, 41% of the vote. Pierre Poilievre, the Conservative leader, lost his own seat. Now, for our American viewers and listeners, remember that Canada has a parliamentary system modeled after Westminster in the UK. I have to explain it to a young American tomorrow — so, you don’t just get to be a presidential candidate. You’re the leader of a party, everyone fights their own parliamentary seat and the party that gets the most seats, or the candidate who can command majority support in Parliament, gets to be prime minister. It is somewhat important to get elected into Parliament, otherwise you can’t be the leader of the Parliament if you’re not even in Parliament. So, poor Pierre — a really bad day for him. What makes it worse is that this was a comeback victory. The Liberal Party has enjoyed a historic surge in polls since the start of the year. Under Mark Carney, a former Governor of the Bank of England, former governor of the Bank of Canada, Liberals have beaten the Conservative Party. So he can send a thank-you card to Donald Trump. Now, how did the fault lines break out? And remember, Mark only announced he was running on January 16, and he won all 343 electoral districts to become leader of the Liberal Party. During the leadership campaign, what did he do? He repudiated some of Justin Trudeau’s economic policies. He blamed Trudeau’s profligate spending for Canada’s vulnerability to American tariffs. He pitched himself as the best-placed candidate to negotiate with Donald Trump and deal with Canada’s perilous economic situation. The message, and obviously his impressive résumé, resonated with many voters.
Canada’s anti-Trump vote
Atul Singh: What did Pierre do? Pierre was against immigration and inflation, and he was promising some sort of Canada First—
Glenn Carle: But he was in favor of apple pie and motherhood.
Atul Singh: (Laughs) Yes, exactly. And, shall we say, he came unstuck. So more about Mark from Glenn, because both of us played ice hockey for Harvard. (Laughs)
Glenn Carle: That’s right. His chief qualification for any position is that he was a Harvard hockey player. But he’s a youth. He was ten years after I was there, so I’ve never met him, unfortunately. Well, this may be one of the positive — perhaps the one positive — thing that Donald Trump has achieved in his public life, is that he brought Mark Carney to the premiership of Canada. I think the vote, to the extent that it has significance in a larger sense — it’s certainly important for Canada — is that it’s an anti-Trump vote. The Conservatives and significant parts of the center of Canada — the inland of Canada, Alberta and Manitoba, and so on — are Trumpian in their political outlooks. And this election was a repudiation of that. It was not only anger at Trump and fear of his imperialistic, bombast rhetoric, and so on, but a rejection of the resonance that that has had within elements of Canadian society and politics. So that makes it significant for Canada, but also in a larger sense. Also, Canada is… well, there’s no other superpower-sized state other than the United States or China. The EU is a conglomeration, of course, a union. So Canada has as much influence as most any. I think in the ranking of economic size, it’s sixth or seventh or something like that, which makes it significant and plausible as a standard bearer for how to coalesce and respond to the threats to all of the norms and practices posed by Donald Trump. Now, what concretely that means remains to be seen, but he at least is, for the moment, the apparent champion of how to respond to Donald Trump.
Global response
Glenn Carle: Now, for the world, what does that imply? The issues in Canada are similar to those of France, Germany, England and other industrialized democracies. How do you address overregulation? This is the big argument always of conservatives. How do you address insufficiencies in defense spending? How do you develop a coherent foreign policy with allies that affirms these norms and yet somehow acts independently, if necessary — as it appears it will be — to the United States?
Atul Singh: And immigration.
Glenn Carle: Thank you. And the most important thing of all: All of this is a response. Carney’s election, all the turmoil in Europe politically, the rise of the far rights in nation after nation — fundamentally, is a reaction to, if not a response to, the issue of immigration and social change. That underlays and explains, really, what’s happened in the United States and in all of these other states. So his election shows perhaps a hope for a response, but has the similar underlying causes. Except poor Canada is stuck having this troublesome behemoth on its southern border, and so it’s obviously a response to that. How this will evolve is unknown, but Carney has as many qualifications as anyone — with the possible exception of political skills. But he’s done well for the last four months in that regard.
Carney–Sheinbaum collaboration?
Atul Singh: Canada potentially offers hope for the Liberals that all is not lost. It is a huge boost to Mexico as well. Remember that the US has two major trading partners — Canada and Mexico — one to the north, one to the south. It doesn’t have a Pakistan or China at its border, unlike India, so life is a lot easier. And now Claudia Sheinbaum — who’s in some ways Marxist, but is a canny politician and a tough negotiator — will almost inevitably team up with Mark Carney, who is a technocrat, who is an economist, who’s a savvy character who’s acquitted himself fairly well, actually, when he was heading the Bank of Canada. That was after the global financial recession, the global financial crisis. And then he headed the Bank of England during the Brexit years, at a time when the Bank of England got greater powers to oversee banks’ capital requirements. So he is a bit of a policy wonk, and it remains to be seen now how both Sheinbaum and Carney negotiate with their national… I wouldn’t say enemy, but national and ideological adversary. So hey ho, there we go: The die is cast.
Glenn Carle: Everyone should play hockey, and you’ll have national success.
Atul Singh: Exactly. On that note, we will see you next month. Thank you very much for watching this. Subscribe to our YouTube channel if you’re watching this on YouTube. And if you are reading the summary on our website, then make sure you sign up for our newsletter and follow us on social media if you’re on social media. And remember that should you want advice on political and geopolitical risk and the global economy, you have Glenn Carle, the senior partner of FOI, to turn to — and we will send you good stuff should you contact us. Bye for now.
Glenn Carle: Au revoir.
[Lee Thompson-Kolar edited this piece.]
The views expressed in this article/video are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.
” post-content-short=” Glenn Carle: I think we have to give at least two minutes to Canada, a country very dear to my heart. Atul Singh: Yes, exactly. Let’s talk about Mark Carney Leading Liberals to a Fourth Consecutive Victory. That is huge. So let me paint what’s happened very quickly. Liberals won 169 out of…” post_summery=”Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney has led Canada’s Liberals to a fourth consecutive victory, defeating the Trump-aligned Conservatives and rising rapidly after entering the race in January. His technocratic credentials and rejection of Trudeau-era economic policies appealed to voters concerned about American tariffs and global instability. This outcome signals a broader anti-Trump backlash and repositions Canada geopolitically.” post-date=”May 10, 2025″ post-title=”FO° Exclusive: Mark Carney Leads Liberals to a Fourth Consecutive Victory” slug-data=”fo-exclusive-mark-carney-leads-liberals-to-a-fourth-consecutive-victory”>
FO° Exclusive: Mark Carney Leads Liberals to a Fourth Consecutive Victory
Glenn Carle: So we go from unilateral foolishness to perhaps bilateral foolishness. There has been a terrorist attack in Jammu and Kashmir, with dozens dead. And how has this put the subcontinent into turmoil?
Atul Singh: So I’ve called it “Pakistan’s Deadly Islamist Terror Attack, India’s New Water War.” So let’s talk about it, because there is nothing new about yet another Islamist terror attack. We know what happened in 1999: the Kandahar hijacking. We know what happened in 2008: the Mumbai attacks. You probably remember that, Glenn. You were probably still in the CIA then. And now the latest attack happened in Baisaran Valley, Belgaum. So it’s near Belgaum, it’s in Kashmir. It’s a meadow, you walk there. Lots of tourists were going there. Kashmir is a part of the Union Territory of Jammu and Kashmir, earlier it was a state. The terrorists were clearly Islamists. They killed 26 men and injured 20 others. And they asked victims whether they were Muslims before killing them. And if they claimed they were Muslim, they had to recite what South Asians call the Kalma. The Arabs probably pronounce it, “Kalima.”
Glenn Carle: And what they were doing was repeating what the terrorists did in the Taj Mahal Hotel in Bombay.
Atul Singh: In a way, yeah, yeah. Exactly, exactly. This is part of a pattern. Of 26 victims, one was a local pony operator, one was a Christian who said, “Look, don’t kill me, I’m a Christian.” And they said, “You’ve been killing our brothers in Palestine, you get the shot.” Bam. Very tolerant chaps, I’m sure. You know, they will be recruited in Hamas. The rest were Hindus, or maybe one was a Buddhist. But the key thing is that of the dead, one was a 26-year-old naval officer, Vinay Narwal, who was on his honeymoon and had been married for just six days. And there were a couple of other officers, one from the Air Force and one from the Intelligence Bureau, and they were all traveling as tourists. And so this sent shock waves, because one, it was cold-blooded. It’s quite brutal. Two, the illusion of peaceful, idyllic Kashmir is gone, evaporated. Tourists were going in from India into Kashmir in large numbers. The government was saying, “We now have tourism, not terrorism, in Kashmir.” This is the Narendra Modi and Amit Shah government, in a way — the dynamic duo, Batman and Robin, running India. And they said, “We’ve brought peace to a troubled land. We have succeeded where Jawaharlal Nehru has failed. Everything is hunky-dory. There are rivers of milk and honey and, yes, it’s brilliant.” And what has happened is that Pakistan has demonstrated yet again that it can inflict asymmetric damage. Because, look, they’ve used a few — five — people and there are thousands of Indian soldiers scouring the forests to find these five characters. There is firing on the Line of Control. India has announced a series of measures. It has responded by closing the main India–Pakistan border crossing, suspending the 1960 Indus Water Treaty — we’ll talk more about that — expelling Pakistani diplomats, halting a special visa regime and ordering some Pakistani visa holders to leave within 48 hours. Pakistan has acted as well by warning that any attempts to alter Pakistan’s Indus River flows would be considered an act of war. It has closed Pakistani airspace to all Indian commercial airlines. So now they are flying around South and North — not very convenient. They’ve halted a special visa regime for Indian citizens and they’ve suspended bilateral trade. All in all, it’s yet another flare-up.
Pakistan’s foundational identity and radicalization
Atul Singh: And the new thing to note is the declaration that India is suspending this treaty. Can it stop water flows today? No. But it can certainly release waters through tunnels at an inconvenient time. It can certainly mitigate the flow as well. And if India pursues this and builds dams, then Pakistan could have trouble, because it’s a downstream country. They would certainly then have a problem with getting water when they need it and having too much water when they don’t want it. So India could use dams as water bombs, but that would take seven to ten years. But that is very much the mood in the country, because each time India thinks it has peace, there’s yet another attack and everything’s back to square one. And the Pakistani Chief of Army Staff, the man who really runs the country — because the most popular leader, Imran Khan, is in jail. The Army has just thrown him into jail and installed puppets from corrupt political dynasties, the Sharifs and the Bhuttos, who used to be political rivals. The Sharifs come from Punjab, the Bhuttos come from Sindh. The Sharifs are businessmen who’ve made an arm and a leg and have huge property in the Middle East, in Dubai. The Bhuttos go back to Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, the flamboyant Prime Minister who promised to eat grass and get a nuclear weapon. He was hung by General Zia-ul-Haq, the Islamist army chief who actually began the process of radicalization. He was a Cold War ally, served his purpose against Afghanistan for the US and instituted Operation Tupac, which was “bleed India through a thousand cuts.” And initially supported the Punjab insurgency, not Kashmir. And then in ’89, Kashmir erupted. And in 1990, Kashmir Islamists conducted massive ethnic cleansing — basically got rid of nearly all the Kashmiri Pandit families. And it’s there on a timeline on Fair Observer — you can read a lot of stuff on Fair Observer and look at the timeline. And that Islamization continued apace. But going back to the Bhuttos, his mother died as well. And Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto’s grandson, Bilawal, is yet another effete dynast from South Asia. He was a truly awful student at Oxford and known for drinking a bit too much alcohol, snorting a little bit of cocaine and conducting orgies. In fact—
Glenn Carle: There’s a cultural openness.
Atul Singh: Pardon me?
Glenn Carle: This is being open to international cultures.
Atul Singh: Openness, exactly, exactly. And he’s now Foreign Minister and coming up with smart-aleck comments and posturing like his grandfather against India. So in India, of course, we have a government that has claimed that it is super strong on national security — a government that claims that Jammu and Kashmir is now under control. And therefore, this attack is egg on both Modi and Shah’s face. And the popular sentiment in India demands action. So now, it’s not as if both the leaders probably want war or want too much action, but they have the tiger by the tail and they have to show that Modi has a 56-inch chest, as he claims. And so we are in a tricky situation, tensions have flared up. And, of course, the Pakistani Defense Minister has said that Pakistan has been handmaiden to the West and washed its dirty linen. And that was an interview with British media that has circulated a lot. And Pakistan has suffered more from terror than anywhere else, and Pakistan will take strong action. So yet again, we are back to saber-rattling in the Indian subcontinent. And at the heart of it is the clash between two nations that emerged from British India: one with this idea that it was the land of Islam and therefore has an element of jihad in its DNA. It’s a feature, not a bug, to use software language, since I am sitting in San Francisco today. I am in Silicon Valley. It’s a feature of Pakistan. And then India, which has been a soft state, which has been a soft target, and has been hit again and again and again. And under the BJP — it is under the Bharatiya Janata Party, the Hindu right, that is now in power — is claiming to get tougher. But it remains to be seen how tough it really is.
Glenn Carle: A number of questions come to mind — reactions that I would very much like your response to and explanation for. First, it comes to mind that Pakistan suffers from a foundational problem, it seems to me, which is that Pakistan exists or views itself as not India and Islamic. And if it’s not both of those things, then it doesn’t exist. And I’m not being facetious. That seems to be the only thing that has Pakistan cohere to the extent that it has. Would you concur, or is that unfair?
Atul Singh: Yeah. I mean, look, you were involved in the War on Terror. You have been to Afghanistan. You have worked with the Inter-Services Intelligence. And so you know these characters. What is keeping a Baloch, a Pashtun, a Punjabi, a Sindhi, a Muhajir and a Kashmiri in Pakistan together? The economy is in the doldrums. They’ve gone to the International Monetary Fund 17, 18 times. They are no longer the darling of the US. They no longer have use as a Cold War ally. The state and the elites have failed to provide basic services to the people: no education, no schooling, no healthcare, no basic facilities. And the population has grown five-fold since 1960. And where do the kids go? Where do the young boys go? To madrassas. And there are reports after reports that your agencies, American think tanks, have written. And of course, I grew up in India, so I have a closer perspective. But even across the world, there’s a clear alarm that Pakistan has become the jihad factory of the world because the state has imploded, and the madrassas have replaced it!
Glenn Carle: That takes us to a point — one of the points you made quickly, among many — about Zia-ul-Haq, that he began the Islamization and radicalization. And that is true, but it’s also not true, meaning that he’s both a symbol, a driver and yet a symptom and product of the deeper trends. My colleagues and other outside, non-Pakistani observers became concerned — oh gosh, it’s 2025 — 50 years ago about the shift in the cultural orientation, which is religious orientation, of Pakistani society. In particular, the one functioning organization and entity that exists in Pakistan, which is the military. That’s the third element that I left out of my comment about Pakistan. There is the definition of Pakistani, meaning, “we aren’t Indian, which means we aren’t Hindu, which means we are Islamic.” And the only thing that kept all of these various groups and ethnicities and so on, that you started to iterate, together at all, was the military — the one functioning organization. So it’s become not just a single-party, hierarchical, typical authoritarian state with no reason to exist, except for Islam as they define it, however they define it. And this Islamization — and we won’t go into huge history and sociology — but it first became, in a practical sense, noticeable and alarming from a foreign policy perspective because of the changing nature of non-commissioned officer training in Pakistan. And a part of it was a rejection of colonialism, which one would understand. But the elites, the ruling people from sergeants up to the heads of state, would have been educated in English educational systems, substantively and literally, up until about 1980. At which point, to become independent and to reject colonialism, they embraced their indigenous, pure — their own — Islamic madrassas. The number of madrassas increased in Pakistan in the past 40 years. I used to know literally the exact number, but I can’t remember that now. But I think the number of madrassas increased by something like ninefold. There are nine or ten times more madrassas now than there were 40 years ago, and a concurrently lower number of secular institutions. And the non-commissioned officer class became heavily Islamicized. So Zia-ul-Haq was a product of that. So that’s one major thing, but — please, yeah.
Historic roots of the Garrison State
Atul Singh: Just to give you evidence that supports your argument: In September 1974 — this is when Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, the grandfather of Bilawal Bhutto, is Prime Minister — the Pakistani Parliament passed an act declaring Ahmadis to be non-Muslims. So the Ahmadis had to flee to London. And the Ahmadis had been loyal foot soldiers of Pakistan, in fact, the most loyal foot soldiers of Pakistan. The father of Pakistan’s nuclear bomb was an Ahmadi. You had to keep your mouth shut. And this was one indication that, like a nuclear fission reaction, what began with Muhammad Ali Jinnah’s idea of a pure state for Muslims — ironically, he was a pork-eating Bombay lawyer married to a much younger Parsi woman who dressed rather boldly… But the ironies of history are manifold. So that trend — you’re right. Jinnah was both the symptom and the cause. And our friend, Ishtiaq Ahmed — let me give her a shout-out, because he wrote The Pakistan Garrison State, which is a phenomenal book if you want to understand Pakistan, that Pakistan became a garrison state. And he says that you can compare it to Egypt as well. But when I spoke to him — you can go back to the earliest Delhi Sultanate, which was formed in 1192, after the Turks beat us, the Rajputs, because we were weak, and in the words of Pashtuns, we were probably “vegetarian surrender monkeys.” But the reality is that once the Turks take over, the Muslim state in India initially is a garrison state and remains so, even under Mughal rule, even after the Mughal Empire disintegrates. And Persian adventurers and Arab adventurers create kingdoms in Bengal, and others. There was even an Abyssinian adventurer earlier who came and created a state in South India. (Laughs) Over to you.
India’s Kashmir strategy
Glenn Carle: History, of course — this is the easy lever to press for me and take me off into endless tangents where I’m perfectly happy.
Atul Singh: There are two of us who have studied history. We are awful! (Laughs)
Glenn Carle: To bring it back to the current terrorist attack and why all of what we said I do truly feel is directly relevant, as you pointed out: Okay, this is the latest atrocity and terrorist attack in Jammu and Kashmir in an endless list. It goes back to the independence of Pakistan and India. So therefore, what would be different from this attack? There are a number of things that I want you to talk about from the past 40–60 years, and does it actually affect and change in any way, or will it, Indian policies in the disputed states and vis-à-vis Pakistan? And if so, why this time? Now, I think there are two or three actual, substantive, fundamental differences in this particular terrorist attack, which haven’t, so far as I’m aware, received almost any discussion at all. Under Modi, India adopted a strategic, fundamentally different policy towards Jammu and Kashmir than his predecessors. And I’m not talking about the 2019 administrative, legal change — which is important — but rather…
Atul Singh: Article 370.
Glenn Carle: Yeah. How do we Indians, as in the government, address this unsolvable problem? What we will do is we will create a regime — economically, politically, administratively — that fosters emigration or moving, migration, of Hindu businessmen and elites — business, educational, so on — into Jammu and Kashmir. That will make the economy vigorous and dynamic, which should make everybody happy.
Atul Singh: Tourism, not movement. People are not settling there. Tourism. It’s not settling because people are scared of living there. Yeah.
Glenn Carle: Okay, well, let me finish. But the objective, as I’ve understood, is to change the ethnic balance between Hindu and Muslim there. And that would then solve the problem. And that this specific terrorist attack is a conscious, direct response by the Pakistanis — by ISI, the government, the two being synonymous — to undermine this policy. And at the same time, to do something even more ambitious, which is this time to so terrify Hindus that they will have the opposite effect. And just as happened to Christians in the Middle East, in Islamic States, so will happen, as it has in parts of Jammu and Kashmir, to the remaining Hindu population. They will be so disgusted and terrified that they’ll leave. And de facto, Pakistan will win the argument by turning the entire region, changing the balance.
A coming water war?
Glenn Carle: Now, are these things at play? How will they play out? Will they succeed on one side or the other? And are these the differences this time? If so, and if not, why is this somehow receiving particular attention, other than the horror that hasn’t dissipated from the attack in the last week or something?
Atul Singh: Too much: We’ll do a separate session on Kashmir, everybody. But very quickly: Is this terrorist attack necessarily different? No. It’s part of a pattern. Is it the biggest? No. Is it the bloodiest? No. Yes, it has been clinical and shocking, but it’s part of a long-term pattern. In fact, since 2023, the Islamist terrorists have been hitting Hindus and Sikhs. There was an attack of pilgrims, there was an attack on laborers. And officers on both sides of the border, Indian and Pakistani, have said that ultimately, demography is destiny. And so Pakistan has been conducting ethnic cleansing in Poonch and Rajouri, the two border districts in the Pir Panjal range next to the border. Because if you have an entirely Muslim population in Poonch and Rajouri over time, then you’ll have more sympathizers. And they followed massive infiltration. And a number of soldiers and officers have been dying, Glenn, including someone who was a friend of a friend: Captain Shubham Gupta of 9 Para Commandos. So this has been in play. They realized that killing army officers and soldiers doesn’t really bother India. In fact, a senior Indian Administrative Service officer once told me, “We can afford two officers and twenty men casualties a day.” This was at the height of the insurgency. So, yeah, India can and does accept casualties of uniformed personnel. But tourists? This is shock and awe. So yes, certainly they want to stop tourism. If they kill tourists, they kill tourism. Half the sites are already closed. That means there’ll be less revenue coming into local Kashmiris. That means there’ll be more unemployment. That means there’ll be more disaffection. That means they can then have more sympathizers. So this is very clear that Pakistan is making a play against the greater integration of Kashmir into the national economy. That is the Modi government’s play: build infrastructure, encourage tourism, have jobs so Kashmiris feel more connected to India. Asim Munir, by the way, was head of Inter-Services Intelligence, the current Chief of Army Staff. He is known to be more Islamist than his predecessor. He needs Kashmir to be an issue, because Imran Khan is in jail, the army is unpopular, there have been crowds protesting against the army for the first time in Pakistani history in such large numbers. So they are even having problems in Balochistan — a number of them got killed — and now they need Kashmir as a rallying cry, as a unifying cry. Why is it different for India this time? Because, number one, it hits at the very image of the government, which claims to be strong on national security. Number two, the nationalist sentiment has risen much greater in the last few years. And number three, therefore, you have, for the first time, the revocation of the 1960 Indus Waters Treaty which survived the 1965 war, which survived the 1971 war, which survived the 1999 border conflict — Kargil — all of that, and so many terror attacks. And I think the zeitgeist has changed, and they’ve decided, “Okay, maybe we just cut off the water and make Pakistan hurt.” In fact, my Israeli friends, when I spoke to them, suggested that India should just carry out targeted killings of top Pakistani military leadership, just as they do with the Iranians. So the Pakistanis should thank their lucky stars that we don’t have too many Israeli immigrants in India! (Laughs)
[Lee Thompson-Kolar edited this piece.]
The views expressed in this article/video are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.
” post-content-short=” Glenn Carle: So we go from unilateral foolishness to perhaps bilateral foolishness. There has been a terrorist attack in Jammu and Kashmir, with dozens dead. And how has this put the subcontinent into turmoil? Atul Singh: So I’ve called it “Pakistan’s Deadly Islamist Terror Attack,…” post_summery=”The latest Islamist terrorist attack in Kashmir killed 26 people, including Indian security personnel and tourists. This conversation explores Pakistan’s foundational identity crisis, radicalization under Zia-ul-Haq and the strategic implications of India suspending the Indus Waters Treaty. Fair Observer Editor-in-Chief Atul Singh highlights the Modi government’s nationalist response and regional tensions.” post-date=”May 09, 2025″ post-title=”FO° Exclusive: Pakistan’s Deadly Islamist Terror Attack, India’s New Water War” slug-data=”fo-exclusive-pakistans-deadly-islamist-terror-attack-indias-new-water-war”>
FO° Exclusive: Pakistan’s Deadly Islamist Terror Attack, India’s New Water War
Atul Singh: Welcome to FO° Exclusive — in fact, the fourth edition of 2025’s FO° Exclusive. Last month, in March, we covered the Risk of Recession in the US, Germany’s Radical New Economic Policy, and New Troubles in the Middle East. In April 2025, our top three issues are:
- Tariffs and the New Donald Trump Economic Revolution
- Pakistan’s Deadly Islamist Terror Attack, India’s New Water War
- Mark Carney Leads Liberals to a Fourth Consecutive Victory
So there we go. Let’s start with number one: “Tariffs and the New Donald Trump Economic Revolution.” US President Donald Trump has announced Liberation Day. So what is Liberation Day? Tariffs on trading partners. Why? Because these trading partners, in his eyes, have been cheating, whilst the US has opened up its markets. These partners have followed protectionist policies — they use tariff and non-tariff barriers — and once he brings tariffs, this will lead to an economic revolution which he is confident of winning. He has echoed Steve Bannon, who has said repeatedly that the rest of the world has not played fair with the US. So this is the politics of grievance, it is the politics of protectionism. And the essence of the argument is very simple, as I said, and there’s an element of truth to it: For decades, the US kept its market open, others did not. And as I said, the others used tariff and non-tariff barriers to keep American goods and, indeed, other foreign goods out of their markets. The argument of the Trump administration is that these countries depress their currencies to gain unfair trading advantages. As a result, honest working-class Americans lost their jobs. They suffered from an opioid epidemic. In fact, China and some other countries exported opioids to the Rust Belt — in the eyes of many in the Trump camp. And of course, China exports fentanyl, a synthetic opioid, and causes the deaths of the very workers whose jobs it has stolen. So we’ve heard this complaint from numerous young Republicans, many of whom work on Capitol Hill and the Trump administration. And they provide a compelling and legally defensible narrative for the new belligerent US trade policy.
The Japan argument recycled for China
Atul Singh: Now, Glenn, you’ve pointed out many a time that Donald Trump used to say the same things about Japan in the 1980s.
Glenn Carle: This is the thing: I’m going to struggle today because endlessly repeated stupid arguments just kill me. And they do others — which is possibly why we now have the government we have. But it’s true that Donald Trump has been very creative. He has changed one word in his vocabulary in the last 50 years: He has replaced “Japan” with the word, “China.” But otherwise, he truly has made the exact same argument verbatim for 46 years at least, which is that the world plays America for suckers. They’re cheating, blah blah blah. “They’re laughing at us,” is the expression.
Atul Singh: Hey, that’s consistency! Forty-five years of consistency! (Laughs)
Glenn Carle: That is correct, that’s right. Consistency is the hobgoblin of little minds, and we’re dealing with a very little mind. But yes, he is consistent. He does see the world as one of exploitation — everyone exploiting the United States, which is weak and a sucker. It’s, as you said, politics of grievance and resentment, of trying to justify why others have influence and you, in fact, never attended a course at either of the two institutions that you’ve bought your way into and aren’t accepted because you’re vulgar — and thus drives the nation. But carry on.
Mercantilism vs. free market thinking
Atul Singh: So, taking a step back, Donald Trump represents an economic philosophy that predates Adam Smith, and that is called mercantilism. In fact, there’s a video with music which a former student of mine sent, which explains the various facets of this philosophy. But we will not get into too much of it. Suffice to say that mercantilists believed that balance of payments — or, let’s say, a trade surplus — more importantly, trade surplus represents the health of an economy. And they believed that exports should exceed imports, and if that is the case, then the country is stronger. Remember, this was at a time when kings paid their soldiers with gold. And therefore, if exports exceeded imports, you got more gold. And if you could pay more gold to your soldiers, you had a bigger army. And of course, later, this was supplanted by Adam Smith’s philosophy, a Scotsman. Mercantilists were the Spaniards, the Portuguese and the French — all the economies that eventually got superseded. And there was another British economist, curiously, with the name David Ricardo. David, of course, is English, but Ricardo sounds suspiciously Italian. And he, again, extended this theory.
Glenn Carle: He was a smart man seeking the freedom of free markets and free discourse in liberal England, as opposed to mercantilist Europe.
Atul Singh: Exactly. There you go. Anglo-Saxon flame flickers strong in your heart. Winston Churchill would be proud of you.
Glenn Carle: Well, I am a quarter French, and my current masters — America’s leaders — would have done well to read a little bit about French history. You know, France was the leading nation in Europe — economically, culturally, politically, militarily — every way in the first half of the 17th century. That’s 400 years ago. And what happened was the king’s chief counselor — who was both foreign minister, intelligence chief and economics minister rolled into one — was Colbert. And he wanted to make France great again, and greater forever, and perennialize French leadership. So he did two things. He centralized the economy and nationalized many industries, essentially, by a ruthless industrial policy. And he centralized the state and brought all power into the hands of the chief executive — who was the king then. And what happened was that France became an also-ran over a period of a couple of generations. Not the leader; he destroyed the basis of French leadership, which was a dynamic, open, decentralizing economy which was industrializing. And he killed it. He killed the goose that lays the golden eggs, and we now have another poultry butcher doing the same thing.
Industrial strategy and trade deficits
Atul Singh: Well, speaking of industrial policy, core members of the Trump administration believe that the loss of the American industrial base is a national security issue, given China’s spectacular rise as the workshop of the world. Now, Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent and Chair of the Council of Economic Advisers Steven Miran both see deindustrialization as the biggest risk facing the US and want the country to reindustrialize. The two policy tools that they’re using are tariffs and a devalued dollar. So once you have tariffs, then you can basically have a hedge against the cost advantage. It makes all the foreign goods more expensive. And once you have a devalued dollar, then your goods get cheaper and you can export. Now, Miran wrote a 41-page paper. And that paper, in some ways, is a revolutionary paper. It’s a plan to reform the global trading and financial systems. We cover this in our FOI Geopolitical Risk Monitor. Those of you who want it, email us — we’ll send you a complimentary copy. But the important thing is: Miran believes — and there’s an element of truth, again, to Miran — that the current system fails because export-oriented economies such as China, Japan and South Korea impose not only tariff and non-tariff barriers to market access, but also engage in currency manipulation, subsidies for preferred industries, forced technology transfers and outright theft of intellectual property. Our sources in the Trump administration see tariffs as short-term pain for long-term gain. They believe that the US has the market size, the innovative technology and the talent pool to prevail over other economies. Now, the important thing here to note is: A lot of the people in the Trump administration think China is weak. They think President Xi Jinping overreached with his wolf warrior diplomacy, failed in his zero-Covid policy. They think that the collapse of their real estate sector, the huge amounts of bad debts on the books of Chinese banks and the squeeze on private businesses — coupled with high unemployment, coupled with an aging and declining population — make this an ideal time for the US to ratchet the pressure, turn on the screws and break China’s back. And they think: If not now, then when? If not us, then who? And they really do believe this. And therefore, hey ho, there we go — you have this new economic policy. And curiously, this has actually caused bond yields to go up. The dollar actually has gone down for the first time in forever. Because generally, when you bring in tariffs, the dollar recedes. But markets have been losing confidence in Donald Trump’s economic policies and protectionism. And, as he himself admitted, the bond markets have turned a bit yippy. Now, I’m going to share my screen with you and show some of the graphs that the managing partners—
Glenn Carle: So the reality, apparently, in the view of the world — and there’s a wisdom in crowds, as we all know — is that Donald Trump’s true name is Liz Truss. He wears a dress and he has no idea what he’s doing.
Atul Singh: Maybe so. But here you can see very clearly that the US has run a trade deficit for almost 50 years. This is something Sanjay Acharya, a managing partner at FOI, made. Of course, this is our Geopolitical Risk Monitor. It tells you how China has responded. And of course, China has rolled out tariff and non-tariff barriers. It has restrictions on seven medium and heavy rare earths, which are particularly useful for fighter jets, submarines, radar systems, drones. And they think they’ve actually cut down their deficit. Look at this: There’s been a $19 billion fall in the annual trade deficit. Of course, the deficit has increased when it comes to Mexico, EU, Vietnam, Taiwan, even India and, of course, South Korea. Some people would argue it’s just Chinese companies reexporting from Vietnam. And something to watch is consumer sentiment. It has plummeted. That’s alarming. Look at what the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta is still forecasting: falling GDP. And I think I’m not going to bore you more with graphs and figures, but the bottom line is that the tariffs have had an effect on markets, on bond markets, on consumer confidence, on the global economy. We can all expect a recession for the next 12 to 24 months. Over to you, Glenn.
Historic parallels and economic fallout
Glenn Carle: Yeah, what we’re experiencing is unique in American history in a number of ways. And Trump — I agree with the view of the intelligentsia, or the commentators in general — that the first 100 days of Trump’s administration have been as significant, as historic — I’ll use the word, “consequential,” which I know I use a lot — as any since Franklin Roosevelt in 1932. So that makes him one of the two or three or four most significant presidents in his first three months in history. One of the differences that’s critical is that Franklin Roosevelt was creating things, Donald Trump is destroying things. That’s not a political statement, like some of the others I made earlier today are — that’s a fact. It’s pretty easy to break stuff, it’s very hard to build things. The administration, however, is not new in much of what it’s attempting to do. When I was working during the Bush son administration — I worked under both, but I’m referring now to the president from 2001 to 2008 — my focus near the end of my career was on terrorism, transnational threats, and I would frequently brief the White House or the executive office and so on. And this is literally true, what I’m now going to say: Whatever the topic that I was briefing on or attending a meeting about, the first question asked when it came time for the Q&A period after the briefing would invariably be by the Office of the Vice President’s representative — Vice President Cheney’s representative. And the question would be: “But what about China?” You know, I might have been talking about the Houthis, or I might have been talking about the water table in Bolivia. Literally, the first question was: How does this affect how we can destroy China? That was not verbatim the wording, but that was the objective. And the belief was that the United States had a unique moment: the unipolar moment of strength when China was not yet strong, and we could, for time immemorial, destroy China as a threat and perennialize American supremacy. Other great nations have had similar thoughts in the past. And this never works against a state that has intrinsic characteristics that underpin its economic, political, international and military strength. You can defeat someone momentarily. If I’m in a boxing match with someone who’s two meters tall and outweighs me by 40 kilos, maybe I can hit him on the head and knock him out momentarily. But he will still remain two meters tall and 40 kilos heavier than I am. And when he wakes up, his capabilities will resurge and return. So this is nothing new. It is similarly — not just by historical example, but by an objective assessment of capabilities, potentials and objectives — an impossibility, short of self-destruction simultaneously. What are the consequences, though? As I said flippantly, but also accurately — referring to Louis XIV’s economics minister and what happened then — this is what’s happening now. Now, the argument is coherent, as Atul laid it out from the administration. It’s coherent, but it’s also delusional. And anyone who studies — this is literally true, and again, I’m not being facetious — basic economics will understand that tariffs increase costs and lower the availability over time of capital for investment. And if there’s less investment, you can have less research and development, you will have less growth, you will have lower GDP rates and so on. So what have been the consequences of the policies? They have destabilized the markets. That will lead to lower profits, therefore less investment, less R&D, less long-term growth. The businesses in the United States and internationally are anxious about Wall Street, but they’re also anxious on Main Street and about Main Street. Meaning: The businesses that will supposedly profit from this — they’re not just anxious, but are going to have less capital to use to conduct business, fewer workers because of the immigration policies and economic policy in this instance, higher costs, lower growth and less cutting-edge technology. America continues to progressively antagonize its allies. Allies are a leverage. They enhance one’s influence and power. They have emboldened our enemies and turned allies into adversaries. “They,” being the policies, are increasing inflation. They are weakening the dollar, which has been historically a unique advantage that the United States has had — because the dollar has been the basis of the global economy. And they will lower long-term GDP growth. I could continue on with the negative effects that are empirically already starting to be verifiable. So the policies are, frankly, delusional and are leading to the relative destruction of American supremacy.
Atul Singh: One quick note before we leave: Tariffs have had their uses. We can’t be completely negative about them. Generally, they lead to disaster over the long term, but sometimes for your core industries, it’s good to have a small garden and a high gate. And the first act after American independence was a protectionist act — it was tariffs. Because the Northeast of the US decided it would industrialize, and unlike Latin America, it would not just supply raw materials to industrial Europe, particularly England. So we don’t want to sound doctrinaire on anything — that’s something we have to be intellectually fair and admit. And then the other thing is, the Trump administration is inspired by Richard Nixon. On the 15th of August, if I remember correctly, 1971, basically, Nixon announced a 10% import tariff and the suspension of the dollar’s convertibility into gold. That killed the Bretton Woods fixed exchange rate system. The Nixon Shock ended the 1944 gold-backed dollar. And people thought the dollar would go down — and it did, to some degree, but it certainly did vis-à-vis gold. It also inaugurated a new era of trading floating currencies, rapid credit creation and unrestricted capital flows that have lasted until now. The dollar replaced gold as the repository of value. Now note that Nixon’s Treasury Secretary, John Connally, once said, “The dollar is our currency, but it’s your problem.” And the Trump administration takes the opposite view: The dollar is everyone’s currency, but an American problem. The US comprises only 25% of the global economy, but 57% of the world’s official currency reserves are in dollars. Foreigners hold an estimated $19 trillion of US equities, $7 trillion of US Treasuries, and $5 trillion of corporate debt.
Glenn Carle: The critical difference between what Nixon did and what Trump is doing was that, fundamentally, Nixon’s policies opened the international economic system and were based upon economic production and dynamism, rather than determining by fiat exchange rates and guarding economic sectors.
Atul Singh: He’s inspired also by the 1985 Plaza Accords, wherein the US forced its trading partners to appreciate their currencies and thereby devalue the dollar. So all of that is going on. But we will now move on to India and Pakistan.
[Lee Thompson-Kolar edited this piece.]
The views expressed in this article/video are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.
” post-content-short=” Atul Singh: Welcome to FO° Exclusive — in fact, the fourth edition of 2025’s FO° Exclusive. Last month, in March, we covered the Risk of Recession in the US, Germany’s Radical New Economic Policy, and New Troubles in the Middle East. In April 2025, our top three issues are: Tariffs and…” post_summery=”US President Donald Trump has launched a protectionist economic agenda dubbed “Liberation Day,” using tariffs and a weak dollar to reindustrialize the United States and confront China’s trade practices. While his administration views this as a necessary national security strategy, it is historically self-destructive. This agenda has brought rising bond yields, plummeting consumer sentiment and fears of recession.” post-date=”May 08, 2025″ post-title=”FO° Exclusive: Tariffs and the New Donald Trump Economic Revolution” slug-data=”fo-exclusive-tariffs-and-the-new-donald-trump-economic-revolution”>
FO° Exclusive: Tariffs and the New Donald Trump Economic Revolution
Professor Luca Jourdan, a social and political anthropologist at the University of Bologna, discusses the ongoing war in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). The war, centered in the eastern region near Rwanda, has persisted for nearly 30 years. The fighting began after the 1994 Rwandan Genocide, when over a million Hutu refugees fled into the DRC. The refugees included members of the Interahamwe militia, who reorganized in camps and launched attacks against Rwanda. Rwanda and Uganda supported rebel movements in the DRC, setting off the First and Second Congo Wars.
The conflict has fragmented over time. Armed groups form and shift alliances. The March 23 Movement (M23), one of the most powerful rebel groups, emerged in 2012 and re-emerged in 2021. M23 fighters seized Goma, a key city in North Kivu, in early 2024. The fighters are primarily Tutsi, and Rwanda is widely suspected of supporting them. The Rwandan government denies involvement. The Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR), which descends from the Interahamwe, remains active and opposes the Rwandan government. Various Mai-Mai militias, self-defense groups with local ties, also participate in the fighting.
Economic and ethnic tensions
The Congolese army (FARDC) struggles with corruption, poor organization and divided loyalties. Many officers were former rebels integrated through peace agreements, which weakens military cohesion. The Rwandan government’s role in the conflict is a point of contention. Rwanda benefits economically from mineral exports, though the country itself has few mineral resources. Smugglers transport coltan, gold and diamonds from eastern DRC, fueling Rwanda’s economy. International trade agreements facilitate these operations. Uganda has also been accused of involvement, though its current role is unclear.
Eastern DRC holds vast mineral wealth. The region contains deposits of coltan, gold and diamonds. Rebel groups, military officers and foreign networks control and profit from mining operations. The European Union has trade agreements with Rwanda for mineral resources, raising questions about indirect economic support for illicit mining operations. Multinational corporations rely on minerals extracted from conflict zones, perpetuating demand.
Ethnic tensions drive violence. Groups identifying as indigenous Congolese clash with the Banyarwanda, people of Rwandan descent who have lived in the DRC for generations. Land disputes fuel conflict. Farmers compete for agricultural land, and miners fight over resource-rich territories. The arrival of Rwandan refugees in the 1990s intensified these existing struggles.
How will the conflict play out?
M23 fighters hold Goma. The Congolese government struggles to reclaim control. Reports of massacres circulate, but casualty numbers remain unclear. The United Nations’ MONUSCO peacekeeping mission, active since 1999, has failed to prevent further violence. Humanitarian organizations work in the region but face security challenges.
International reactions remain minimal. Rwanda has faced scrutiny, but no major sanctions have been imposed. European nations express concern but take little action. Governments focus on conflicts in Sudan, Ukraine and Gaza, leaving the DRC crisis in the background. Sanctions on Rwanda remain a possibility, but their effectiveness is uncertain.
The DRC has a history of resource-driven conflicts. Pre-colonial fighters clashed over ivory and slaves. Belgian rulers extracted rubber, leading to mass atrocities. Cold War leaders backed Mobutu Sese Seko to counter communist influence. Today’s war follows a familiar pattern. Local strongmen and external actors profit from instability.
The war in eastern DRC is unlikely to end soon. The Congolese government lacks the strength to counter rebel groups. Economic interests benefit from continued violence. The humanitarian crisis deepens. Millions live in displacement camps. Without major international pressure and structural reforms, the cycle of violence will persist.
The views expressed in this article/video are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.
” post-content-short=” Professor Luca Jourdan, a social and political anthropologist at the University of Bologna, discusses the ongoing war in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). The war, centered in the eastern region near Rwanda, has persisted for nearly 30 years. The fighting began after the 1994 Rwandan…” post_summery=”Rwanda has backed M23 rebels in eastern DRC, where armed groups and the Congolese army fight for control of mineral-rich land. M23 took Goma after overpowering government forces. The war will go on unless international pressure forces Rwanda to stop supporting rebels and the Congolese government builds a stronger military.” post-date=”Apr 29, 2025″ post-title=”FO° Talks: RDC, Rwanda and M23 Rebels” slug-data=”fo-talks-rdc-rwanda-and-m23-rebels”>
FO° Talks: RDC, Rwanda and M23 Rebels
Peter Isackson: Welcome to FO° Talks. I’m Peter Isackson, Fair Observer’s Chief Strategy Officer. It’s my great pleasure to welcome back the talented opera and theater director Emily Hehl for our second edition of a series of conversations we’re calling The Culture of Culture. Our focus is on music, theater and all forms of storytelling. A key aim of what we’re doing is to look more deeply into the role of the audience — not just the artist, but the audience. Now, in the previous chat, Emily, we talked about the history of the classical concert and the role of the audience in its construction and impact. Today, I think you suggested that we delve into the relationship between music and storytelling. Could you just say a few words about what you’re working on now in Vienna?
Emily Hehl: Yes, I’m currently working on two productions, one of them being a new production of Norma by Vincenzo Bellini, and the other production is something that will be coming later this year, which is a new opera about Lee Miller, the war photographer who took a picture of herself in Hitler’s bathtub. And this new opera is questioning how a person could possibly have the idea to take a picture of herself in Hitler’s bathtub, and therefore it becomes a very intense portrait of Lee Miller and things she lived through. And yeah, so that’s the things I’m currently working on. And then, yeah, I have the pleasure of having these serious conversations with you every few weeks, which is a big pleasure. Thanks for having me.
Peter Isackson: Oh, it’s a wonderful pleasure for me to have these conversations. I never know where they’re going to go.
Emily Hehl: Neither do I! (Laughs)
Historical context and rediscovery of La Montagna Noire
Peter Isackson: So it’s not like we’re talking about the events in the political world — and there are plenty of those today — but it’s great to get away from them. So let’s go look at La Montagne Noire, which I don’t think many people know. It had some impact at the time. I think it was noticed by the musical world in Paris, where it was produced. When was it? Just before the end of the 20th century?
Emily Hehl: Yes. So the world premiere was 1895, and it was written by Augusta Holmès — a woman. She was French-Irish, and it was only the second opera that was ever premiered by a female composer in the Palais Garnier, or the big opera house in Paris. And the one before had been Louise Bertin in the 1830s. So after 60 years of no female composers presenting their own works in Paris, this was only the second time in history. So for that reason, this was quite remarkable, but it was forgotten since then and never performed again since 1895. And so we re-premiered the work last year at the opera in Dortmund in Germany.
Peter Isackson: So, has it been forgotten or neglected because it was written by a woman? She was the composer and the lyricist at the same time?
Emily Hehl: Absolutely.
Peter Isackson: And I think the critics said that the music was really good and interesting, but the plot and the writing wasn’t up to the same standard. Was that your impression?
Emily Hehl: To me, it would be the other way around, because I think the libretto is remarkable. But you’re right — she wrote the libretto herself. She wrote poems, she was composing, she was singing as well. And at her time, she was one of the most famous women in France, and she was living a radical life. She had kids with a man she was not together — who was actually married with someone else. So she had really the most liberal life you could imagine at that time. And being a composer as a woman in France, who actually had an Irish nationality, was very, very difficult for several reasons. And why was this work forgotten? I think, yes, her being a woman might have been one of the reasons, because the critiques were worse than they might have been if it was a work by a man at that time. But also, I think we’re quite deep in the kind of content we want to talk about, which is, for example, the repertoire — and how do things become part of history, and how do things just disappear in history? And I think it’s the responsibility of the people who live after the composers to keep these pieces alive. Because, I mean, many composers like Bach and Mozart, they were not composing music for them to become eternal. Music was composed for one event, usually. The idea of repertoire is an invention. It was not usual. But there was this time where an audience and performers started going back into history. And then, of course, we started appreciating a certain quality of pieces and then seeing pieces which are not in this kind of canon or repertoire. Sometimes they might have less quality, but also they might remind us of the quality that the pieces have that we keep playing again and again. So I think there’s a whole question connected to why do we not play certain pieces.
Emily’s directorial approach
Peter Isackson: So was this your choice, La Montagne Noire? And how did you — or whoever made the decision to produce it — how did you come to know it, because it’s such an obscure part of the repertoire?
Emily Hehl: It is. No, the artistic director of Opera Dortmund asked me if I would like to do this piece. The piano reduction was available on the Internet, and it is a collaboration with the Bru Zane, which is an edition that takes care of rediscovering composers or preparing the material in order for these works to be played again. And so they invited me, and all I got was the score. There was no translation, there was no research on this piece very much. And that’s a very different approach to directing, because usually, if you direct, I don’t know, an opera by Puccini or Verdi, you have to, on the one hand, deal with the piece, but you mainly have to deal with the history of the performance, because what has been done? What have been the interpretations? How have people looked at the piece? Whereas in this case, it was really just about trying to get any information about where is the libretto coming from? Because she wrote it, but you felt that there were sources. What is all of this music? Who is Augusta Holmès? So it was really more of a scientific work for a long, long time. It took me almost three years to prepare it. And I translated the libretto myself, all these kinds of things. It was really research. But it was beautiful. I play the piano, so that was very helpful, because whenever you turn a page, I started playing, and it was like reading a very interesting novel, because you had no idea where it would go.
Themes and storytelling in La Montagna Noire
Emily Hehl: And so, yeah, I did a lot of research on the libretto. It’s set in La Montagne Noire — it’s an old French word for Montenegro. So it’s set in this Slavic country during the time of the Ottoman occupation. And you feel in the libretto that there’s a lot of very specific terms and words that I didn’t know, but it didn’t feel as if it was a pure fictional text. And so I started doing a lot of research, and I was diving into the folk songs of the Slavic time around the time where the story is set, because often diving into folk poetry and folk songs can give you a lot of ideas of where things might be coming from. And as I was reading these folk songs of the Slavic people of this time, I recognized a lot of parallels to this libretto. And it turned out that she must have known these folk songs, because around the time where she was writing, just a few years before, there was a French translation of the most famous Slavic folk songs published in France. And she most likely came across them, because her father had one of the biggest libraries of France at the time. And it turns out that she must have done some kind of a mosaic — taking characters from the Slavic folk songs, turning them into a different kind of story, but also uncovering the backside of all the heroes and myths, and basically showing how history and myths are being constructed. And that maybe the truth is not the most strong word for where these stories are coming from.
Peter Isackson: So that’s why you maintain that the libretto is more interesting than the music itself?
Emily Hehl: Absolutely. Also because she talks about constructing, the construction of history, not knowing that she would be the one being forgotten. I mean, she had no idea that this could happen. But looking at it from today, her caring so much about her heritage and talking about how people are being remembered and then being forgotten herself is quite a remarkable combination of things. So we made this whole reflection part of the production. So, yeah.
Peter Isackson: I take it that when you were asked to do this — I don’t know if you committed immediately — but you didn’t know what you were getting into?
Emily Hehl: I had no idea. I was young. I just took it. (Laughs) Honestly, it was the first — I’m quite young, and I’m very lucky that at an early age I had people who trusted me to direct these kinds of massive operas. The whole thing is over three and a half hours. There’s a massive chorus. There’s like a hundred people on stage. The orchestra is almost bigger than Wagner’s orchestras are. It was a massive undertaking. So when they offered it to me, of course I was very much afraid. But yeah, I had no idea what would come.
Peter Isackson: How do you work with the performers? Are you concentrating on the musical side or the textual side — the storytelling side — or both?
Emily Hehl: Both. For me, I always start from music, because I’m a musician at first, and that’s ultimately what singers are as well. You can never go against the music. You always have to deal with the fact that it’s singing people on a stage. And there was a time of directing where directors tried to hide that people were singing — they should act as if they were just in a movie. But it doesn’t work, because singing needs your whole body in order to do it. So that’s where I will always start from, is this whole physicality of singing. But then, of course, in a case like this, to really have everyone included in the whole development of the piece and where things are coming from is important. So what I did with this production was that the first day — which is with the whole cast sat on a table — I tried to tell them everything I had researched in the last two and a half years. And it’s important for people to know where characters are coming from, because especially in this case, most of the characters have an equivalence in the Slavic folk culture. And so we were preparing, kind of — they were reading into the songs and into the characters where their characters were based on — because it’s important for a singer, an artist, a performer, to know where their characters are coming from. But in this case, we also invited a Montenegrin-Serbian artist whose profession is to sing these folk songs. So there’s this very specific instrument called the gusle, which is a one-stringed instrument, and it’s played like this. And this is how the bards at that time were traveling through the countries singing these folk songs. And because this is where this story is originating from, we invited a female artist from Montenegro-Serbia — she’s half-half — and she was part of this production. And we basically looked at the piece of Holmès through her eyes — or actually through her blind eyes, because we had her as a blind character. And so the audience was diving into the imagination of this blind bard. And that’s how the opera came into existence for the audience.
Audience reaction and impact of political events
Emily Hehl: Because it’s also a difficult piece — 1895 — I mean, political correctness is not the term that is the right one for this piece. So there’s a lot of religious conflict. So you have to be quite clever and careful when putting something like this on the stage, to not reproduce any kind of conflicts or assumptions or these kinds of things. So that’s why we chose this blind, imaginational approach to look at the story.
Peter Isackson: So when you started working on it — you say it took three years.
Emily Hehl: It took three and a half years, yeah.
Peter Isackson: So that was before the political events that Eastern Europe has been living through. Now, did that have an effect on the audience and on the production itself? Because, I mean, this is about the Balkans. The Balkans is the frontier between Eastern and Western Europe. In some ways, it epitomizes what’s happened in Ukraine, right? I just throw that out. I don’t want to get involved in political discussion, but your experience as a director and part of a production that wasn’t designed initially to take into account the politics that was going on around you. Of course, you did it in Dortmund — you didn’t do it in Montenegro. But just tell me if that had any influence at all, negative, positive or interesting, let’s say.
Emily Hehl: I mean, of course, it always has an influence, because you read the news in the morning before you go to rehearsal. So you’re full of these conflicts and these themes. But then also, you have to take artistic, visual decisions two years in advance, so you never have an idea what will be happening when you actually are directing the opera. Which is one of the reasons why I try to very much avoid any kind of contemporary reflections on a stage visually. Because you will always be behind, you have no chance. And therefore I’m trying to, of course, create a universe on a stage that allows these kinds of reflections, but they are never explicit. But of course, you know that the audience will be loaded with this information, and they will look at certain conflicts in the opera differently than you would have probably imagined they would a year before. But I think, therefore, it’s a task of an artistic team and the director to keep this openness without being too explicit, and to avoid making something too small. Because you have to be very concrete when you do something on a stage, otherwise no one can act if you don’t have a very concrete situation. But you can also not make the situation too concrete and too small, in order to keep the openness and the reflection of the audience into this situation.
Peter Isackson: So in terms of your aesthetic choices, as you were saying earlier, some people try to contemporize — if we can say that — to bring up to date traditional operas where the plots took place in defined historical circumstances, and then bring them up to date by referring to either modern customs or modern events and modern costumes as well. I think you chose a more classical idea of using the costumes and the styles of the end of the 19th century. Is that right? Or was it set in an earlier time?
Emily Hehl: No. So what we did actually is — because it’s so difficult, especially with these kinds of politics and these kinds of conflicts — to actually reproduce something on the stage. And therefore the approach we chose was through this blind poet. And maybe I’ll just quickly dive into why we chose this: Because I told you that this libretto comes from these folk songs, and that’s the reason why I suggested this theme for our conversation today — because there’s so much more connected to it than just this opera. Because there were these bards traveling through the Slavic countries, and they were writing their songs, and they were listening to people — their stories, their opinions on historical events — and they turned this mixture of historical events and fiction into the songs. But the interesting thing is that many, many of these bards were blind. So they had no possibility to verify things with their eyes. But they were really just depending on what people would tell them. But then these songs were the kind of historiography of this country at that time, and the people were singing these songs as kind of marching into the vision which they had created in the songs — they wanted to be freed from the Ottoman Empire. And they wrote songs about this liberation. But so historical events were turned into songs, and these songs then were turned into historical events, because eventually they were freed from the Ottomans. And so this kind of circle — how stories and fiction influence historical events, and how historical events are always stories in the end, because it’s what we tell each other — that was very crucial for us. And this idea of blindness, in a very beautiful, poetic sense, was the starting point for our production. And therefore, what you see on the stage is neither historical nor purely fictional, but we actually took fragments from all kinds of times and we turned them into a fictional world. Because Augusta Holmès, she had never — at least it’s not recorded — been to Montenegro or Serbia. She had no idea what it looked like. So she described certain things, but it’s a very French look of the 19th century on these kinds of things. And so we didn’t try to make a documentary, but we were really trying to go into this individual imagination of a person imagining these stories and these conflicts.
Peter Isackson: Were you thinking of a parallel with Homer? Because isn’t that the story of how the first truly important literature of Europe is accounted for? Whether it’s true or not, whether Homer was actually a blind poet. I mean, I think historians believe that there were a whole series of poets who were Homer, but maybe all of them were blind or some of them were blind in the same way you say that that seemed to be part of a tradition in the Balkans.
Emily Hehl: Yes, absolutely. It’s very, very fascinating. And this idea of this blind historiography that we’re now talking about — Augusta Holmès — and that’s why I think the libretto is better than the music, up to a certain point, because we have these myths in the Slavic culture. One of them is about Marko Kraljević, who is now — and I was in Montenegro in summer to really see the kind of settings and to talk to people — the hero of the Serbians, I mean, what we call Serbia now, because he’s the most celebrated hero who freed the country from the Ottomans. But if you dive deeper into the research of the historical Marko Kraljević, he in the end actually switched sides to the Ottomans. He didn’t die in the battle, but he had a quite good life until the very end. And so the main character in the opera is not called Marko but Mirko, but his fiancée has the same name. So it’s very obvious that she refers to this very character. But what Augusta Holmès does in the opera is that she uncovers the point where he actually switches his sides. So in the beginning, we have the folk and the people who are telling these songs about the hero, but then the audience — and that’s the interesting point — witnesses the actual other side of the coin of this myth. But in the end, the people keep singing the same song as they did in the beginning, but the audience knows more than they did in the first act. And in the very end, it’s very much about who survives and who is dying — because the people who survive, they will be the ones telling the stories. And that’s where we are questioning: Why do we perform certain pieces and why do we forget others? It’s always our responsibility — the living — to transfer stories in written or oral ways and to keep performing pieces. Yeah, it’s our responsibility.
Peter Isackson: So you added — I mean, as a jazz musician, I would call that your act of improvisation. You added the blind poet. That’s quite a feat, because you’ve got an opera which is totally composed. Did the blind poet actually have a musical role in your production?
Emily Hehl: Yes, but it was not part of the score that she wrote — something we added. But it was, for me, very, very important to actually add it. Because if you look at music in the 19th century, you have a lot of this local color — it’s composers who tried to make music sound like something they imagined Egyptian music would sound like, or Serbian music would sound like. And in order to overcome this, and to just say, okay, you see, this is an actual heritage of this country, and this is what Holmès made of it — but this is not trying to be this. This is really — it’s the creation of poetry, it’s fiction. It’s not reality. And also, for me, talking about this whole culture, which is a very complex culture — when I was in Montenegro this summer talking about these stories — it’s so deeply rooted, these conflicts, until this very day. And so for me, it was very, very important to have someone from this culture with us in the production to verify things and to feel more comfortable with this theme and to tell this story — which is definitely not my story — but to actually have someone on the stage who cared about it very, very much, because her grandfather had already been one of these blind poets as well. It felt more acceptable for me to perform this piece or to direct this piece, because I felt there was some kind of justification for it on a stage. And yeah, people said that she really opened their eyes for a different form of singing also. Yeah.
Peter Isackson: I’m very interested — you’re in the audience reaction. I mean, how much feedback do you get from your audience, and how long did the production run?
Emily Hehl: We had, I think, six performances, but spread over several months. And so, I mean, you get as much feedback as you would like to take in, because everyone will put their opinion on you if you want or not, but it’s up to you to listen to it or to actively seek for it. But the interesting thing was that there were some people at the premiere, and they kept coming back for every single performance because they loved the music, they loved the piece, and they loved the production. So if a theater programs a piece like this, they know that it won’t be sold out, because it’s not Don Giovanni and it’s not Wagner. But of course, then therefore they do musical theater before to be able to finance this kind of responsibilities, experiments, whatever you want to call it, rediscoveries. But the people who were there — and I was in three out of the six performances, for other reasons I was in town — but so I witnessed three of the six performances, and the audience was cheering and really, really enjoying the performance, apparently. Of course, you always have people who don’t like anything, but in general, the reviews were good and the audience seemed to really enjoy it as well.
Comparison with other productions and personal reflections
Peter Isackson: Because the storytelling was such a big part of it for you, do you feel that the audience could appreciate that and had learned something, if you like, had challenged their understanding of the opera itself? I don’t think that’s really a question, because nobody knew the opera — it’s not like Don Giovanni or Norma. But do you feel that you got the point across, the original points you were trying to make about the history, about the story itself, the impact? Also, it’s a tragedy, right?
Emily Hehl: Yes, it is.
Peter Isackson: So it’s got that emotional dimension which fits into a historical context. So you could look at it like any Shakespearean tragedy and say it’s as much the emotion as the poetry and the music. But I’m curious: With only six performances, what kind of feedback do you get? I suppose there were critics about it.
Emily Hehl: Yes, and we also got nominated. There is the International Opera Awards, which is one of the biggest awards for opera. And our production got nominated for the Best Rediscovered Work. So it was really appreciated in the critics and the reviews. Also, what I was happy about most was that people were interested in Augusta Holmès and not only in this Slavic culture, because they were really intrigued by Bojana Peković. That was the artist that joined us. And she was also giving workshops around and concerts and stuff. So I really think that the people who saw it were really, really touched by her singing as well, because it’s a very different way of singing. It’s very direct. If you know this kind of wide voice that just goes right through your body — you immediately get goosebumps. It’s the opposite of operatic singing. Also to have this as a contrast, I think for audiences this was a great experience. But we had a lot of after-talks and these kinds of things. And people were just curious about Augusta Holmès. Because when you read a little bit about her, you wonder why you had never heard about her. Because she was so big at her time. Like, she was a friend of Wagner, and she had relations with Liszt and a lot of really important composers. She was very deeply in the scene of the poets in France at that time. Everybody knew her, but no one knows her today. And so I think that’s what people really started to wonder about — how is this possible? And I think this is where the reflection probably sets in even more than in just the story of the opera. Because her life’s story and the dilemma and drama of her life’s story corresponds so much with what she actually talks about in the opera, without knowing that this would become her story. The question that you are not responsible for what people will tell about you once you’re not on this planet anymore. So I think this was a coincidence of these two things that, yeah, I’m sure people realized it, and I hope that it inspired them to think further into it.
Peter Isackson: So how would you compare the kind of experience it was for you — in terms of the research you did on storytelling itself, and the relationship between music and narrative, and propaganda even, I think, is part of it because there’s this political dimension — how would you compare that with what you’re doing with Norma?
Emily Hehl: It’s a completely different world. It’s literally a different universe. And I must say, I prefer the universe of the rediscovered works, because you feel you’re actually contributing to something. And you’re giving these pieces a chance to be seen again, and also people to experience these things. I had a very interesting conversation with John Andrews not so long ago — who is a British conductor who is a master in performing rediscovered works or works that hadn’t been performed in a long time, or even just in the last 20 years. And as I said in the beginning, for me, it’s really the main difference that, in the case of Holmès, you take care of and really investigate the piece, just the piece and how it came into existence. Whereas in the other case of Norma, you’re mainly busy with what have other people done with the piece. And for me, that’s different.
Peter Isackson: With Norma, do you feel — I mean, not you personally — but is this the normal thing, to feel that you’re in competition with all the directors who have done this before you?
Emily Hehl: Absolutely. Because even now, it’s really culminating, because Vienna has two big opera houses: Staatsoper and Theater an der Wien. And within a few days of difference, they’re performing Norma in two different productions. So this is really the culmination of the problem I’m talking about. Because it’s not about Norma, it’s about the competition of these two productions. And that’s what I really, really admired about being able to direct La Montagne Noire, was to dive into this universe. And yeah, I mean, it’s a beautiful coincidence that this became this kind of meta-reflection on storytelling and historiography and all these kinds of things. And also this historiography that reflects on the repertoire we talk about. And I think that’s a whole other series of serious conversations, is the repertoire and who came up with the idea of having a repertoire, and how it didn’t exist for a very, very long time.
Peter Isackson: Yeah, so just to go back to the question of competition, you are now competing with another production?
Emily Hehl: Yes, Staatsoper is competing with another production! (Laughs)
Peter Isackson: Do you communicate? Do you know the people there?
Emily Hehl: Yes! Well, so the Norma, it’s not my personal direction. I’m part of the team, but it’s not my responsibility what the artistic output will be. There’s communication, there’s non-communication, I would say. Yeah.
Peter Isackson: I mean, when I say that, do you try to do things differently because you know the others are doing it in a certain way and you have to contrast? And is there a spirit of competition, or is it a kind of creative collaboration — “We can both turn Norma into something contemporary with impact on the audience?”
Emily Hehl: Ideally, it will be the second. And ideally, people who see the show in one place are so curious that they want to see the piece in the other one. And also it’s beautiful, because you’re confronted with the core conflict of performing arts, which is: You can never see a piece as it just hangs in a museum. Because you always need the people to do it. So I think this is really a beautiful problem we have, and something we’re presented with or we are confronted with now here in Vienna, on this example of Norma. But then also, something I said before is that you have to take the major decisions many years in advance. And with this size of house, even more than two or three years. And I’m not even sure if back then, things were clear that things would happen at the same time, so I’m quite sure that these productions came into existence without knowing of each other. And so, yeah. But I hope—
Peter Isackson: We’ll kind of wrap this up, because we’ve used the allotted time. But I’d like to come back, in perhaps a more general way, to the question of competition or collaboration in musical productions. I have my own ideas about it, but in a different context. We have the example given to us by Hollywood of Amadeus, where we are told, through that storytelling, that Mozart and Salieri were competing in ways that probably aren’t very true, but maybe they are as well. But that’s a topic — if you’re interested — I’d like to come back to that in one of our conversations.
Emily Hehl: Yes, I’d appreciate that.
Future plans and legacy of La Montagna Noire
Peter Isackson: Okay, great. Well, thank you again. And is there any place that people can profit from your production of La Montagne Noire? Has it been filmed?
Emily Hehl: It has been filmed. It hasn’t been published. But if anyone who is watching this is actually really curious, just reach out to us and I’m sure we can find a way of sharing this recording. But it’s not available in public. So we hope that someone will program this piece again. I mean, that’s why these kinds of awards — one might think about opera awards, whatever you like — but it’s good for these kinds of reasons, that things stay in the memory of people for a bit longer. And so maybe there will be an artistic director who will program it again. There are even conversations of actually bringing the piece to Montenegro, because Montenegro doesn’t really have an opera story. That was the reason why I was there in summer, because we’re trying to find a way to bring the piece there. But then also we would need to majorly rewrite it, because, of course, then there is already a political interest in performing art. And then that’s where it gets difficult for me as a director, because Augusta Holmès — she had never in mind to write it for this kind of event.
Peter Isackson: Yeah, if you were to do it again more than a year later than the initial production, would you have the same singers? Would they be available?
Emily Hehl: It really depends on when and how and what. But it’s also for singers to learn a piece that no one has ever performed before, and that will most likely not be performed again, and then you confront this really difficult music of like three and a half hours. It’s quite an investment of a singer to say, “Yes, I really want to do it.” And usually you don’t have an idea what the piece will be like when you sign the contract. So, yeah. It would be wonderful to keep—
Peter Isackson: At least they can see the film.
Emily Hehl: Exactly. (Laughs)
Peter Isackson: Okay. Well, thank you very much, Emily, and I’m looking forward to our next session. We’ll be announcing it very shortly.
Emily Hehl: Yes, wonderful. Thanks for this invitation to chat.
Peter Isackson: Bye.
[Lee Thompson-Kolar edited this piece.]
The views expressed in this article/video are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.
” post-content-short=” Peter Isackson: Welcome to FO° Talks. I’m Peter Isackson, Fair Observer’s Chief Strategy Officer. It’s my great pleasure to welcome back the talented opera and theater director Emily Hehl for our second edition of a series of conversations we’re calling The Culture of Culture. Our focus…” post_summery=”Fair Observer Chief Strategy Officer Peter Isackson and opera and theater director Emily Hehl explore Augusta Holmès’s forgotten opera, La Montagne Noire, and examine its themes of history, myth and audience perception. Hehl shares her journey of rediscovery, emphasizing the opera’s overlooked feminist legacy. They highlight the living power of storytelling in music.” post-date=”Apr 27, 2025″ post-title=”FO° Talks: The Culture of Culture, Part 2: Memory, Melody and a Forgotten Opera” slug-data=”fo-talks-the-culture-of-culture-part-2-memory-melody-and-a-forgotten-opera”>
FO° Talks: The Culture of Culture, Part 2: Memory, Melody and a Forgotten Opera
Atul Singh: Welcome to FO° Talks. With me is Ashank Desai, the founder and chairman of Mastek. Today, we are going to explore the fascinating story of NASSCOM. Ashank, of course, is one of the founders. He’s a legendary entrepreneur in the software space. He’s also a philanthropist who has done a lot to promote public policy in India. Today, our focus is how NASSCOM was born. India’s National Association of Software and Services Companies, NASSCOM, was born in 1988, a little more than 19 months before the Berlin Wall fell on November 9, 1989. Two years later, the Soviet Union would dissolve. In contrast to the Soviet bloc, NASSCOM went on a rocket ride. Over the years, it has gone from strength to strength. And who better than Ashank, one of the founders and past chairman of NASSCOM, to recount the story of this extraordinary Indian success. Welcome, Ashank.
Ashank Desai: Thanks, Atul. It is always great to interact with you, and I appreciate your contribution to this whole area of covering the public policy, covering the politics and economics globally.
Atul Singh: Thank you for your kind words. So let’s get started. What was going on in the IT industry before NASSCOM began?
Ashank Desai: Yes, so this is an interesting story of, as you said, almost now, from 1988 till 2025, which is close to 35–37 years. And I always say that I have lived a dream. So it’s a dream that we were going to live, which I was not aware when the dream started. But let me go back to, in fact, late ‘70s, early ‘80s. That’s the era when India was just getting into what I would call as software and IT-related things. For example, Mastek started in 1982. There were a few other companies who started before that. And what really was happening at that time was the whole software development as a separate business was not existing — not only in India. In fact, even in the US, it was a very small business because hardware companies used to give software. In fact, there is some — I don’t remember — IBM case was there when the court ordered them to give a separate code for software versus their hardware, and that’s the way they could create a competition. Others could do software. So that was the era when hardware was the main cost and software was very rich in cost. And because of that, what used to happen was hardware companies were the major players and software companies were very small minnows, if I may call that — ‘70s and ‘80s. On top of it, there was this idea that India has an advantage because of English language, large talent pool, cost of development and a very, very, very focus on improving and excelling in whatever they do. Now, that was a potential, although the image outside of India was not that great at that time, and everybody used to think that India has only elephants and snakes. So that was an era where a few of our entrepreneurs, started these companies for software development, and we were struggling to understand how we go about making this software business global. And we figured out that unless we come together in some form and push this as a group — and also pressurize government to offer us better policy — we will not be able to move it. Now, it was not possible to do it under the umbrella of hardware companies. They had their own association, MAIT, and obviously they were busy in the domestic market, and it was growing. And as I said, software was given almost very low cost by them. Now it is the other way — we can almost give hardware free along with software. So there was no motivation in that group called MAIT. Some of us had become members of that group to push software and software exports in particular.
The founding of NASSCOM
Ashank Desai: So then there was this discontent and an opportunity. And all of us, whether in Mumbai, whether in Bangalore, whether in Delhi, were discussing how we can come together. In fact, there is a story that even in the US, there were groups from India discussing this and so on. So this action at different places got into some kind of mass, if I may call it. And that mass ultimately converged in Delhi, sometime in ‘87, probably sometime around that, to say what we can do together. And that was an inflection point, really, where around 30–40 of us, I think, if I remember right, came together and we said, “We want to split away from this existing association and start our new association.” I still remember the chairman of the other association came and had a great plea for us, that you should remain together and how it is the power of staying together and all that. We heard that, but we felt that their dynamics and their opportunities are different, and we should form a separate association. And that was really a starting point, although, as I said, there were many, many groups in different places talking about what can be done for building the software industry. So that meeting — I still remember very vividly what we were doing and how we were thinking about doing it. After that, when this group formed, there was the idea that we should write a constitution and start naming the association and all that, which is what happened over the next few months. And actually, Mumbai was a center point there. And my friend, Harish Mehta, who was a part of a group called Hinditron at that time, was very dynamic to make this happen. And then we had others who came together, and we sat together and we wrote the constitution. We gave a name, and we thought about the name. We said, “What shall we name it?” So there is, in the software industry, what is called software, which is about building software products like Microsofts and Googles and so on and so forth. And then there is services, because you can’t do software unless you build custom-made software, unless you implement some of the software. So that is services. So we thought about that, and we said, “We should not say just software, but software and services.” So NASSCOM is the National Association of Software and Services Companies. That is NASSCOM.
NASSCOM’s pioneers
Atul Singh: So Harish Mehta played a critical role and it was one of the key drivers of NASSCOM. Who were the other players? Of course, one of them was you. Harish Mehta is another. Who were the others people?
Ashank Desai: Yeah. So we had also Mr. Nandan Nilekani and Mr. Narayans Murthy. Both of them got involved. We had Mr. KV Ramani, who was a CEO of Futuresoft, it was called — his company — and Mr. Saurabh Srivastava, who was working at that time in Tata Unisys, if I am right, the name of the company. So these were five, six people. We were very, very involved, and we worked really hard over the next few years to make it happen. And that is, again, a story by itself, which I can recount as we move ahead. But these were the five, six people, and then there were a few others also, all names may be difficult. But the core group around which we started working was this: Four of us — who were, of course, later felicitated by Prime Minister Modi for being founders — that is Harish Mehta, myself, Mr. KV Ramani and Saurabh Srivastava. But Infosys also had a major role to play, as I said, through Nandan Nilekani and Mr. Narayana Murthy. And I’ll talk about it later.
[Lee Thompson-Kolar edited this piece.]
The views expressed in this article/video are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.
” post-content-short=” Atul Singh: Welcome to FO° Talks. With me is Ashank Desai, the founder and chairman of Mastek. Today, we are going to explore the fascinating story of NASSCOM. Ashank, of course, is one of the founders. He’s a legendary entrepreneur in the software space. He’s also a philanthropist who has…” post_summery=”A founder of NASSCOM, India’s premier software and services industry association, recounts the company’s origin. Ashank Desai describes how early entrepreneurs, facing global challenges and domestic policy gaps, united to form an independent platform. Key figures like Harish Mehta and Narayana Murthy played instrumental roles in shaping India’s IT revolution.” post-date=”Apr 26, 2025″ post-title=”FO° Talks: How India’s NASSCOM Was Born” slug-data=”fo-talks-how-indias-nasscom-was-born”>
FO° Talks: How India’s NASSCOM Was Born
Peter Isackson: Welcome to FO° Talks. I’m Peter Isackson, Fair Observer’s Chief Strategy Officer. November 22, 1963 — I know where I was. In the meantime, the mainstream media, despite all its efforts, haven’t managed to silence the plethora of questions raised by that event. Today, we delve into the newest pieces of the puzzle with Jefferson Morley, journalist and author, who earlier this month gave his testimony before the House Oversight Committee’s new Task Force on the Declassification of Federal Secrets. Formerly a journalist at The Washington Post, Mr. Morley, editor of the blog JFK Facts — a great resource — is the author of several books on the CIA and the assassination, notably The Ghost: The Secret Life of CIA Spymaster James Jesus Angleton, who we’ll be hearing more about. So Jefferson, thanks for being here to bring us up to date as things continue to evolve.
Jefferson Morley: Thanks for having me, Peter. There’s a lot to talk about.
Peter Isackson: Yeah. So let’s get started with just a couple of things. You’ve had the documents for a month now. Where are you with the analysis of those documents, the ones that were released by the Trump administration on the 18th of March, I think? And second, I’d like to know more about what you know about how the task force itself is working and how things are likely to play out with them.
Jefferson Morley: Yeah. So, since March 18th, I’ve delved a little bit into these records. But to do the kind of reporting you do that needs to be done is very painstaking. So, thousands of records that once had redactions came into the public record. Once they’re in the public record, it’s impossible to tell what was redacted. So what we have to do is go back and look at the redacted versions — not just from 2022, but going back to 2017, really — because things were withheld for 30 years, 25 years, and only released five or seven years ago, and they haven’t really registered in the public mind because they haven’t been reported. So what we’re going to do is we go back, look at the documents that were redacted, understand the passages that were redacted, get the new versions and understand bit by bit what became public. And we don’t do that for one document. What people are doing now is they’re going in and they find an interesting document, they hold it up and they say, “Look, this proves my theory.” And they hang it on the clothesline of their theory. That’s not my approach. What I do is I go through and I look at every document on a given topic. And now we have the ability now that we’ve made these documents searchable, which just happened in the past week. We’ll go in and we’ll look at, “Okay, how many documents with the name Oswald were redacted as of December 2022?” Now, that’s when we know it: 103 documents that had Oswald in the metadata had redactions in the document. So we’re going to go through 103 documents — what was redacted, what was released and what does that tell us about Oswald? And then you do the same thing for each topic. So you do the same thing for the Fair Play for Cuba Committee, which Oswald belonged to. You do the same thing for the CIA. You do the same thing for leading personalities in the CIA: Richard Helms, Bill Harvey, David Phillips. These are men who knew about Oswald before the assassination, lied about it, so are the subject of interest. So that’s the process that we’re in right now. And, you know, we’re not very far along. It’s difficult to do, people don’t like to do it, they don’t know how to do it. I have to teach people how to do it. But the good thing is, there’s a ton of important and interesting material. This is the stuff that the CIA has been hanging on to for 50 or 60 years, right? And let’s be common sensical: The last thing that they release is, by definition, the thing that they are most reluctant to make public. So we’re just finding out now, not about the obvious stuff, but about what they were most reluctant to make public — and which, to be sure, they fully intended to keep private if Trump’s order hadn’t come along. So there’s a lot there, and we’re just beginning to unpack it.
The CIA, the archives and the law
Peter Isackson: Now, are these all CIA documents, or the FBI, or something else?
Jefferson Morley: A lot of different federal agencies: Army Communications Agency, a bunch of NSA records. CIA is most of them, I would say probably 75 to 80% of them. But there’s a significant portion of the FBI and other agencies.
Peter Isackson: And did they already exist in the National Archives but were hidden, or were they just released to the National Archives?
Jefferson Morley: These were documents that were made available to the National Archives via the JFK Records Act process. The JFK Records Act process was a process that was created by the 1992 JFK Records Act. That law passed in response to Oliver Stone’s movie, created an independent civilian review board with the power to declassify all assassination-related records in the government’s possession. What the law gave the agencies the right to do was withhold material for a certain period of time if they could justify it to the JFK Review Board. So starting in 1994, for the first time — 30+ years after the event — we actually began to get the historical record of the assassination. And a lot of that was released between ’94 and ’98. A lot of stuff was postponed from 1998 to 2017. In 2017, everything was supposed to be made public, according to the law — not according to the CIA. There was a provision which said the CIA could ask for continuation beyond the 25 years. What the law said was that after 25 years, all records should be made public, except in the rarest of cases. I talked to Judge John Tunheim, the head of that review board — he’s a federal judge in Minnesota — and he said, “At the end of 25 years, we expected there might be 100 records that would still remain secret. The CIA said, ‘No, there’s 16,000 records that we want to keep redactions in.’” And Trump caved and gave them that in 2017. And then when the question came to Biden in 2021 and 2022, he gave them continued secrecy while releasing some records.
Peter Isackson: I remember Biden, when he was supposed to release at the date that was planned for him to release, he said for security reasons it couldn’t happen, but that a year later it would take place. And then nothing happened a year later. Is that right?
Jefferson Morley: No. What he said in 2021 was, “Well, we had the pandemic.”
Peter Isackson: Oh, that’s right. Yeah.
Jefferson Morley: “And so you get another year.” Okay, so they’re 29 years past the deadline. And he said, “Well, yeah, you get another year because you really haven’t had enough time to comply with the law.” When The Washington Post called me up, I said, “This is the COVID dog-ate-my-homework excuse.” It was pathetic. And a year later, Biden did release some records — but basically gave the CIA everything they wanted and wrote an executive order in June 2023, washing his hands of the whole matter, effectively eviscerating the JFK Records Act and handing final disposition of the records back to the CIA and the NSA. Now, Trump came along, ran on releasing all the records — a popular issue — and he issued an order to do just that. So Biden’s order is defunct now, and the agencies are obliged to produce everything. So on March 18, we started to get those documents that had been sent to the National Archives and withheld under the JFK Records Act. There are still some redactions in these documents. But by and large, it seems that they have been fully declassified. So there’s a ton of material there — 77,000 pages of new material — and it’s definitely, a lot of it is significant. And we can talk about the significant things we’ve found so far, but there’s more to come, for sure.
The Warren Commission and the cover-up
Peter Isackson: So it’s significant. It’s not a smoking gun — everyone will say that, apparently — but it seems to me that the mountain of evidence that already existed proves a simple point, which I think is what you insist on, and that is that we have to forget about the Warren Commission and what it said, in a sense.
Jefferson Morley: Yeah. You know the official story. It’s not true. It’s not true that the President’s motorcade went by this building and a guy unknown to the US government fired three shots at it. That’s not what the medical evidence says, that’s not what the forensic evidence says, that’s not what the eyewitness evidence says. And so people continue to say, “Well, you don’t have a smoking gun.” I wasn’t looking for a smoking gun, okay?
Peter Isackson: I called your method the Sherlock Holmes method: Eliminate the impossible and whatever remains, however improbable, must be the truth. And I would say that the Warren Commission’s was: Eliminate the inconvenient, and whatever remains will be the actual story.
Jefferson Morley: Yeah. Don’t forget the Warren Commission story, as it’s been handed down to us, did not originate with the Warren Commission. It originated with Lyndon Johnson and J. Edgar Hoover, who decided the day Lee Harvey Oswald was killed that the entire crime would be blamed on him. And Hoover and Johnson were quite explicit about their intention to make sure that the public was convinced that this one guy did it and nobody else was involved. Okay? The assassination of the President hadn’t even begun. The President hadn’t been buried. And these guys had settled on the solution that the Warren Commission rubber-stamped, and some people who just don’t want to pay attention to the new evidence continue to repeat it.
Peter Isackson: I recently listened to that conversation, which was recorded between Johnson and Hoover. And the one thing that really surprised me — because I knew and I’ve always thought that the presence of Allen Dulles was the key to understanding why nothing that the Warren Commission could say would likely be true — but what really surprised me is that Johnson began the conversation and he says, “Well, we need to start thinking about who we’re going to nominate to this commission.” And I was thinking, “Allen Dulles” — the first name, the first name! It’s not as if it’s an afterthought — “Yeah, we need somebody who knows the CIA.” The first name he put on it. So Warren was the titular head, but if Johnson wanted to put Dulles on it, doesn’t that give the game away?
Jefferson Morley: Yeah, it does. It’s obvious. People didn’t comment on it at the time because people were so shocked. But yeah, a blatant conflict of interest. And then if you look at what Dulles did — he worked very, very hard to exclude any contradictory evidence. And there was plenty of it. He opened up the first session of the Warren Commission and said, “By the way, every political assassination in America has been committed by a lone nut.” And somebody raised their hand and said, “Excuse me, Mr. Dulles — what about Lincoln?” Right? A conspiracy to decapitate the Union — kill Lincoln and two cabinet officers — that was a lone nut? So Dulles had his mind made up from the start. And then when Richard Helms and John McCone—
Peter Isackson: And he had a motive.
Jefferson Morley: Yeah. And when he handles the questioning of John McCone, his successor, and Richard Helms, his great good friend — his leading questioning lets them say on the record a key part of the CIA’s cover-up, which was, “We just didn’t know anything about the guy.” And McCone says, “We had very little information in our files.” And Helms says, “It was probably minimal.” Okay, that was a maximal lie. James Angleton had a 194-page dossier on Lee Harvey Oswald the week Kennedy left for Texas. Okay? So Helms and Dulles were in on the cover-up from the get-go, and Helms lied under oath. One of the key things I pointed out in the new testimony was, we know that Helms had lied. We know that George Joannides, the chief of covert action in Miami, lied to JFK investigators. And then, when we got the documents on March 18, we got the testimony of Angleton to the House Select Committee on Assassinations, and one of the declassified passages showed that he lied about what he knew about Oswald before the assassination. So that’s a pattern of malfeasance. And this is what I said to the Luna Subcommittee: “You can interpret that however you want, but to me, that is not incompetence — that’s malfeasance. Three people lying in a homicide investigation — that’s a pattern of malfeasance. That’s incriminating. It’s not exculpatory.” So it adds to the state of the indictment of the CIA. And sure enough, you say this and the defenders of the Warren Commission reflexively defend the CIA and say, “Well, they were just lying because they were embarrassed.” Okay, is there any evidence of that? Is there any evidence? Did anybody ever say Dick Helms lied because he was embarrassed? That James Angleton lied because he was embarrassed? No, there’s zero evidence. It’s another one of those JFK theories for which there’s no factual support. I think that’s one of the important things we learned from this new—
Peter Isackson: Okay, so I have a question for you. You were a journalist. You’re no longer working as an establishment journalist, but you were at one time with The Washington Post, right?
Jefferson Morley: Yes.
Peter Isackson: So how do you explain that the editorial policies of major media can continue today to underreport the facts that you uncover and the facts that a lot of other people have uncovered, and continue to say, “Well, yeah, we don’t know, so we’ve got to trust the Warren Commission?” How do you explain that in terms of reasoning?
Jefferson Morley: I think there’s two things. One, people — institutions — are committed, right? The Washington Post attacked Oliver Stone before he even made his movie. They were attacking his idea, right? He hadn’t even put his idea on celluloid, and he was already savagely attacked by The Washington Post. And on March 18, the speed-reading editors of The Washington Post said, “77,000 pages of material came out, and none of it says anything to contradict the official story.” Huh? You read 77,000 pages in one day? That’s very impressive. But see, they don’t need to read it, because they know the truth — or they think they know the truth. Because one thing is the institutional thing. They can’t back off of it. If they start to show an open mind, then the whole institution looks bad. And same with The New York Times, same with CBS. So they’re locked into that. And then the second part of it is, it’s a scary story, right? The fact that the president was killed by his enemies and they got away with it? That’s a very profound story. And it’s not one that people want to look at. It’s very destabilizing to one’s worldview. And if you’re in a comfortable position in Washington and in Washington journalism, you don’t want to say something like that. You’re going to be branded a conspiracy theorist. What’s interesting now, though, is we had this hearing, and the Warren Commission people — they were very upset that they weren’t invited. But they have nothing new to add. That’s why Representative Luna didn’t add them. They have nothing to say. J. Edgar Hoover and LBJ got it right on November 24, 1963, and there’s really no need to revisit it. Well, okay, there’s nothing new in that proposition. Why would anybody be interested in it? Nobody is interested in it. People are interested in what was really going on.
Politics, press and patterns of malfeasance
Peter Isackson: So Representative Luna seemed pretty receptive to everything you and Oliver Stone presented. Do you see any serious follow-up? And is there?
Jefferson Morley: Yes. I’ve been very impressed with Representative Luna. We come from very different places politically, but on this issue, she’s very action-oriented. She has pressed the CIA repeatedly for documents and continues to do so, because they still have not disclosed fully. So I think she’s knowledgeable about the case, and she’s showing real leadership and acting strongly. We’re talking with her staff now, me and some friends, about a second JFK hearing and what that might entail. And so we’re hoping that happens soon. But we don’t have a date or exact format for that yet.
Peter Isackson: And is RFK Jr. at all involved in this?
Jefferson Morley: Not really. He put his voice behind it during the campaign and when he endorsed Trump the other day, when he was in a meeting, and I think Tulsi Gabbard was saying something about how she had assigned a lot of people at the ODNI to look into JFK, RFK and MLK. Trump pointed down the table and said, “What do you think, Bobby?” And he said, “Get it all out there,” or something. So he didn’t jump in — he just said, “Good idea.” I think he’s got other things to worry about.
Peter Isackson: So I thought we might be talking a lot about Angleton, whom you’re an expert in. I do have one question about Angleton, though, because I can refer people to all your other interviews where you’ve gone into great depth on this. We can talk about it, but the one question I wanted to ask you is: Oliver Stone came up with that anecdote about Angleton reckoning it was probably to help him. Were you aware of that?
Jefferson Morley: Yeah, yeah, Joe Trento. That was in a book that Trento published about the US intelligence community. And Trento spent a lot of time with Angleton. So I think that it’s a true quote. And yeah, it reflects the… you know, he said, “We were amoral people, we would do anything.” And he was sort of fessing up to that at the end of his life, kind of like, “Yeah, we were dirty tricksters, and we pulled off dirty tricks on the most massive scale you can possibly imagine.”
Peter Isackson: We got Mike Pompeo to say, “We lied, we cheated, we stole.”
Jefferson Morley: Yeah.
Peter Isackson: Yeah, that’s in character.
Jefferson Morley: And what you see in the defenders of the Warren Commission is a plea of innocence: “No, we’re not really like that. We’re well-meaning men who just made a few mistakes about this lunatic who up and shot the president. It’s no big deal that they were surveilling him. We’re really sorry, Mrs. Kennedy, that we didn’t understand the threat. But please excuse us.” It’s so lame, and it’s so anti-journalistic. There’s no effort to take on the new evidence. When you present new evidence, what they do is impugn the witness or the person who presents it. “Well, don’t believe Morley — he’s a conspiracy theorist.” The only problem with that is, I don’t have a conspiracy theory. So then they try to make one up and pin it on me, which I decline to do, because I don’t have a conspiracy theory. That’s not how I understand the case. And so they impugn the witness and they exclude the evidence. It’s signs of obvious bias. And so it’s just not credible anymore.
Suspects and leads
Peter Isackson: Yeah, okay. I’m going to push you towards a conspiracy theory, but staying with the facts.
Jefferson Morley: Okay.
Peter Isackson: You are very interested in William K. Harvey, right?
Jefferson Morley: Yeah.
Peter Isackson: You’ve spoken a lot about Harvey.
Jefferson Morley: Yeah.
Peter Isackson: And you think he’s a key player, right?
Jefferson Morley: Well, he was the agency’s leading specialist in assassination, and he hated the Kennedys, and he associated with Johnny Roselli and other mobsters who were killers. So he’s a plausible suspect. That’s what I would say — he’s a plausible suspect.
Peter Isackson: Well, yeah. If I was writing the story as a fiction writer, that would be a godsend to have his story. And I know you’ve officially requested the travel records of Harvey.
Jefferson Morley: Yeah. So that’s an example of records that the CIA has not turned over yet.
Peter Isackson: So you said he was in communication with Roselli?
Jefferson Morley: He wasn’t in communication with Roselli. He was best friends with Roselli. And that’s not something I said — that’s something his wife said. Clara Grace Harvey never gave an interview. The only interview she ever gave is on JFK Facts. And in there, she says, “Oh, I loved Johnny Roselli. He was a great guy. He was a patriot. My husband loved him.” So that’s who he was, yeah.
Peter Isackson: Yeah, so my question is: If it’s just open knowledge that a high official of the CIA, who even had responsibility for assassinations, which is quite a responsibility — if he was known to be working with or associating with the Mafia, doesn’t that tell us a lot about the whole set of relations that must have existed?
Jefferson Morley: Absolutely, absolutely. And those relations continued after RFK in 1962, when RFK first learned that the CIA was working with Roselli and Sam Giancana. He said, “Next time you work with those guys, just tell me, okay?” They didn’t do that. Harvey was meeting with Roselli in the summer of 1963 after he had been fired at the behest of the Kennedys.
Peter Isackson: Yeah, that’s something I found in the archives. When did he go to Rome? When was he sent to Rome?
Jefferson Morley: He was pulled off the Cuba Task Force after he cursed out Bobby Kennedy during the Cuban Missile Crisis. He didn’t actually go to Rome for many months.
Peter Isackson: Oh, right, okay. So you said — and I think in the archives it says — he had lunch with Roselli in June of ’63?
Jefferson Morley: Yeah. The FBI surveillance were watching Roselli at National Airport. And he gets out of a plane and he walks up to a car — and son of a bitch, Bill Harvey’s driving the car. And they all know Harvey because he was in the FBI. And they say, “Oh my God.” And now he’s a top CIA guy. And they call up their boss. They say, “Oh my God, why is Roselli talking with the top guy in the CIA?” And that guy calls Angleton at home and says, “What’s your guy doing with Roselli?” And Angleton calls the restaurant where Harvey and Roselli are, and he gets Harvey on the phone. He says, “What are you doing?” He says, “I’m having dinner with Roselli.” Angleton says, “That’s fine.” He hangs up. He calls back the FBI guy and says, “Leave him alone.” That was it, he totally blessed the thing. None of that is made up; we have the whole transcript. Hank said it himself. He was rather proud of the story, and he told it to Senate investigators in 1976.
Peter Isackson: So all this, the public doesn’t know about these things, even though they’re verified fact?
Jefferson Morley: They’re on the public record. And the public does know about them. It’s the elite media reporters who don’t really want to think about it. And so they say, “Well that’s not smoking gun proof of a conspiracy,” which is a way of saying: Don’t talk to me about the new evidence.
Peter Isackson: So if we take the case of Roselli. I’ll just ask you the question. James Files, who claims to have confessed to being the shooter on the Grassy Knoll, worked for Roselli. He was an accountant for Roselli, so he knew Roselli. Is his story at all credible?
Jefferson Morley: I haven’t looked at his story in a long time, and it’s probably worth revisiting. The first time I did it, I didn’t think it was credible. And I felt like sometimes he was talking like somebody who had read the JFK literature as opposed to having lived it. So there’s nothing to corroborate Files’s account.
Peter Isackson: No, I know. That’s what I appreciate about your methods, which is: Let’s stick to the facts. But it’s always interesting to notice that there are other accounts that somehow seem to correlate after you learn something else. And so your thing about patterns of facts — that is what we’re looking for, right?
Jefferson Morley: Yeah. So, I’ll tell you — here’s another story that just came out of them. Another person who has been plausibly described as a gunman in Dealey Plaza was a man named Herminio Diaz Garcia. And he was an assassin. He was a bodyguard for Batista. He was known to have committed an assassination in Colombia in 1948. A marksman, and passionately dedicated to killing Fidel Castro. And in fact, in 1966, on a raid into Cuba where he said he was going to go assassinate Castro, he was killed. And in the firefight that ensued, his leader of his commando group was blinded by a hand grenade and captured. He wasn’t killed. In the hospital, that man was questioned by Cuban intelligence, Tony Cuesta. And Cuesta said he believed that his dead friend, Herminio Diaz, had been in Dealey Plaza. And he said he didn’t have independent proof of that, but he had come to believe that, knowing Diaz. Well, another guy who was in the hospital at that time — not on any kind of political crime and not connected with anti-Castro activity, a guy who was in jail for embezzlement — had been childhood friends with Herminio Diaz. And he wound up taking care of Tony Cuesta in the hospital, this blinded man. And so they talked about it, and he talked about his friend. And this man, Martinez, came forward — he’s dead now — in 2011. And he went to British journalist Anthony Summers, and then to Bob Blakey, who headed the House Select Committee on Assassinations. And he told his story, and he said, “I too believe that Herminio Diaz was involved in the assassination.” He didn’t have independent proof. So there were two people who were not hostile to Diaz, who were friendly to Diaz, who felt this. Guess what pops up in the new JFK files? An informant talked to an FBI agent on November 26th and said, “I think Herminio Diaz was involved in the assassination.”
Peter Isackson: Wow.
Jefferson Morley: Who that informant was, that’s something we’re trying to figure out now. But when I saw that, that’s like, wow. We had no independent evidence connecting him to the event. And now we have somebody saying, four days after the assassination, “Oh, they thought he was involved.” So when people say, “Oh, there’s nothing there,” that’s a very interesting lead, which we are now pursuing.
Potential uses for AI in the case
Peter Isackson: Okay. I think we’ve consumed our allotted time, basically. But I have one more question to ask you, which is more about method than anything else. You talked about the difficulty of handling all these archives… actually, two questions. One: Shouldn’t the people at the National Archives have been organizing all this material?
Jefferson Morley: Well, Trump wanted a good news cycle. They did the thing very hurriedly. And one thing they didn’t do was they didn’t make the documents searchable by doing this thing called optical character recognition, OCR.
Peter Isackson: Yeah. It’s been around for 30 years, yeah.
Jefferson Morley: Yeah. So they didn’t OCR the documents. So the Mary Ferrell Foundation — which I’m associated with and which has the largest collection of online JFK documents — had to OCR the 77,000 pages themselves. Now they’re searchable. So the National Archives is not very up-to-date technologically, let’s put it that way.
Peter Isackson: And the other question is: Are you using AI to do any of this work?
Jefferson Morley: So, yeah, we’ve been exploring. We have an AI project with the computer science program at Duke. And we’ve had some smart young people doing that. People are sending me stuff — “Oh yeah, I talked to Grok. There’s a 71% chance that Angleton was part of a conspiracy.” That’s not a useful way of using AI.
Peter Isackson: I’m talking about using AI with the released documents.
Jefferson Morley: Yeah, yeah, no, so we are looking at how to get AI to interpret and organize documents quickly. So we’re not trying to use AI to solve the crime. That’s kind of a non-starter. But help us organize, sort and get new insights about the records — I think that’s definitely doable. And we’re just at the beginning of that process right now.
Peter Isackson: Okay. Well, thank you very much, Jeff.
Jefferson Morley: You’re very welcome.
Peter Isackson: I have about a hundred and more questions to ask — but I mean, that’s the whole problem with the JFK assassination. Of course, I was 17 years old when it happened, and obviously it affected my life. So I’m curious. Anything you can come up with, I’m interested in.
[Lee Thompson-Kolar edited this piece.]
The views expressed in this article/video are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.
” post-content-short=” Peter Isackson: Welcome to FO° Talks. I’m Peter Isackson, Fair Observer’s Chief Strategy Officer. November 22, 1963 — I know where I was. In the meantime, the mainstream media, despite all its efforts, haven’t managed to silence the plethora of questions raised by that event. Today, we…” post_summery=”In March, the Trump administration released declassified records of the infamous assassination of US President John F. Kennedy. In this interview, journalist and author Jefferson Morley outlines the longstanding institutional efforts to suppress key information about the event, as well as the painstaking analysis of redacted documents. He criticizes media and intelligence agency complicity in distorting the historical record and presents patterns of malfeasance within the CIA as central to the case’s unresolved truths.” post-date=”Apr 21, 2025″ post-title=”FO° Talks: Why the Media Buried the Truth, the JFK Files” slug-data=”fo-talks-why-the-media-buried-the-truth-the-jfk-files”>
FO° Talks: Why the Media Buried the Truth, the JFK Files
Peter Isackson: Welcome to FO° Talks. I’m Peter Isackson, Fair Observer’s Chief Strategy Officer. Today, I’m joined by the talented opera and theater director Emily Hehl. This will be the first in a series of discussions I’ve chosen to call The Culture of Culture. Emily has been hailed as an innovative stage director for both theater and opera. She’s now working on three projects concurrently — correct me if I’m wrong, Emily — in Vienna, as well as being involved in projects elsewhere in Europe and especially in Brussels. So for this first conversation, Emily suggested focusing on the evolution of the classical music concert, a journey through its history, function and audience. Why are we talking about classical music?
Emily Hehl: Well, there is a beautiful citation of Charles Rosen, who was a pianist and musicologist, and he said that “the death of classical music is perhaps its oldest continuing tradition.” I think that’s quite well on point because people keep talking about the crisis of classical music and the classical music events, and we’ve been talking about this for so long, and people have been talking about this a hundred years ago. And so I think it’s interesting to think about this crisis of the classical music, and to think if it’s really the crisis of the classical music itself or about the way how classical music is presented in the institutions or in the forms like the classical music concert.
Audience expectations
Peter Isackson: Okay, so a concert is a public event, independently of the music that’s going to be featured. So before we explore the history — which is what you suggested we talk about, the history of the institution and the role of the public, which I think is a really important thing to assess — I’d like to ask you a very personal question. As someone who doesn’t just organize concerts but designs and produces complex spectacles for the public, can you talk about how you perceive and think about the public’s expectations for a new production? Do you know how they’re going to react? Do you have to do things specifically that take into account a lot of different variables?
Emily Hehl: A new production of opera, for example, or theater?
Peter Isackson: Yeah, yeah.
Emily Hehl: I think it would be ignorant not to think about the people because when I direct, what I care about are the people on that stage and the people in the audience. And the most precious thing about both opera and concert is the fact that this is a live event and that people can react on to things, and that there’s a certain tension and a feedback. And so for me, it’s absolutely crucial to think of this situation of an audience and people on a stage as a starting point, but it is, I think, honestly impossible to predict how people will react because they will react all differently. And that’s the beautiful thing about art — that there is no right and no wrong, but just opinions of people, and there’s craft and all these kind of things. But to really predict how a certain person will react, it’s impossible because people are loaded when they enter a room. You never interact with a blank auditorium because everyone has their expectations, their experiences, their knowledge, their non-knowledge. So yeah, it really depends on who is in this audience. And I think that’s something that can be considered: Who do we expect to sit in that audience, and how can we therefore react to what we put on the stage?
The art of presence
Peter Isackson: Are there surprises? I mean, do you see audiences react in ways that you absolutely didn’t expect? And if there are, what kinds of strategies do you have for adapting? Because doing a complex spectacle is not the same thing as what someone like — I’m a performing jazz musician — it’s much easier for us to say, “Okay, let’s not play that tune, let’s play another tune.” So how does that work out? And what are the emotions that accompany that for someone like yourself, who’s in charge of, I would say, the audience’s reaction in a certain sense?
Emily Hehl: First of all, I would like people to like what they see and to experience something they actually like. There’s directors who say, “Oh, if I get a boo, that’s good, because then they were moved.” But I think that’s a very easy way to get out of the situation that people didn’t like what you were putting on a stage. And the difficult thing about these complex productions is that you can’t change too much the moment it’s on a stage because there is no time to correct. That’s a part of the system we work in. The moment you have a premiere, there is basically no time to really change it anymore. So what I try to do is to keep the people who are on the stage — the performers, the singers — to keep them present as human and not to cover them in a character, but to keep spaces in the production where they can actually interact with the audience or to react on things, and to just keep something that is actually very present and alive: Just a classical music concert, where people are performing music without pretending to be anyone else but themselves performing music. And I think this is why the concert, for me, is such a valuable event, because there is this direct connection between the audience and the performing people, and there is no pretentious character or something around. And so I think I’m trying to actually preserve something of what is happening in concert, sometimes in opera as well, because I think stage and opera and performing arts like this can learn a lot from the idea of a concert. So that’s also why I suggested this theme, is because for me, that’s actually a base to start thinking from when thinking about opera.
Peter Isackson: So are there real possibilities of doing strategic adjustment if you see that some of the effects you anticipated or planned psychologically to produce in the audience didn’t work out in the way you expected? How much leeway do you have to change the performance to meet the goals you’ve defined for yourself?
Emily Hehl: It’s a good question because it really depends on where you’re working. If it’s a very, very big house with a tight schedule — as, for example, here at Vienna State Opera, where I’m currently working — there is literally no time to correct anything afterwards if it regards anything technical. You can always go to the performers and ask them to go more into something or to go less into something else. But I think the most beautiful thing about seeing performances of your own work is that people will react in places you never would expect them to react, and that sometimes they will react differently every night. And also you can trust that the performers will understand how an audience will react, because that’s all they do, is being on a stage, reacting to the reactions of an audience. And I think a way of working in general is to keep a staging as open as possible so that the audience can actually dive into narrations they want to dive into. Whereas when you look at film, a camera tells you where to look at. But in theater — and that’s the reason why I’m a theater director and not a film director — is because I love creating broad pictures, broad images, broad narrations, where the audience, with the kind of load they come into, the expectation they come into, can start choosing their little threads through a story, through an evening. And therefore, yeah, expectations will never be met and will always be — yeah — overmet, if you could say so. Excuse my non-native English speaking sometimes.
Opera planning and production
Peter Isackson: That’s a perfectly legitimate neologism. Typically, how long do your productions run?
Emily Hehl: Usually, I would say it’s something between — like, if we talk about Germany and Austria — it’s something between six and ten performances. And they can be spread over just three or four weeks, but they can also be spread over several months. If it’s a not-so-popular piece or not a so well-known piece, then a theater will try to spread it a bit more so that the people can talk about it, there will be critiques and reviews. So yeah, it really depends on the piece and where you’re doing it.
Peter Isackson: So if you’re running for — or do you know? Do you always know how long it’s going to be? It is all pre-planned?
Emily Hehl: Yeah, it’s pre-planned. That’s one of the horrible — or not of the horrible things, but the difficult things about opera is that usually these things are planned several years in advance. Like, I know now what I’m going to be doing ‘27, ‘28 — that’s the kind of distances. And therefore, opera is also difficult because if you want to make art up to date, or at least in some kind of relation to what is happening in the world, you have to know three years in advance. So that’s one of the big, big challenges. If you want to decide on very exact stage designs or whatever, you don’t know what is happening three years later in the world. And I think there again, a big, big potential of the concert is that it is a lot shorter in preparation, shorter in time, short in rehearsal time. There’s a lot more space to try things, whereas the classical opera — just the institutions — they need this long, long time. And I think, again, there is something where the opera could learn from the concert if we want to be more relevant.
History of the concert tradition
Peter Isackson: This very question of personal curiosity: How much rehearsal is required for an opera?
Emily Hehl: Usually six weeks.
Peter Isackson: Six weeks. And is that a daily ritual?
Emily Hehl: Yeah, it’s a daily ritual. You rehearse usually six days a week, two times a day, one day off. So it’s always really a six-week — you feel like you’re in an intense workshop, kind of like holiday with your team or something. (Laughs) Really, a six-week, very intense kind of stretch. And then you have the opening night. But before you start rehearsing these six weeks, you will have already worked on the piece for several years normally, as a director, with your team together.
Peter Isackson: And are you there full time during the rehearsals?
Emily Hehl: Yeah, I mean, there will be rehearsals which the conductor is leading with just the orchestra, although I always try to even be there because for me, if you talk about opera — for me this is really a horizontal art form. It’s an art form of the collective: the orchestra, the chorus, the soloist. For me, a flute player is as important as a chorus singer or a soloist. And therefore, I think to take — yeah, to bring this up to the same kind of level of importance also in your work as a director — is one of the big potentials and challenges as well.
Peter Isackson: Okay, so now let’s go to the official theme we announced, which is the history. I don’t know if you’ve seen the documentary Howard Goodall did for the BBC — The Story of Music in six installments. I mention it because everyone in the West — you know, we’re talking to people from all over the world — so we’re nevertheless focusing on a Western tradition. And we all in the West, and probably a lot of people in the East, have their own idea of what a classical concert is. And I don’t have to make the case for the importance of classical music because we have so many fantastically talented musicians from the Far East who are playing European classical music and not Chinese or Japanese or Korean classical music. So we all have an idea, that’s why I insist on talking about the concert as an institution. Because it has its history, it has its shape, it has its sense of importance of culture and importance for people in social life, let’s say. So Goodall, when he began writing in the introduction to his series on The Story of Music, which is essentially the story of Western music, he said — something I don’t fully agree with, but it’s typically provocative from an entertainer — “Not that long ago, music was a rare and feeble whisper in a wilderness of silence.” Now, he’s contrasting that with today, where you can just press a button and listen — you know, Spotify — and listen to any bit of music you want, you’re interested in. But I would contest the idea that music was something that rarely existed in a wilderness of silence, which takes us back to the history of the concert. So I don’t know what knowledge you have historically about how music developed in the West, but we know that the concert became — in the 19th century, actually, I don’t think before that the idea of concert existed, but it’s part of that tradition. So just tell me anything we need to know about how the concert evolved and the role of the audience and the presence of music in a public event.
Emily Hehl: Yes, first of all, I won’t be able to, like, hold a lecture on that because I’m an artist and not like a scientist. So whenever I say any of these things, for me, that’s an artistic perspective or an artistic interest. But I think we can learn a lot when we look back where music comes from. And I think the most interesting thing for me when I started reading into that was that music always had a purpose. Like a purpose in the sense of — okay, music was played in church as part of liturgy; or on the court as a part of a status symbol; or as entertainment on fairs or as education in the house, domestic music kind of environment. The music always had a function and a purpose. And there was this time in the 18th century, I think, where for the first time something — it was called a music room — was invented. Which just meant that when people were sitting together in a salon, that the person who was playing the instrument was put on a little table so that the music got more attention. And this was basically the beginning of the idea of a concert, where the attention went more to the music than to the surrounding or the function that the music was fulfilling. And so this idea of the music room basically developed into the concert halls we know. That this music table was the ancient stage, basically, where people would look up to. So the idea that music would have its own place where it didn’t need to serve anything but itself, was the reason why the concert was invented — in order to give it more attention and more concentration. And first of all, I think that’s a beautiful idea and somehow a necessary idea that came in the 18th century also with the bourgeoisie and the middle class. It was self-understanding for these people to have this kind of concert and the concert hall. But then in the 18th century, people would go there, they would talk to each other, there was still, like, pieces of music would never be played completely, maybe just a fragment. Then there would be drinks or a dance or a tableau vivant, and then there would be another piece of music. But bit by bit, in the 19th century, there was a real kind of revolution or a reform of how a concert has to be. And this reform is what we do until this very day. And I think it’s interesting that the way we listen to classical music hasn’t changed in 150 years. It literally hasn’t really changed. The rules are the same, which are: silence; don’t be talking; don’t you dare applaud in between certain movements of one piece; rather 45 minutes, a little break, and another 45 minutes; you should dress up a little bit chic. So these kind of rituals that we have until this very day were invented 150 years ago. Yeah.
Resonance, ritual and physicality in performance
Peter Isackson: What I find curious is that that tradition, which I think we both agree seems artificial in many ways — there are a lot of artificial components to it about what you’re expected to do as an audience, the kind of attitude you’re supposed to have as you listen and the silence you mentioned — that I discovered, became part of the tradition of popular music. The popular music that I know, which is jazz. And that’s a surprising thing because if you know, and if you experience — as I had the opportunity to do — the way people listened to jazz 50 years ago, it was basically in clubs. And the way you reacted to the music was extremely varied. You could get up and move, you could — I mean, if you go back further to the ‘30s, let’s say — jazz actually functioned to allow people to dance. It was dance music. Then it became artistic music in the 1940s, really, with the Bebop Revolution, and the musicians thought of themselves and were very consciously aware of the classical tradition and the seriousness of music, even though at that time—
Emily Hehl: The holiness, one could even say.
Peter Isackson: Pardon, sorry?
Emily Hehl: Even the holiness. Like the seriousness, holiness. It’s the kind of spectrum we move into there.
Peter Isackson: Absolutely. I know that Sonny Rollins, the saxophonist, once was surprised that somebody criticized his music, and he said, “But it’s celestial.” And he expressed something that’s really very recognizable by any serious jazz musicians — but I would say any serious musician — and that is that you’re not just playing for an audience. You’re playing for a tradition, you’re playing for your relationship with the universe. Because music is basically resonance. I mean, you could go into quantum physics and seek parallels, but music is something — and I say that as someone who practices music. But you can be simply a listener, because you have no experience as a player or as a performer, but it’s something that you absolutely feel in a certain way. And you know that, in fact, music speaks for itself. The musician is just an instrument. I say that — classical pianists have said this as well as jazz pianists — they’re trying to express something that comes from somewhere else. No music is totally original. And they’re doing it in a way that they’re discovering as they do it. How they perform is something that they’re listening to and learning from. So that’s where — I don’t want to invent theories, although I’d be very happy to entertain theories about what resonance means in terms of relationship, and not just the frequency of the sounds we’re producing.
Emily Hehl: Absolutely. I think this kind of aspect of relationships that you mentioned is for me one of the most crucial points of — if we think about a future of the classical concert — is because that’s the most precious thing, is this relation between the people and the fact that it is a live event. And if you think about classical music itself, it’s the most current kind of art form you could think about. Because it’s — yes, okay, it’s notes written on paper — but the only way to actually listen to it, that’s the most simple notion, is by someone putting them into a live event, which is very much different from any kind of museum. And I think there’s a big potential and desire in today’s society to experience these kinds of things. But my point would be that the kind of institution of the concert as we have it now banishes any kind of social relation or physical experience. Because that was the idea of this kind of invention of the concert halls was to ban any kind of context, to ban any kind of physical, sensual experiencing. It was the attempt to make music an autonomous thing that would happen only here. Not with your heart, maybe, but it was not meant to be a physical, sensual experience. And in my eyes, that’s a big, big, big mistake. Because if you look at the kind of flourishing concert forms, that’s the exact opposite. If you look at pop concerts, it’s a very physical experience. And I think there is the potential for this experience also in classical music. And I think it’s very remarkable what you said about pianists who want to basically disappear behind their music. Because I was wondering about the organ for a while. Because the organ, I would say, was constructed in a way that you would not see who is playing the organ, but you could only hear the sound, as if it was magic. But for me, if I go into a concert, it’s the most emotional thing to look at the person who is actually playing the music. And therefore, I do have my problems in opera with the orchestra pit, because I want to see what these people are doing. And so I think there is a big kind of aesthetic change possible — not necessary, but possible — to think about the physicality of music and performing music.
Peter Isackson: Perhaps we could do the opposite of what I just mentioned: That in the world of jazz, which existed in a setting where people were doing other things, including dancing — not necessarily only dancing — but there was a sense of permanent interaction between the audience and the performers. And then I would say, really in the ‘70s or ‘80s, jazz moved to the concert hall, and it suddenly became a different kind of experience. And it actually had an influence on the evolution of the music because it put more accent on being a virtuoso and performing something that would wow people in terms of the technical performance, and less on the kind of cultural expression and that human quality that existed in, say, a nightclub. But this brings me back — I actually focused on Elizabethan and Jacobean literature in my university days at Oxford, and I learned at that time that, first of all, that was a very significant moment in the history of music, of European music, of English music, obviously — but significant in the sense that music appeared to be very widespread. People played instruments. There are periods of history when people didn’t play instruments, but that was a period of experimentation with instruments. There were some great composers in the Elizabethan period: William Byrd, Orlando Gibbons, people like that. But the interesting fact I picked up in my studies was that if you went into a barbershop — if there were barbershops — you went to a barber’s, and they actually had lutes sitting there so that someone who’s coming in and waiting to have their hair cut could pick up a lute and start playing. And I thought, “That’s a moment of culture that’s very specific, that’s really doing something to honor music, if you like, by bringing it into daily activities. And then we have periods where music moves away, what you were talking about, when the concert becomes an institution thanks to which you can isolate music from the environment. And then you have also the physical dimension of a theater with a stage, that proscenium arch that keeps the audience on the other side, if you like. So my question is: Can this change? Can we have the kind of phenomenon that we saw in jazz, which went in the other direction, going from an interactive music to a passive audience listening to active performing musicians? And in the classical world, can we come back from the formal concert, with all its rules and regulations, and find and create something more spontaneous? Is it possible?
Emily Hehl: I would say it absolutely is. I think one of the difficulties is that, indeed, as you say, these institutions have these kind of rituals in their architecture. The architecture itself demands a certain way or a certain distance or these kind of things. But I also think that there’s so many aspects of a concert that have this very precious quality, and if we would focus more on this performative aspect, on this human relational aspect instead of, for example, the interpretation of the musical piece itself. Because we have recordings, we have noise-canceling headphones — if it’s about the virtuosity and the perfection, then go and listen to something, because the concert will never be able to reach that kind of quality. Someone will be coughing all the time. You don’t have Dolby Surround. So I think we need to focus on a different aspect, which the qualities of a concert could be. And there is already, especially in contemporary compositions, a lot of things that I think provoke a new way of experiencing concerts. For example, there is a German composer called Georg Friedrich Haas, and he composed a piece of music which is meant to be played in complete darkness. No matter where you play it, it has to be completely dark. It’s an hour-long piece, and this very radically really brings you back to just your inner self because you can’t observe anything. But there was also, like in the ‘60s, ‘70s, ‘80s, Mauricio Kagel who brought theater into music. There’s many musical pieces which are on the edge of theater and music, where the musicians already perform something more than just music. So I think there’s a lot of pieces in the last 50 years, and also in the coming years, that will provoke a different way of experiencing classical music. And I think what we should dare to do is to also look at the repertoire which we love so much and think about ways how to perform this. And for me, one of them — it’s a simple thing — but I was in Zurich in the Tonhalle and there was one of the most wonderful orchestras of Europe playing, and they were playing fantastically. But they were looking as if they were bored, angry. It was just an orchestra of angry people. It was beautiful, but it was horrible to see it, because I felt so distant. So I think if one would even just make people aware of the kind of presence they have — or I think also, if you don’t play for a certain moment, there’s so much like listening to each other, there’s so much potential, although you’re maybe in that second not playing. You can learn a lot from the dramaturgy which we had back in the 17th, 18th century. There is new fields like museum studies. I think that’s a very interesting way as well to bring museum studies back into the concert. There is a new kind of department called concert design starting in the last ten–15 years. And I think there’s a lot of things happening. And yes, indeed, I think that there’s a big potential. And I personally try to start projects in that way — or projects with choruses — or when I get an offer for an opera, sometimes I try to bring it back more to a concert kind of base. So I think we just need to think from different fields onto the concert, because the concert has all of this in it. The concert has all the theatrical elements, all the visual elements, but they are rarely really thought about because we just keep doing it for 150 years.
Music education and commercial culture
Peter Isackson: Yeah, so I would suggest that we need to make a major effort at the level of education of music, I think it’s just been done in a very poor way. And it’s not clear what people in the educational field really want to achieve when they teach music. I think it’s either too technical or it’s too blandly historical. It’s not interactive enough, if you like. But I think there’s a lot of things that can be done. And given the kind of experiments you’re talking about, where we think of the way music is performed differently, education should be feeding into that and reflecting it at the same time. That I think is a major thing. I also think that we have a big challenge in front of us because music has become a commercial industry rather than a cultural reality, and the commercial side has really drowned out everything else to a large extent. I mean, I’m shocked when I see discussions in the media where they say they talk about music, and they’re only talking about popular songs. “We have great music.” “What great music?” “Oh, well, you know, Taylor Swift,” or whoever it is, “came out with a great song.” And we lose track of the reality that music is that lute in the barbershop, as well as the concert hall and Taylor Swift’s latest single. So I think we’ve covered a fair amount of ground there. There’s much more to say, but I don’t want to keep this on for too long. I do want to inform the audience that this is the first in a series. We have other topics planned such as silence in music — we talked a little bit about silence and the concert hall, but silence in music, which is a really fundamental thing as far as I’m concerned, which relates to what I was saying about resonance — culture and art of the future. So we’ve been talking a little bit about how things can evolve into the future, and this is really important because we mustn’t neglect the role that music plays unconsciously for people in their perception of who they are in the world, and even the political relations they have with other people. And then we’ll go on to blind historiography, the power of stories in history. I think you’ll be referring to one of your productions. And I’d like to go on and treat other topics like music, AI and the arts, and ask the question: Is art itself a simulation? I mean, we think it is, but simulation of what? And then another question I’d like to ask: Is anyone listening? And that applies to this podcast as well. (Laughs) So thank you very much. It was great spending this short time with you, but we’ll come back and do a whole series of conversations like this about where we are with the arts and music in particular, as well as opera and theater. So thank you very much, Emily Hehl.
Emily Hehl: Thank you. Was a big pleasure.
[Lee Thompson-Kolar edited this piece.]
The views expressed in this article/video are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.
” post-content-short=” Peter Isackson: Welcome to FO° Talks. I’m Peter Isackson, Fair Observer’s Chief Strategy Officer. Today, I’m joined by the talented opera and theater director Emily Hehl. This will be the first in a series of discussions I’ve chosen to call The Culture of Culture. Emily has been hailed as…” post_summery=”Peter Isackson and opera and theater director Emily Hehl discuss the evolving role of classical concerts, traces their origins and questions their current formats. Live performance, audience connection and the need for innovation are vital in staging and concert design. The conversation explores how tradition, architecture and education shape musical experience — and how change is possible.” post-date=”Apr 20, 2025″ post-title=”FO° Talks: The Culture of Culture, Part 1: The Classical Music Concert” slug-data=”fo-talks-the-culture-of-culture-part-1-the-classical-music-concert”>
FO° Talks: The Culture of Culture, Part 1: The Classical Music Concert
Atul Singh: Welcome to FO° Talks. With me is Jean-Daniel Ruch. He is one of Switzerland’s finest diplomats. He has a sharp mind, he’s a man who spends a lot of time mulling over the state of the world, a wise man, a great sage. And today we’ll talk about International Law in the New Donald Trump 2.0 World. Welcome, Jean-Daniel.
Jean-Daniel Ruch: Thank you very much for having me on the program again.
Atul Singh: Well, it’s always an honor. Jean-Daniel, international law has always been a tricky field. We’ve had Hobbesian conceptions of international law, universalist conceptions of international law, and we now live in a world where Viktor Orbán has just taken Hungary out of the International Criminal Court, the ICC. At the same time, Rodrigo Duterte has been arrested and will now face trial in the ICC. So what is going on these days? Paint us a picture.
Jean-Daniel Ruch: I think we’re at the confluence of various streams. And when various streams are joining, then there are turbulences. This is what happens with water and with rivers, and I think this is exactly where we are. On the one hand, I would say we have the continuation of the world we have dreamed of and mostly Europeans have tried to establish after the fall of the Berlin Wall, which is a world in their image — meaning a world based on a number of international treaties started, of course, with the United Nations Charter, with an executive power which would have been the Security Council, a legislative power which would have been the General Assembly, and the judicial institution. So typically, the three powers of democracies, according to the theory of democracy by Montesquieu from the Age of Enlightenment. Now, since this project was put in place — let’s say, in the ‘90s — and the negotiation of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, which is precisely the judicial arm of the system. Since the end of the ‘90s, a number of things have happened. And actually, what we see with Orbán, with Netanyahu traveling to Hungary, with Donald Trump ignoring totally or despising anything that might restrict the use of American economic, financial, political or military power… What we see is not surprising, because this is the natural result, I would say, of a slow sliding of international law into something that has become more the law of the force rather than the force of the law. In other words, the great powers have tended, on important issues, on key issues like the use of force, to ignore international law increasingly. I would say that there are three defining moments from where this process has been starting. Maybe the first one is the Kosovo wars or the bombings of Serbia by NATO in 1999. This decision to bomb by NATO was taken without the approval of the United Nations Security Council. And by international law, the use of force must be permitted by the Security Council unless you are in a situation of legitimate defense. And it was certainly not the case for NATO in Serbia in those days. The second key moment, which came as a kind of shock — I mean, a terrible shock — for the United States and the world, was the September 11 attacks against the Twin Towers in New York. And at that point, the Americans, of course, they were seeking revenge, they were seeking protection. They launched this War on Terror, which has very few rules, even though the first military operation in the context of the War on Terror was the invasion of Afghanistan. And the invasion of Afghanistan was indeed based on the resolution of the Security Council. So you can say this was a lawful war. But maybe the most important breaking point in the last 30 years has been the war on Iraq. Because the war on Iraq is as unjustifiable as the Russian aggression against Ukraine. There was no direct threat. It was not a case of legitimate defense. There were no weapons of mass destruction, as poor Colin Powell pretended in an ominous meeting of the Security Council. And there was no decision of the Security Council. So in terms of international law, UK said this is an act of aggression. And ever since—
Atul Singh: And we must remind our viewers and listeners that both Germany and France opposed this decision. Neither Jacques Chirac nor Gerhard Schröder went along with it, and Tony Blair’s support of George W. Bush really cost him, in many ways, his legacy.
Jean-Daniel Ruch: Yes, this is absolutely true, absolutely true. I think that this will stay as a dark spot in the legacy of Tony Blair. And quite the opposite, I believe that both Schröder and Chirac — but also Jacques de Villepin, who made this amazing statement in front of the Security Council when Colin Powell was falsely pretending that he had the evidence that Iraq was producing weapons of mass destruction — Villepin, who is back in the public stage in France right now, saved the honor, I would say, of the Western world back in those days.
Atul Singh: And he has support even among socialists because of that, and he may one day be president again. Who knows?
Jean-Daniel Ruch: Well, the line between left and right in France has been pretty blurred since Macron came to power, because Macron comes from the socialists. But then you can say is more of a centrist allied also with forces which you would define as rightist. So I think the political spectrum in France is not so clear-cut as it used to be in the times of Chirac. Whether Villepin has a chance to become the next president, we will see, I’m not sure. I don’t think he — he lacks the apparatus, the political party for that. But certainly his memory is very positive, mostly because of that famous speech in 2003 in front of the Security Council. And here’s a vision, which is a vision precisely based on international law. But the point is here that we have seen a slow sliding of respect for international law by great powers ever since 1999 or 2003. You can talk about the war in Georgia in 2008, you can talk about the war in Libya, you can talk about bombings of the Americans in various places in the world, even under Obama, which lacked, in my view, any sort of legal basis — all the way to the aggression of Russia against Ukraine. So this crumbling of the international law superstructure with international institutions, is not quite surprising because it’s a natural process now, which is, of course, encouraged by the behavior of Donald Trump, who seems to know absolutely no law, no faith, no religion.
Atul Singh: So basically, by your analogy — to take the water metaphor — like water dripping on a stone, it has worn away that bit of the stone, and we now are in a more Hobbesian world.
Jean-Daniel Ruch: Well, definitely in a more Hobbesian world, absolutely.
Resilience of legal institutions and the South Africa–Israel case
Jean-Daniel Ruch: But still, we should not also ignore the forest behind the tree. There are a range of international institutions based on treaties, based on international law, which are continuing to work. I mean, of course, what we see is Gaza, where there is absolutely difference, no respect whatsoever for international humanitarian law, the Geneva Conventions, which regulate the behavior of armies within a war. We see an ignorance of international law, the Charter of the United Nations, in the case of the Russian aggression against Ukraine, just like we’ve seen it when George Bush Jr. attacked Iraq. But still, be it in Geneva, be it in New York, be it in Brussels, don’t forget regional institutions. There are a number of international institutions based on the law which continue to work every day. And then, on the more sensitive issues like peace and war or war crimes, the ICJ and the ICC have proven in 2024 that they can operate, even in this highly politicized environment, and operate in a manner which is honestly very reasonable. Now, we will see. We all know that there are terrible pressures exerted on the members of the judiciary — the judiciaries, I should say, because we are talking about two separate courts in The Hague, both of them are in The Hague — to drop cases, especially the cases against the allies of America, meaning Israel. But so far, they seem to stand their ground — both the personal, but also those who support the courts, who are funding the courts, which are mostly the Europeans and other supporters, like many African countries, South Africa being the most vocal.
Atul Singh: So you mentioned the ICC — the International Criminal Court — and you mentioned the ICJ — the International Court of Justice. Most people don’t know the difference between the two, so please explain. What are these two institutions and how are they similar? How are they different? What is the jurisdiction and what is the status quo right now?
Jean-Daniel Ruch: I think it’s very important to keep in mind that the ICJ — the International Court of Justice — which was created by the United Nations Charter back in 1945, is dealing with states. Its main task is to resolve disputes between states. The International Criminal Court deals with individuals, not states. The International Criminal Court is a court of criminal law. So it is there to punish individuals — and I really have to stress individuals — for their behavior which might be a violation of the Rome Statute. The Rome Statute is sort of the basic law — or the criminal code, if you want — of the International Criminal Court. And the Rome Statute defines what is a war crime, what is a crime against humanity, what is a crime of genocide and what is a crime of aggression. And the International Criminal Court has jurisdiction over the territories and the nationalities and the persons of the nationality of the signatories and the member states of the International Criminal Court, which is by far not the whole world. But if an American or Russian — both have not ratified the ICC, are not members of the ICC — but if a Russian citizen or an American citizen commits a war crime on the territory of a state which is party to the court, then there is jurisdiction over that person. So this is for the ICC, whereas the ICJ reacts to complaints filed by individual states against other states. The most famous case over the recent years has been the case of South Africa against Israel. South Africa pretends that Israel is violating the Convention on Genocide, which was approved after the Second World War as a reaction precisely of the genocide committed against the Jews, the Holocaust. And the court has found that it had indeed jurisdiction to rule over this complaint filed by South Africa. And as a result, in January of 2024, the court issued a ruling which is saying that yes, there is a plausible risk of genocide, and we order Israel to take a number of measures to prevent that crime from happening. Now, there is some correspondence between the two. Because let’s say that the International Court of Justice, in the case of South Africa against Israel, finds that indeed genocide is taking place in Gaza. Then this would have an effect on the International Criminal Court, because it would be almost impossible for the International Criminal Court to ignore that count, that accusation, against the leaders of Israel. And probably they would then have to amend the indictment against the leaders of Israel, and probably they wouldn’t have to amend the indictment against Netanyahu to introduce the charge of genocide. So far, he is only — “only” between brackets — indicted for war crimes and possibly crimes against humanity. Is that clear enough?
Atul Singh: Yes, clear enough. Absolutely clear enough. But states—
Jean-Daniel Ruch: ICJ, states; ICC, individuals. Very important.
Limits of enforcement and the role of universal jurisdiction
Atul Singh: But what is the status quo? Have over the years these institutions suffered? For instance, we know that the ICC is powerful and it tried to bring Kenyan leaders to justice. That case fell apart. We know that the US is not a member of the ICC. We know that Hungary is withdrawing from the ICC. Similarly, we know that Israel and indeed many other countries have regularly ignored the ICJ. So how did they begin? When did they begin? And what is the status quo now?
Jean-Daniel Ruch: Well, I think what we need to say is that one of the weaknesses of the system. If you want, again, to try to think along the lines… we wanted to bring an international system which is a mirror of the domestic system, with the legislative, an executive — the Security Council — and judicial bodies. There is one missing link there, which is a police. You don’t have a United Nations police force. So therefore, these institutions have to rely on the willingness of the member states of the United Nations or of the International Criminal Court to bring those people indicted by the court to justice. In the case of Israel and Palestine, what happened is that in November, the judges of the International Criminal Court issued three arrest warrants based on the indictments: two against senior Israeli leaders, one of them being Prime Minister Netanyahu, the second one the former Defense Minister Yoav Gallant, and also one against the senior Hamas leader Mohammed Deif, the leader of the military branch in Gaza. There were two more indictments requested by the prosecutor against Hamas leaders, but in the meantime they have been killed by Israel — one of them in Gaza and the other one in Tahrir. So these arrest warrants create a legal obligation to all member states of the International Criminal Court, including Hungary. Which means that, in welcoming Netanyahu for a weekend in Budapest, Hungary has violated its obligations according to international law and to the International Criminal Court. But there is no enforcement mechanism, so nobody can really take sanctions. The International Criminal Court can only complain. It can say that Hungary has violated its obligations, but it will have no legal or practical consequences, I’m afraid.
Atul Singh: So that means, without a police force, in a way the court depends upon whoever brings a case to justice and the will of strong states to apprehend culprits or to impose some kind of order.
Jean-Daniel Ruch: Yes. You know, for instance, we had a similar dilemma when I worked for the Yugoslavia War Crimes Tribunal. This was actually the precursor, the pioneering work together with the tribunal on Rwanda, which then led to the creation of the International Criminal Court. The International Criminal Court has a universal jurisdiction, whereas the ICTY — the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, or the one for Rwanda — had a jurisdiction limited to the territories of Rwanda and of the former Yugoslavia, and also limited to the duration of the war. So we had the same problems. When I joined the Yugoslavia War Crimes Tribunal, we had about 20 or more indictees — people indicted for war crimes or crimes against humanity or genocide — who were at large, and we had no police force. So what we did, we put pressure on the states sheltering these war criminals through the European Union, mostly, and the USA. We were lucky, because all of these states aspired to join the European Union. So the European Union put in place what they call political conditionality, meaning, if you want to make progress toward the European Union, then you have to deliver the persons indicted for war crimes to the tribunal. And it worked. At the end of the day, all our indictees ended up behind bars and in front of the court, and most of them were sentenced heavily. Some of them were acquitted — which I wouldn’t consider unfortunate — but this is justice. I was part of the prosecution, so when you’re a prosecutor, of course, you want to see the people you have indicted being sentenced. But at the end of the day, 92 senior officials — political leaders, military leaders, militia leaders — were sentenced by the court, which is a pretty good result in terms of justice, maybe the best. And from all sides — this is also important to underline—
Atul Singh: After all, all prosecutors measure their success through convictions — and you did a bloody good job by that metric.
Jean-Daniel Ruch: Well, of course. Now, if you look at the number of crimes committed between ’91 and 2000 on the territory of the former Yugoslavia, there were many more hundreds of perpetrators we would have liked to bring behind bars. But this was not possible for that court, of course, it was too small. And there you have to rely on the domestic judiciary. But of course, we were lucky, because we had the most significant powers for that part of the world who were really supporting us — especially the European Union. I must say, after the September 11 attack, the Americans lost interest. They continued to pay lip service, but their real interest was in the Middle East. And they moved all their assets — you know, intelligence assets and things like that — to the Middle East, because they were preparing for what was to follow. But the difference here, if you consider the case of Israel–Palestine in front of the ICC, is that the main power in the world is actually protecting the Israelis. It doesn’t mean it has no impact at all. To give you a very precise, concrete example: It seems that the airplane of Mr. Netanyahu, when he left Budapest to go to America — because he went to Washington after Budapest — he made a detour because he was afraid to overfly some countries whom he believed might arrest him should there be an emergency landing. So he had a few hundred kilometers… he had to turn around, for instance, the Netherlands, of course, which is the host of both courts. Another thing is, so it means, basically, that Netanyahu or Gallant cannot travel anymore anywhere in the world. There is a risk. I can give you also a few other examples, because many countries in the world — and most of them member states of the International Criminal Court, including Switzerland — they have in their criminal legislation something called universal jurisdiction. It means that for international crimes — the crimes I have mentioned before: genocide, crimes against humanity, aggression and war crimes — there is jurisdiction even if the crimes were committed elsewhere in the world, and even if no Swiss citizen was involved. So I was confronted — I was ambassador in Israel — with two cases where senior Israeli figures either had to shorten their trip in Switzerland — that was the case of the former Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni — or eventually renounced their trip to Switzerland — that was former Prime Minister Ehud Olmert — because of the risk that they could be prosecuted in Switzerland, for crimes committed in the context of a totally different operation; nothing to do with Gaza today. It was another military operation in Gaza in 2008–09 dubbed the “Cast Lead,” which was also hundreds of civilian victims. And when Tzipi Livni was in Switzerland, an NGO filed a complaint against her, and there was a real risk that she could be brought in front of the federal prosecutor. And the same thing would have happened if Ehud Olmert, the Prime Minister then, would have come to Switzerland. So still, these instruments — international criminal law — it may have some deterrent effect on some of them. And it may pose a risk when they travel. Another example from last year is this Israeli soldier who was stupid enough to boast with videos of him in Gaza looting houses. An NGO found out that he was in Brazil. Brazil, who is a member of the court, who is also the system of universal jurisdiction. And they filed a complaint against him, and the Israeli embassy, I guess, managed to extract him before he was arrested. So basically, each and every Israeli soldier who has been involved in the war in Gaza runs the risk of being arrested depending where he’s traveling. But places like Brazil or Western European countries — maybe not Hungary now — are unsafe for them. And there are NGOs who are reviewing all these videos, all the materials you find on the Internet, to try to identify the names of the soldiers, put them on the list and make sure that they are being arrested, or that a complaint is raised against them should they travel in a country where there is universal jurisdiction.
Israel, antisemitism and the ICC’s global reach
Atul Singh: I see. So some would say that this universalism, in a way, is new imperial and even antisemitic. That’s what you hear a lot, especially in Israel.
Jean-Daniel Ruch: Well, I think this is wrong, because the ICC has been prosecuting people all over the world. I think that their prosecutions are based on the merits of the case. And then you have also a number of levels of checks and balances to make sure that the prosecutor cannot raise an indictment or issue an arrest warrant without any checks and balances. The indictments and the arrest warrants have to be reviewed by a chamber of three judges, and they are the ones, at the end of the day, who take the decision on the basis of the request from the prosecutor. So that’s one thing. The second thing is that, as we see, Israel is certainly by far not the only state which has been — and it’s not about states, it’s about individuals. So not only Israeli citizens have been targeted by the prosecutor for war crimes or crimes against humanity. I would say it is rather the opposite which is true: Israel has been enjoying for far too long total impunity. Because the crimes falling under the jurisdiction of the ICC are not new. In Article 8 of the Rome Statute, where they define all the war crimes, there is one of them which is exactly the settlement enterprise. So from that point of view, I think it’s pretty easy to argue that each and every illegal settlement — and they are all illegal — so each and every settlement in the occupied Palestinian territory is a war crime. And this has been going on since the ‘70s in total impunity. We now see also that crimes are not being punished inside the judiciary, even crimes which are very well documented by the Israeli system. And you have also NGOs in Israel — like Breaking the Silence, B’Tselem — who are extremely professional in documenting war crimes. But it almost never happens that there are proper investigations and prosecutions and convictions of persons involved in war crimes in those wars. Because one thing that has to be underlined that I have not underlined before is that the International Criminal Court functions according to the principle of subsidiarity. It means that the prosecutor has to prove before opening a prosecution that there was no proper prosecution in the domestic system. So if Israel would properly prosecute its soldiers or the persons having committed crimes, for instance, in Gaza, then there would be no need for the ICC to get involved. Now, I think you know this is a defense mechanism that has been built over the years, and I would say more forcefully over the past years, which is that every criticism of Israel becomes immediately antisemitism. Frankly, I think it is bad, because there is antisemitism. There are rising antisemitic acts and talks all over the world, including in Switzerland, including in European countries. And by enlarging that much the scope of the definition of antisemitism actively, you sort of reduce its legitimacy or its credibility, because everything becomes antisemitism. So I think really that this is not good. This way to define each and every criticism of Israel as antisemitism is diluting the power of the truth for the legitimate critique or the legitimate actions in prevention measures where truly antisemitic acts are taking place.
Duterte, Kenya and the ICC’s political dilemmas
Atul Singh: So let’s go back in the past and talk about Kenya, where the ICC initiated a prosecution and then it spectacularly fell apart. Do you think the allegation that arose in Kenya — that this was a new imperial institution which tried African leaders in Europe, which imposed universal standards of justice just as Europeans had once tried to enforce universal religion — has any merit?
Jean-Daniel Ruch: I don’t think so. Well, certainly the prosecution did a very bad job. And the justice, the ICC, did not do a good — actually, it’s a good job when you have people who are acquitted. Well, I mean, it means that justice works both ways also. I think when you have opponents to Putin who appear in front of Russian courts, it does not happen very often that they are being acquitted. So the fact that people are acquitted is also saying that this justice provided by the ICC is fair. Now, the criticism about neo-imperialism I think is really far-fetched because Kenya joined, as a sovereign state, the ICC, recognized the jurisdiction of the ICC. Plus, when the troubles happened — I think it was in 2008 — that you had this post-electoral violence in Kenya. Obviously, the Kenyan system, the Kenyan judiciary, was not in a position to do its work of justice for the crimes committed in the course of these riots and acts of violence. So I think there is another cause, maybe more important, in the criticism towards the ICC: that it was a court designed as a kind of neo-imperialist instrument against African countries. The argument is that in the, maybe, ten–15 first years of its existence, it dealt only with cases in Africa. And it didn’t deal with cases outside of Africa — for instance, the Iraq war. And I think that’s maybe one of the reasons why many in Africa have designated this court as an imperialist instrument. But I think now they cannot use this argument anymore, because you have the Philippines, Duterte, and you have Israel–Palestine.
Atul Singh: So let’s talk about the Philippines leader, Rodrigo Duterte. He had pulled out of the ICC, but now he’s been arrested by the ICC, and he will be tried. What’s happened there?
Jean-Daniel Ruch: Listen, I’m not familiar with all the legal details. But what any state can do — and this is based on the status of the ICC — is to request, even if you are not a member, to recognize the jurisdiction of the court for a specific duration of time. For instance, I know the case of Palestine a bit better. I know that in the case of Palestine, once Palestine obtained the status of an observer state at the United Nations, immediately they approached the ICC, and they asked the ICC to investigate — even retroactively — on crimes committed on the territory of Palestine, meaning the occupied Palestinian territory: Gaza, the West Bank and East Jerusalem, from 2014. And that gives the authority and the jurisdiction to the International Criminal Court to do this sort of investigation. So again, I’m not too familiar with the case in the Philippines, but I can imagine that something like that happened.
Atul Singh: Alright. So basically, some say that Marcos used the ICC to settle a domestic political score. Yes, of course, the state arrested Duterte on an ICC warrant, but many say it was convenient — it was fundamentally a political vendetta. What do you say to that?
Jean-Daniel Ruch: The eruption of politics into criminal law is an old story. There is nothing new to that. I’m pretty confident — because I know some of the judges and the judicial personnel in The Hague — that this is certainly not the political calculations they had in mind when they issued the indictment. It seems pretty clear to me that their base, their logic — and this is sometimes a challenge when you are in the prosecutor’s office in The Hague. You receive all sorts of pressure telling you, “You know, if you indict that one, that will create chaos in the country,” — so many states can try to interfere and push you in one direction or another. And I know that some of these personnel in the ICC have been trained in the Yugoslavia War Crimes Tribunal, where the line has always been: You do your work on the basis of the legal merits and never on the basis of political calculations. And I think that principle is what they have used. If you look at the situation the other way around: Imagine what would have been the reaction if the court had said, “Oh yes, this guy is a criminal. I mean, the indictment is very convincing. We have all elements to indict him and issue an arrest warrant. But because it’s a political calculation and it may be a political vendetta in the Philippines, we’re not going to do it.” I mean, they would not fulfill their mandate.
Atul Singh: So the challenge then is that you’re damned if you do and damned if you don’t. Now we are living in a new world. Donald Trump is now president again. The US is not a member of the ICC. As you said, it developed cold feet after 9/11. He does not seem to have much interest or respect for either the ICC or the ICJ. And of course, Viktor Orbán has withdrawn from the ICC. What exactly is going on? Do you see more pressures on both these institutions and on international law as the far right rises, even in Europe — and, of course, not to mention all the other things happening around the world: increased violence, extrajudicial violence as well — for instance, in Mexico, Brazil and elsewhere?
Jean-Daniel Ruch: Yes, I think you’re absolutely right. Times are getting tough. And when times are getting tough, you have to count on powerful supporters also to counterbalance the attacks you will be subjected to. And the only forces I can see who can counterbalance the wind which is coming from those, let’s say, rightist, nationalist, conservative movements who believe in the law of the force rather than in the force of the law, is to maintain a very strong Europe allied with Latin American, African and some Asian countries to uphold the importance of international law. In the case of the International Criminal Court, those states are mostly the European states, who are also defenders of the court. So we have to count on France, Germany, the UK, Spain, Italy and a few other states — the Nordic states, of course — to be principled and to continue to invest into that court. Which is — frankly, I think in a way, it’s a good thing that they are very much in the media today. Because it raises attention to them, and to the power they have, and to the deterrent. And maybe that can create a deterrent effect for future warlords or future leaders when they enter a war. Frankly, have you ever thought about the financial investment? Do you know what is the budget of the ICC and the military budget, for instance, of the United States? The budget of the ICC per year is exactly 4,400 times lower than the military budget of the United States. So with the military budget of the United States, you could create every year 4,400 tribunals. So you can say that having a court is a cheap investment and potentially, it may have a big impact. So I think it would be wrong for all peace-loving countries who believe in international law, even though we are now going through difficult moments, to give up. Quite the opposite: It is the time when we have to reassert the legitimacy of this court. Now, of course, we don’t know what will happen in Europe. We don’t know who is going to come to power over the next 20 years in the main European countries. But there is something I’m sure of: Deep inside, the drive, the greed, almost, for justice will not disappear. Because this is maybe the thing which is the most common in mankind: the sense of justice. And you see that — when you have kids, you have two children, you give a chocolate to one of them and not to the other one, of course the other one will feel a sense of injustice. It is as basic as that. And this drive for justice in whatever form will continue to animate the human soul and human feelings for as long as there is such a thing as mankind.
Atul Singh: So Jean-Daniel, point taken. But debates about what is justice go back thousands of years. Is it retributive? Is it normative? Is it restorative? What exactly is justice? Come on, Plato was discussing it. People in the East were discussing it. The Old Testament and the New Testament have different ideas of justice. And whilst you’re absolutely right that yes, there is a desire for justice that animates the soul, it’s more difficult to agree upon what exactly is just. And also, it is in human nature to bend and break those laws of justice and to be unjust, too, because human beings are complicated. So it’s a song and dance that seems to be going on at all times.
Jean-Daniel Ruch: Yes, and I understand the complexity of the matter. I think in the United Nations, they have thought a lot about that and they have elaborated a kind of concept of what they call transitional justice, which is based on four pillars. One of them is the punishment — so that’s what you would call retributive justice. Another one is the right to know — so the right to truth is also part of the justice process. And actually, if you look at the truth and reconciliation commissions that happened in various places in the world — thinking more about the successful ones. In my view, less South Africa, and more maybe Colombia or Guatemala. And then the third principle is the right to be sure that this will not happen again — so the non-recurrence or non-occurrence right.
Atul Singh: Preventive, deterrent.
Jean-Daniel Ruch: Yes. States have to take the measures.
Atul Singh: Yeah, you don’t really want to punish somebody who’s a pickpocket — you don’t want him to suffer, but you want to make an example out of him so that others don’t become pickpockets.
Jean-Daniel Ruch: Yes. And then we can go into details on all these four principles. The last one is the right to compensation for the loss and the sufferings you have. But you’re absolutely right: If you take the principle of the truth and reconciliation commission, the idea is to depart from retributive justice and to say, “Well, what is more important is truth and forgiveness. And to have truth and forgiveness, we can make an arrangement with you. We know you have committed awful crimes, but maybe know they were not the most serious.” So you come, you tell your story, you bring truth — which is also a way to bring relief to the victims or the families of the victims — and then either you’ll have a lighter sentence or you will have no sentence at all. That’s the way truth and reconciliation commissions have been working. So I think you have all these elements. There are also some traditional ways — especially in Africa, probably elsewhere also — to deal with justice. For instance, if somebody is caught committing an awful act — not talking about war crimes there — then the whole community is meeting on the main square of the village, or in some cases, it’s still under the tree, I hear. And then the guy is sort of confessing his sins and talking about that. And then the community will sort of forgive him and go back to a situation of harmony. Because these unlawful actions are destroying the harmony of the village, and what is more important for the village than punishment is to restore the harmony of the community. So there are all sorts of very interesting mechanisms, you are absolutely right. But when it comes to very serious crimes — the most serious crimes committed by very senior officials — I think it’s very difficult for any domestic judicial system to do a trial. You know, I think when you talk about Duterte — definitely, if he had been tried by the judiciary of the Philippines, first, there might have been all sorts of pressure, intimidation, blackmail, maybe worse, against the judiciary, so it’s difficult. But then it would have appeared as a political vendetta, and then it would have been much more difficult because of the political implications of such a trial in Manila. So that’s why also there, I think, for such cases, you need — as a kind of last recourse, not as a first-instance jurisdiction, necessarily — but as a last recourse when no other judicial or non-judicial means can be found, then I think the ICC remains a court which makes sense and which remains important. And I really hope that, despite all the tremendous pressure they are subject to, we, the Europeans; we, the Africans; we, the Asians; the Latin Americans — we will stay firm, and we’ll continue to work for a world. Because at the end of the day, what is it about? It is about a world which is ruled by dialogue, by the law — and not by the force. Because I’m very much afraid that these confrontations we see now — now it’s a trade war between China and the United States — but you never know how this can escalate one day. And mankind has much more, I would say, challenging issues than trade wars — I’m thinking, of course, about the climate and the consequences of climate changes, like migrations, like the preservation of resources also, including the soils. These are the key issues for the survival of mankind. And it’s just bad that we’re distracted by other things, like the ego of the most influential man in the world.
Atul Singh: Alright, so let’s talk about states that are not party to ICC. America is not a party to ICC. Russia is not a party to ICC. China is not a party to ICC. India is not a party to ICC. Pakistan is not a party to ICC. Saudi Arabia is not a party to ICC. Iran is not a party to ICC. I doubt Turkey is a party to ICC.
Jean-Daniel Ruch: It’s not.
Atul Singh: Yeah, so the leaders of the Muslim world — where there’s two powers, one where you have Mecca, and one which is a descendant of the Ottoman Sultanate — the former Shia empire, India, Pakistan, China, Russia, US… this is — geographically and population-wise — much of the world. So can the ICC exercise jurisdiction here? Is it even possible?
Jean-Daniel Ruch: Well, legally speaking, they can. Putin has been indicted by the ICC. So, in principle, Putin cannot travel to any of the member states of the ICC. I recognize absolutely that the absence of the most populous and probably soon-to-be the most important countries in the world, and the wealthiest countries in the world, is a serious weakness. But let’s not forget what I told you before: that each and every state which is a member of the ICC — or even not — any of these leaders who commits war crimes or crimes against humanity can be prosecuted by the countries under universal jurisdiction. So there is still, I think, a deterrent effect even against these big powers, just that they don’t really realize it. Because yes, they feel they can do whatever they want in all impunity. Look at the bombings in Yemen over the past weeks. Now first, you really wonder: What is the legal basis in domestic American law to start these bombings? Because I cannot say that the Houthis were representing a direct threat on the national security of America. And even so, I thought that there was something called the War Powers Act, which was obliging the Congress to be involved in the decision to go to war. So we know that there are civilian victims there — probably there are war crimes being committed there by the American bombing, indiscriminate bombing, is an indiscriminate attack against the civilian population. One cannot exclude that one day some court or NGOs will investigate these cases, will find out the names of the commanders who ordered those strikes, and may start judicial processes. This is theoretically and practically absolutely possible, because we have also seen that, for instance, against Olmert or Tzipi Livni. So yes, this deterrent effect is not being felt so much by the powerful people in the world today, but it’s not sure it will not happen in the future. You know, when the Yugoslavia War Crimes Tribunal indicted the then-President of Serbia, Slobodan Milošević, everybody was thinking, “This is ridiculous. This guy will never end up in front of the court. He’s so powerful, everybody is courting him, we need him to maintain stability in the Balkans. Without him, the war will restart.” And what, six years later, he was in The Hague? So you don’t know how the world will evolve. And maybe we one day will realize that it was a very wise investment — and a very cheap one — to continue to support the ICC.
Justice, state fragility and the role of the UN
Atul Singh: Alright, let’s talk about the ICJ. Because the ICJ looks at states. But we are seeing many of the states under pressure. Syria, as a state, is under pressure. We’ve had violence. Sudan split into Sudan and South Sudan. A lot of African states are under enormous pressure and may disintegrate. Myanmar is going through its own version of civil war. Afghanistan, you could argue, is a state of sorts. What happens in a world wherein states become failed states or split apart? I mean, that scenario exists for all large countries, too. After all, Russia, China, India and the US could all break into constituent parts.
Jean-Daniel Ruch: Yes, well, I don’t think you can ask any international institutions, and certainly not a judicial institution, to prevent a failed state from falling apart or falling into a—
Atul Singh: I’m not asking that. I mean, it’d be tricky to censure a state, right? If the state itself is like, “What is Syria?” You know? If you censure Syria, it’s like, “What is Syria right now?”
Jean-Daniel Ruch: I think Syria is not the worst case. I think one of the difficult ones would be Somalia. Would be Sudan—
Atul Singh: Yemen, even Yemen.
Jean-Daniel Ruch: Or Yemen, of course. Yemen also. So definitely there you wonder who is the real… because some of the big powers are supporting the official government, some others are supporting opposition or rebellious groups. This being said, in all these countries, you have sort of official representatives of these states. I mean, those sitting under the UN, for instance, the diplomats of Sudan or Yemen sitting at the UN have an official status and represent officially the states, even though sometimes their government does not control much of the state. And this is true also for a number of African countries.
Atul Singh: Even though sometimes they may not support the government — at least not in private! (Laughs)
Jean-Daniel Ruch: Well, you know, it’s a bit tricky to be the diplomat representing a country which is failed, which is split. Because what happens when there is a change of government? Look, I think you had the case with the Syrian ambassador in Russia this week, who was recalled to Damascus and sought and received political asylum in Moscow. So it is always dangerous as an individual to represent such regimes — especially in the case of Syria, when the regime of Bashar al-Assad was actually a criminal regime. But there, I would say forget the ICJ, the ICC. They were dealing with political issues and military issues and security issues. And in an ideal world — but we are far from living in an ideal world for the reasons mentioned before — but if the dream that those who won the Cold War in the early ‘90s had been implemented, then in all these cases we mentioned — Libya, Syria, Yemen — you would have had a consensus of the Security Council to dispatch military and political force in Yemen, in Sudan, in Libya, to restore order and put back on track a political process between the various parties. Now, since the permanent members of the Security Council have not been able to agree on anything meaningful regarding peace and war — probably since when? Since Libya, I think, over the past almost 15 years? You cannot really rely on the United Nations to play this role. Although, there are some interesting signs and we don’t know where it’s going to lead. But this new sort of temporary-or-not honeymoon between Russia and America can lead to surprising results. After many, many years where really there was no breakthrough in the UN Security Council on conflicts, this year, surprisingly, the United Nations Security Council approved a resolution calling for a ceasefire and for peace in Ukraine. Well, it’s the first time in almost 15 years that Russians and Americans could force a decision of the United Nations Security Council on a situation of conflict. So God knows, maybe those two, maybe with the support of China — we don’t really know where the world is going. As I told you, the water is bubbling in all directions, and we don’t know where it can lead. But sometimes you have a positive result, also surprisingly positive. Maybe the talks between Moscow and Washington will lead to more stability and more predictability in the world, God knows. But I think with China and India, it could be much more promising. But there are sometimes some interesting developments. Let’s dream a little bit: What would happen if the Russians, the Americans and the Chinese in the Security Council would agree on sending a peacekeeping force to Ukraine? A peacekeeping force with a military component, but also a political component, to supervise new elections in Ukraine? Well, I guess the French and the British would have to go along. And nowadays — it was unthinkable until 20 January, 2025, that something like that would happen. Nowadays, frankly, we can be surprised, and sometimes positively.
Atul Singh: On that positive note, Jean-Daniel, thank you for your time. We look forward to having you back.
Jean-Daniel Ruch: Thank you very much, Atul. And you know, I’m always trying to see the positive, and always trying to be optimistic, even in the dire circumstances we live through today.
Atul Singh: All for the best in the best of all possible worlds, in the spirit of Voltaire, Candide. (Laughs)
Jean-Daniel Ruch: Absolutely. I’m a bit like Candide.
Atul Singh: Thank you.
Jean-Daniel Ruch: Thank you very much, Atul.
[Lee Thompson-Kolar edited this piece.]
The views expressed in this article/video are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.
” post-content-short=” Atul Singh: Welcome to FO° Talks. With me is Jean-Daniel Ruch. He is one of Switzerland’s finest diplomats. He has a sharp mind, he’s a man who spends a lot of time mulling over the state of the world, a wise man, a great sage. And today we’ll talk about International Law in the New Donald…” post_summery=”This conversation with Swiss diplomat Jean-Daniel Ruch explores the erosion of international law amid rising geopolitical tensions, with particular focus on the ICC and ICJ under US President Donald Trump. Powerful states increasingly bypass legal norms while institutions like the ICC exert limited deterrence. Justice remains a vital global aspiration.” post-date=”Apr 19, 2025″ post-title=”FO° Talks: International Law in the New Donald Trump 2.0 World” slug-data=”fo-talks-international-law-in-the-new-donald-trump-2-0-world”>
FO° Talks: International Law in the New Donald Trump 2.0 World
[This is the final part of a nine-part series. To read more, see Parts 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8 here.]
Josef Olmert: Hello. This is going to be our ninth and last episode in the current series about Syria. And I need to start with a methodical comment, I should say, because people ask me, knowing that’s going to be the last episode in this series, as to, “Why didn’t you talk enough about that issue or about this issue?” And obviously, Syria is a complicated, diversified and very important country. There’s so much to talk about, so I promise that I will talk more about certain aspects of the Syria situation in another series or in a couple or three more video presentations later on, and I will announce it to my followers on Facebook, on YouTube and all that. So this will happen.
Western media and grounded reality
Now, about what has happened in Syria recently, I have to again and again emphasize the fact that the media in the West — I have to say it. It’s not a campaign I conducted against the media in the West, but I want my watchers, my listeners, my followers to know what really is going on in Syria. There are lots and lots and lots of troubles between Sunnis and Alawis. Mostly the Alawis are now the victims. And the videos that come out from Syria — and they are authentic, they are authentic — are very bad, are very disturbing and should arouse concerns about what really is happening. Also, there are videos that show clearly that despite the image that the leaders of the new regime, particularly Ahmed al-Sharaa or al-Julani, are trying to portray about moderation or a more realistic approach, there are signs of attempts to enforce religious behavior. You see more and more women with the hijab in a lot of the videos, as opposed to before. And there are stories about the enforcement to do so and so on. And of course, the problems between the Turks and the Kurds in the northeast of Syria continue to simmer. So there are lots of issues that put together form a picture of a very fluid, unstable situation in Syria that doesn’t necessarily come to the attention of the world media. And it should, because we need to know what’s going on. Otherwise we shall be again surprised, like we were surprised so many times before, or at least those who were surprised — not everybody was as surprised. So today, in our last episode of this series, I would like to make some very concrete comments about what’s happening and will happen in Syria in the foreseeable future.
Elections and representation
And let’s start with the question: What government is Syria? Is the current guys that are in Damascus — al-Julani or Ahmed al-Sharaa, the people around him — are going to be the government of Syria? Or there might be elections? I would say that we cannot see or foresee — and that’s maybe a prediction — a situation whereby Syria will be conducted by a group of people that were not elected for a period of time that will be more than, say, a few months or so. It’s not that Syria has a tradition of elections. They used to have elections in Syria. There were elections in 1949, 1954 that were relatively democratic. But they don’t have a tradition of elections. So if this group of people, if this coalition of Islamic or Islamist groups, will continue to rule Syria without elections, there will be troubles. There will be also troubles if there will be elections, and the results will be the usual in some Arab dictatorships — of the 99%. There’s not going to be 99% in the real elections in Syria. You know, it used to be under Hafez Assad, under Bashar Assad. And you know, Hafez Assad was elected president for seven years, the term was, and it was like 99.96%. And then seven years later, it was 99.97%. And people asked me at that time, “What’s going on?” I said, “Look, he’s become more popular — from 99.96 to 99.97.” But we know, of course, this was elections. So we’ll see what happens about that. My prediction is there won’t be real elections in Syria that will be democratic on the basis of one person, one vote. And if there will be elections, there will be sham elections. Real elections in Syria should reflect the cleavages of society according to religious, ethnic and other divisions. I’ll say, to some in surprise, “Look, in Iraq, there were relatively free elections after the fall of Saddam. Under the American supervision, but they were more democratic than any time in Iraq before and maybe in most Arab countries at any time.” And what they showed was the role of local forces, of ethnic groups, of religious divisions as part of the overall new political fabric. Civil wars in countries like Iraq or Lebanon or Syria brought about a real breakup of society according to bases of loyalty that were primordial, traditional. And at the time of conflict, people went back to the original basis of their social and therefore political loyalties. And that was reflected, at least in the case of Iraq, in the results of elections. So if there will be real elections in Syria, there should be representation for people representing different regions, even within the Sunni community. And there are differences between Hama, Homs, Aleppo and Damascus. There are many differences. Regionalism is very significant. There will have to be representation for the various communities: the Kurds; the Druze; the Alawis, of course, they should be represented; the Ismailis, which is a Shia sect; the various Christian groups. And there are quite a few: Armenians, Assyrians, alongside the Greek Orthodox and the Greek Catholics of Syria and others. The Turkmen — there are lots of Turkmen people in the north of Syria, more than what people know about, over a million. It’s a large group of people. And the Turks will take care and they will be represented. So that remains to be seen, and that will be a test. So to sum up this point, there are not going to be real democratic elections in the foreseeable future. And if there will be elections, and the results will be the usual 90-whatever, you know it was sham elections. Real elections will show all those divisions that I talked about. They will have to show them if they are really real.
Islamization and social tensions
Islamization will be significant, even if these people claim to be more moderate, which is very logical for them to say and do and very clever politically, because they need to show a nicer face in order to be able to then talk to other governments and ask for economic aid or any of those, or political aid, diplomatic aid, diplomatic support. There will be definitely an Islamization in society that again will create issues with the religious minorities. Arab Sunnis in Syria are 55 to 60%. That means 40 to 45%, definitely around 40, are not Sunni Arabs. And any Sunni Islamization process that will be enforced from above is bound, therefore, to cause troubles. Very obvious it’s going to happen.
Regional relations and internal divides
When we talk about foreign relations of Syria, obviously Iran is out of the game. The question is the level and the depth of Turkish support to the new regime and influence over it. And we talked a lot about the Turkish part of all this. Iraq, neighboring country, Sunni Arab minority. Will they be encouraged by the new regime in Damascus? Possibly. Not necessarily going to happen. My prediction: will not be a major factor. More important is the connection between the Kurds in Syria and Iraq. That could be a much bigger problem for both the Syrians and the Iraqis. The Druze in the south will not like to separate themselves in any formal way from the Syrian state. Never mind what some agitated Israelis have in mind about that. It’s not going to happen. But I can see, and I believe it will be, an informal Israeli zone of influence in parts of south Syria bordering with Jordan as well, inhabited by the Druze of the Jabal, of the mountain, that will make sure, from their perspective, because of their interest, that the border will not become a zone of hostilities between any government in Damascus and Israel. And that will be a difference from what it was when the Assad regime was so much dominated by Hezbollah, the Iranians, that tried to turn the Syrian side of the Golan Heights into a zone of conflict with Israel. And what Israelis are doing in Syria or have done in Syria to destroy any presence of hostile elements in those areas of Syria was intended to make it easier for the local forces that are there to keep stability along the border, which will be their interest. The real problem will be between the regime in Damascus and the Alawis. Killing Alawis in the streets now, of cities in Syria which are not Alawi-dominated, is terrible. It’s one thing, though. Trying to invade the mountains and really take over the entire mountainous region of the Alawis and then enforce a regime upon them would lead to a bloodbath, to a real major bloodshed. It hasn’t yet happened. Hopefully, it will not happen. But then the question is, what will be the representation of the Alawis in the new regime, in the new parliament that will be in any body of influence in the country? It will be very small. And you can’t ignore a certain percent of the population if you adapt to this. Also the 2% of the Ismailis — about 50% that are closer to Shia Islam than to Sunni Islam.
Sectarian dynamics, regional influence and outlook
And, of course, the question of the relation between Syria and Lebanon. In a famous speech in 1976, when Hafez Assad justified the Syrian invasion of Lebanon during the Lebanese civil war at that time, he said in simple words, Syria and Lebanon is one country, is one nation. That’s the typical Greater Syria approach that was adopted by the Ba’ath regime, even though originally, it is the approach of the Syrian Social Nationalist Party of Antoun Saadeh, the SSNP, that was mistakenly in French called the PPS. It’s not the right acronym in Arabic. The Syrian regime now will have to let the Lebanese conduct their affairs by themselves, and they will have to leave Lebanon for itself. Lebanon will have its own problems. We don’t talk about Lebanon now. They elected a new president, he talks a lot about changes, and all this remains to be seen. We always have to take with a grain of salt what Lebanese politicians say, particularly after they are elected. But that remains to be seen. So Syria and Lebanon will not be one country, one nation. And that also depends on the Iranians. If Iran is not allowed to move anymore from Iraq via Syria to Lebanon, the Iranian influence in Lebanon will have to be weakened, and will be weakened. And it will be not totally destroyed. There are Shias that are always supporters of Iran — many of them — but it will be decreased dramatically. And it also depends on Israel, how Israel would tolerate or not any attempts to recreate connection between Syria and Lebanon that would have also adverse repercussions on the border between Lebanon and Syria. Now we come to the last point about this — foreign affairs — and this is the role of the powers. Russia is out of the game. There are talks about, if vacuum created by the absence of Russia, China will move in. Remains to be seen, I doubt it. There’s an opening here for other countries. The question really is, who would fill the vacuum? Mostly, initially, it will be by Turkey. But the Turks cannot do in Syria what everybody said that they intend to do. They don’t have the funds, the financial resources, the economic resources rather, to reconstruct Syria. That will have to come from the Gulf countries, which as of now keep their hands off. They’re very careful and will remain careful for time to come. And, of course, the role played by the US. What will the Trump administration do? Surely, they have to make sure that the Kurds’ virtual autonomy in the northeast will be maintained, but to try and do it in a way that will prevent Turkish–Kurdish war. That remains to be seen. I doubt whether the Trump administration will invest too much money in Syria or at all. So we are going back to the EU. Somebody will have to put some money because Syria is a ruined, destroyed country after all those years of civil war. And if you don’t rehabilitate, reconstruct, rebuild Syria, there will not be stability there. Doesn’t matter who rules the country. As of now, we hear statements from the Europeans about the desire to accommodate themselves to the new regime. And al-Julani shows how moderate he is, and visits by the German and French foreign ministers and all this. But in the meantime, no money is coming, and money will be the key here. I will leave you with that, because we can go on and on like this. But the picture coming or emerging — isn’t that the main point? Syria is in a very bad situation. Rehabilitating, rebuilding a country after such an atrocious civil war is not a simple matter. And even if you can establish some political institutions that will be considered representative, to rebuild the relationship between the various communities is another story altogether. The same problem in Iraq. We have the same problem in Lebanon. We have the same problem in Libya. We shall have troubles in Syria. We shall have troubles by Syria. We shall have troubles connected with Syria. And therefore, there will be more talks from me, more presentations, but not immediately. I will let you know when we shall do more. So I will leave you with that. Sometimes people like an end to a story like this to be a happy end. The history of Syria over 100 years is not a happy history. I have no reason to believe that we are witnessing now a dramatic departure from traditional Syrian history, unfortunately. Thank you, my friends.
[Lee Thompson-Kolar edited this piece.]
The views expressed in this article/video are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.
” post-content-short=” Josef Olmert: Hello. This is going to be our ninth and last episode in the current series about Syria. And I need to start with a methodical comment, I should say, because people ask me,…” post_summery=”Professor Josef Olmert analyzes Syria’s unstable political future, emphasizing the unlikelihood of democratic elections and the deep societal divisions along ethnic and religious lines. He highlights foreign influence, especially from Turkey and Iran, and the region’s reconstruction challenges. Despite hopeful narratives, Syria’s complex history suggests ongoing turmoil and limited prospects for lasting peace.” post-date=”Apr 18, 2025″ post-title=”FO° Talks: Josef Olmert on Syria, Part 9: Predicting Syria’s Future” slug-data=”fo-talks-josef-olmert-on-syria-part-9-predicting-syrias-future”>
FO° Talks: Josef Olmert on Syria, Part 9: Predicting Syria’s Future
[This is the eighth part of a nine-part series. To read more, see Parts 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 here.]
Josef Olmert: Hello, I’m doing today the penultimate one, which will be a summation of the main points which I made until now. And then the next one will be like some, if you will, assessments/predictions about the foreseeable future of Syria as a result of all that we have discussed until now and the recent developments there. When we talk about recent developments, I would just mention that there still are clear signs that despite the impression created in the Western world, mainly because of the Western media — which, as usual, particularly, the American media — doesn’t really cover what really is happening on the ground. The impression is that Ahmed Sharaa, or Abu Muhammad al-Julani, the leader of the main group that took over now in Damascus, Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham, that he is in full control of Syria and is the new ruler. And it is not the case. I repeat, this is not the case. I’ll give you an example. His people sent a convoy, a kind of military-civilian convoy, to the Druze areas of South Lebanon in order to assert their authority there. And they were basically sent back after the Druze threatened to resist violently because, from the Druze perspective, any future of South Lebanon — something that we already discussed in this series, and I will come back to this later on today — has to be negotiated between them and the government in Damascus. Which is to indicate to you that the Druze will insist from now on — and I will explain more about that — some kind of autonomous self-rule regime in South Syria, more or less like the SDF or the Kurdish people are demanding and still experiencing and exercising in the northeast of Syria.
Historical context and persistent instability
So that’s just an indication of how fragile, still precarious, all these so-called central regime in Damascus. And another point about that is that when we look at the media in the West and the way they cover the situation in the Middle East, there’s always this tendency to apply impressions that we have about our own systems in the West to the other side of the world — in that case, the Middle East. And because we see al-Sharaa now in a suit and tie sitting in his nice chair in one of the buildings that they took over in Damascus — so there is a new government, there is a new regime and there is stability. No, there isn’t, and it doesn’t work like that. And it doesn’t work like that because of what we have seen in this series. So let’s sum up, therefore, the main points of what has really happened in Syria, which was leading to the current situation, to the downfall of the Assad regime. I will start with the most fundamental basic point, and this is that Syria, as of 1920, for over a century, has not been able — I will repeat, has not been able — to establish a legitimate, stable political entity which is supported by the vast majority of its people. Whether they like every aspect of government in Damascus or not, but because they share some common values — a fundamental kind of values basis for agreement between various groups, various ethnic groups, various religious groups. And because they share all these values, they accept whatever is the regime in Damascus as a legitimate and stable one. It has never happened in Syria. And the greatest failure, of course, of independent Syria since 1946 — until 1946, you could always argue it’s the fault of the mandatory system, the French. And yes, the French did apply divide and rule in Syria, promoting the Alawis, for example, to an extended role; the Christians, not really touching upon the Kurds in the northeast — all in order to weaken the Sunni Arab majority. And then they created Lebanon, separated from Syria, carving it up from Syria. Yes, but the French basically were playing up, not creating, divisions that existed before for centuries. This was the history of all this region. So the failure of the Syrian state at the end of 1946 was exactly that: the inability to overcome all these problems and to create a stable state. Syria is therefore the modern country of the failing Middle East state.
The Ba’ath regime’s contradictions
In the case of Syria, it was even more dramatic than in other cases, for example, because for three and a half years, between February of 1958 — as we mentioned — and September of 1961, they even agreed to cancel their own separate independence and to unite with Egypt, the much bigger and stronger Egypt of Nasser, into the United Arab Republic, as it was called, which was basically Egypt plus greater Egypt, because they did not find a way to maintain Syria as an independent state. So much so, the failure was so big. The Ba’ath regime gave you the aura, the soul, the sense of stability. Because you can argue they existed from 1963 until 2024 — that is to say, over 60 years. But even that was not the case for various reasons, because the ironic situation is — and this is something that has to be dealt with more extensively in a separate maybe series, but definitely not in this one, but I will mention it and just say something about it — the basic historic irony of the Ba’ath Party is that the party claiming to be the biggest, greatest, most comprehensive embodiment of Arab nationalism, of Pan-Arabism, became — and we talk about Ba’ath in Syria, not about the Ba’ath in Iraq — in the case of Syria, they became the party of the minorities, which through its so-called secular character of the party tried to create a political community which will surpass the ethnic and religious differences and give the minorities the sense of sharing in the running of the state, of equality. But this was resented by the Sunni majority from day one.
Assadism and the end of Syrian statehood
The Sunni opposition to the Ba’ath regime was already in place in 1964–65, and in the same places where it would be later on, on occasions — central Syria, Hama, Homs and other parts of Syria — with the Sunni alliances, so to speak. And the Ba’ath regime already in 1964–65 was bombarding mosques, attacking the Sunni population, even more so after the rise of the so-called Neo-Ba’aths in the coup d’état of the 23rd of February, 1966. And definitely after Assad came to power finally as the one and only dictator as of November of 1970, in what they called Harakat al-Tashih, the Movement of Corrections — that is to say, correcting the early Ba’ath regime. The Ba’ath regime of Assad was basically a three-pillar kind of regime. It was Ba’athism as the framework of political legitimacy. It was Alawism as the main force which really upheld the regime and kept it going. And it was Assadism, because of the personality cult of Hafez Assad and his family. And his family, by the way, is just one part of one of the four big confederate tribal connections of the Alawi community — which is, again, something that should be much more detailed and developed in a series like this. But we couldn’t do all this in this particular series. I still keep the option open for more on Syria in the foreseeable future, and there will be — in which I will dwell more specifically into any of the main communities in Syria, their history, their religion and so on and so forth. So the failure of the Ba’ath regime of Hafez Assad to create this real unity — other than using brutal force — and then of his son, Bashar, is the failure of the Syrian political entity as such. Syria failed to become a legitimate, united, stable political entity. It failed. And now with the rise of the Muslim, Islamist rulers — the Islamic, the Sunnis, whatever we would call them, Jihadists — pick out your name. This might be another attempt to create a community. Pan-Arabism failed, Ba’athism afterwards failed — by pan-Arabism, I mean the unity with Egypt and Ba’athism in Syria. And before, the various attempts at parliamentary democracy, with all the coup d’états and so on and so forth. So what we see really is not just the collapse of the regime. It is another dramatic indication of the collapse of the idea of statehood in a country like Syria. And the name of the new rulers, Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham — Bilad al-Sham is more than Syria and its current borders. It is another, not-so-implicit indication of the problematic of the Syrian existence. What? Where? How? What’s Syria? What borders? Is it Bilad al-Sham, which is Syria, Lebanon, Israel, Palestinian territories, Jordan? Wow. Is it only Syria? And the problem about identity throughout Syrian history has not been just one that was exemplified by the changes in the Ba’aths’ own ideology — from pan-Arabism, unity with Egypt, to particular Syrianism. Look also at the Syrian National Syrian Party of Antoun Saadeh, the famous SSNP, the party that talked about Greater Syria, the party that was supposed to be the enemy of Ba’aths ideologically, because they were pan-Syrians as opposed to pan-Arabists. And later on, they started to cooperate with each other. But they also — the Palestinians — talked about Syria beyond its borders today. That is to say, the problem of Syrian stability and legitimacy, as was exemplified by the downfall of another attempt at creating one state which seemed to be working because it lasted for so many years, the failure of all that is maybe indicating something much more fundamental: the artificiality of the entire political system that was created in the Middle East after the First World War. The creation of states that did not really reflect stable, long-standing historic geopolitical contexts, entities, legacies. Syria is the example of that, and that’s what happened in Syria. So before we talk about the chances of the new regime in Syria — the ability of the new regime to survive — all this has to be seen in historic perspective. And the perspective is that, until now, any attempt in creating stability in Syria failed. So it is too early, far too early, to already give praise to a new regime like, “This is the new Syria.” Maybe the new Syria in terms of who is sitting in the palaces of power in Damascus. But it will not be a new Syria in terms of the final creation of a stable, legitimate, everlasting political entity. So that remains to be seen. And this is basically the main something, the main item, the main topic that I wanted to emphasize in this series. Next time, we shall talk about some future predictions in terms of the specifics of Syria’s relations with other countries and also the domestic situation in Syria. That remains to be seen. Again, it will be a very careful attempt to make some predictions. It is still a fluid, not-so-stable situation. Thank you very much for your attention.
[Lee Thompson-Kolar edited this piece.]
The views expressed in this article/video are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.
” post-content-short=” Josef Olmert: Hello, I’m doing today the penultimate one, which will be a summation of the main points which I made until now. And then the next one will be like some, if you will,…” post_summery=”Syria has repeatedly failed to establish a stable, legitimate political entity since 1920. Despite Western media portrayals, current control by Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham is fragile and contested, notably by the Druze. This instability reflects deeper historical, ethnic and ideological fractures.” post-date=”Apr 13, 2025″ post-title=”FO° Talks: Josef Olmert on Syria, Part 8: Unstable Political Structures” slug-data=”fo-talks-josef-olmert-on-syria-part-8-unstable-political-structures”>
